3 Tr 1 - PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON CASE NO. 84-680-E-C Entered: March 3, 1987 MARIE WEBSTER, (aka WINIFRED A. GOUDIE), 1000 Washington Street, Harpers Ferry, Jefferson County, vs. THE POTOMAC EDISON COMPANY, a corporation, Comp lainan t, Defendant. HEARING EXAMINER'S DECISION HISTORY On October 10, 1984, Marie Webster (also known as Winifred A. Goudie) filed a complaint against The Potomac Edison Company (Defendant) alleging the Defendant had terminated her electric service without holding the hearing required by the Commission Rules; that the Defendant's billing procedures were incorrect; and that the Defendant failed to give Complainant the 20% discount allowed to certain low-income residential customers under West Virginia Code 524-2A-1. An Answer was filed to the complaint by Defendant denying any improper acts and contending Defendant's actions were in accordance with the law and Commission rules. A properly scheduled hearing was held in Charles Town, West Virginia, on April 2, 1985, at which time, the Complainant did not appear. On May 29, 1985, the Examiner dismissed the complaint for Complainant's failure to prosecute her case. Complainant filed exceptions to the Hearing Examiner's Decision stating illness had prevented her appearance CUDLIC SLRVICC COMMISSION OF WE87 VlROlNlA
at that hearing. The Commission modified the Hearing Examiner's Decision on September 25, 1985, to allow Complainant an opportunity to present her case. Pursuant to that Commission Order and other proper notices, hearings were held on this matter on October 16, 1985, in Charles Town, West Virginia (the testimony of which is found in a transcript, designated Tr.); and on February 6 and 7, 1986, in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia (those transcripts are marked Tr. I and Tr. 11, respectively). Appearing at these three hearings were Marie Webster (also known as Mrs. Goudie), without counsel; Philip J. Bray, Esq., representing Defendant; and Mark Thessin, Esq., representing Commission Staff. (Mr. Thessin did not appear at the October 16, 1985 hearing). The Examiner has reviewed all of the evidence including exhibits presented at the three days of hearing. The witnesses were Carrie Chadwell, Marie Webster, Lawrence A. Pittsnogle and Harry J. Nuse. The transcripts totaled 499 pages. The parties were permitted to file a Memorandum of Law or a Proposed Order at the conclusion of the hearing. The Defendant filed a Memorandum. The Complainant and Staff did not. The parties were advised by Certified Mail, return receipt requested, of the receipt of Defendant's Memorandum and given a period of time to file anything they wished for the Examiner to consider. Nothing was filed. The transcript is long, cumbersome and rambling, so the Examiner will not try to summarize the evidence presented. However, the Examiner did review the transcript carefully and has not overlooked any testimony by failing to refer to it in this Decision. All rulings which have not been ruled on at hearing are denied unless this Decision indicates to the contrary. PUmLIC SCRVICL COYYISSION OF WEST VIROINIA -2-
The reason for the two names in the style of the case is that Complainant's electric service is in the name of Marie Webster, which Complainant explained is her maiden name and also her pen name. (Tr., p. 5). Her SSI, Welfare Department and food stamp benefits are in the name of Winifred Goudie. (Tr. I, p. 169). The discrepancy between the names did cause part of the complaint issues in this case. COMPLAINT ISSUES The Complainant complained that: 1. She was denied a hearing and ten (10) days notice of her termination of service and requested that Defendant be required to give due process to its customers before terminations of electrical service. 2. The Statements of Account sent to the Complainant were incorrect in content and improperly dated, if at all, and the Defendant should be required to correct its billing procedures; 3. The 20% discount, i.e. reduced rates for low income residential customers, had not been allowed to Complainant; 4. She is entitled to Notice of Termination after she has entered it into a payment arrangement with Defendant; 5. The Defendant does not read meters on a timely basis; 6. The Defendant should not be able to turn off electric service if a customer is disabled; 7. The Commission rules for termination are unconstitutional; 8. The Defendant's position of requiring a Physician Statement every month is an unacceptable procedure and not in conformity with the Rules; and FUBLIC SKRVICL COMMISSION OF WEST VlROlNlA -3-
