22nd June 2016 Issue 30

22nd June 2016 Issue 30 Issue 30 of the series reviews, analyses and threat assesses the fragile and conflict affected coastal states Libya, Somalia and Yemen. The Mediterranean migrant crisis, incidents affecting maritime security and influencing maritime news are also reported and analysed, focusing on the keys theatres of maritime instability. The Maritime Intelligence Report Series focuses on: Contents: Page Areas of instability which could affect the passage or port call of your vessel; Changes or impediments to navigation/restrictions of; and Charts and analysis detailing piracy, suspicious approaches and hijackings. MAST has a global reach and presence, delivering first hand, accurate and exclusive intelligence. MAST is entrenched and committed in continuing to support and promote the awareness of the very real risks that seafarers and stakeholders face. Indian Ocean Region 2 Somalia 3 Yemen 4 Yemen Ports 5 Mediterranean 6 Libya 7 Gulf of Guinea 8 South East Asia 9 Central & South America 10 Mast Services 11 This Intelligence Report Series is a brief snapshot of MAST s Intelligence capabilities. MAST Intelligence specialises in providing clients with a suite of products, including; detailed port and vessel security briefs, vessel passage plans, threat and risk mitigation, travel risk management. Working closely in conjunction with a host of experts, MAST Intelligence offers a market leading service pertaining to all maritime affairs. Follow MAST on LinkedIn and Twitter to keep abreast with these insightful weekly reports and more including real time security updates. Editor: Alexander Farrow Business Intelligence Officer alex.farrow@mast-security.co.uk www.mast-security.com MAST UK +44 (0)1279 216 726 operations@mast-security.com MAST Singapore +65 8302 7561 ben.stewart@mast-security.com 24/7 Emergency Telephone: +44(0) 117 916 6012 1

Indian Ocean Region Incidents: Nothing Serious to Report HRA Naval Presence: Japan has announced that they will extend their naval contribution to the multinational counter piracy mission, CTF 151, off Somalia by one year. Red Sea Islands Having declared in April that the Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir were to be transfer from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, an Egyptian judge has declared the action invalid. But the decision can be over turned by a higher court. For further reading click here. Recent incidents in the HRA have included; a tanker in the IRTC (12Jan16), MSC Clara in the Bab el Mandeb(27Jan16), an MV in the Arabian Sea (15Apr16), an MV off Al Mukalla (24Apr16) and an MV in the IRTC (16May16), all previously reported in this series. Precisely what happened in several of these incidents is not entirely clear and they have subsequently been recorded by UKMTO as suspicious approaches. Despite this, the sighting of weapons and ladders during these incidents makes it likely that the intent behind the approaches was piracy. The recent UN Contact Group on piracy off the coast of Somalia, highlighted concern that Somali government officials have been unwilling or unable to prosecute investors. With many of the convicted pirates coming to the end of their prison sentences, the UN is concerned that the pirate investors will have a fresh source of experienced and willing crews for future pirate action groups. EUNAVFOR has made it clear in it s threat assessment dated 10th March 2016 that the reduction in the use of armed guards and BMP 4 measures along with fewer naval patrols is increasing the opportunities for Somali pirates to get back in the game. We assess that with the Federal elections due in August and the SW monsoon increasing sea states through the region, it is unlikely that Pirate Action Groups will be mounted from the coast of Somalia. Once the elections are complete, and the inter-monsoon period starts in September, the situation could quickly change. Meanwhile, vessels should remain vigilant in the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea, where conditions might favour speculative attacks by skiffs operating between Yemen and Somalia. Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 1st December 2015 HRA limits 2

