CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE-ZONES: PAST LESSONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS MODERATOR: WILLIAM POTTER, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES SPEAKERS: JEAN DU PREEZ, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES SONIA FERNÁNDEZ-MORENO, AUTORIDAD REGULATORIA NUCLEAR, ARGENTINA AMBASSADOR SAMEH SHOUKRY, EMBASSY OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT COMMENTATOR: ARIEL LEVITE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 2009 Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.
WILLIAM POTTER: I m Bill Potter with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, and also have both the privilege and responsibility of chairing our panel this morning. The focus of the panel is on Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Past Lessons and Future Prospects. I ll be very brief by way of my introductory comments, and then turn the floor over to the panelists. I would like to observe, however, that nuclear-weapons-free zones are among the few disarmament and nonproliferation approaches that have shown considerable success in recent years and I would argue, also, retain significant promise looking forward. Indeed, much of the world is covered by nuclear-weapons-free zones, including the entire Southern Hemisphere. For those of you who may not have noted on our Web site or the Office of Disarmament Affairs Web site, and a few others I m pleased to report that on March 21st, just a few weeks ago, the Central Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone entered into force for the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. I note this, in part, because I closely followed and, in some respects, you could say participated in the negotiation of that zone, but also because of two unusual features of the Central Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone: one, a focus on remediating environmental damage caused by both nuclear-weapons testing and production, including uranium mining and milling; and secondly and this is a point that I think is important, but it s generally overlooked the requirement for parties to the zone to adhere to the Additional Protocol to the IAEA. Now the more difficult task remains of gaining support from the nuclear-weapons states, in the form of a protocol to the treaty, pledging negative-security assurances. Having been involved in this negotiation for the past dozen years, I can say, with some confidence, that there is truth to the old adage that, while nuclear-weapons states may pay lip service to the benefits of nuclear-weaponsfree zones, in practice they have rarely, if ever, found a zone that they really liked. Why, we may ask, is this the case? What accounts for the emergence of nuclear-weaponsfree zones in some regions and not in others? What are the prospects for new zones to enter into force, and to gain the important support of nuclear-weapons states for negative-security-assurance protocols? Why has the very important Road to Zero initiative, launched by the so-called Gang of Four, been virtually silent on nuclear-weapons-free zones as a practical measure in pursuit of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons? In addition to these general questions, I ve asked each of our expert speakers to address several issues specific to their region, and I ll mention them as I do the brief introductions. I ll first call upon Ms. Sonia Fernández-Moreno, who is senior advisor on nuclear affairs at the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Argentina, to speak about the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free-zone experience and its relevance to other regions. In particular, I ve asked Ms. Moreno to discuss the primary factors responsible for the adoption of the Tlatelolco Treaty; the benefits intended, and otherwise, that resulted from its entry
into force; and any lessons from the Latin American experience that she believes may be relevant to other regions where zones are currently being considered. I ll next turn to my Monterey colleague and former South African diplomat, Jean du Preez, to discuss Pelindaba: The End Game. I ve asked him to focus his remarks on why the African nuclear-weapons-free zone has not yet entered into force, more than a decade after it was open for signature, and, given recent momentum, to assess when the last two ratifications are likely. Last, but certainly not least, I ll call upon His Excellency Sameh Shoukry, Egyptian ambassador to the United States, to speak on the subject of Whither a Middle East Nuclear- Weapons-Free Zone? The topic is designed to encourage a sorting out of reality from rhetoric with respect to the potential for negotiation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, and to assess what might realistically be accomplished, and how best to move the process forward. Each of the panelists has been forewarned that they ll have no more than 12 minutes for their prepared remarks a time limit I will enforce stringently. Following the panel presentations, I ve been asked to provide Eli Levite with the opportunity to comment briefly from the floor, after which time I ll turn to the rest of the audience for questions. So let me first call upon Ms. Moreno to start us off here. SONIA FERNÁNDEZ-MORENO: Thank you very much, Dr. Potter, and good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let me first express my appreciation to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; not only for inviting me to share this important panel with distinguished speakers, but also for organizing a timely and significant encounter to discuss what is crucial for the peaceful development and expansion of nuclear energy, which is a nonproliferation and disarmament regime that really enjoys consensus and keeps us progressing towards total disarmament. The challenges facing in the nonproliferation and nuclear-disarmament regime need to be adequately and urgently addressed to ensure the legitimate peaceful uses of nuclear energy for future generations. To address the status and the value of NWFZs to non proliferation and to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and more generally to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction is then timely and relevant. Nuclear-weapons-free zones continue to be a promising approach to these aims. Since Tlatelolco Treaty was the first nuclear-weapons-free zone covering a vast populated region in the world, I will focus on the primary factors responsible for the adoption of that treaty; the benefits resulted from its entry into force and any lessons learnt from the Latin American and the Caribbean that may be relevant to other regions where zones or other mechanisms to address nuclear disarmament and non proliferation are being considered. It took almost 30 years the full realization of this treaty. It just entered into force in 2002 for the entire region, with the ratification of Cuba. First, and to better understand the primary factors that led to the establishment of Tlatelolco, let s place ourselves in the context existing at that time. Early attempts to establish a Latin American and Caribbean nuclear-weapons-free zone began as early as 1958. In 1963 the