9. The Complainant's request for kilowatt information from Defen- dant was not answered. (Tr., pp. 28 d 35-37). DISCUSSION The Examiner will discuss the complaint issues in the sequence above outlined. The issue of the greatest importance is whether the Complainant received notice of her termination of service, as is required under the Commission's Rule 4.08. The Complainant, in outlining her complaints, referred to January 1983 and December 1983 terminations, which she contends were improper. The evidence does not show that there was a termination in December or January 1983. Rather this complaint is before the Commission because of the Complainant's appeal from her September 26, 1984 termination and the Examiner will address that termination only. Complainant made references to previous terminations but did not complete any presentation of evidence which would allow the Examiner to review them and thus those terminations are not at issue here. The Complainant's history of electrical service began when she first received service from the Defendant on April 16, 1980, in the name of Marie Webster. Between that date and June 26, 1983, the Complainant accumulated unpaid balances of $2,631.20. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 5). During that period, the Complainant entered into two installment plans and defaulted on both after approximately one payment on each payment arrangement. (Tr. I, pp. 1598~160). Pursuant to her default on the later installment payment plan, the Complainant's electrical service was terminated on June 6, 1983. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 5). Prior to the June 1983 termination, the Complainant was sent a Termination Notice which PUBLIC SCRVICL COMMISSION O? WEST VlROlNlA -4-
substantially was the same as the Termination Notice Form contained in the Commission's Rules, designated Form 14. (Tr., pp. 65&66). The Complainant acknowledged receipt of the notice. (Tr., pp. 201&203). The Complainant asked for and was given a hearing on May 17, 1983. (Tr. I, p. 72; Tr. 11, p. 66). After that hearing, a "Hearing Decision Notice" was mailed to and received by the Complainant as the Certified Mail Return Receipt Card indicated. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 4). The Complainant then wrote a letter to the Consumer Protection Division of the Commission about the termination but the complaint was never docketed as a formal case at the Commission. (Tr. 11, p. 67). The Defendant terminated the Complainant's service on June 6, 1983 and it remained terminated until it was reconnected in September, 1983 after an Installment Payment Agreement, dated September 13, 1983, was agreed to by Complainant and Defendant. The subsequent termination pursuant to this Installment Payment Arrangement is the termination now under review. Under the Installment Payment Agreement, the Complainant was to pay $50.00 per month on the tenth of each month beginning October 10, 1983. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 6). The Complainant made the payments until September 1984 but did not make the payment due on September 10, 1984. (Tr. 11, p. 68). Thereafter, the Defendant's employee contacted the Complainant personally, on September 24, 1984, and notified her that service would be terminated because she had not paid the payment on the Installment Payment Agreement, as was agreed, and because she had failed to pay current charges as they came due, which was another term of the Installment Payment Agreement. (Tr. 11, p. 69 and Defendant's Exhibit No. 7). Complainant had on file with Defendant, at the time of this notice, a PUBLIC SERVICL COYYI~SION or WCST VIROINIA -5-
1982 medical certificate which Defendant had intermittently requested her to update. Electrical service was terminated on September 26, 1984, and after the Complainant requested a hearing on the termination alleging there was a billing dispute, her service was reconnected the same day. (Tr., 11, p. 70). The hearing on the dispute was scheduled for October 3, 1984. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 8). The Complainant arrived at the scheduled location of the hearing but refused to speak to Mr. Pittsnogle, the Defendant's managerial employee delegated and present to hear the dispute. (Tr. 11, p. 71). Defendant mailed to Complainant the "Hearing Decision Notice" informing the Complainant of the outcome of the hearing and notifying her that her service would be terminated on October 11, 1984. (Tr. 11, pp. 718~73). The Defendant was notified by the Commission after its business day that her appeal had been filed and Complainant's service was reconnected the following day. So the issue is whether Complainant is entitled to both a written Termination Notice, often called a Form 14, after she entered into the Installment Payment Arrangement with Defendant since the Defendant provided notice by personal contact prior to the termination. The Commission's Orders have held that notice pursuant to Rule 4.08 is not required for terminations after an installment payment arrangement has been negotiated such as Defendant and Complainant have in this case. In Case No. 84-298-E-C, (July 17, 1984) Paul Tassone v. The Potomac Edison Company citing Oba Massey v. Appalachian Power Company, Case No. 81-241-E-C, dated April 15, 1982. (Order Modifying the Hearing Examiner's CUbLlC SLRVICL COMMISSION OF WEST VlROlNlA -6-