Somalia Al Shabaab Al Shabaab have confirmed the death of senior military commander Mohamed Mohamed Kuno Dulyadeyn. Somali National Army AMISOM troops killed Dulyadeyn during a raid near Kismayo, Lower Jubba region on May 31 with assistance from U.S. forces. Dulyadeyn was Al Shabaab s top commander in the fight against Kenya and allegedly overall responsible for the Garissa University attack in May 2015 that left 148 students dead. It has been reported that Al Shabaab Militants ambushed an AMISOM convoy travelling through Barawe town on the 18th June. An IED detonated and was followed by small arms fire. An Al Shabaab spokesman claimed to have killed ten AMISOM troops and destroyed three vehicles. Suspected Al Shabaab militants fired mortars into an AMISOM base close to Marka town, Lower Shabelle region on the 19th June. The AMISOM troops responded with artillery fire. Al Shabaab has repeatedly launched mortars into the urban centres in and around Mogadishu. Analysis Al Shabaab continues to be active, and has yet to be defeated by the Somali National Army or AMISOM. They continue to present a challenge in Mogadishu and it is likely that Al Shabaab will seek to disrupt the upcoming Federal elections. The Somali National Army and AMISOM continue to struggle to maintain security over Mogadishu. Mogadishu Port continues to be operational. After earlier warnings in March that an attack on Somali ports is likely, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency stated that it has implemented further security measures in Somali ports to protect business continuity. To date this seems to have worked. Under control of Al Shabaab and allies Under control of neutral forces Under the control of Government and allies Somaliland Government Control of Somali territory (10th June 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 3

Yemen The Yemeni Prime Minister says that the government will remain in Aden until Houthi occupied capital Sanna is liberated. Peace Talks The UN mediated peace talks have entered their third month, with little substantial progress made. It has been reported that the negotiations have largely stalled. Yemeni Foreign Minister Abdulmalek Al-Mikhlafi told a press conference that we have informed the UN special envoy to bring a document signed by the rebels in which they recognise the basic references and UN Security Council resolutions. These are called for under UN Security Council Resolution 2216. Prisoner exchange On 18th June, Houthi and pro government forces exchanged nearly 200 prisoners. The exchange is considered by many as a good omen for the on-going peace talks and that it continues to alleviate tensions. We advise vessels to conduct a risk assessment and maintain increased levels of security when in the vicinity of Yemen or in Yemeni ports. As predicted by CMF at the 3rd May Oceans Beyond Piracy conference, the eastern section of the IRTC near the Yemen coastline has had reported piracy attempts. There have been 2 instances of gun fire exchange and 1 instance of evasive actions taken by an MV within the last few months. There is still a considerable AQAP presence in the region and although Al Mukalla has been liberated, AQAP and pirates are not reliant on the use of a port to launch skiffs, which may present a false sense of increasing regional security. Houthi Pro Hadi Government Forces Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Control of Yemen territory (22nd May 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 4

Yemen Ports Maritime Combined Coalition Command (MCCC) advises that all vessels operating in and around Yemen maintain AIS at all times and use approved UN Location Codes. UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) The UN s Secretary-General has decided to institute a UNVIM for the facilitation of commercial imports to Yemen, at the request of the Government of the Republic of Yemen and in line with Security Council resolution 2216 (2015). UNVIM is operational with immediate effect. Shipping companies or vessel owners shipping commercial goods or services to any port not under the direct control of the Government of Yemen (Salif, Mokha, Hudaydah and associated oil terminals) need to apply for permits upon departure of the port of origin of their cargo. For further details click here. UN arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2216 of 2015 is in place. Port Aden: The port of Aden is under the protection of the Republic of Yemen security forces. Curfew in effect for Aden, 2000-0600 daily. Merchant vessels wishing to enter Yemeni ports must first apply for a permit through the Yemeni Ministry of Transportation; contact: yemen.transport@gmail.com for more information. Final clearance to enter Yemeni ports (with permits in place) is authenticated by the coalition guard ship. Aden is the only port in Yemen currently able to facilitate container vessels. The container terminal has it s capacity. recently increased Port Salif: Capacity 2 berths. Operating at capacity. Vessels experiencing severe delays due to minimal port equipment. Port Hudaydah: Capacity 5 berths. Reduced vessel berth capacity from 8 to 5 due to substantial damage from air strikes in July, especially to cranes. Only 1 of 5 shore based cranes in partial operation, container vessels highly recommended to have their own internal cranes. RSNF is utilizing a holding area 60 NM west of the port of Hudaydah for all vessels attempting entry into Salif or Hudaydah. Inbound vessels should plan on holding within this area prior to receiving clearance from port control warships. Port Mokha: No recorded activity since August 2015. Port Al Mukalla: Capacity 2 berths. Al Mukalla port was liberated on the 23/24 April by the Saudi-led coalition and southern resistance. Port officials have advised that port operations resumed on the 26th April. MCCC Notice: Following open source reporting of increased military activity in and around the Yemeni port city of Mukalla and the maritime security incident on the 24th April, where an MV was fired upon, please be advised that the security situation in the vicinity of the port has changed. Vessels using the port or operating nearby are advised to take additional security measures and proceed with caution. Coalition warships are patrolling in the area and should be hailed on VHF Channel 16 by any vessel witnessing or subject to threatening behaviour. 5

