Introduction FHSMUN 36 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOURTH COMMITTEE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS Author: Brian D. Sutliff While UN peacekeeping missions generate the greatest press and criticism about the U N System s work, special political missions are designed to assist the UN in achieving conflict resolution, and, in the best of circumstances, prevention. Understanding the substantive differences between peacekeeping and related peace operations and special political missions is essential to ensuring that all of these missions and operations are ultimately as successful as possible. Special political missions can be broadly defined as United Nations civilian missions that are deployed for a limited duration to support Member States in good offices, conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. 1 In addition, special political missions have political engagement in the form of good offices, mediation or facilitation at their very core. The majority of political missions are specifically mandate to conduct this kind of work, including for example the UN Missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 2 As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted in second report to the General Assembly about special political missions, these missions now routinely carry out multidimensional mandates that go beyond their traditional political functions to cover activities in areas such as rule of law, constitutional and electoral assistance, human rights, security sector reform, gender and conflict-related sexual violence. 3 Delegates to the General Assembly Fourth Committee (GA 4) will need to examine the successes and failures of current and previous special political missions as well as the increasing demands and expectations placed on these missions. Furthermore, the General Assembly Fourth Committee must also consider whether the current operational framework is optimal for ensuring the greatest degrees of success possible for these missions or whether the UN System would benefit from revising its existing arrangements for special political missions. Evolution of Special Political Missions While the good offices functions of the UN System have been a vital part of the Organization s activities since its founding in the 1940s, special political missions (SPMs) became a much more integral component of the UN s diplomatic activities after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Over the past 25 years, the UN has deployed more special political 1 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Political Missions 2013 p. 2. 2 Alischa Kugel, No helmets, just suits: Political missions as an instrument of the UN Security Council for civilian conflict management March 2011 p. 2. 3 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions A/69/325 August 18, 2014 p. 10.
missions (SPMs) and as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently noted the mandates of the missions have become significantly more complex than they were at the outset, when they had primarily reporting and monitoring tasks. 4 Special political missions are also expected to work closely with host governments and regional organizations, all of whom have specific foreign policy goals that may at times coincide, and at other times conflict, with the goals and mandates of the special political missions (SPMs). You ve Been Clusterstruck! 5 : Types of Special Political Missions Special political missions are currently grouped in three main clusters: special envoys; sanctions panels and monitoring groups; and field-based missions. Each of these types of missions builds upon the overall legitimacy of the UN System as well as the good offices functions of the Secretariat. The envoys of the Secretary-General, sometimes designated Special Representatives (SRSGs), are amongst the most well-known of the special political missions, particularly when the Secretary-General appoints an especially well-known diplomat, such as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan or former UN UnderSecretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi. Less well known, but equally important, is the conflict prevention work of regional offices and resident political missions. 6 Sanctions and monitoring groups are often directly affiliated with the Security Council, particularly as sanctions must be approved by the Security Council. Field-based missions are also now emerging as a critical component of conflict resolution and prevention, particularly in the context of the winding down or ending of peacekeeping missions. Alischa Kugel warns, though, that political missions are unlikely to replace peacekeeping operations and should not be seen as a panacea to conflict resolution. 7 As of July 31, 2014, the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) administered 11 special political missions that featured Special Envoys: for Cyprus; for the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa; for Myanmar; on the Prevention of Genocide; for Sudan and South Sudan; for Syria; for Western Sahara; for Yemen; on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (S/RES/1559), dealing with Lebanon; and representing the UN at the Geneva International Discussions. 12 Sanctions panels and monitoring groups were also being administered: on Somalia and Eritrea; on Cote d Ivoire; on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); on the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK); on Iran; on Liberia; on Libya; on Sudan; on Security Council resolution 1526 (S/RES/1526) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) Executive Directorate; on Security Council resolution 1540 (S/RES/1540) concerning the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD); on the Central African Republic (CAR); and on Yemen. The UN also administered 14 field-based missions: Lebanon; the Middle East Peace Process; Afghanistan; Iraq; Somalia; Guinea-Bissau; Burundi; Central Africa; West Africa; the African Union (AU); Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission; Libya; and a joint mission with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab 4 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Political Missions 2013 p. 13. 5 With all due reverence and gratitude to AC/DC s Thunderstruck. AC/DC, The Razor s Edge Epic Records 1990. 6 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Political Missions 2013 p. 8. 7 Alischa Kugel, No helmets, just suits March 2011 p. 1.
