Syllabus BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS:POLITICS AND BEHAVIOR - 56248 Last update 02-08-2016 HU Credits: 4 Degree/Cycle: 1st degree (Bachelor) Responsible Department: political science Academic year: 0 Semester: 2nd Semester Teaching Languages: Hebrew Campus: Mt. Scopus Course/Module Coordinator: Moshe Maor Coordinator Email: moshe.maor@mail.huji.ac.il Coordinator Office Hours: Tue 07:30-08:30; Thu. 10:00-10:30, 12:00-12:30 Teaching Staff: page 1 / 7
Prof Moshe Maor Course/Module description: This course introduces four theoretical approaches to the study of bureaucratic organizations and presents the students with a series of lectures by senior members of governmental echelons so that they may compare the theoretical material they have learned with the reality these senior officials face and how they shape this reality. Course/Module aims: This course focuses on government ministries and regulatory agencies which operate on the national level in OECD countries, and particularly in Israel and the United States. The aim of the course is to give the students an in-depth knowledge of the various theoretical approaches to the study of bureaucratic organizations, and to acquaint them with the forefront of academic research dealing with bureaucratic politics. The topics covered by the course will include classical theories of organizations (the Weberian approach), the behavioral approach, the contractual approach and the cultural approach. In the framework of the cultural approach, emphasis will be placed on the various applications of the reputational approach. Following the study of the theoretical approaches, guest lectures will be presented by senior members of the governmental echelons in Israel, so that students may compare the theoretical material with daily practice in administering the governmental sector. Learning outcomes - On successful completion of this module, students should be able to: -To describe the four main theoretical approaches to the study of bureaucratic organizations. -To criticize each of the approaches from the viewpoints of the other approaches. -To assess the extent to which each of the approaches succeeds in explaining the existing realities in bureaucratic organizations. -To recommend changes in the behavior of bureaucratic organizations considering the unique challenges of the frameworks within which they operate. -To construct a critical literature review in the framework of a Masters degree in this area of study. Attendance requirements(%): Compulsory Attendance, except in cases of Army service or birth. Teaching arrangement and method of instruction: Lectures addressing theoretical page 2 / 7
issues, and guest lecturers by senior government officials (from the level of district administration to director-general of government ministries). Course/Module Content: Introduction The Weberian Approach The Contractual Approach The Behavioral Approach The Cultural Approach Required Reading: PART A: INTRODUCTION 1. Course Desciption and Summary of Theoretical Perspectives - תיאור הקורס ודרישותיו - סיכום הגישות התיאורטיות שיילמדו בקורס - הגישה הוובריינית - הגישה ההתנהגותית - הגישה החוזית - הגישה התרבותית וגישת המוניטין PART B: THE WEBERIAN APPROACH 2. Traditional Organizational Theory דרי, ד. וא. נאור. 1997. יסודות המנהל הציבורי, יחידות 3-4, תל אביב: האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, עמ' 23-31. דרי, ד. וא. נאור. 1997. יסודות המנהל הציבורי, יחידות 1-2, תל אביב: האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, עמ' 127-197. או, Weber, M. 1958. Bureaucracy, in: From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology, eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press), 196-266. Stinchcombe, A. 1959. Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production, Administrative Science Quarterly 4: 168-187. March, J.Q. and Simon H.A. 1993. Organizations, Second Edition (New York: Blackwell), chapters 1 and 2. Simon, H.A. 1951. Administrative Behavior, Fourth Edition (New York: The Free Press), Chapter 1 and 2. page 3 / 7
PART C: THE TRANSACTION COST APPROACH 3. Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H. Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H. 1950. Production, Information Cost, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review 58: 777-795. 4. Williamson, O. Williamson, O. 1975. The Economics of Organization: The Transactions Cost Approach, American Journal of Sociology 87: 548-77. 5. Miller, G. Miller, G. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 15-74. 6. Principal-Agent Models Moe, T.M. 1984. The New Economics of Organization, American Journal of Political Science 28(4): 739-777. Horn, M.J. 1995. The Political Economy of Public Administration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-39. Non Compulsory Reading: Waterman, W. Richard and Kenneth J. Meier. 1998. Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8: 173-202. Wood, B.D. 2010. Agency Theory and the Bureaucracy, In Robert F. Durant (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 181-206. PART D: THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACHE 7. The Garbage Can Model March, J.G. M.D. Cohen and J.P. Olsen 1972. A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly 17(1): 1-25. Non-Compulsory Reading: page 4 / 7
Kingdon, J.A. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, NY: Longman. 8. Muddling Through Lindblom, C. 1959. The Science of Muddling Through, Public Administration Review 19: 79-88. Bendor, J. 1995. A Model of Muddling Through, American Political Science Review, 89(4): 819-840. 9. Information Processing Carpenter, D. 1996. Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, The American Political Science Review 90(2): 283-302. PART E: CULTURAL AND REPUTATIONAL APPROACHES 10. Crozier Crozier, M. 1964. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Introduction and Chapters 6, 7. 11. Kaufman Kaufman, H. 1967. The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future), Chapters I, VI, VII. 12. Powell & DiMaggio Powell, W.W. and P.J. DiMaggio 1991. (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapters 1-5. 13-14 Carpenter Carpenter, D. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Networks, Reputations and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1962-1928. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Introduction, Chapter One, Conclusion. Carpenter, D. 2010. Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. Introduction and Chapter 1. Carpenter, D. 2004. Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator, American Political Science Review, 98(4): 613-631. page 5 / 7
15-17 Maor Maor, M. 2010. Organizational Reputation and Jurisdictional Claims: The Case of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Governance, 23(1): 133-159. Maor, M. 2011. Organizational Reputations and the Observability of Public Warnings in 10 Pharmaceutical Markets, Governance, 24(3): 557-582. Maor, M. 2015. Theorizing Bureaucratic Reputations, In: Arild Waeraas and Moshe Maor (eds.) Organizational Reputation in the Public Sector. London: Routledge, pp. 17-36. Non-Compulsory Reading: Maor, M., S. Gilad, and P. Ben-Non Bloom. (2013) Organizational Reputation, Regulatory Talk and Strategic Silence, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 23(3): 581-608. Gilad, S., M. Maor and P. Ben-Non Bloom (2015) Organizational Reputation, the Content of Public Allegations and Regulatory Communication, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25(2): 451-478. Maor, M., and R. Sulitzeanu-Kenan. (2013) The Effect of Salient Reputational Threats on the Pace of FDA Enforcement, Governance 26(1): 31-62. Maor, M. and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2016). Responsive Change: Agency Output Response to Reputational Threats. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26 (1): 31-44. 18. Brehm & Gates Brehm, J. and S. Gates. 1999. Working, Shirking and Sabotage. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, chs. 1 & Conclusions. Brehm, J. and Gates, S. 2008. Teaching, Tasks and Trust. N.Y.: Rusesell Sage Foundation, chs. 1 & 8. Additional Reading Material: page 6 / 7
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) Course/Module evaluation: End of year written/oral examination 0 % Presentation 0 % Participation in Tutorials 0 % Project work 10 % Assignments 0 % Reports 0 % Research project 0 % Quizzes 0 % Other 90 % Home Exam Additional information: Course Requirements: Mid-term paper (10%) - 5 pages Home Exam (90%) During the course, the lecturer may decide on changes in the course plan, on the basis of academic considerations, and including changes in the course assignments and syllabus. If the students do not fulfill the regular course requirements (by not reading the required material, non-participation in lessons, lateness in handing in assignments and the like), additional assignments will be required such as reading reports and a midterm exam. page 7 / 7