Mediterranean Egyptian migrant vessel embarkations: Amid growing numbers of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean from Africa to Europe, it has been reported that the EU is looking to hold talks with Cairo to resolve the increasing migrant departures from Egypt, particularly surrounding Alexandria. The journey from Alexandria to Italy, the primary destination, can take 10 days. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia extension EU Operation Sophia has had it s mandate extended until 27th July 2017 and the operations tasks broadened. The Council [of member States] reinforced the operation s mandate by adding two supporting tasks training of the Libyan Coastguard and Navy, and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya stated an EU spokesperson. Following the likely IED rigged life raft in May on the Turkish Syrian border, MAST is concerned that Islamist extremists may use a migrant vessel as a Trojan horse. We advise that any migrants being rescued should not be allowed onto a vessel while carrying their belongings. Rescuers should also be aware that human traffickers often carry small arms in order to maintain control over their vessel if the need arises. SOLAS operations in the Mediterranean can be complicated by the numbers of migrants involved, the nature of the migrant craft, the safety of the vessel s crew, medical issues or the potential for a terrorist incident. Migrant crossings 2014-2016. Source: UNHRC MAST can advise and provide training for crisis management and SOLAS operations, as well as on-board security advisors for port operations and assistance and guidance with rescue missions. The weight of migrants may impact on the freedom of navigation if too many vessels are obliged by SOLAS to conduct rescue operations. At present many rescued Analysis migrants are disembarked in nearby Italy, but this depends heavily on the continued goodwill of the Italians. Libyan Following last week s comments by Palermo Professors that designate prime Minister Serraj has stated that he will not international warships are assisting human traffickers, the boss accept migrants back to Libya, as the majority do not of Frontex, the EU border enforcement agency, has also originate from Libya. declared that rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean may 'trigger' their departure from the coast of Libya. 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 2014 2015 2016 But these are far from original insights. The Italian rescue operation Mare Nostrum scaled back its operations in October 2014 precisely because it was deemed to encourage migration in the Mediterranean. Map depicting major migrant routes in the Mediterranean (22nd June 2016). Source: UNHRC 6

Libya Assault on ISIS held Sirte The assault on Sirte which captured the majority of the city and port has met the toughest resistance yet within pockets of the city. Held up ISIS fighters are reportedly pushing back in defiance, while it is thought that many of ISIS leaders have escaped to the south. Analysis ISIS s controlled territory has nearly been completely reclaimed by forces loyal to the Government of National Accord in a matter of weeks. The liberation of Sirte has occurred without the assistance of international militaries which were initially thought necessary. While ISIS may no longer control the territory, they are still in existence and present a considerable threat. A threat which is perhaps more unpredictable as ISIS is forced into an increased terror role than previously in Libya. Control over Sirte has kept ISIS militants at arms length from Tripoli and Tobruk. With no principle town now to rally to, ISIS militants will become dispersed and may be encouraged to conduct individual attacks with little central planning. The NOC is responsible for securing oil port facilities with their own armed force, the PFG. To date the PFG have been highly effective at repelling ISIS and have even gone on the offensive while ensuring business continuity at open ports. The oil industry is integral to Libya s economy and is appropriately safeguarded. Divisions between the east and west NOC branches and the control of ports has not yet impacted on the security of a vessel. Many Libyan ports are operational, but not without risk. MAST is able to provide risk assessments and crew training to improve situational awareness and risk appreciation. Controlled by the Government of National Accord Controlled by the Tobruk led government Controlled by Tuareg forces Controlled by local forces Controlled by ISIS Control of Northern Libyan territory (10th June 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 7

