Liberal Democracy and Peace in South Africa

Liberal Democracy and Peace in South Africa

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND PEACE IN SOUTH AFRICA THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM AS DIGNITY PIERRE DU TOIT AND HENNIE KOTZÉ

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND PEACE IN SOUTH AFRICA Copyright Pierre du Toit and Hennie Kotzé, 2011. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2011 All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN in the United States a division of St. Martin s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-29176-2 DOI 10.1057/9780230116320 ISBN 978-0-230-11632-0 (ebook) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Du Toit, P. van der P. (Pierre) Liberal democracy and peace in South Africa : the pursuit of freedom as dignity / Pierre du Toit and Hennie Kotzé. p. cm. ISBN 978 0 230 10888 2 (alk. paper) 1. Democratization South Africa. 2. Toleration South Africa. 3. Peace-building South Africa. 4. South Africa Politics and government 1989 1994. 5. South Africa Politics and government 1994 I. Kotzé, H. J. (Hendrik Jacobus), 1947 II. Title. JQ1981.T65 2010 320.968 dc22 2010019215 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Transferred to Digital Printing 2012

Contents List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgments Introductory Comments vii xi xiii 1 Introduction 1 2 Democratization, Liberalization, and Pacification 13 3 The State as Guardian? 35 4 Society in Transition: An Overview 69 5 Interpersonal Relations: Trust, Tolerance, and Gender 91 6 Religion, Evil, and Liberalization 133 7 Outsiders 159 8 Conclusion 173 Technical Appendix: Technical and Methodological Notes and Explanation 207 Notes 221 Index 243

Figures and Tables Figures 3.1 Political fatalities in South Africa, 1984 1998 41 3.2 Public confidence in central state institutions by race, 1981 2006 44 3.3 Elite confidence in state institutions, 2000 2007 46 3.4 Public confidence in civil society by race, 1981 2006 48 3.5 Elite confidence in civil society, 2000 2007 49 3.6 Public perception of the legitimacy of democracy, 1995 2006 53 3.7 Elite and public perceptions of the legitimacy of democracy 54 3.8.1 Legal public protest propensity by race, 1981 2006 57 3.8.2 Illegal public protest propensity by race, 1981 2006 58 3.9 Legal protest propensity of elites and the public by race 59 4.1 Number of serious crimes reported, 1990 1997 82 4.2 International murder and attempted murder rates, 2004 (rate per 100,000 of population) 83 5.1 Generalized trust among the public by race, 1981 2006 94 5.2 Generalized trust among the public by religiosity, 1981 2006 96 5.3 Free- rider index of the public by race, 1981 2006 (Percentage very intolerant) 105 5.4 Permissiveness index of the public by race, 1981 2006 (Percentage very intolerant) 109 7.1 Public tolerance toward immigrants/foreign workers by race, 1995 2006 164 8.1 CART analysis death penalty (dependent variable) 178 8.2 Importance plot death penalty (dependent variable) 179 8.3 CART analysis elimination of evil threats (dependent variable) 182 8.4 Importance plot elimination of evil threats (dependent variable) 183 8.5 CART analysis immigration policy (dependent variable) 186 8.6 Importance plot immigration policy (dependent variable) 187

