Brief Report on the Workshop I Held at Nagasaki, Japan on December 7-8, 2012

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Brief Report on the Workshop I Held at Nagasaki, Japan on December 7-8, 2012 Hiromichi Umebayashi, Dr. Director, RECNA, Nagasaki, Japan June 20, 2013, Hanshin University, Seoul, ROK I would like to express my heartiest thanks to all people concerned and Hanshin Univ. for their works for preparing this wonderful workshop. I feel we are now at the Geographical and Informational Center of the issue we are tackling, and hope we will gain very productive outcome from this workshop. Why has Nagasaki Initiated the Study Project? The Workshop I, entitled Developing a Comprehensive Approach to a NEA-NWFZ was held last December in Nagasaki with almost the same co-sponsorship with this Workshop II, including the participation of Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes and others. The initiative of the workshop was taken by our Institute RECNA, so I would like to explain about RECNA briefly. The RECNA, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, was established in April last year. It is a very young institute of sixteen months old. The RECNA s predecessor was a medical school located at about 500 meters from the hypocenter of the atomic bombing in August 1945. It was during the summer vacation period, so the campus was much less populated. In spite of the fact, about 900 death-toll was counted, including students, professors, assistants and others. Due to this history, on one hand Nagasaki University has been working hard in the field of medical study and care of the survivors, but on the other hand, it has long been put under the pressing challenge how it can serve for nuclear weapons abolition or a world without nuclear weapons, the natural vision of the survivors. President Obama s Prague Speech in 2009 helped Nagasaki University stand up at last to launch the RECNA. One of the major programs RECNA has started to tackle is to study the Comprehensive Approach for a NEA-NWFZ. There were two contexts for it: global and regional. In the global context, the threat posed by nuclear weapons has been one of the urgent tasks to be tackled, like poverty, climate change, new pandemics and others, as pointed 1

out by the successive UN Secretary Generals. The threat of nuclear weapons is not only the threat of life extinction but also political threat to hamper the realization of the UN Charter. Toward the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, the practical steps to be taken now is to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in the security policies in the countries that rely upon nuclear deterrence, including Japan and ROK, as well as the DPRK. A NWFZ is a regional way to do this, while global efforts for fast reduction of nuclear arsenals have to go in parallel. In the regional context in NEA, we have many bilateral, trilateral and multilateral security problems, which are mostly rooted in history and require the process of mutual trust to solve them. However, the nuclear issue has turned out to be an acute urgent issue, which could overflow into many other regional issues. In other words, it is an issue for regional cooperation to cope with shared regional concerns, and the process could lead to establish a mechanism for regional consultation. In this context, a NWFZ is a measure whose benefits are proven by the presidents. Fortunately, Morton Halperin, who is here today, proposed a Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia in late 2011, which includes Establishment of a NEA-NWFZ as one of its chapter. So we have organized our study program to further develop his idea, making use of our past research accumulation on this subject. In today s program book, you can see the draft Summary Report of the Nagasaki Workshop. Mort will give you an updated account of his proposal, so I want to explain some gist of our discussions at the Workshop I. Necessity of Sustained Efforts and Comprehensive Strategy In the workshop, there was a general agreement that the emergence of nuclear armed DPRK as a fait accompli should not be allowed and efforts for a nuclear weapons free Northeast Asia should be sustained. Halperin stated, The costs of accepting a DPRK operational nuclear capability are very high and we should not accept this outcome without at least one more sustained effort to find a solution. In the Hayes speech, he said, The US and the regional states cannot and should never accommodate a nuclear-armed DPRK, as some have argued. For many of the Japanese participants, especially those from Nagasaki, the denuclearization of the region is a natural requirement because the NEA is tied to Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragic history and a third nuclear weapon use in this region 2