General Assembly of the U.N. approved Resolution 1911, to progress with the idea of a nuclearweapons-free zone in the region. After four years of negotiation, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was open for signature, on February 14, 1967. Although the majority of states signed the treaty within the first year of its opening for signature, it took almost 30 years for the treaty to achieve universality in the entire zone. Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have agreed not to test, not to use, manufacture, produce or acquire nuclear weapons, or to receive, store, install or deploy nuclear weapons in their territory. To verify that each member state in the region is in compliance with these pledges, each state has to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards. In addition to the IAEA safeguards, the treaty also establishes a regional inspection organization, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean OPONAL. And, on top of it, then the two countries in the region with significant nuclear activities that is, Brazil and Argentina signed a bilateral agreement for peaceful uses of nuclear energy that establishes an independent agency ABACC for a reciprocal inspections regime. I think that this example is a good one to mention, as a contribution as a real concrete example on how this can be worked out. The treaty has certain characteristics that are related to its time. That means good ones: The Treaty is of permanent nature and it remains in force indefinitely. It was the first international treaty that attempted to define what the nuclear weapon is. That treaty also permits nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Today it maybe strange, but, at that time, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were deemed to be something to provide economical development and beneficial input for the industry. It is the first disarmament treaty which brings the five nuclear-weapon states to legally commit to respect the status of denuclearization of the region and also not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against contracting parties (negative security assurances). The treaty recognized the use of nuclear energy for peaceful applications. It requires a verification system, and IAEA full-scope safeguards. And, more importantly for other regions, this treaty can be amended and may enter into force for a state although all the conditions specified in Article 29 are not met, if that state just waives this article. You know that the Treaty has also two protocols one from the nuclear-weapons states not to attack, not to threaten to attack, with nuclear weapons, countries of the region. And another protocol for the countries extra continental countries that have some jurisdiction in the territories of the region. The two protocols were signed, and they were ratified and are in force. So we can say that the primary factors that led the agreement on Tlatelolco were, first, the idea of getting some security assurances that nuclear-weapon states will not attack or threaten to attach the states of the countries in the region. We must remember, at that time, that the Cold War was realized in Latin America with examples like the missile crisis in 1962. This, in addition with the general situation and the tensions surrounding the Cold War, and the relationship between the former Soviet Union and the U.S., took us to think that creating a region out and free of nuclear weapons could be not only for our security, but also a contribution to the imperative need to address nuclear disarmament.
Of course, the negotiations of the treaty were complex. The idea of a NWFZ in this area was shared by the vast majority of us. However, at the same time, it was certain concerns about the content of this agreement, in terms of the possible impact on the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses applications. So countries like mine, and others, were concerned about the scope of these obligations would, or may, impact on that peaceful development. In sum, it would be valid to say three main factors driving the Tlatelolco Treaty were: security of the nonnuclear-weapons states part of the NWFZ region; the assurances of nuclearenergy technology for peaceful uses; and the contribution of the NWFZ to international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. And here I would like to make some notes. I think that NWFZ are really a very big contribution to nonproliferation and disarmament. After Tlatelolco, four new NWFZ have been negotiated. However, such contribution and the importance of such endeavors are not fully recognized by the international community. And I think that we have to think what actions we can put in force, and in place, to fully recognize these efforts and these agreements. The lessons learned and experience to share some benefits for the region and for the world. First, despite the time and the complexities of the negotiation and interest in place, a nuclearweapons-free zone is achievable. And provide the main interested actors that means the countries engaged in the zone, but, more generally, to the total international community a tangible contribution to nuclear disarmament, peace and stability. And it also furthers nuclear cooperation for peaceful uses. Second, it is possible to accommodate different and even competing interests of other parties. All nuclear-weapons states have ratified the two protocols, committing themselves not to threaten, not to use, not to deploy nuclear weapons in the zone. The lesson that could be extracted, then, is the need of flexibility to negotiate and to agree on possible ways out. The third benefit is the existence of a system that verifies the fulfillment of the obligations of the treaty and that remains an essential requirement. The IAEA safeguards play a key role. And that can be enhanced further by the existence of building confidence measures between countries like the experience of Argentina and Brazil through the establishment of a bilateral agreement for the peaceful use of nuclear energy that created an independent organization, ABACC, which inspects both countries nuclear activities. This is a tangible contribution from two countries of the region to the nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaty, and also for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Fourth, the role of nuclear-weapons-free zones in strengthening the security of the states that belong to such zones were widely recognized also collected in Article 7 of the NPT. And, again in my view, there is a need to revisit to what extent the recognition has an expression in the real world. Political and regional tensions continue to be the main impediment to achieve more geographical areas free of nuclear weapons. However, I would say that we need also to revisit the role of nuclear weapons in international and national security, and the prestige and the value that we assign to these weapons to further the idea of having other nuclear-weapons-free zones.
