IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO: SC05-374 BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., vs. Petitioner, CAROLYN HOLMES, individually, and as Parent and Guardian of COREY HOLMES and COURTNEY HOLMES, Respondents. ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FOURTH DISTRICT RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON JURISDICTION HUNTER, WILLIAMS & LYNCH, P.A. Christopher J. Lynch, Esq. 66 West Flagler Street 8th Floor, Concord Building Miami, Florida 33130 Telephone: 305-371-1404 Fax: 305-371-1307 Counsel for Respondents
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION...4 STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS.4 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT..7 ARGUMENT SINCE THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW DOES NOT EXPRESSLY OR DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH A DECISION FROM THIS COURT ON THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW, CONFLICT JURISDICTION DOES NOT EXIST.9 CONCLUSION.13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..14 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 14 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE Adams v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 296 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1974)..10 American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1986) 12 Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1959) 8 Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1986)...6 City of Jacksonville v. Florida First Nat l Bank of Jacksonville, 339 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1976) 9 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Palank, 743 So.2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).6 Department of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Nat l Adopt Counsl, Serv 498 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1986) 9 Department of Revenue v. Johnson, 442 So.2d 950 (Fla. 1982)...13 GMC v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)..6 Owens - Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1999)...6 Reaves v. State, 405 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1986).9 Times Publ. Co. v. Russell, 615 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1993)...9 White Constr. Co. Inc. v. Dupont, 455 So.2d 1926 (Fla. 1984) 12 W.R. Grace & Co. - Conn. v. Waters, 638 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1994) 12 3
INTRODUCTION In this brief, Petitioner, BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., will be referred to by name or as Petitioner, while the Respondents, CAROLYN HOLMES, individually, and as parent and guardian of COREY HOLMES and COURTNEY HOLMES, will be referred to collectively as the HOLMES or Respondents. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS By pure chance, and unlike numbers of others before them, the HOLMES escaped death and catastrophic personal injuries when, in October of 1999, their Ford Explorer, equipped with Firestone Radial ATX P235-75R15 tires, rolled over as a result of tread separation. The HOLMES subsequently sued BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE for product liability based on failure to warn of a known defect - tread separation under normal use - and strict liability. After the HOLMES prevailed in their action, HOLMES appealed the trial court s denial of their motion to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages. 1 Following de novo review of the trial court s denial 1 Petitioner was found to be 20% at fault, while a non-party, Olson tires, was found to be 80% at fault. Olson had inspected the tires shortly before the accident and had failed to warn of the defect. This is hardly a finding that Firestone had virtually no responsibility for Plaintiff s injuries. (Petitioner s Brief page 3). 4
of the motion to amend, the Fourth District reversed indicating, in material part: Plaintiffs moved to add a claim for punitive damages to their complaint in December, 2001 and the motion was heard by the court in January, 2002. The information attached to the motion came entirely from the website of Public Citizen, http://www.citizens.org/autosafety/articles.cfm?id=5336). There was a summary entitled Public Citizen Chronology of Firestone/Ford Knowledge of Tire Safety Defect. Public Citizen is a non-profit consumer advocacy organization founded by Ralph Nader in 1971. The chronology purports to describe the content of Ford and Firestone memos and letters, as well as actions taken by governmental agencies, which showed that Firestone knew about the tread separation problem long before the tires were recalled. Ford and Firestone were experiencing problems with these tires in other countries with warm climates during the 1990s. The first lawsuit alleging a tire separation of this tire on an Explorer was filed in 1992... Holmes v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 891 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The Fourth District s brief summary of Firestone s knowledge of the defect and the suits and complaints claiming serious personal injuries, 5
constitutes just that - a summary or outline of the facts proffered by the HOLMES. Thus, the Fourth District s opinion cannot be construed as an exhaustive explanation or expression of the extent of Petitioner s knowledge of the defect prior to the HOLMES accident. Suffice it to say that based on the proffer, the Fourth District concluded: We agree with plaintiffs that the proffer reflected the facts from which it could be found that Firestone knew about the tread separation, but delayed warning the public in order to protect its own financial interests. Such a finding would support punitive damages. Owens - Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1999); GMC v. McGee, 837 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Palank, 743 So.2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). There was accordingly a reasonably showing under the statute, and the amendment should have been permitted. The Petitioner now seeks to invoke this Court s discretionary jurisdiction arguing that the Fourth District s decision expressly and directly conflicts with this Court s decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1986). For the reasons which follow, BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE s petition should be denied. 6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT There can be no conflict jurisdiction in this case, since on its face, the decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal under review, does not expressly or directly conflict with any decision of this Court on the same question of law, which it must, in order for discretionary conflict jurisdiction to exist. Specifically, Holmes does not either: (1) announce a rule of law that conflicts with this Court s decision in Chrysler v. Wolmer, or (2) apply a rule of law to substantially the same controlling facts, outlined in Chrysler v. Wolmer, to produce a different result. In fact, contrary to BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE s contention, Holmes does not in any way, shape or form, announce a new rule of law or standard for punitive damages. Rather, the Fourth District, through the de novo review process, applied existing Florida law, in the form of 768.72 Fla. Stat (2000), and this Court s decision in Owens - Corning Fiberglass Corp v. Ballard, to conclude that the proffered facts would support a punitive damage claim. Accordingly, since Holmes v. Bridgestone/Firestone expressly applies existing Florida Supreme Court and statutory standards, and since BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE does not otherwise contend that the Fourth 7