Recommended Decision), at page 6, it reads: 1. A customer who has been faced with termination of service pursuant to Rule 4.08 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations for the Government of Electric Utilities, is entitled f i b y that Rule; however, the Complainant is entitled to receive those rights only one time with regard to any termination of service, complaint or appeal. 2. When a customer enters into a deferred payment arrangement, pursuant to the terms of Rule 4.08, that customer is not subsequently entitled to reinvoke the provisions of Rule 4.08 if the customer subsequently defaults on the deferred payment arrangement. 3. When a customer defaults on a deferred payment arrangement, entered into pursuant to Rule 4.08 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations for the Government of Electric Utilities, that customer is entitled only to written notice of the utility company's intent to terminate service, since the customer has already received a Form 14 notice pursuant to Rule 4.08, personal contact notice and a meeting with the utility company, at which meeting the deferred payment arrangement was agreed upon by both parties. Also cited in that Decision was Martha Goodwin v. Monongahela Power Company, Case No. 81-279-E-C, August 16, 1982 Commission Order Modifying Hearing Examiner's Decision, in which the Commission held similarly. The Examiner concludes that, although written notice is acceptable and perhaps preferable, the Defendant may use personal contact notice after there is a default on an Installment Payment Agreement to notify a customer of an impending termination. The Complainant had notice of the possibility of termination if the Agreement were not adhered to. Agreement stated that: "Should default in any installment occur and continue for a five day period after payment is due it is understood that [Defendant] shall consider the unpaid balance immediately due and may terminate service without further notice. " (Defendant Exhibit No. 6). The Agreement, by its terms, provided that no notice of termination would be given if a default occurred. The Rules do not require notice of The I' PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Ot WEST VlROlNIA -7-
the default on an Installment Payment Agreement. Complainant had received written notice, a hearing and a Hearing Decision Notice on the termination prior to the execution of the Installment Agreement. Before this termination (after default on the Installment Payment Agreement), the Defendant did give Complainant notice by personal contact. There is no question in the Examiner's mind that some notice of termination should be given to the Complainant before any termination. This is not a notice which would include any rights of review and appeal of the impending termination. To continue the rights of review and appeal would forestall indefinitely termination but the customer should be given some notice that service will be terminated. In the past Commission cases, written notice was an acceptable notice, but the question of personal contact notice has not been ruled on. This Examiner feels that personal contact notice of an impending termination after a default on an Installment Payment Agreement is sufficient. Here, again, this notice does not carry with it the rights of review and appeal that the Rule 4.08 notice carries prior to execution of the Installment Payment Agreement. Here Defendant provided acceptable notice and, in fact, the notice in this instance carried the rights of review and appeal, which were unnecessary. There was an October 1983 termination of short duration, but service was reconnected when the installment payment arrived. The issue regarding notice of a termination would be the same for any termination after an I Installment Payment Agreement is executed. I I ' Next, the Examiner must address whether the Complainant's health is an absolute bar to her termination of service. The Complainant has provided medical certificates dated August 10, 1978, July 26, 1982, October 5, 1982 and June 4, 1985, and a treadmill test dated January 20, PUBLIC SERVICE COYYl8blON OF WEST VIRGINIA n Y