The experience gained with Tlatelolco that does not allow for reservations, but conditions to enter into force can be waived, until the proper conditions are settled, is a good example on how to advance to a NWFZ full realization. ABACC and its bilateral safeguards together with regional cooperation are other good examples that could serve other regions and other problems. Tlatelolco also helps defining the principles and the guidelines for the establishing of other nuclear-weapons-free zones. As you remember, in 1999 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a report from the Commission of Disarmament about the guidelines and the principles that may be followed for other countries in a region to pursue a nuclear-weapons-free zone. And now, just to be a little bit provocative because I think I am approaching the end of my time and I think that maybe it s something to reflect. The weapon states, being de jure or de facto, have to reflect on how to include the concepts that we can bring from our experience as a nuclearweapons-free zone into their territories, under their jurisdiction or control anywhere. Questions for me are: Why it s not possible to apply this concept and related requirements to subzones in a country. Why not to work in separating the nuclear-weapons program from the civilian nuclear activities, in such a way that the civilian part becomes a nuclear-weapons free subzone? That would also help to minimize the differences in obligations in certain verification standards. I think that the Security Council and the U.N., in general, should work together in order to decrease the prestige and the security perceptions surrounding the possession of nuclear weapons. I think that we all share that nuclear-weapons-free zones are good contributions to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and for the security of the region, and adds to the security and stability of the world. It promotes dialogue between countries countries that share values and commonalities in their histories and culture, and countries that may have different interests. Therefore, to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free zone, there is a need of flexibility and recognition of the political environment and the political changes along the time. Graded or incremental approach to the zone may be a way to achieve it. It can start with a single country. We have an example with Mongolia. We can start, as Tlatelolco, having a full region, but having islands and just spots in the whole region until we reach, 30 years later, the whole region in force. And, therefore, I just want to end by saying that the most important lesson learned from Tlatelolco is that, despite complexities; regional tensions, political interests, perceptions about national and international security nuclear-weapons-free zones could take a long process of negotiation, but they have proven to constitute a tangible and substantive contribution to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Thank you very much. POTTER: Thank you, very much. And, also, thank you for adhering to the time restraints here. Jean, are you next? JEAN DU PREEZ: Thank you, Will and thank you, everyone, for attending this session. While slightly disappointed that the room is not as full as the previous session on the CTBT, I expect that, in about 10 years time, when we ve basically reached the same period, that the CTBT has been in discussion of about 50 or 60 years, that the room will be full of folks.
But, jokes aside, I also find myself in a slightly different, or a wrong venue, discussing the issue of Pelindaba. This discussion should, rather, be taking place in Addis Ababa than in Washington, D.C. The Pelindaba Treaty was negotiated we find ourselves at a point in time 50 years or so after the French tests in the Algerian desert. Twelve years after the treaty was finally negotiated on the site where South Africa enriched the uranium for its nuclear-weapon program at Pelindaba, the treaty has not yet entered into force. Yet, there s renewed hope that it will be soon be capable of doing that. Pelindaba, for the non-zulu speakers in the room, means the matter, or the discussion, is closed. It signals the end of a struggle to make Africa free of nuclear weapons, and legally make the Southern Hemisphere a de facto nuclear-weapons-free zone. For Africa and nations of the South, a nuclear-weapons-free world is no longer a Kilimanjaro shrouded in the mist, but a clear and scalable hilltop. To give its Zulu name true meaning would require entry into force. This would require 28 states, African states, to ratify the treaty. So far there are 26, so this is very reachable. But it also requires a full implementation of the treaty. By that I mean, in particular, the respect by all the nuclear-weapon states for African nations aspirations not to be threatened by nuclear weapon, and not to ever again have nuclear weapons tested on their soil. So far, the United States and Russia have refused to ratify the security-assurance protocol. Of less importance, but equally significant, is Spain s refusal to ratify the protocol on ex-territorial-state responsibilities. But why is an African nuclear-weapons-free zone important? Ambassador Shoukry is going to talk about the Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone that is an aspiration for a long time, and one can argue that is of crucial importance. So why is African one important? After all, South Africa gave up a small nuclear arsenal almost 20 years ago; the French stopped testing in Algeria many, many years ago; and all African states are NPT parties. And there s no concern at least, not that I ve heard recently of any of the African states harboring nuclear-weapon aspirations. So is the treaty only of symbolic value? I believe it is far from it. And I ll point out five concrete advantages of the treaty, which serve to enhance the objectives of the nuclearnonproliferation treaty. First of all, the Pelindaba Treaty represents a more balanced and comprehensive approach than the NPT. While reaffirming the NPT obligations not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and implement the comprehensive safeguards agreement, Pelindaba requires dismantlement and destruction of nuclear-explosive devices manufactured prior to entering into force, and to destroy and convert manufacturing facilities. So why is that important? Well, clearly, this is the first nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaty with this provision. And although South Africa already dismantled these nuclear weapons and if one would argue, which I dispute, that Libya had a nuclear-weapon program, then one can say this was relevant. The fact is, it sets a new standard. Will mentioned earlier the entry into force of the Central Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone. That also includes this new standard. And I believe this
