Can Our Election Systems be Trusted?

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Transcription:

Can Our Election Systems be Trusted? Talk at the 2018 CyberMaryland Conference, Oct. 10, 2018 Balakrishnan Dasarathy, PhD Professor & Program Chair, Cybersecurity & Information Assurance Department Graduate School

Election Systems Voter Registration System Campaign System Voting/Ballot System Vote Tally System When people talk about election systems, they actually mean different-type of systems A closer examination of each constituent system depicted gives a more complete picture of the trust we can place upon them or what we could do to improve our trust of our election results 2

Voter Registration System Many states allow registering online Voter registration systems also get registered-voter information from other state-maintained systems, such as the Registry of Motor Vehicles Not hacker-proof We now know the attack on the Illinois voter-registration systems and likely other state systems as well was carried out by Russian agents primarily to sow distrust in the minds of the voters Just recently, in Georgia, a private researcher discovered that the records of more than six million registered voters in the state could be accessed online by anyone looking Certainly, there is some concern that hackers might attempt to delete or add voters Disrupting elections by causing long lines at the polls and delays in vote counting 3

Minimizing Hack to a Voter Roll or Its Impact Many simple, but effective cybersecurity measures Enhanced password requirements, two-factor authentication, better firewall rules and technology to prevent repeated intrusion attempts A process can be put in place to detect, on a daily basis, any alteration to the voter database and ensure that the changes are supported by proper documentation, such as a proof of residency and signed notification of moving out of a precinct/county 4

Campaign System Support canvassing, fundraising and compliance reporting functions for a party or candidate Periodically obtain voter information from voter registration systems at the state and county levels We now know DNC systems were hacked with the help of Russian state actors if a campaign system is exploited, the integrity of the voter registration database is not compromised because there is no data flow from a campaign system to a voter registration system Is that enough? An attack or even the persistent threat of an attack can sow mistrust and might even result in voters changing their minds when picking a candidate or a political party to support A positive outcome of the DNC hacks is that now both Democrats and Republicans are taking their cybersecurity seriously! 5

Voting/Ballot System The ballot systems in a precinct are not connected to the Internet, at least during voting, and that prevents them from being hacked Isolating voting machines from the Internet was one of the most important recommendations made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) A smart card with memory chip is used to extract vote tallying data from a voting machine and this chip (with cryptographically-protected data) is then securely handed over to a central location or another utility system in the precinct to transfer the tallied data to a central location 6

Vote Tally System It is possible that the systems in the central location can be hacked They are not voter-facing systems (only a few have access to these systems) As these systems are few, good cyber hygiene should be/seem to be practiced Paper Trail: With proper records of voter tallies kept in various precincts, any breach to these systems or data handover from the precincts can be detected and effect can be nullified during review and certification 7

What have we learned since the 2016 Election? For starters, we have learned a lot about who hacked various systems and what motivated them Prior to 2016, we mainly emphasized securing ballot systems and votetallying systems We largely focused on the integrity of votes cast and tallied About 34 percent of likely voters believed, according to a 2016 survey, that the general election (in 2016) would be rigged. Attacks by Russian agents on campaign and voter registration systems, most likely, are only contributing to this distrust The pressing issue is not just one of information security; it is about assurance and the trustworthiness of all voting technology and processes 8

Improving Trust We need to secure every system involved in and every process associated with our elections (including campaign and voter registration systems) A public test of a voting machine in every polling booth and every tallying system should be conducted before each election to ensure that it is functioning as expected Keep diversity in key systems Diversity makes the election hard to manipulate in any coordinated way Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines that do not produce any paper record that remain in use should be removed Verification of votes cast requires that we maintain a paper trail Social Media Social media companies (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) need to be vigilant against foreign agents meddling in our elections 9

More Information See my blog at UMUC for more detail and for references: https://cyberconnections.umuc.edu/two-years-after-the-presidentialelection-hack-can-our-election-systems-be-trusted/ 10