1983. Defendant has elected to treat the last medical certificate received prior to the 1984 termination as a certification of permanent disability and not require a certificate each thirty days as is required by the Rules. This may be due to a Memorandum opinion issued by Hearing Examiner Marland at the request of Complainant. The acceptance of this certificate by the Defendant renders the Complainant's issue moot, i.e. there is no controversy. So the Examiner will not address this complaint issue. Generally, the Examiner feels that Defendant should use some discretion in deciding whether a medical certificate needs to be renewed every thirty days in cases of chronic and continuing diseases. Rule 4.08 contains no provision which would allow it to be interpreted as an absolute bar to termination of electrical service to a customer with medical problems. Here, we have a customer who is failing to make payments on her delinquent account as well as failing to pay for her current services. The Complainant has chronic diseases which this Examiner concludes would allow the Complainant to, at most times, have a valid medical certificate on file with the Defendant. However, such a condition, pursuant to the terms of Rule 4.08(2), (3) and (41, only entitles the customer to an opportunity to enter into a deferred payment arrangement. Payment for electric service is absolutely required by Rule 4.08, even by customers with health problems. Therefore, even though the Complainant may have on file with the Defendant a valid medical certificate, the Defendant, upon adequate notice, may terminate service to the complainant. The Complainant next argued that the Defendant's Statements of Account were incorrect and undated. Some of the schedules were undated on the front page. However, all of these schedules outline the dates of?ublic SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VlROlNlA -9-
~ -~~ payment, processing or billing in chronological order. These were in- ternal documents generated for the purpose of informing the Complainant of her delinquency. The Complainant showed no specific errors in the sched- ules. The Complainant professed to be confused by the schedules but the Examiner could see no grounds for her confusion. She complained that the schedules did not separately break out her current and delinquent charges, but, when Defendant showed that it had prepared such a schedule, at her request, some months prior to hearing, the Complainant stated that she was dissatisfied because no consolidated schedules were sent to her. Defen- dant's employees had photocopied the first page of the Statements of Account sent to Complainant which stated the "date rendered" to be Septem- ber 26, 1984, even though the individual entries extended beyond the September 26, 1984 date. Even on these schedules, each transaction date was properly entered. Defendant's schedules, although perhaps they could be improved, were acceptably clear in content and form. The Complainant had no evidence to show that she had made any payments which were not reflected on those statements. The Examiner concludes the Defendant acted reasonably in the preparation of its Statements of Account for the Comp 1 ainan t. The third issue involves the failure of Complainant to receive the 20% discount under West Virginia Code $24-2A-1, - et. seq. The Complainant was not allowed the reduced rate because, in most months, she provided no Certification of Eligibility from the Department of Human Services to Defendant. The evidence shows the Defendant granted the Complainant the reduced rate in the one month that the Complainant provided a Certificate of her eligibility. Because Complainant's electric service is in the name of Marie Webster, and her benefits were in the name of Winifred Goudie, PUBLIC SERVICE COYYI88ION OF WEST VIROINIA -10- m
her application was originally denied. The Defendant, before the hearing date, took the sworn statement of Complainant that Marie Webster and Winifred Goudie were the same person and allowed the reduced rate for the month in which she was certified. West Virginia Code $24-2A-l(b) reads, "The burden of proving eligibility for the special reduced rates shall be on the customer requesting such rates." The Examiner concludes that the Defendant acted properly in its allowance or disallowance of the 20% discount to the Complainant. The fourth issue is if the Complainant should receive a Notice of Termination letter after she defaults on the payment plan. This is the same argument as in the first issue. The evidence shows the Complainant did not receive written notice of the September 26, 1984 termination although she was given notice by personal contact. The Examiner agrees with the Defendant that the written notice is unnecessary so long as some notice is given. However, the Defendant should be aware that the burden of proving adequate notice of termination of service rests on its shoulders and written notice provides the best and clearest evidence of adequate notice at hearing or in a pleading. The Complainant further argues that the Defendant does not read the meters on a timely basis. This was a general allegation. The Complainant presented no evidence, except her memory, which the Examiner concludes was generally not very reliable, that her meter was not read timely. There was no diary of the dates when the meter reader did not read the meters, nor any witness who could corroborate her concern. Basically, the Complainant testified that she did not know how a meter reader could read her meter because she had placed tape over the meter or put spray paint on it so as to make it impossible for the reader to read the meter, but she PUBLIC SCRVICL COMMISSION OF WEST VIROINIA -11-