viii FIGURES AND TABLES Tables 3.1 Public confidence in state institutions by social class, 2006 47 3.2 Public confidence in civil society by social class, 2006 49 3.3 Public confidence in state and non- state institutions, 1981 2006 50 3.4 Elite confidence in state and non- state institutions, 2000 2007 51 3.5 Public perceptions of the legitimacy of democracy by race, 1995 2006 55 3.6 Elite and public rankings of essential characteristics in a democracy 56 3.7 Elite and public support for aspects of liberal democracy 56 3.8.1 Liberal (first choice) priorities of the public, 1990 2006 (first battery) 60 3.8.2 Liberal (first choice) priorities of the public, 1981 2006 (second battery) 60 3.8.3 Liberal (first choice) priorities of the public, 1990 2006 (third battery) 61 3.8.4 Elite and public assessment of democracy in South Africa 62 3.8.5 Public assessment of government delivery by race, 2006 63 3.9 Elite and public perceptions about the death penalty, by race 64 3.10 Elite perceptions about the death penalty, by sector, 2007 64 3.11 Elite perceptions about the death penalty, 1991 2007 65 3.12 Elite and public perceptions about the death penalty, by race and level of education 66 3.13 Public perceptions about the death penalty, by social class, 2006 66 4.1 Personal disposable income per head by race, 1960 and 2007, at 2000 constant prices 78 4.2 Changes in living conditions by household (actual numbers), 1996 2007 80 4.3 Contact crimes: Actual reported cases 1994/95 to 2007/08 82 4.4 Affirmative action and racial representativity in the SAPS and SANDF, March 2007: Actual employment and equity targets by race (Percentages) 87 5.1 Generalized trust among the public, 1981 2006 94 5.2 Generalized trust among elites by sector and religiosity, 2007 97 5.3 Interpersonal trust of elites and the public 98 5.4 Interpersonal trust of the public by race and social class, 2006 99 5.5 Interpersonal trust of elites by sector, 2007 100 5.6 Free- rider indicators of the public, 1981 2006 104 5.7 Free- rider index for the public, 1981 2006 104 5.8 Free- rider indicators of elites, 2000 2007 107 5.9 Permissiveness indicators of the public, 1981 2006 108 5.10 Permissiveness index for the public, 1981 2006 109

FIGURES AND TABLES ix 5.11 Permissiveness indicators of elites, 2000 2007 110 5.12 Permissiveness index for elites by sector and religiosity, 2007 111 5.13 Indicators of tolerance of people by the public, 1995 2006 112 5.14 Indexes for the public s tolerance of people, 1995 2006 113 5.15 Permissive outsiders index for the public by religiosity, 1995 2006 114 5.16 Permissive outsiders index for the public by race, 1995 2006 115 5.17 Tolerance among the public by social class, 2006 115 5.18 Public attitudes toward women wanting children as single parents, 1981 2006 118 5.19 Public attitudes toward men being given preference for jobs during employment scarcity 119 5.20 Public attitudes toward gender equality, 1995 2006 119 5.21 Public attitudes toward gender equality by race, 2006 120 5.22 Public attitudes toward gender equality by gender, 2006 121 5.23 Public attitudes toward gender equality by race and gender, 2006 122 5.24 Gender equality index by race and social class, 2006 123 5.25 Trust- tolerance matrix of the public toward people of a different race, 2006 131 6.1 Attendance at religious events by the public, 1981 2006 136 6.2 Religiosity of the public, 1981 2006 136 6.3 Practice of prayer/meditation among the public, 1981 2006 136 6.4 Importance of God among the public, 1981 2006 137 6.5 Religiousness index among the public by race and social class, 1981 2006 138 6.6 Public response pattern to items on Evil, 2006 146 6.7 Religious threat and religious policy support, public responses, 2006 147 6.8 Elite response pattern to items on Evil, 2007 147 6.9 Religious threat and religious policy support of the elites, 2007 148 6.10 Elite and public attitudes toward Evil 149 6.11 Religious threat and religious policy support (Percentage with high threat perception and low support for policy) 149 6.12 Religious threat perception of the public by social class, race, and religiosity, 2006 150 7.1 Public tolerance toward immigrants/foreign workers by social class, 2006 163 7.2 Policy preferences of the public toward foreigners, 1995 2006 165 7.3 Policy preference of the public toward foreigners by social class, 2006 165 7.4 Policy preferences of the public toward foreigners by race, 1995 2006 166 7.5 Elite tolerance toward immigrants/foreign workers, 2007 166

x FIGURES AND TABLES 7.6 Elite attitudes toward migration issues, 1995 and 1997 168 7.7 Elite preferences of authorities actions against illegals, 1995 170 8.1 Multivariate regression: Attitudes toward the death penalty relative to trust, tolerance, confidence, and socio- demographics 176 8.2 Multivariate regression: Attitudes toward the elimination of evil threats relative to trust, tolerance, confidence, and socio- demographics 180 8.3 Multivariate regression: Attitudes toward immigration policy relative to trust, tolerance, confidence, and socio- demographics 184

