Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic. Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies

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Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic Appendix A: Data Description Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies Online Appendix Virginia Oliveros 1 and Christian Schuster 2 Table A.1: Survey Representativeness, Gender and Age 3 Table A.2: Public Employee Characteristics 4 Table A.3: Institutions in the Sample 5 Appendix B: Regression Results Table B.1: Regression Estimates for Figure 2 (Corruption) 6 Table B.2: Regression Estimates for Figure 3 (Political Services) 7 Table B.3: Regression Estimates for Figure 4 (Work Motivation) 8 Appendix C: Robustness Checks Figure 1: Ideological Proximity to incumbent President Medina 9 Figure 2.a: Political Services, by Ideological Alignment of Respondent 10 Figure 2.b: Corruption, by Ideological Alignment of Respondent 10 Figure 2.c: Work Motivation, by Ideological Alignment of Respondent 11 Figure 3: Perception of Job Stability Associated with Administrative Career 12 Figure 3.a: Political Services, by Perception of Job Stability of Career Servants 13 Figure 3.b: Corruption, by Perception of Job Stability of Career Servants 13 Figure 3.c: Work Motivation, by Perception of Job Stability of Career Servants 14 Figure 4.a: Political Services, Respondents Recruited by Gov. vs. Opposition Party 14 Figure 4.b: Corruption, Respondents Recruited by Gov. vs. Opposition Party 15 Figure 4.c: Work Motivation, Respondents Recruited by Gov. vs. Opposition Party 15 Figure 5.a: Political Services, by Gender 16 Figure 5.b: Corruption, by Gender 16 Figure 5.c: Work Motivation, by Gender 17 1 Political Science Department, Tulane University. Contact: volivero@tulane.edu 2 School of Public Policy, University College London. Contact: c.schuster@ucl.ac.uk (corresponding author) 1

Figure 6.a: Corruption, by Rank in Hierarchy 17 Figure 6.b: Political Services, by Rank in Hierarchy 18 Figure 6.c: Work Motivation, by Rank in Hierarchy 18 Figure 7.a: Political Services, by Seniority 19 Figure 7.b: Work Motivation, by Seniority 19 Figure 7.c: Corruption, by Seniority 20 Figure 8.a: Corruption, by Seniority (only PLD recruits) 20 Figure 8.b: Political Services, by Seniority (only PLD recruits) 21 Figure 8.c: Work Motivation, by Seniority (only PLD recruits) 21 Figure 9.a: Political Services, by Education 22 Figure 9.b: Corruption, by Education 22 Figure 9.c: Work Motivation, by Education 23 Figure 10.a Corruption, by Age 23 Figure 10.b Political Services, by Age 24 Figure 10.c Work Motivation, by Age 24 Figure 11.a. Corruption, by year of entry into administrative career 25 Figure 11.b. Political Services, by year of entry into administrative career 25 Figure 11.c Work Motivation, by year of entry into administrative career 26 Figure 12.a Corruption, by Institution of Respondent 26 Figure 12.b Political Services, by Institution of Respondent 27 Figure 12.c Work Motivation, by Institution of Respondent 27 2

Appendix A: Data Description Table A.1: Survey Representativeness, Gender and Age Survey Respondents All public Email Survey At least one All respondents employees Frame conjoint Sex Female 163585 64% 1572 65% 487 67% 360 65% Male 93276 36% 837 35% 234 32% 195 35% Missing 5 3 Age Less than 20 247 0% 0 0% 2 0% 1 0% 20-29 21135 8% 180 7% 40 6% 33 6% 30-39 60167 23% 698 29% 188 26% 146 26% 40-49 71150 28% 809 34% 237 33% 186 33% 50-59 65416 25% 582 24% 192 26% 142 25% 60 and more 38746 15% 137 6% 59 8% 47 8% Missing 3 8 3 TOTAL 256861 2409 726 558 Source for All Employees : Ministry of Public Administration (MAP), Dominican Republic (2015) 3