~ still received billings. (Tr., p. 21). Defendant's employee testified that the meters were read every two months or the computer estimated the billings, noting such was an estimate on the billing. It appears to the Examiner that the Defendant has a standard procedure of reading meters and nothing Complainant said made the Examiner conclude that the meters were not read regularly. The Complainant contends that electric service should not be terminated to any one who is disabled. Rule 4.08 contains no provision which would allow it to be interpreted as an absolute bar to termination of electrical service to a customer with medical problems. Again, the mechanics of termination are covered in paragraph one. The Commission, through Rule 4.08, does not consider disability to be an absolute bar to termination of a customer's service, although Defendant must deal with each termination in a professional manner. The Complainant argues that the Commission's Rule 4.08 is ambiguous and unconstitutional. The Rule provides notice to a customer of impending termination of service. The Rule provides all of the protection required by the United States Supreme Court in Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). Therefore, this argument is without merit. The Complainant argues that providing monthly Medical Certificates is an unacceptable business practice. For this case, the Defendant has waived the requirement and accepted the Complainant's last medical certificate for a year long period of time. This makes the Complainant's argument moot. The Examiner concludes that the monthly certificates could become cumbersome and Defendant should handle these certifications on a PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VlROlNlA -12-
~~ -~ case-by-case basis. It should be noted Complainant has not been particularly diligent in getting concise medical certificates to Defendant. The Medical Certificate on file at the time of termination was dated October 5, 1982, and stated, basically, that Winifred Goudie has a history of coronary artery disease and heart failure. It further reads termination of electrical service in the physician's opinion would be especially dangerous to the health of Mrs. Goudie to October 4, 1981, and the present condition of this person is expected to exist until October 4, 1981. (Answer). The Certification was obviously defective on its face because the condition expired one year before the date the Certification was executed. The next medical certification which Complainant supplied to Defendant is dated June 4, 1985. The results of a treadmill test was submitted on January 20, 1983, but the treadmill test was not a medical certification and it made no reference to the fact that termination of electrical service would be extremely hazardous to Complainant's health. The Certifications are vague and ambiguous and Defendant had valid reasons to question them or determine they were not proper as in the situation with the treadmill test. Providing these Certifications could become burdensome to provide, however, Defendant is correct in requesting clarification of dates and requiring certain information required on the Certification. The Examiner concludes Defendant acted reasonably in accepting the medical certification for longer than a one month period. The last complaint is that Complainant requested kilowatt information and Defendant's employees sent a handful of brochures which did not provide that information or provided that information only in part. There is no question that the legitimate inquiries of a customer should be PUDLIC SERVICE COYMI8SlON OF WEST VIRGINIA -13-
answered but it is difficult for the Defendant's employees to know exactly how much information will satisfy a particular inquiry. The Defendant provided specific information after the first hearing. Complainant did not use the information in her presentation of evidence. As far as the Examiner is concerned, the Complainant's request has been satisfied and no further action needs to be taken on the matter. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. As of June 6, 1983, the Complainant had accumulated unpaid electric service charges of $2,631.21 and her service was terminated June 6, 1983. (Tr., 11, p. 65). 2. Prior to the June 6, 1983 termination, the Complainant was sent a Termination Notice substantially as found on Form 14 of the Commission's rules; was personally contacted on April 7, 1983 by Defendant's employee; was given a hearing on May 17, 1983 on the impending termination; received a notice of the outcome of that hearing in a Hearing Decision Notice; and her service was then terminated. (Tr. 11, p. 66). 3. Electrical service was restored on September 16, 1983, after the Complainant and Defendant entered into an Installment Payment Agreement dated September 8, 1983, wherein the Complainant would pay $50.00 per month on the delinquency and keep current in the payment of her current service. (Tr. 11, pp. 66&67 and pp. 364). 4. The payments of $50.00 per month were made by Complainant through August 1984 but the September 10, 1984 payment was not made. (Tr. XI, p. 68). 5. The Defendant's meter reader, Ernest Caden, personally contacted the Complainant on September 24, 1984, and told her service would be - PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Of WEST VIROINIA -14-