new standard will be very useful in discussions and, eventually, negotiations of a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone. Some may argue that this disarmament provision is obsolete, and that, in fact, the Pelindaba treaty is nothing more than a treaty aimed at disarming the disarmed. I dispute that, and argue that these criticisms are baseless. All African states are already NPT parties. No additional safeguards are required that are already required by the NPT. And safeguards, in fact, are not a condition to membership of the Pelindaba treaty. In fact, the Pelindaba treaty states very clearly that 18 months it will allow an 18-month grace period for a state to implement safeguards in terms of the treaty. Interesting that there are 13 non-ratifying states, African states that already have comprehensive safeguards in place. So for them to ratify the Pelindaba treaty will be a relatively easy task. The second advantage is, the Pelindaba treaty, like other nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaties, represent a zonal approach to global nuclear elimination, by significantly shrinking the areas for which nuclear weapons are seen as a requirement for national or regional security. By linking the regional organization, as foreseen in the treaty, with the IAEA, this would, in actual fact, strength the IAEA s ability to ensure that nuclear disarmament in the region is complete. Such mechanism will provide enhanced confidence that all African states remain nuclearfree, but this model could also be used in the context of a future Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone. The Pelindaba Treaty will be a significant building block towards a world free of nuclear weapons, and, as such, will provide a powerful incentive for that 28th ratifying state to bring the treaty into force. But there s a tremendous amount of apathy, I think, amongst some African states, and some leading African states, about the treaty. Some believe, as I said earlier, that the treaty is aimed at disarming the disarmed. And I believe that the signal that this sends to other African states, who have not yet ratified, is a very negative one. The third element and this is, perhaps, the most important, from a political and security perspective is that the Pelindaba Treaty require the nuclear-weapon states to provide negativesecurity assurances to the states in the region. By bringing the treaty into force would increase the pressure on both the United States and Russia, which have not yet ratified this treaty. And while states such as South Africa, and Nigeria and others, have promoted, over the years, initiatives calling for global negative security-assurance measurements, the African nuclear-weapons-free zone treaty requires that already. The fourth advantage is that it would ban forever nuclear testing. Clearly, the CTBT does that, too but the CTBT is still some distance away from entry into force, while the African treaty is very close. And, finally, it provides for a more rigorous peaceful-use cooperation in nuclear science and technology than the NPT. In fact, the organization the African Commission on Nuclear Energy could serve a dual purpose. It could both serve as the implementation mechanism, as OPANAL does in the case of Tlatelolco, but it could also be used in combination with the IAEA perhaps a
future fuel bank to ensure that African nations interest, as far as nuclear energy, is adequately represented. And one can even go further, to foresee a link to a regional fuel center in Africa. So why, then, has African nations not ratified this treaty? There are many reasons. And I, of course for sake of time, I m going to be very brief. Firstly is competing priorities. I don t think anyone in this room will dispute the fact that African nations have many other priorities. Clearly, there are raging conflicts in Africa; there s the problem with poverty; scarce food and water resources. And then the proliferation of small weapons and light weapons that pose, for Africans, far more a threat than nuclear weapons. An AK-47 is a weapon of mass destruction in Africa, and not a nuclear weapon. The role of the African Union. The African Union is the depository of the treaty and, as such, it is expected to promote, actively, the treaty. Unfortunately, due to a lack of resources, as well as competing priorities, the African Union has not proactively been engaged in this up until now. Third, a lack of ratification infrastructure. Many African nations are also lacking the ability to implement Security Council Resolution 1540 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. And so the task not of the African Union, the IAEA, but other African states, and, indeed, other countries is to assist African countries to establish that infrastructure. And the misperception that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is a precondition for ratification. As already pointed out, that is not the case. Very important in my view, and Ambassador Shoukry may disagree, is the linkage with the Middle East. The fact that there s an overlap between Northern African states and the Pelindaba Treaty creates the