Acknowledgments We would like to express our gratitude to a number of institutions. Without their interest and assistance, this study would not have been possible. Our thanks go to the Open Society Foundation (OSF) whose generous support made possible the leverage funds for the fifth leg of the World Values Survey in South Africa in 2006. In many ways, the WVS has guided the elite survey and served as the foundation of this study. We would also like to extend our thanks to the National Business Initiative (NBI) for its recognition of the importance of values research. The NBI was instrumental in helping us to identify South Africa s top companies and putting us into contact with their CEOs and directors. In this vein, we wish to express our deep appreciation to the South African corporate sector and especially to Xstrata, Goldfields, and South African Breweries Limited for their financial support and contributions to the World Values and Elite studies. We are much indebted to the National Research Foundation (NRF) for their financial assistance and support for research initiatives such as this undertaken in South Africa. (Reference numbers: IFR2008052300019 and IFR2008051600007). Our thanks go to our colleagues in the international research unit, the Transformation Research Initiative (TRI) led by Prof Ursula van Beek, sponsored by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation in Stockholm. We also wish to acknowledge the financial support for the Elite study offered by Daimler-Fonds in Germany, which made it possible for us to include Sweden, Chile, Poland, Turkey, Germany, and South Korea in the study. A special word of mention and gratitude is extended to our colleagues: Prof Martin Kidd, Center for Statistical Consulting, who undertook the CART analysis for this study; and Prof Edwin Hees, who was responsible for language editing. With a data base comprising many surveys conducted over a number of decades, this project has been assisted by many researchers in a variety of ways. The decisive work was that of merging all the data sets into two manageable units for the Elite and Public surveys. Many have contributed to this effort; however, we single out Cindy Lee Steenekamp, researcher at the Center for

xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS International and Comparative Politics, as first among equals for her outstanding contribution to this project. Finally, we extend our thanks to the University of Stellenbosch, which not only functions as a home for the Center for International and Comparative Politics but also continues to financially support our research efforts. * * * Please note that any opinion, findings and conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this study are those of the authors and not of the abovementioned institutions and/or organizations, and they do not accept any liability in regard thereto.

Introductory Comments This book is an overview of the attitudes of both elites and the public before, during, and after South Africa s transition to democracy. This transition is both a process of democratization and of peace, and its success hinges on the establishment of a peaceful society in a consolidated democratic regime. Although analytically distinct, in practice these two objectives are intertwined, with the expectation that the structural changes that comprise the transition from the White authoritarian apartheid regime to the new democratic regime will yield changes in values and attitudes necessary for domestic peace. It is a widely held conviction that the spread of liberal values and attitudes are conducive to the pacification of societies emerging from civil conflict. We track some of these essential changes in values and attitudes that mark the transformation of South Africa to a more liberal society. * * * At the outset, it is necessary to mention three points of clarification regarding the Elite and Public attitudinal surveys. First, a note on terminology is appropriate. The race categories of Black/ African, Colored, White, and Indian/Asian were legal categories developed as cornerstones of the apartheid regime and legally defined in the Population Registration Act of 1950. These categories came to assume huge descriptive significance as they emerged through the years of apartheid rule to also connote disparities in wealth, social standing, and power. Even before the democratization of the regime in 1994, the legal standing of these categories was scrapped with the repeal of the Population Registration Act in 1991. The new rulers, the African National Congress (ANC), however, continue to use these categories in legislation, such as in the Employment Equity Act of 1998. In this study we therefore use the categories as listed above as descriptive categories only and not as an endorsement of any policy whatsoever. In the World Values Surveys the categories used are Black/White/Colored/Indian. Second, any interpretation of the 1981 data is done with caution as that data set was not representative of the adult population of South Africa and limited to mostly urban inhabitants and excluded those in the homelands.

xiv INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS Lastly, it should be stressed that this book incorporates an opinion-leader study, which implies that generalizations should not be made from elite opinion to the broader South African public. Generalizations are only possible from the World Values Surveys to the South African public.