Theorising the Democratic State. Elizabeth Frazer: Lecture 4. Who Rules? I

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Transcription:

Theorising the Democratic State Elizabeth Frazer: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~efrazer/default.htm Lecture 4 Who Rules? I

The Elite Theory of Government

Democratic Principles 1. Principle of autonomy: Individuals should participate in governing structures 2. Principle of collective self-government: People together should organise governing structures 3. Majoritarian principle: The alternative that has the support of the majority should be agreed to 4. Principle of representation: Where individuals cannot be directly involved in decision making and oversight their representatives act for them 5. Principle of autonomous formation of opinion: Nothing but the force of the better argument should persuade a person to change their mind 6. Principle of deliberation: The decision to pursue a course of action should be transparently and logically connected to the public reasons given in collective deliberation 7. Compare with: Principle of secret ballot: Individuals should form their preferences independently and autonomously; and express them in a voting procedure free of domination

Objection Voting systems typically deliver decisions which would not be the decision of the majority of the electorate

No method of aggregation of preferences (where more than 2 options) meets all these conditions: Kenneth Arrow b.1921 It copes with every possible individual ordering of options; Guarantees that if every voter prefers x to y, the outcome will rank x over y; The outcome rank ordering of each pair of options is not affected by the rank ordering of some other pair of options There is no dictator : someone whose preferences win out irrespective of what others prefer

Does Democracy always involve Dictatorship?

Thomas Hobbes 1588-1679 Leviathan pub: 1651

Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem: any voting system is liable to manipulation [Iain McLean Public Choice 1987]

Niccolo Machiavelli 1469-1527

Joseph Schumpeter 1883-1950

Schumpeter s criticism of traditional theories of democracy there is no common good no unique solution - that people can agree on even if some single solution were agreed on, there would be disagreement about how to pursue it autonomy conditions are not met in conditions of mass democracy in public decision making people are dominated by affect and failures of rationality public affairs are distant from the interest (and hence capacity) of individuals government needs to be conducted by experts

Schumpeter s new theory of democracy The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people s vote. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) NOT: People will x be done; select representatives to do x; BUT: People select a government; government makes policy and executes it.

What must be true about people, if Schumpeter s theory is valid? either there are two kinds of people: those who are and those who are not competent in public affairs; or some people are positioned in the social structure in such a way that they are close enough to public affairs so that their perspective on them is not different from their perspective on their personal affairs but: a necessary condition of attaining the power to govern is being willing to compete for authority

Schumpeterian citizens? If electors are as irrational as he argues, can they be relied upon to vote out bad governments? What education is needed for competence as a voter? Schumpeter: the same that is needed for competence as a consumer Freedom For Schumpeter this model of democracy is freedom maintaining; Freedom to choose occupation; to associate; to organise Freedom from public obligations Freedom to live a non-participatory life

Political Theory 1.Ideal: measures the distance between us and the ideal; tells us what the standard should be or what to aim at. 2. Non-ideal : Ideal constrained by what s possible (theory of least-worst, or 2 nd best) Description of how things are Does Schumpeter a. propose an alternative ideal model of democratic government? b. offer a non-ideal theory (theory of 2 nd best)? or c. offer a descriptive account of how things are, their implications and likely outcomes?