perception that, since Egypt s stated position is that it will not ratify the Pelindaba Treaty until there is progress or, if not, a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone creates a perception among some states and in our consultation that has been clear that they believe: Well, this will mean that the African treaty will not enter into force. Despite Egypt s very important role in Africa, it s not a requirement for Egypt to be a party to the treaty for the treaty to enter into force. And then the first and this is the lack of nuclear disarmament. There is a lot of countries in Africa that believe why should they do more by entering into yet another obligation, if there is little progress on nuclear disarmament? And, hopefully, the statement by President Obama and, also, the Russian president will change this perception. POTTER: (Inaudible.) DU PREEZ: I ll wrap up. And then the final problem is the unwillingness of the United States and Russia to ratify the security-assurance protocol. And this message suggests that, despite being completely free of nuclear weapons, and not presenting any threat to any of the nuclearweapons states, African states may still be targeted by nuclear weapons. It is a complete illogical idea. And so African states may very well question why they should make the effort to ratify this treaty if these two states with the most nuclear weapons potentially could use their nuclear weapons against African states. And so while a little bit disappointed that, in President Obama s statement two days ago, there was not a clear indication that his administration would immediately seek
ratification of the Pelindaba Protocol, I think it s implied that a lot of changes will occur. And I look forward to one of those changes being ratification of the protocol. So, to conclude, to try and look forward, I think it s been very difficult to look in a crystal ball and predict when the treaty will enter into force. Mozambique and Ethiopia are the two states that have recently ratified, last year, and have set in motion sort of a new hope that there are only two more states. And, in fact, if one more state ratified, there will be a clear incentive for that one state. It could be the smallest state in Africa. In fact, it could be a non-state entity, because the Polisario Front is actually a signatory to the treaty. But the matter of nuclear weapons in Africa will not be closed without strong and enthusiastic drive by the capitals of the most influential African states. And I find that that is lacking at the moment. Equally so is lacking international attention. Africa is, yet again, becoming the forgotten continent. And the last piece of the puzzle in the Southern Hemisphere nuclearweapon-free is one or two states and, of course, the full implementation of the treaty. So the challenge is not as much, you know, what needs to be done to get the treaty to be implemented, but: Who will be that last state? If I were a betting man, which I m not, I would argue that Malawi and Zambia would be the two states that could be next. Two rather small countries and, in the nuclear-nonproliferation field, not countries that are very active but countries that could be remembered for bringing this treaty into force. And, of course, equally important would be the role of the rest of the world in particular, the nuclear-weapons states to ensure that African states continue to believe in the benefits that the treaty holds. If not, the matter of a nuclear-weapons-free Africa might, too, be simply a vision shrouded in the mist. Thank you. POTTER: Thank you very much, Jean. We turn next to Ambassador Shoukry. AMBASSADOR SAMEH SHOUKRY: Thank you very much, Professor Porter. And I d like, also, to thank the Carnegie Endowment for inviting me to attend this important function. I m sure everybody here recognizes that the establishment of nuclear-free zones was recognized, and thereby encouraged, by Article 7 of the NPT. Based upon that, Egypt has been actively pursuing the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East since 1974, and has been sponsoring a yearly resolution in the General Assembly since then which has, over time, achieved consensus within the international community. We ve broadened our commitment to ridding the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons, as well as all other weapons of mass destruction, by virtue of a presidential initiative, to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This initiative has also gained traction, and international recognition and support, and is repeatedly expressed in various fora related to disarmament and international security. Despite this, very little, if anything at all, has been achieved to fulfill these two objectives. The threats to international peace and security emanating from the Middle East are well-recognized. And this makes it even more fundamental that we strive to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone,
and thereby contend with some of the security perspectives of the region and security concerns of all states in an equal and effective manner. In addition to the current situation of the region, there is a continuing threat by the status of a single nonparticipant in the NPT nonparty to NPT Israel, which challenges the very credibility of the NPT regime and application of its universality. Hope was rekindled in 1995, during the review and extension conference of the NPT, when the resolution on the Middle East was endorsed by consensus. But, unfortunately, 14 years later one draws the conclusion that, though lip service has been paid both to the creation of the zone and to the resolution, very little, in terms of the international communities political will to effectively establish this zone, has been demonstrated. Not to mention, of course, the will of Israel. The initiative has been plagued by the increasing interjection of conditionality, which refers to the necessity that we achieve the optimum and ultimate security conditions in the region, before any