Table A.2: Public Employee Characteristics Survey Respondents N % TOTAL 558 All public employees % Education High School or less 15 3% 58% College Degree 339 61% 29% Postgraduate Studies 199 36% 13% Missing 5 1% Rank in Hierarchy General Services 2 0% 8% Administrative Support 85 15% 9% Technicians 45 8% 9% Professionals 287 51% 37% Direction and Supervision 66 12% 4% Missing 73 13% 33% Year of Appointment Before 1996 62 11% 1996-2000 48 9% 2000-2004 126 23% 2004-2012 299 54% Since 2012 23 4% Average # of years in public sector 12.8 years 9.9 years Joined Administrative Before 1996 1 0% Career 1996-2000 41 7% 2000-2004 117 21% 2004-2012 348 62% Since 2012 51 9% Sources for All employees : MAP. (2015). Portal de Estadisticas e Indicadores (http://map.gob.do:8282/estadisticas/) LAPOP. (2014). Dominican Republic Latin American Public Opinion Project Dataset (http://datasets.americasbarometer.org/datasets/523612957lapoprep14- v15.2.2.0-spa-140201_w.pdf) Banco Central de la República Dominicana. (2014). Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo (http://www.ilo.org/surveydata/index.php/catalog/1071/download/7220) 4

Table A.3: Institutions in the Sample General Audit Office 274 49% Ministry of Public Administration 76 14% National Office of Statistics 32 6% Ministry of Culture 31 6% Ministry of the Environment 28 5% Ministry of Finance 21 4% Ministry of Economy 16 3% General Directorate for Pensions 15 3% Social Welfare Office 14 3% Ministry of Industry and Commerce 9 2% Office of Politics and Legislation 8 1% Ministry of Women 7 1% Other 27 5% TOTAL 558 Note: Although our sample over-represents the General Audit Office, our findings about merit and tenure are not sensitive to the exclusion of this institution. 5

Appendix B: Regression Results Table B.1: Regression Estimates for Figure 2 (Corruption) Attributes Coefficients SE Year of Appointment 2005 (Fernandez Presidency) 0.078*** 0.018 2013 (Medina Presidency) 0.119*** 0.018 Recruitment Examination 0.104*** 0.017 Administrative Career Incorporated 0.158*** 0.019 In process of incorporation 0.050* 0.024 Education College Degree 0.154*** 0.024 Position Technical-Professional 0.059** 0.019 Sex Female 0.078*** 0.015 Observations 4844 Respondents 547 Note: Table reports coefficients (column 3) and standard errors (column 4) clustered by respondent from regression models from Figure 2. 6

Table B.2: Regression Estimates for Figure 3 (Political Services) Attributes Coefficients SE Year of Appointment 2005 (Fernandez Presidency) 0.064*** 0.019 2013 (Medina Presidency) 0.129*** 0.019 Recruitment Examination -0.117*** 0.016 Administrative Career Incorporated -0.081*** 0.020 In process of Incorporation -0.035 0.024 Education College Degree -0.053* 0.025 Position Technical-Professional -0.032 0.020 Sex Female -0.040** 0.014 Observations 4874 Respondents 549 Note: Table reports coefficients (column 3) and standard errors (column 4) clustered by respondent from regression models from Figure 3. 7

Table B.3: Regression Estimates for Figure 4 (Work Motivation) Attributes Coefficients SE Year of Appointment 2005 (Fernandez Presidency) 0.078*** 0.018 2013 (Medina Presidency) 0.102*** 0.019 Recruitment Public examination 0.075 0.016 Administrative Career Incorporated 0.059** 0.020 In process of incorporation 0.073** 0.024 Education College Degree 0.057* 0.024 Position Technical- Professional 0.051* 0.020 Sex Female 0.012 0.015 Observations 4896 Respondents 552 Note: Table reports coefficients (column 3) and standard errors (column 4) clustered by respondent from regression models from Figure 4. 8