District s application of the established rule of law to the facts of this case produced a different result than that which occurred in Chrysler v. Wolmer, or other decisions of this Court involving substantially similar facts, the petition for review should be denied. 8
ARGUMENT SINCE THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW DOES NOT EXPRESSLY OR DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH A DECISION FROM THIS COURT ON THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW, CONFLICT JURISDICTION DOES NOT EXIST Article V, Section 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution, permits the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction only where, unlike here, the decision under review expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of this Court, on the same question of law. See also, Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(IV). The conflict must appear on the face of the different decisions, within the four corners of the majority decision and inherent or implied conflict is not a basis for jurisdiction. Reaves v. State, 405 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986); see also, Department of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Nat l Adopt Counsl, Serv., 498 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1986) (finding no express and direct conflict and dismissing petition for review); Times Publ. Co. v. Russell, 615 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1993) (declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction to decide case that did not present the necessary express and direct conflict). Further, the general rule is that conflict may exist either (1) where an announced rule of law conflicts with other appellate expressions of law, or (2) where a rule of law is applied to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same controlling facts as a prior case. City 9
of Jacksonville v. Florida First Nat l Bank of Jacksonville, 339 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1976), quoting Adams v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 296 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1974). In support of its efforts to invoke this Court s discretionary jurisdiction, Petitioner in effect argues that the first basis for jurisdiction is present because the Fourth District s ruling in Holmes announced a rule of law which conflicts with the rule of law announced in Chrysler. Petitioner repeatedly and inaccurately contends, that as a result of Holmes, punitive damages may now be pled whenever a manufacturer knows about a defect and delays warning the public - a standard which, in Petitioner s view, will result in punitive damages claims in virtually all product liability cases. (Emphasis in Petitioner s brief page 5). However, not even the most biased and twisted reading of the Fourth District s decision in Holmes would lead one to conclude that the Fourth District has propounded a new standard or threshold for obtaining punitive damages in Florida. While thefourth District s opinion does not outline, in its entirety, the extensive information contained in the proffer submitted by the HOLMES to the trial court, the Fourth District did nonetheless indicate that there were prior lawsuits; that Petitioner knew of the defect; that Petitioner delayed warning the public in order to protects its own 10
financial interests; and that the tires were not recalled until subsequent to the HOLMES accident - well after the first problems were documented. In concluding that these facts and the additional facts proffered supported a claim for punitive damages, the Fourth District relied on the applicable statute; this Court s decision in Owens -Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Ballard; as well as two Fourth District decisions, GMC v. McGee and CSX Transp. Inc., v. Palank. It is interesting to note that Petitioner does not contend that the Fourth District s decision conflicts with this Court s decision in Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., which appears to be the most recent interpretation by this Court of the punitive damage standard. And, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., in turn, did not announce any new standard for punitive damages but rather relied upon existing Florida cases, including Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, which have consistently restated the recognized standard. This Court has consistently maintained the rule that no matter what label is used to characterize tortious conduct, punitive damages may be awarded only when the tortious conduct rises to the level of conduct which is fraudulent, malicious, deliberately violent or oppressive or committed with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard for the rights and safety of others. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Ballard; W.R. 11
Grace & Co. - Conn. v. Waters, 638 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1994); Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer; American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1986); White Constr. Co. Inc. v. Dupont, 455 So.2d 1926 (Fla. 1984); Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1959). Again, nowhere on the face of the decision in Holmes, is there any indication that the court was announcing a new rule of law which departs from the above standard. Rather, as stated previously, the Fourth District simply applied the above standard to the proffered facts to reach its result. Further, this is not a case in which the court has reached a different result from that reached by this Court in a case involving the same controlling facts. For example, the facts in this case are readily distinguishable from those in Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer. The obvious reason is, as the Fourth District outlined in its opinion, the proffered facts demonstrated that there was a defect; that the Petitioner was aware of the defect and the resulting injuries; and rather than taking appropriate steps to avoid future injuries or deaths, the Petitioner, motivated by its own financial interests, chose to remain silent. Parenthetically, in Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, this Court emphasized that the evidence did not support the inference that the defendant Chrysler had actual knowledge that the alleged defect was inherently dangerous. As such, 12
this Court concluded that the facts simply did not support a claim for punitive damages. Thus there also can be a no express and direct conflict between Holmes and Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, based on the assertion that the two courts reached different results on the same controlling facts. See Department of Revenue v. Johnson, 442 So.2d 950 (Fla. 1982) (where cause was before the court on apparent conflict, but cause was distinguishable on its facts, the Supreme Court would discharge jurisdiction). CONCLUSION In Holmes the Fourth District applied the well-established standard for punitive damages properly concluding that the proffer demonstrated, as required, Petitioner s wanton disregard for the rights and safety of others. The standard applied by the court was not novel and because Petitioner s conduct, outlined by the proffer, was so unusually and significantly egregious, the ruling will not open the floodgates. The petition should therefore be denied. 13
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent by U.S. Mail to all counsel on attached mailing list this 29 day April, 2005. HUNTER, WILLIAMS & LYNCH, P.A. 8th Floor, Concord Bldg. 66 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 By: CHRISTOPHER J. LYNCH CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Respondents Brief on Jurisdiction was prepared in 14-point Time New Roman font. By: CHRISTOPHER J. LYNCH 14