serious contemplation of achieving, or creating, the zone could be embarked upon. This is simply a vicious circle. It contributes to create the stagnation we have to contend with. And emanates not only from Israel which might be recognized as having a vested interest to do so, so as to maintain its superiority, in terms of the acquisition of nuclear arsenal in the region, but is unfortunately now being promoted by many members of the Western European group who, while declaring their unwavering and absolute commitment to the principles of the NPT, in this case, seem to have a qualified opinion. The situation is quite important to contend with, especially at this juncture, by virtue of the threats that are emanating in the Middle East, and the situation in terms of the Iranian nuclear program. The initiatives of many countries of the region now to take advantage of the benefits, economic benefits, of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and, thereby, all should fall in our recognized objective of the creation of a zone that would deal with the security perspectives related to ridding the region of the potential of a nuclear-arms race, and, at the same time, providing a structure for greater confidence-building measures, and for the possibility of more stringent safeguards regime and control. As we are embarking on and very close to the NPT review cycle in terms of the 2010 review conference of the NPT, it is even more incumbent that we address the issue of the creation of the zone, and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution. Continuing to relegate this to lower, in terms of a priority and I can t even say priority, but to try to avoid having to deal with this important issue I think will have adverse effects on the continuing credibility of the regime, and the attachment of many to the package that was arrived at, in terms of the definite extension. If the NPT no longer serves and promotes the security interests of states in the region, I think we can recognize that this is an incentive might be considered an incentive to find other means to achieve those security concerns. This is certainly something that Egypt does not advocate, and is endeavoring to avoid, specifically by virtue of the establishment of the zone. The zone must be recognized as the only practical mechanism that will deal with these issues effectively and comprehensively. And we while at the same time recognizing the practical limitations in terms of the components that are necessary to create the zone, that, certainly, does not mean that within our
collective wisdom we cannot achieve certain progress cannot incrementally find the necessary tools to promote the ideal and to evolve it, so as to create the necessary conditions. So that when we are able to ascertain the full needs and the dimensions of the various parties of the region, that we may embark on the creation. So I believe, more than any time in the past, this is an issue that attracts greater international attention, and, thereby, we should redouble our efforts, so as to achieve progress in this regard. Thank you. POTTER: Thank you very much, Ambassador Shoukry. We are on time we may even be a few minutes ahead of time and I want to continue that kind of pace here. So, Eli, I ll give you a few moments, if you d like, to comment. ARIEL LEVITE: I think that there were great presentations laying out the issues, and revealing the differences between the various nuclear-weapons-free zones, so I ll just highlight them. I think that when it comes to the discussion of a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone on which, essentially, all of the parties in the Middle East agree there are fundamental difference in concept of what a nuclear-weapons-free zone is all about. Let me highlight, very quickly, a few of those fundamental differences. One is: Is this Zone a mechanical extension of the NPT to the region? Or with minor modifications, perhaps? Or is it a stand-alone instrument that has, by virtue, nature of the obligations or the verification regime whatever a fundamentally different character? I think there are significant differences on this point also within the Arab world, let between the Arabs and the Israelis. And, of course, the Iranians clearly have a view which is not consistent with the views of many of the Arab countries. And second is, do you rely on a global verification mechanism? And if you do, by what standard? And we already heard, for example, that Pelindaba had taken a very different approach than some of the other nuclear-weapons-free zones have taken. And if it is a global one, is the standard comprehensive safeguards? Is it the Additional Protocol or the Additional Protocol Plus? And so on. Do you go for a regional one, or do you go for a combination thereof such as we have heard in the case of a Latin American case, where the ABACC model is complemented with the IAEA. So this is a second major disagreement. A third one is: Can we agree on what is the geographical delineation of the Middle East? Is it meaningful as a geographical delineation of the Middle East, and where do you draw the line? The Egyptians, for example, have suggested there ought to be a core and there should be others, and so on. There is a clear disagreement on this issue. And, of course, related to that is: well, what is the role of the extraregionals? Which extraregionals count? Will the DPRK count in the Middle East? Will Pakistan count for the Middle East? And so on. A third issue. A fourth issue concerns the sequence, conditionality, pace and scope of the Zone. Just to point out the differences again, not unrelated to some of the issues that came up in other contexts: what is the linkage to the nonnuclear agenda be it NBC, the Mubarak initiative of a Weapons-of- Mass-Destruction-Free zone. Do ballistic missiles come into the equation? Do we actually talk