Republic. 8 This list of 37 special political missions (SPMs), 33 of which are authorized by the Security Council and 4 which are authorized by the General Assembly, clearly indicates that special political missions (SPMs) are being employed to improve the prospects for peaceful resolution of conflict and post-conflict situations throughout the world. While it is also evident that increasingly, special political missions operate in environments where transnational organized crime and drug trafficking constitute a main driver of instability, yet, even in instances when the odds of success seem very low, the continued political engagement of the United Nations is important. 9 Obstacles to Success Achieving peace, or at the very least a cessation of armed conflict, is often a very complicated and time-consuming task. Compared to peacekeeping missions that cost $7.9 billion USD in 2009-2010, political missions operate on a shoestring budget. 10 Furthermore, while most special missions are established by the Security Council, all of them are funded through the regular budget of the United Nations, constituting what a Brazilian delegate recently termed the single most important distortion in the budgetary process. 11 One of the main remedies advocated by many countries is the establishment of a dedicated fund for special political missions. While establishing a dedicated fund for special political missions appears to be a vital piece of any comprehensive solution to strengthening and improving the performances of these missions, it is vital that GA 4 delegates not become bogged down in exhausting, and potentially fruitless, discussions of the intricacies of specific assessments. A more viable solution may be to propose that the General Assembly establish a voluntary fund for special political missions and encourage all countries to contribute. Staffing of special political missions is another key area that, when done properly, vastly enhances the effectiveness of any mission but can present particular difficulties. Alischa Kugel notes that problems with staffing also extend to the field, although they are not always of a financial nature but also stem from managerial difficulties and inadequate recruitment practices. 12 A related staffing problem is that the primary staffing countries overwhelmingly come from more highly developed countries in the global North, with the United States and the United Kingdom occupying the top 2 positions for civilian staffers on special political missions (SPMs) with Brazil sending only 4 staff personnel and China only 1 as of early 2010. 13 As will be detailed below, though, the UN has taken some vital steps towards remedying staffing problems, including at least partially redressing traditional gender imbalances for personnel, particularly in senior leadership positions. Special political missions also face further difficulties as these missions now routinely carry out multidimensional mandates that go beyond their traditional political functions to cover activities in areas such as rule of law, constitutional and electoral assistance, human rights, 8 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions A/69/325 August 18, 2014 pp. 12-13. 9 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Political Missions 2013 p. 10. 10 Alischa Kugel, No helmets, just suits March 2011 p. 5. 11 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), As Fourth Committee Reviews Special Political Missions, Focus Centres Upon Separate Funding, Bolstering Response to Realities on Ground GA/SPD/571 November 3, 2014 p. 2. 12 Alischa Kugel, No helmets, just suits March 2011 p. 7. 13 Alischa Kugel, No helmets, just suits March 2011 p. 8.