Appendix C: Robustness Checks Figure 1: Ideological Proximity to incumbent President Medina On the following, scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is left and 10 is right I. Where would you place yourself ideologically? II. Where would you place President Medina ideologically? 0 50 100 150 Respondent (N=482) Mean=7.38 0 5 10 0 50 100 150 President (N=499) Mean=7.87 0 5 10 Note: Figure includes respondents who answered at least one conjoint experiment. 9

Figure 2.a: Political Services, by Ideological Alignment of Respondent Figure 2.b: Corruption, by Ideological Alignment of Respondent 10

Figure 2.c: Work Motivation, by Ideological Alignment of Respondent 11

Figure 3: Perception of Job Stability Associated with Administrative Career For each of the following statements, please indicate if you: strongly agree (1), somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree (5): I. All public servants are protected from arbitrary dismissals II. Administrative career servants are protected from arbitrary dismissals 0 50 100 150 200 250 Strongly agree All public servants (N=541) Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Mean=3.27 Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree 0 50 100 150 200 250 Strongly agree Administrative career (N=547) Somewhat agree Mean=2.23 Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Note: Figure includes respondents who answered at least one conjoint experiment. 12

Figure 3.a: Political Services, by Perception of Job Stability of Career Servants Figure 3.b: Corruption, by Perception of Job Stability of Career Servants 13

Figure 3.c: Work Motivation, by Perception of Job Stability of Career Servants Figure 4.a: Political Services, Respondents Recruited by Governing vs. Opposition Party Presidents 14

Figure 4.b: Corruption, Respondents Recruited by Governing vs. Opposition Party Presidents Figure 4.c: Work Motivation, Respondents Recruited by Governing vs. Opposition Party Presidents 15

Figure 5.a: Political Services, by Gender Figure 5.b: Corruption, by Gender 16

Figure 5.c: Work Motivation, by Gender Figure 6.a: Corruption, by Rank in Hierarchy (Q4=1: administrative assistant; Q4=2: technical-professional; Q4=3: managerial) 17

Figure 6.b: Political Services, by Rank in Hierarchy (Q4=1: administrative assistant; Q4=2: technical-professional; Q4=3: managerial) Figure 6.c: Work Motivation, by Rank in Hierarchy (Q4=1: administrative assistant; Q4=2: technical-professional; Q4=3: managerial) 18

Figure 7.a: Political Services, by Seniority Figure 7.b: Work Motivation, by Seniority 19

Figure 7.c: Corruption, by Seniority Figure 8.a: Corruption, by Seniority (only PLD recruits) (0 = a decade or less in the public sector, 1 = more than a decade in the public sector) 20

Figure 8.b: Political Services, by Seniority (only PLD recruits) (0 = a decade or less in the public sector, 1 = more than a decade in the public sector) Figure 8.c: Work Motivation, by Seniority (only PLD recruits) (0 = a decade or less in the public sector, 1 = more than a decade in the public sector) 21

Figure 9.a: Political Services, by Education (Q3=2: high school, Q3=3: university/bachelor, Q3=4: master s/phd) Figure 9.b: Corruption, by Education (Q3=2: high school, Q3=3: university/bachelor, Q3=4: master s/phd) 22

Figure 9.c: Work Motivation, by Education (Q3=2: high school, Q3=3: university/bachelor, Q3=4: master s/phd) Figure 10.a Corruption, by Age 23

Figure 10.b Political Services, by Age Figure 10.c Work Motivation, by Age 24

Figure 11.a. Corruption, by year of entry into administrative career Figure 11.b. Political Services, by year of entry into administrative career 25

Figure 11.c Work Motivation, by year of entry into administrative career Figure 12.a Corruption, by Institution of Respondent 26

Figure 12.b Political Services, by Institution of Respondent Figure 12.c Work Motivation, by Institution of Respondent 27