about some conventional armaments or other security issues, or do we try to somehow carve out the nuclear agenda and keep it separate? But I think that there is an even more interesting difference that is both absolutely fundamental and germane to the disagreements between the parties: whether you envision a process which starts, like, in Latin America, through mutual agreement, recognition, dialogue, commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes, nuclear CBMs CBMs like dialogue between nuclear societies of both parties that proceeds the nuclear-weapon-free zone, and that was the case that has made the ABACC possible. I think at the end of the day, the big question is do we look at this NWFZ as a culmination of a process or do we look at it as some kind of a mechanical imposition. And I think that when we look at the various examples that are in front of us, we see why there is such a difficulty in formulating a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. Thank you. POTTER: Thank you very much, Eli. Okay, we have a little bit over a half an hour for questions. So I ll ask you to line up behind the microphone, to identify yourself, to be brief in your questions, and I ll also ask my panelists here to try to be brief but responsive to the questions. Avner, you want to start us off here? Q: Sure. Sure, sure. It s more a comment. POTTER: Do you want to identify yourself? Q: I m Avner Cohen. I m currently the University of Maryland. I think that Eli was definitely right. There are right now a fundamental difference between priorities, interests, concepts between the two sides. I think that one of the issues that has not been fully explored for the last 20 or 30 years since the 70s is, and perhaps I think the issue is one of the questions is whether the Iran issue perhaps under some circumstances could help us to examine that, is whether there are ways to somewhat narrow that breach. I mean, the breach is huge. For example, are there any interim measures, not fully zone, you know, of free of weapons of mass destruction but perhaps elements of it, perhaps to try to think to explore modalities towards conditions, to have some more clarity how to go, perhaps an effort to try to draw a roadmap, perhaps to begin to look into elements like perhaps free of certain technologies, enrichment and reprocessing. I think under the present conditions with Iran, it s very, very and the current present of Iran, it s very, very difficult to create a situation that will be dialogue. But in principle perhaps under different political circumstances, there are rooms. So my question is to everybody, including Eli as the commentator, can you think about interim measures to try to explore and to advance that kind of approach? Thank you. POTTER: Thanks very much, Avner. Please.
AMB. SHOUKRY: Thank you very much. It s interesting that we seem to be emphasizing the differences, and seem to be emphasizing the difficulties, and not presenting any form of solution or mechanism to deal with those differences, and that is specifically why we had advocated for the for a conference under the auspices of the depositaries of the NPT or under the auspices of the B-5 in terms of their special responsibility to for international peace and security, and not necessarily within the context of the NPT but within the context of an international consensus that might be endorsed by the parties of the NPT and thereby provide the forum for discussing those differences. And there are many and varied, and nobody contends otherwise. But I think it is more effective if those differences and those different perceptions should be discussed somewhere rather than just advocated. We don t get anywhere if we don t advocate those discussions. And thereby the commitment, if the commitment is there and there is a recognition of the importance at one stage or another, then the faster conceive a mechanism to discuss those issues and possibly see where we can reach a convergence on some of the issues is the only way to proceed. POTTER: Thank you. Let me call upon Jean du Preez, who I might also note supervised an arms control negotiation simulation of a zone in the Middle East. I m not sure if that s what you re going to refer to, John, by way of a solution. DU PREEZ: No, I was not since I see one of our former students sitting in the front row here that actually chaired that simulation, Elena Hushbeck, I m going to actually pick up on this question that Avner raised and also what Eli mentioned. I think there are opportunities without getting involved in actual negotiations and without seeking the political endorsement of all of the parties in the Middle East to start negotiations, the opportunities to look at these things, at the prospects of a zone through informal consultations. And one can imagine and here I m purely speculative but imagine a situation where open-ended consultations could be held, hosted by a government in the Middle East, hosted by a regional organization in cooperation with a government in the Middle East, or in other combinations and even prominent think tanks, where the idea would be that it s open-ended, it s not binding on any party, but simply to look at the modalities. And some of these that Eli referred to are some of the ones that I think are very important, that what are the various options for the for what such a zone could look like. As far as the scope, what are the implications of having a zone that covers all weapons of mass destruction including delivery systems versus just a nuclear scope? What are the what would be the entry-into-force requirements of the zone, and how would that be linked with the verification requirements including additional protocol and perhaps even verification measures that goes beyond additional protocol? Will a regional organization be even more powerful than what the IAEA is at the moment given the suspicious of the IAEA perhaps? So I think that it would be very useful to have such a mechanism in place where when some of these issues are actually addressed that the political problems with such a zone may actually be easier to cope with. POTTER: Thank you very much. Next questioner please.
