THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL JEFFREY A. SEGAL State University of New York, Stony Brook HAROLD J. SPAETH Michigan State University CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
List of tables and figures Preface 1 INTRODUCTION: SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING What courts do Judges as policy makers Reasons for judicial policy making Fundamental law Distrust of governmental power Federalism Separation of powers Judicial review The mythology of judging The federal and state judicial systems National supremacy The system of comity Sovereign immunity The full faith and credit clause Adequate and independent state grounds for decision Choice of law Summary Conclusions 2 MODELS OF DECISION MAKING The legal model Plain meaning Legislative and framers' intent Precedent Balancing Interpretivism The interpretivist position The non-interpretivist position The meaninglessness of the legal model The attitudinal model page xii XV 1 1 4 7 8 9 11 12 14 17 19 20 22 24 25 26 28 30 30 32 33 34 38 44 52 53 54 58 62 64
viii The legal realists The behavioralists The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model 3 A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT The first Supreme Court The Marshall Court Judicial supremacy National supremacy Federal power vis-a-vis that of the states The Civil War era The Taney Court The case of Scott v. Sandford Reconstruction Military justice Civil rights Fighting the welfare state Taxation Interstate commerce and other national powers Freedom of contract The court-packing plan The civil liberties agenda The preferred freedoms doctrine Incorporation of the Bill of Rights First Amendment freedoms Criminal procedure Equal protection Reapportionment The right to privacy The Supreme Court and the distribution of power, 1936-1991 The Curtiss-Wright case The Japanese internment cases The steel seizure case The Watergate tapes case The legislative veto case 4 STAFFING THE COURT Presidential selection Factors affecting nomination Senate confirmation The case studies 65 67 69 72 74 74 76 76 77 78 81 81 83 84 85 85 86 87 88 92 95 97 97 100 103 106 111 114 115 118 119 119 120 121 122 123 125 126 127 131 134
An aggregate analysis An individual-level analysis Appendix 4.1: Measuring constituent ideology, personal ideology, and ideological distance Appendix 4.2: Correlated error structures 5 GETTING INTO COURT Legal requirements Jurisdiction Standing to sue Jurisdiction over the parties Case selection Procedure Criteria for selection Effects of denial or dismissal The Supreme Court's caseload Which cases for decision Individual-level models Aggregate-level models Rehnquist Court affirmations Proposals for reform 6 THE DECISION ON THE MERITS Process Oral argument The conference The conference vote on the merits Fluidity and the attitudinal model The report (or final) vote on the merits Facts Attitudes Content analysis The source of attitudes Non-attitudinal factors and Supreme Court decisions Roles External influences The final decision on the merits: Conclusions Policy outputs Courts Justices Summary Appendix 6.1: Predicting the justices' votes ix 143 145 159 160 161 165 166 166 171 177 179 179 182 185 185 187 191 194 199 203 206 208 208 208 210 212 213 214 215 221 226 231 234 { 235; 237 ' 241 242 244 245 255 255
7 OPINION ASSIGNMENT AND OPINION COALITIONS Opinion assignment Assignment patterns Equality Ideology Important cases Opinion assignments and opinion coalitions Opinion coalitions Voting and opinion options Patterns of interagreement Who "influences" whom The failure of coalition formation Special concurrences Opinion assignees Opinion assigners Accommodation versus jurisprudential purity 8 THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY Dahl and his critics Judicial activism/restraint: Myth and reality > The independent regulatory commissions Considerations of economic federalism Civil liberties Support for the Solicitor General Access to the federal courts The accommodation of a restraintist reputation in the face of activist behavior Declarations of unconstitutionality Alterations of precedent The subordinate status of judicial restraint Reactions to the Court's decisions Congress President The public Conclusion 9 THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS A framework for understanding impact Result on the parties Compliance Impact Compliance Interpreting population 261 262 263 265 268 271 274 275 276 278 282 290 291 293 295 296 297 299 302 305 305 308 310 313 313 316 318 322 326 327 328 329 330 332 333 334 334 335 337 337 338
xi Implementing population 339 Potential reasons for noncompliance 342 Impact 345 Methodological problems 345 Case studies of impact 348 The Supreme Court and public opinion 353 Summary and conclusion 354 10 CONCLUSION: RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 356 The time-bound criticism 356 The institutional criticism 357 The absence of non-attitudinal factors 359 The Supreme Court is still a court 359 Circular reasoning 361 Anecdotal evidence 362 The failure of the legal model 362 APPENDIX: LOGIT ANALYSIS 364 The linear regression probability model 364 Statistical significance 365 The multivariate model 367 Mathematical problems 368 The logit model 370 Subject/name index 373 Case index 385