should be avoided by all means. However, a participant raised the problem of weakness or absence of feasibility consideration in the past studies of the NEA-NWFZ. This is exactly why a comprehensive strategy is now the theme of the workshop. While there were mixed assessments among participants on what Six Party Talks had attained or would attain, many seemed to agree that the DPRK s verifiable denuclearization first approach would not work anymore. The RECNA expressed that no doubt a new approach was necessary to break the stalemate regarding the nuclear problems in NEA and that Halperin s proposal on a Comprehensive Agreement provides the sound starting point of the future strategy for us to move in the right direction. It is noted that there was some confusion among participants in understanding the concept of comprehensiveness. Obviously there are many international security issues to be solved in this region. They are all important, as well as substantial in nature, and might be raised in the future negotiation process for an Agreement which we are discussing. However, it should be clear that our comprehensiveness is a very limited concept and doesn t mean to include everything, so that the strategy may be practical and robust. Comprehensiveness here should be precisely focused to our concern how a nuclear weapon free NEA will be realized. In this respect, an Agreement should be as simple as possible at least at the outset, although there is no reason to deny keeping the door open for future possible expansion. Creative Ideas and discussions for a NEA-NWFZ One of the most productive aspects of the Nagasaki workshop was seen at the ideas developed regarding the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ, the sixth element of the Agreement proposed by Halperin. An obvious question to be addressed is how a NWFZ treaty can deal with a state already armed with nuclear weapons like the DPRK. Hayes proposed an innovative idea how a NEA-NWFZ treaty can embrace the DPRK as a full party to the treaty from the outset. According to his presentation, the DPRK can be admitted at the outset as a full party, but also can be provided time to comply fully, which could not happen in less than two years, and might take as long as a decade to complete. During this time, nuclear weapons states can calibrate the degree to which their legally binding guarantee of non attack using nuclear weapons to the extent that the DPRK has disarmed its nuclear weapons, and reverted to non-nuclear weapons state status in compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, as well as fulfilling the requirements to establish confidence that it has not only dismantled its 3

weapons, but abandoned fully its aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons and to become a nuclear-weapons state. The idea is also accompanied with an additional innovative clause to be applied to non-nuclear weapon states, which says to the effect that Non-nuclear states such as South Korea and Japan could pull out of the treaty after five years if the North had not dismantled its nuclear programs. Other Elements of a Comprehensive Agreement Other possible elements of a Comprehensive Agreement were also discussed in the workshop. The issue of missile control in NEA was one of them. It became clear that the actual concern of missiles was related to the way how to lift the sanction posed on the DPRK by the UN Security Council resolutions and that a general regional missile control per se was not an issue in this regard. A view was expressed that, once the nuclear issue is solved, missiles would not be a serious problem. This means that, at least in the NEA regional context, we can focus on solving nuclear issues and that the sanction in relation to nuclear and ballistic missile issues can be dealt with a single set of issues. How to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle in NEA is undoubtedly one of the complex issues to be discussed in the Agreement. It is related to the energy security need, thus energy assistance need, of the DPRK, and also it is related to the scope of obligations to non-nuclear states of a NEA-NWFZ. The discussions on this issue in the workshop were again very productive and we obtained a reasonable common basis for future studies. The current disparity, in which only Japan enjoys the right of reprocessing and enrichment, is an unhappy prerequisite but we will have to start from this point. The real question is in which direction to move. It will take some time to develop an agreeable direction among parties concerned, therefore it will be a wisdom worthy to note that the treaty-outline developed by the PNND Japan Working Team suggests a NWFZ treaty to stipulate the establishment of a Planning Mechanism for Future Energy Cooperation and leave the issue to the future process. As was noted in the workshop, the Fukushima disaster and Japan s nuclear fuel cycle policy to follow will bear critical importance in that future process. A seemingly common view shared in the workshop was that the plutonium accumulation by Japan should be put in a moratorium or terminated as soon as possible. Players and Forums for Future Efforts 4

In relation to our future strategy, a shared concern was expressed in the workshop. It was how any idea such as developed by Halperin will be brought up to the level of a state policy option. A Japanese proverb will be right in this regard, It is better to get down to work than to worry about it. A jump success will happen any time, and we should continue to develop and spread ideas. In Nagasaki, the workshop played a critical role to lift up the issue of a NEA-NWFZ and the idea of comprehensive approach to a level of common concern shared among key researchers and leaders of the community. It also provided the basis to spread the issue to other areas in Japan. I do believe today s workshop II will bring us much farther beyond where we stand today after the Workshop I. Such process led by academic researchers and supported by concerned civil groups will be effective as a ground work to engage officials at the government level, if implemented in many cities in other parts of NEA. 5