Q: My name is Cindy Vestergard. I m from the Danish Institute of International Studies. Two quick questions. One is how is it we ve now gone from a WMD free zone in the Middle East to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. This is something I m not quite understanding the disjointedness that has happened over the past few years on that by Egypt. And the second thing is: what are your thoughts on an arctic nuclear-weapons-free zone? AMB. SHOUKRY: Oh, being a part of the arctic, it certainly isn t supported. But we don t see any disconnect. If you would recognize that a weapon a zone free of weapons of mass destruction necessarily includes nuclear weapons. So there is no disconnect between the two initiatives. But having said that, I think it is it is recognized that the eminent danger is from nuclear weapons and not from other weapons, in addition to the fact that there is n ongoing for in the NPT, if you wish, where nuclear weapons are solely addressed, and thereby in the context of the review conference, in the context of the 1995 resolution, we must necessarily focus on a nuclear-weaponfree-zone. But having said that, there s nothing to preclude expanding that if the political will exists to address a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. But I think it all depends on the political will that exists and what is achievable within the context. Currently of the NPT I think it is more reasonable to focus on primarily the more dangerous of those weapons being nuclear weapons. POTTER: Did anyone want to pick up DU PREEZ: I ll just make a lighthearted comment about the arctic. I mean, I m not an environmental specialist. I m more familiar with the Antarctic treaty, which obviously is a nuclearweapon free zone by implication, but I think as global warming continues, we may not need an arctic free zone because there is already the Seabed Treaty that bands placement of nuclear weapons on a seabed. POTTER: Thank you, Jean. Next questioner. Q: My name is Howard Morland. I understand that the agreements between countries in Latin America and Africa, that sort of agreement is missing in the Middle East, but nonetheless, I still have my question about the targets, that Israel has nuclear weapons because somebody perceives that Israel has to be able to destroy things that can t be destroyed with conventional weapons. And when I was there in Israel in 71 and everybody was talking about Israel s new bomb, they were predicting that Cairo would be destroyed in the next Arab-Israeli war, which came in 73 without Cairo being destroyed, fortunately. But it seems there s very little that the neighbors can do to get rid of Israel s nuclear weapons. That debate has to take place in the United States and Israel. But I still question what are the targets that Israel has that requires it to have a nuclear arsenal because if there are no targets, then there s no reason to have nuclear weapons except sort of metaphysical reasons. But nuclear weapons are not metaphysical devices; they are devices. So it seems like we got to ask: what are Israel s nuclear targets?
POTTER: Okay, thank you. I m not sure that there s anyone on the panel here who is in a position to (laughter) to respond, but I would welcome anyone okay, why don t we put that one in our pocket, and we ll return to it if the spirit moves any of the panelists. The next questioner. Q: My name is Kai Maeda with the American University. My question is just simple. Is it possible to establish Northeast Asia nuclear weapons nuclear-weapon-free zone with South Korea and North Korea and Japan? POTTER: Jean, do you want to DU PREEZ: Sure, I ll including Japan might be more difficult I think than including North Korea because I think the North Korean issue is resolvable. Once North Korea is negotiations in the Six-Party talks and other venues resulting North Korea being free of nuclear weapons, the organization, the treaties already exist to make the Korean Peninsula a nuclearweapon-free zone. Adding Japan to it might be complicated, and it may also be against the spirit of the guidelines to establish nuclear free zones, which calls for a clearly defined region. Bringing Japan into that could be a little bit complicated. And of course then the whole issue of the nuclear umbrella in the case of Japan is complicated, and how the United States is viewed in sort of the seven principles of the United States that includes that such zones should not interfere with existing security arrangements, how that would complicate both in the case of Japan and South Korea. But I do believe that in the case of North and South Korea, you could establish a and I think that might actually be quicker to establish than the case of a Middle East nuclear weapon treaty. POTTER: Thank you. Our next questioner. Q: My name is Ruud Lubbers. I m Dutch. I have no affiliation. I m simply a have-been. I was a long-time prime minister of the Netherlands. I want to make a few remarks. First of all, I m really grateful for this session because I think that nuclear-weapon-free zones, which is discussed here, are a very relevant part of the total effort on the way to a global nuclear order. So this is my first just saying thanks. A second remark is that being Dutch, I grew up in Europe with a treaty which was called the Euratom Treaty. It still exists. It s not so well-known that in European countries beyond the nuclear capacity of France and the U.K., all fissile material for what we use to call atoms for peace have possessed not by countries by Euratom/European Union these days. So to make it a bit clear, when a country like Finland became a member of the European Union, they had to hand over procession of their fissile material, what they actually have. Now, I lived for decades with the struggle of the NPT. I think this is a wonderful treaty, a basic agreement with the two dimensions that the haves, in terms of nuclear arms promised to reduce and ultimately ban, and the have-nots to refrain. Now, many countries did efforts on that road. When I see the (inaudible) situation, I think time has come to urge the P-5 these are the