terminated for her failure to pay past due amounts on the Installment Agreement and for her failure to pay current charges. (Tu. 11, pp. 68&69 and Defendant's Exhibit No. 5). 6. The Complainant's electrical service was disconnected on September 26, 1984, and reconnected the same day after the Complainant requested a hearing alleging billing discrepancies. (Tr. 11, p. 70 & pp. 4&6). 7. A hearing was scheduled for October 3, 1984, and Complainant came to the Defendant's office but refused to speak to the managerial employee designated to hear the complaint. (Tr. 11, pp. 71&78). 8. The Complainant was mailed a Hearing Decision Notice on October 3, 1984, indicating the outcome of the hearing and that service would be terminated on October 11, 1984. (Tr. 11, pp. 71&72). 9. The Complainant filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission which arrived at the Commission on October 10, 1984, and she notified the Defendant's Legal Department that a complaint would be filed. (Tr. 11, p. 73). 10. The Defendant did not receive confirmation of the Complainant's filing of the appeal from the Commission until after business hours on October 11, 1984 and Complainant's electrical service was restored the following day. (Tr. 11, p. 73). 11. The Defendant had in its file a medical certificate, dated October 5, 1982, for Winifred Goudie, stating that she had a history of artery disease and heart failure which the Defendant treated as a statement that Complainant was permanently disabled. (Tr. 11, p. 73). 12. Defendant, subsequent to the termination of September 1984, received another medical certificate dated June 25, 1985, stating that PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VIROINIA -15-
termination of electric service would be particularly hazardous to Conplainant's health through June 4, 1986. (Tr. 11, p. 74). 13. Complainant did not provide any evidence that she had made any payments for which Defendant had not given her credit on the Installment Payment Agreement. (Tr. 11, pp. 25-46&75-88). 14. The Defendant has been providing the Complainant with Statements of Account separating her delinquent account from her current charges since September, 1984. (Tr. 11, p. 20). 15. The complainant could not show that she had made the September 10, 1984 payment on the September 8, 1983 Payment Agreement. (Tr. 11, p. 75). 16. The Complainant has made no payment on her Installment Payment Agreement or in payment of her current charges since August, 1985. (Tr. 11, pp. 48&49). 17. The Complainant's Statements of Account were acceptably clear in form and content. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1). 18. The Complainant presented to Defendant a Certificate of Eligibility for Winifred Goudie from the Department of Human Services for the month of March 1984 and no certificates were presented for other months in the 1983-1984 hearing season. (Tr. 11, p. 89). 19. Complainant received the reduced rate for low income residential customers in March, 1984. (Tr. 11, p. 30). 20. The Defendant did not receive Certificates of Eligibility from Complainant for the 1984-1985 or 1985-1986 heating seasons. (Tr. I, p. 130). rn PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION or WEST VIROINIA rn -16-
21. The Defendant accepted the Complainant's sworn statement that Marie Webster and Winifred Goudie were the same person. (Answer, Tr. 11, p. 90). 22. The Complainant presented no reasonable evidence that the meters of the Defendant were not read on a timely basis. 23. The Defendant tested the Complainant's meter on August 20, 1984 and results were within acceptable standards. (Tr., pp. 38&39). 24. The Defendant's employees read meters every two months or the billing was estimated by the computer and the estimated usage was noted on the billing. (Tr. I, pp. 48-50). 25. Pursuant to Complainant's inquiry, the Defendant's employee sent her a handful of brochures which did not provide the information she requested or provided it only partially. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Rule 4.08 entitles a customer to the entire scope of rights provided by the Rule only one time with regard to a particular delinquency or dispute. Tassone v. The Potomac Edison Company, Case No. 84-298-E-C, July 17, 1984; Massey v. Appalachian Power Company, Case No. 81-241-E-C, 69 ARPSCWV 1422 (1982); Goodwin v. Monongahela Power Company, Case No. 81-279-E-C, ARPSCWV 584 (1982). 2. When a customer enters into a deferred payment arrangement, pursuant to the terms of Rule 4.08, that customer is not entitled to reinvoke its provisions if the customer subsequently defaults on the deferred payment arrangement. - Id. 3. When a customer defaults on a deferred payment arrangement, entered into pursuant to Rule 4.08, that the customer is entitled only to 11 PUBLIC SCRVlCL COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA -17-
