RECITATION 6 RELATIONSHIP ET EEN REGIME TYPE AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES A RELATED QUESTION: THE SIZE OF THE STATE AND THE RECITATION 6 GOVERNMENT

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Transcription:

RECITATION 6 1

THE VARIABLES WE ARE INTERESTED IN Regime type Democracy / dictatorship: how are they defned? How would you defne them? Is the designation of the leader through elections enough to say we are in a democracy? How they are actually defned: using indexes, such as Polity Index or Freedom House index take into account: existence of elections, but also degree of actual electoral competition, openness of leader's recruitment, existence of an opposition, degree of political participation, civil liberties, etc. Democray index 2011 (The Economist): "Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are unlikely to be sufcient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent and at least minimally efcient government, sufcient political participation and a supportive democratic political culture." 2

THE VARIABLES WE ARE INTERESTED IN Economic outcomes: which outcomes do we take into account? Growth Variance of growth (C riskiness) Poverty / inequalities? - we have seen this in the model, but not in empirical papers 3

THE Image removed due to copyright restrictions. Please see: Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, et al. "Income and Democracy." American Economic Review, 98 no. 3 (2008): 808-42. Figure 1 4

1ST DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY: ECONOMIC What are the main fndings? What are the underlying mechanisms? Which identifcation strategies used? 1st outcome: Level of growth AJR, settlers: democracy, including protection of property rights growth 2nd outcome: Variance of growth: higher variance of growth rates under autocracy than under democracy why? good and bad leaders matter more in autocracies; good dictator j autocratic system can impose the politically difcult policies (cf. China today). Jones and Olken deaths in leaders while in ofce but then: why are some leaders better than others? It depends on expected tenure time (Olson 1993): if longer, invest in public goods that increase productivity and yields in 2nd period; if shorter, tax everything in 1st period. How can we identify this impact? (Popa 2012) democracy is better than autocracy to reduce variance from shocks outside the political system (Easterly 2011) 5

2ND DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY: ECONOMIC SITUATION REGIME CHANGE I TYPE What are the main fndings? What are the underlying mechanisms? Which identifcation strategies used? Possible mechanisms: suppose initial autocracy; remember model seen in class; democracy can happen in 2 cases after revolution: we didn't call it democracy, but that's the idea happens if µ (amount due to do a revolution) becomes smaller and autocrat can't commit to redistribution in the second period µ can get smaller due to specifc circumstances (cf. recent Arab revolutions) or because income has grown controlled democratization: if µ gets smaller, autocrat wants to be able to commit to do some redistribution controlled democratization is a way to commit in both cases : income growth reduction of relative µ revolution or controlled democratization 6

2ND DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY: ECONOMIC SITUATION REGIME CHANGE I TYPE Another mechanism for income growth revolution democratization: Tocqueville, The Old regime and the Revolution French revolution did not happen in the most backward state; on the contrary, equalization of conditions had started economic situation improves privileges of the nobles perceived as less acceptable and less obvious because were contradicting underlying movement freedom in short: taste of some equality created desire for more cf. Tunisia today? Empirical Evidence: AJRYared, Income and democracy: use changes in income and changes in democracy no statistically signifcant relationship 7

MILTON FRIEDMAN'S ARGUMENT: FROM THE TYPE OF REGIME TO ITS SIZE Great book: Capitalism and freedom Same question: relationship between economic and political freedom? economic freedom = free market = absence of barriers put by the government on economic choices: choice of health care or retirement plan; license necessary to get certain jobs; quotas to international trade; minimum price political freedom = being free to go wherever one wants, characteristic of democracies Theory: economic freedom is itself a component of freedom (cf. indexes for democracy) economic freedom political freedom mechanism: economic freedom dispersion of power, separation between economic and political power political freedom 8

MILTON FRIEDMAN'S ARGUMENT: FROM THE TYPE OF REGIME TO ITS SIZE For Friedman, political freedom depends on both regime type and size of the government too big government decreases economic freedom and political freedom BUT: necessary function of the government: protection of nation against war and of economic freedom tension 9

HOW DO WE GET SUFFICIENTLY BIG IN THE FIRST PLACE? Beyond regime type, there is the question of state and government size If regime matters, it is because state and government are sufciently big How do they become big? 10

HOW DO WE GET SUFFICIENTLY BIG IN THE FIRST PLACE? How does state become big? how can state collect taxes? Fundamental positive role of war war favored state formation in Europe: it required the creation of centralized and efcient structures to collect taxes; these structures didn't disappear when war ended Things can be a little more complex: What about Africa? Interstate vs. intrastate war prerequisites for institutional development aided by war (cf. failed development of states in Latin America) state must be forced to turn inward in order to meet the fnancial challenges of war Adequate administrative mechanisms must be in place to manage the explosion in revenues and expenditures The central state must have already established sovereignty over its territory and must be supported by enough local actors (which see war as the best means with which to defend and reproduce their privileges) as to make domestic extraction proftable 11

MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 14.75 Political Economy and Economic Development Fall 2012 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.