security sector reform, gender and conflict-related sexual violence. 14 As the mandates of special political missions become broader, and potentially deeper as well, member states are increasingly calling for clear and achievable mandates. 15 In November 2014, during the General Assembly Fourth Committee s recent meeting on the Comprehensive Review of Special Political Missions, India called for a more participatory process in formulating the appropriate policies for special political missions and also cautioned against any further blurring of mandate and also disconnect between the mandate and the political situation of a particular region where SPMs [special political missions] are supposed to be sent. 16 Ensuring that the mandates for special political missions (SPMs) can be achieved within a reasonable time frame is an extremely important and interrelated dimension of strengthening these missions. The longer that any particular special political mission lasts the odds increase that the mandate will become more complex and also that underlying political conditions within the host country may only increase the difficulties already inherent in any particular mission. Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon noted that A field-based special political mission in place in July 2013 has had an average duration of slightly less than six years. 17 The collective patience of the international community, host governments, and the affected civilian populations must be considered when mandates are established and revised; furthermore, there are increasing calls for more clearly delineated exit strategies and timelines, notwithstanding the increasing complexity of the missions themselves. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pointedly asserted that the sustainability of the success of any special political mission depends to a large extent on how well transitions to United Nations country teams are managed. 18 Delegates to the General Assembly Fourth Committee (GA 4) must also consider the fact that many special political missions (SPMs) are no longer deployed exclusively in the national capitals of the respective host countries but also to other key locations in the country concerned to enable liaison with a broader spectrum of the population. 19 More diffuse mission structures are often necessary to fulfill the mandate but they increase the logistical and staffing demands as UN personnel must now operate in a wider array of locales and must engage with a broader spectrum of actors. Successful Special Political Missions Elaborating the most important criteria for consistently successful special political missions (SPMs) is an essential step but the extent of a mission s political engagement is ultimately determined by the stage of a country s conflict cycle. 20 Improving relationships with host countries is absolutely critical to the long-term success of special political missions (SPMs). In terms of staffing and response time improvements, an important asset in the rapid response capability of the Organization is the standby team of mediation experts. These experts, deployable within 72 hours, are specialists in mediation process design, constitution-making, 14 Ban Ki-moon, A/69/325 August 18, 2014 p. 10. 15 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), As Fourth Committee Reviews Special Political Missions, Focus Centres Upon Separate Funding, Bolstering Response to Realities on Ground GA/SPD/571 November 3, 2014 p. 2. 16 The Economic Times, India stresses on need for having clear-cut mandates for SPMs November 4, 2014. 17 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Political Missions 2013 p. 12. 18 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Political Missions 2013 p. 20. 19 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Political Missions 2013 p. 14 20 Alischa Kugel, No helmets, just suits March 2011 p. 2.
gender and inclusion issues, sharing of natural resources, power-sharing and security arrangements. 21 As response time in conflicts and post-conflict situations remains a top priority for the UN System and related international actors, these new developments are certainly welcome. The UN System has also improved the depth and reach of gender mainstreaming for special political missions (SPMs) and these initial steps towards achieving gender equality must be sustained and advanced. Conclusion Deftly managing the shifting mandates and personnel of special political missions (SPMs) is an increasingly critical element and now the most visible manifestation of the Secretary-General s good offices. 22 Delegates to previous meetings of the General Assembly and the Security Council have already articulated critical components of a comprehensive review and strengthening of special political missions (SPMs), including, but not limited to: enhanced and/or improved cooperation with host governments; dedicated funding; strengthened cooperation with regional organizations as well as other UN peacekeeping and special political missions (SPMs); and articulating clearer mandates with more finely delineated timelines and exit strategies. While everyone wants to avoid mission creep as well as the inefficiencies created by missions that are extended either unnecessarily or in such fashion that they become counterproductive, Alischa Kugel points out that because political progress id difficult to measure, particularly within set timelines, determining a mission s expiration date and deciding when it has achieved its set goals is a complicated matter. 23 Guiding Questions Has your country ever hosted a UN special political mission (SPM)? If so, what mission(s) did your country host and what were the results of that mission? How effectively was your government consulted by the UN and other international organizations during this/these particular special political mission(s)? Has your country authorized and/or participated in any UN special political missions? How successful does your government feel that these missions were? What steps can be taken to ensure that current and future special political missions (SPMs) are as effective as possible? If your government has not yet participated in any UN special political missions, what might induce your government to consider sending civilian experts and staff personnel to enhance and strengthen current and future missions? If the General Assembly authorizes the establishment of a dedicated fund for special political missions (SPMs), will your government voluntarily contribute? What steps can the UN System take to encourage all countries to contribute voluntarily to this prospective fund? 21 Ban Ki-moon, A/69/325 August 18, 2014 p. 7. 22 22 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), As Fourth Committee Reviews Special Political Missions, Focus Centres Upon Separate Funding, Bolstering Response to Realities on Ground GA/SPD/571 November 3, 2014 p. 3. 23 Alischa Kugel, No helmets, just suits March 2011 p. 3.
Resolutions and Reports General Assembly Resolution 69/95 (A/RES/69/95) Comprehensive review of special political missions December 5, 2014. Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions A/69/325 August 18, 2014. Security Council Resolution 1559 (S/RES/1559) Middle East September 2, 2004. Security Council Resolution 1540 (S/RES/1540) Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction April 28, 2004. Security Council Resolution 1526 (S/RES/1526) Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts January 30, 2004.