E-Filed Document Sep 16 2014 12:20:19 2013-CA-01986 Pages: 9 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI RAVEL WILLIAMS APPELLANT VS. NO. 2013-CA-01986 STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE APPELLEE DOES NOT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSISSIPPI BAR NO. 9390 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MS 39205-0220 TELEPHONE: (601) 359-3680
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... ii STATEMENT OF THE CASE...1 STATEMENT OF FACTS...1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT...2 ARGUMENT...2 ISSUE I. THE APPLICATION OF MISSISSIPPI S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION....2 CONCLUSION...5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...6 i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, 175 (2003).............. 3 STATE CASES Garrison v. State, 950 So.2d 990, 992-993 (Miss. 2006).............................. 3 State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 614 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2005)........................... 2, 3 FEDERAL STATUTES 42 U.S.C. 14071-14072...2 STATE STATUTES Miss Code Ann 45-33-21...1 Miss Code Ann. 45-33-23(g)(ii)...3 Miss. Code Ann. 45-33-23(g)...3 Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-65(1)(b)...3 ii
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI RAVEL WILLIAMS APPELLANT VS. NO. 2013-CA-01986 STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner Williams was indicted for rape in a multi-count indictment in 1991. C.p.11-12. Williams pled guilty and was sentenced to 12 years with six suspended and with six to serve. After having served his time, the Mississippi Legislature passed a sex offender registration law, Miss Code Ann 45-33-21 et seq, requiring defendant to register as a sex offender. Williams petitioned the Circuit Court of Coahoma County seeking relief from the continuing duty to register as a sex offender. The trial court denied relief (Court order, c.p. 26-28). It is from that order denying relief Petitioner noticed this instant appeal. (C.p. 29-30). STATEMENT OF FACTS As best as can be determined from the limited record and posture of this record, defendant has dutifully fulfilled his obligation to register as a sex offender since required by law. (Order denying relief, c.p. 28). 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Issue I. The application of Mississippi s Sex Offender registration Law does not Violate the Ex post Facto clause of the Constitution. The Mississippi Supreme Court, following the rationale of the US Supreme Court, has clearly held that Mississippi s Statutory Sex Offender Registration does not violate an ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Further, the Statutory provision that defines exceptions to sex offender registration is based upon more that just the age of the offender. The law under which Williams pled guilty, based upon his age and the age of the victim, is not an exception to registration. ARGUMENT Issue I. The application of Mississippi s Sex Offender registration Law does not Violate the Ex post Facto clause of the Constitution. Petitioner Williams seeks relief in two ways, 1) claiming Mississippi s Sex Offender Registration law violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution; and, 2) that a subsequent amendment to the statute relieved him of the duty to register. As to the first question, as the state presented in response to the petition and as the court relied upon in its order denying relief, the Mississippi Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court have ruled that such sex offender registration laws are applicable retroactively and are not an impermissive ex post facto violation of the Constitution. 4. In 1994, Congress enacted legislation that conditioned continued federal funding of state law enforcement on state adoption of sex offender registration laws and set minimum standards for such state programs. State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 614 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2005). See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 14071-14072. Further, the United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged, by 1996, every State, the 2
District of Columbia, and the Federal Government had enacted some variation of [a sex offender registration and community notification program]. 614 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, 175 (2003) (holding that Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act is nonpunitive; thus, its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution)). The Mississippi statute is analogous to that of Alaska in that it establishes a civil, non-punitive regulatory scheme. The holding of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe is applicable in the case sub judice. Accordingly, Garrison's ex post facto argument is without merit. Garrison v. State, 950 So.2d 990, 992-993 (Miss. 2006) So, as the State argued at the trial level, and as the judge noted and quoted, the law in Mississippi is that our sex offender registration statutory scheme does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. As to Petitioner s second argument, he asserts that the statute to which he pled guilty was later revised and that under the revised Statute, Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-65(1)(b), he would not be required to register as it is exempted by Miss Code Ann. 45-33-23(g)(ii), claiming, based on his age alone, he is exempt from registration. So, looking to the Statute under which he seeks relief: Miss Code Ann. 45-33-23(g)(ii), in pertinent part to this argument states:...(g) "Sex offense" or "registrable offense" means any of the following offenses: (i) Section 97-3-53 relating to kidnapping, if the victim was below the age of eighteen (18); (ii) Section 97-3-65 relating to rape; however, conviction or adjudication under Section 97-3-65(1)(a) when the offender was eighteen (18) years of age or younger at the time of the alleged offense, shall not be a registrable sex offense; Miss. Code Ann. 45-33-23(g) Petitioner Williams grasps onto the phrase... however, conviction or adjudication under Section 97-3-65(1)(a) when the offender was eighteen (18) years of age or younger at the time of the alleged offense, shall not be a registrable sex offense; and claims his conviction fits that provision. 3
Specifically by claiming his age at the time (age of the offender) was less than 18 years of age so he need not register. The position of the State at trial level and in the ruling of the Court is that William s conviction did not fall within the definition of 97-3-65(1)(a) (as there was no such section at the time of his crime and plea) and even if the facts of his case were applied to the law of today, he still would not be eligible as his facts fit the current definition of 97-3-65(b). Williams forgets that it is more than just the age of the offender taken into consideration, you must also take into account the age of the victim. Which by Williams' own admission was ten years of age. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in ruling that Mississippi s Sex offender registration is not an ex post facto violation of the Constitution and that the code section under which Williams sought relief claiming his offense was a non-registerable offense (because of his age alone) is flawed and without merit. The trial Court was correct in denying relief and no relief should now be granted on this claim of trial court error. 4
CONCLUSION Based on the arguments presented supporting the well reasoned order of the trial court, the State would ask this Court to affirm the ruling of the lower court in denying Williams from sex offender registration. Respectfully submitted, JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MS 39205-0220 TELEPHONE: (601) 359-3680 BY: /s/ Jeffrey A. Klingfuss JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MISSISSIPPI BAR NO. 9390 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS, hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed the foregoing pleading or other paper with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system which sent notification of such filing to the following: Further, I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-mec participants: Honorable Johnnie E. Walls, Jr. Circuit Court Judge P.O. Box 548 Cleveland, MS 38732 Honorable Brenda Mitchell District Attorney P.O. Box 848 Cleveland, MS 38732 Azki Shah, Esq. P.O. Box 487 Clarksdale, MS 38614 This the 16th day of September, 2014. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 220 JACKSON, MS 39205-0220 TELEPHONE NO. 602-359-3680 FAX NO. 601-576-2420 Email: /s/ Jeffrey A. Klingfuss JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 6