Gulf of Guinea It has been reported that a one month ceasefire between the Nigerian Government and Niger Delta militants has been agreed, including the Niger Delta Avengers who have been responsible for much of the sabotage in recent months. For further reading click here. Incidents: 1. Angola: late report, 13Jun16. A robber boarded an anchored tanker and managed to transfer ship's stores into his boat at 2145 LT in Luanda Anchorage. Alarm sounded and the crew were able to detain the robber. Port officials and the local police were informed and the robber arrested. MTISC GoG replaced with MDAT GoG. The new French/UK Centre, called Marine Domain Awareness for Trade Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG), commenced operations at 0800 GMT on 20th June 2016. MDAT-GoG will be operated by the Navies of France and the United Kingdom from centres in Brest, France, and in Portsmouth, England. MDAT-GoG contact details: Email: watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org Telephone: +33(0)2 98 22 88 88 Calls to this number will be answered either in Brest or in Portsmouth. All vessels operating in the GoG should conduct a thorough risk assessment and practice emergency drills. Locally procured patrol boats can, in the right circumstances, enhance a vessel s security. MAST advises against the use of embarked armed Nigerian Navy personnel. Under contact from pirates, embarked armed Nigerian guards will draw increased fire towards the bridge of the vessel which can result in the death or injury of crew members and damage to the vessel. The Secure Anchorage Area (SAA) off Lagos provides effective protection for drifting and waiting vessels and the area has been piracy free for several months. It has also been reported that there is an unofficial, but operational SAA off the Bonny River. MAST can advise on risk assessments, the most effective countermeasures and on the most effective locally procured Nigerian patrol vessels to escort vessels to and from operation in Nigeria to 150nm offshore. 3 30 4 00 4 30 7 00 6 30 7 30 5 00 5 30 6 00 8 00 6 00 5 30 5 00 4 30 4 00 3 30 Militant Sabotage Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 1 8

South East Asia Philippine transit corridor to counter Abu Sayyaf It has been reported that Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have agreed a transit corridor for commercial vessels. All 3 nations will increase air and sea patrol along the corridor and increase the number of present escort vessels. Best practice learned in the Malacca Straits by Indonesia and Malaysia will be shared and serve as a model for tri-lateral co-operation. Incidents 1. Indonesia: 20Jun16. Three robbers armed with knives boarded an anchored bulk carrier at 0540 LT in Dumai Inner Anchorage. Two robbers managed to enter the engine room via the open skylight. They threatened the duty oiler with knives and ordered him not to raise the alarm. The robbers then stole engine spares and escaped. After the robbers left the oiler informed the D/O who in turn raised the alarm and crew mustered. No injuries to crew members. 2. Indonesia. 17Jun16. Three robbers boarded an anchored product tanker at 0110 LT in Dumai Anchorage. Duty AB noticed the robbers and informed the D/O who raised the alarm and crew mustered. One of the robbers rushed towards the duty AB and threatened him with a knife not to make any movements. Hearing the alarm and seeing the crew alertness, the robbers jumped overboard and escaped with their accomplices in their boat. The padlock to the steering gear room entrance was found broken, but nothing reported stolen. 3. Indonesia: 16Jun16. 4 robbers, armed with guns, boarded an anchored Heavy Lift Carrier, held hostage the duty AB at gun point, stole ship s engine spares and escaped at 0300 LT in position around 2.5nm West of Batu Ampar, Batam Island. 4. Federated States of Micronesia: 15 Jun16. underway, a vehicle carrier received call from 2 suspicious boats approaching at high speed at 2210 UTC between Pisares Island and East Fayu Island, Caroline Islands. The boats initially called the vessel and asked it to stop. Master raised the alarm and increased speed. The boats continued their approach and identified themselves to be Navy boats and indicated their intention to attack if the vessel did not stop. The boats continued to threaten the vessel. As the boats closed to the vessel the Master observed each boat with a number of people. After around 20 mins the suspicious boats stopped pursuing and moved away. Opportunistic theft of ships stores and equipment continues to be sporadically spread across the archipelagos of SE Asia. Thieves tend to be non violent and will escape when spotted. We encourage vessels to conduct thorough risk assessments when operating with SE Asian archipelagos and to adopt appropriate measures to protect vessel and crew. Abu Sayyaf has traditionally targeted small slower vessels such as fishing vessels, passenger vessels, yachts, tugs and vessels under tow with the intent of kidnapping crew for ransom. Vessels operating in the Sulu Sea should adopt security measures. While Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 1 2 3 9

Central and South America Incidents Nothing Serious to Report Standing advice: The repercussions of a vessel being caught acting as a mule with drugs stowed will depend on the type, amount and national laws, but may be disruptive and costly. When and if operating in these areas, especially Columbia and Peru, it is advised that: Potential stowage areas such as rudder shafts are denied as far as possible, and/or routinely searched. Access points are closely monitored by a vigilant watch for the duration of the vessel s call at port. Hi-Jack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 10

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