. written notice of the utility's intent to terminate service, since the customer has already received a Form 14 Notice pursuant to Rule 4.08, personal contact notice, and a meeting with the utility at which meeting the deferred payment arrangement was agreed upon by both parties. - Id. 4. In this case, the utility provided the customer with notice by personal contact after she had defaulted on the Installment Payment Agreement which was sufficient notice that termination would occur. 5. After default on an Installment Payment Agreement, the customer is not entitled to a review and appeal of the proposed termination. 6. The Complainant failed to convince the Examiner that the utili- ty's Statements of Account for Delinquency Purpose was inadequate because it stated clearly the date, the charges and the credits. 7. The Complainant did not prove that she had made any payments for which she had not been given credit. 8. Complainant was given the reduced rate for low-income residential customers in the one month when she provided a Certificate of Eligibility from the Department of Human Services. 9. Complainant did not provide Certificate of Eligibility from the Department of Human Services from other months, as is required for Defen- dant to give her reduced rates under West Virginia Code $24-2A-1. 10. The customer is entitled to a written or personal notice that termination will occur but is not entitled to any review or appeal rights under Rule 4.08 when service is to be terminated due to a default under an Installment Payment Agreement. 11. The Complainant did not prove that Defendant's meters were not read on a timely basis.?uillc SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VIROINIA -18-
12. Even though a customer has provided the utility a medical certification that termination of service would be hazardous to the customer's health, it does not prevent termination of service, although proper safeguards to give the customer adequate notice must be provided. 13. The Commission's Rule 4.08 is constitutional and was designed to a customer with the procedural safeguards required by Memphis Light and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). 14. The Defendant has been reasonable in accepting Medical Certifications for longer than a thirty day basis, when analysis of the individual cases justifies such conclusion. 15. A utility should respond to requests from customers for kilowatt information. 16. There was no showing that the Defendant intentionally did not provide the kilowatt information requested by Complainant. 17. The Complainant has stated no grounds in her complaint for which relief can or should be granted. ORDER IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the requests contained in the complaint dated October 10, 1984, of Marie Webster, also known as Winifred Goudie, against The Potomac Edison Company, are denied and the complaint is dismissed from the open docket of the Commission. The Executive Secretary is hereby ordered to serve a copy of this order upon the Commission by hand delivery, and upon all parties of record by United States Certified Mail, return receipt requested. Leave is hereby granted to the parties to file written exceptions supported by a brief with the Executive Secretary of the Commission within PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VlROlNlA -19- '1
' fifteen (15) days of the date this order is mailed. If exceptions are filed, the parties filing exceptions shall certify to the Executive Secretary that all parties of record have been served said exceptions. If no exceptions are so filed this order shall become the order of the Commission, without further action or order, five (5) days following the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen (15) day time period, unless it is ordered stayed or postponed by the Commission. Any party may request waiver of the right to file exceptions to a Hearing Examiner's Order by filing an appropriate petition in writing with the Secretary. No such waiver will be effective until approved by order of the Commission, nor shall any such waiver operate to make any Hearing Examiner's Order or Decision the order of the Commission sooner than five (5) days after approval of such waiver by the Commission. AR:jas Hearing Examiner PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION or wlst VIRQINIA -20-