NOREWGIAN RENEWABLES POLICY Why did Norway first adopt and then do away with Green Certificates? Elin Lerum Boasson, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Senior Researcher CICERO Renewables workshop 21.06.16, Litteraturhuset
Content Why did Norway adopt a green certificate scheme, and why will it abolish it? Key economic-material features Organizational field explanation National political field explanation European environment explanation Preliminary conclusions
Norwegian support schemes 2001 Operation support scheme for wind introduced; competitive bidding, individual decisions on support level. Very few applicants. 2006 Failed Norwegian-Swedish certificate negotiations 2009 Agreement between Sweden on Norway 2012 Norwegian participation effectuated 2016 Majority of the Storting withdraws Norway from the certificate scheme in 2021
The 2016 shift implies Decreased degree of state steering Certificate scheme governed at arm s length Now renewables development will be left entirely (?) to market forces Economic criteria of paramount importance Only renewables project profitable in the Nordic electricity market will be realized Other Nordic countries will continue to have support schemes and hence possible investments will come here
Possible explanations - What can explain why a green certificate scheme was adopted and later done away with? - Direct responses to changes in materialeconomic conditions? - Structural or institutional changes in the organizational field? - Structural or institutional changes in the national political field? - Structural or institutional changes in the European environment?
The certificate scheme Common Swedish Norwegian objective of 26,4 TWh in 2020 More investments in Sweden than in Norway 2014: 3,3 TWh in Sweden and 0,8 TWh in Norway Investments in Norway Small hydro, not wind power in Norway No development of offshore wind or PV in Norway
Norwegain electricity prices - Source: SSB Norway
Certificate prices - Source: NVE/Energimyndigheten
The organizational field - Actors - The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, Enova and Statnett - 9 Electricity utilities with more than 2% market share, Statkraft has 35% - Electricity industry represented by Energy Norway.
The organizational field - Structural resources - Rather centralized authority distribution - The ministry is the dominant governmental actor - Statkraft dominant commercial actor, fully state owned - No renewables industry - Energy Norway follows Statkraft on renewables - Information gathered on two hands - Statkraft - The ministry and NVE
The organizational field - Institutional pattern - Institutional logics - Market dominant in large utilities - Minimizing societal costs dominant in governmental organizations - Technology development of less importance - Normative objectives - 2000 2010: Energy framed as a climate issue - 2010 2016: Energy increasingly framed as economic interest issue (?)
Organizational field influence Structural pattern Concentrated Distributed Institutional pattern One dominant professional logic, normative agreement 1) Segmentation 2010 2015: Norwegian organizational field (?) 2) Collaboration Several professional logics, normative conflict Strong policy impact 3) Turf Battle 2000 2010: Norwegian organizational field Intermediate mechanism Intermediate mechanism 4) Pluralism Weak policy Impact
National political field - Actors - 2000 2005: Shifting coalitions on renewables - 2005 1013: Labour, Socialist Left and the Centre Party in majority. - 2013 2016: Government of the Conservatives and the Progress Party, supported by the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. - Structural resources - Authority distribution: centralised with political leaders of ministry - Political competition - Electricity price: 2000-2005 - Renewables: 2006 2009 - No issue (?): 2010 2016
Political field influence Structural pattern Concentrated Distributed Institutional pattern Political Competition Garbage Can 1) Politicizing 2005-2010 Intermediate mechanism 3) Ministerial Governing 2000 2005 2010 2015 2) Legislation Governing Strong policy impact 4) Random Decision Making Weak policy Impact Intermediate mechanism
European influence Institutional pattern One Dominant Model/Policy Approach Structural pattern Structural power gathered in Brussels 1) EU Governs 2009 2015: RES objectives in 2009 RES directive 2014?: Environmental and Energy State Aid Guidelines Structural powers dispersed across Europe 2) Natural harmonization 1990 2010 Diffusion of Feed-in support schemes in Europe Different Models/Policy Approach National fields have little importance 3) Unpredictable EU Governing 2008 2014: Environmental State Aid Guidelines National fields are important National fields are important 4) Let a thousand flowers bloom National fields are important
Explanatory factors Time period 1990-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 Social sphere Political field Ministerial Governing Ministerial Governing Politicizing Ministerial Governing (?) Organizational field Segmentation Turf Battle Turf Battle Segmentation (?) European environment Let the 1000 flowers bloom Bottom up harmonization Unpredictable EU governing Transition to EU steering on state aid RESULT No operation support scheme renewables ENOVA scheme competitive bidding, individual treatment Green Certificate Scheme No operation support after 2021 unclear if anything new will be introduced
Preliminary conclusions - What can explain why a green certificate scheme was adopted and later done away with? - Structural or institutional changes in the organizational field: CONFIRMED - Structural or institutional changes in the national political field: NOT A MAJOR DRIVER, REACTIVE - Structural or institutional changes in the European environment: YES, BUT NORWAY HARDLY AFFECTED - Responses to material-economic conditions - Interpreted by organizational (and political) actors - Low prices may have resulted in other responses at other times in history
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