Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather
VS RESEARCH
Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather The Case of Lebanon With a foreword by Prof. Dr. Theodor Hanf VS RESEARCH
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Dissertation Universität Freiburg, 2007 Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienstes 1st Edition 2009 All rights reserved VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2009 Editorial Office: Dorothee Koch / Anita Wilke VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is part of the specialist publishing group Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Registered and/or industrial names, trade names, trade descriptions etc. cited in this publication are part of the law for trade-mark protection and may not be used free in any form or by any means even if this is not specifically marked. Cover design: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany ISBN 978-3-531-16529-5
To the memory of Riad Fakhoury
Foreword Is democracy possible only in homogeneous societies? Does heterogeneity exclude a stable democracy? Throughout history, ethnic, linguistic, or religious homogeneity whether by circumstance, coercion, or choice, has seemingly been conducive to democracy. In France, democracy was established after the imposition of religious uniformity and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The United States pulled in immigrants who renounced their original affiliations to forge a new identity in a newly born state. Still, defying assumptions, democracies have emerged in heterogeneous states such as the Swiss Confederation, the Successor States of the Holy Roman Empire and, later, those carved out of the previous colonial empires. One common feature is the failure of often violent attempts to enforce homogeneity, or the lack of any such attempt in the first place. In the course of time, these divided societies have learned to live in diversity, to pacify their differences, and to find a path towards peace or at least accommodation. In sum, they went beyond forms of separating powers to sharing power. Whether defined by ethnicity, language, religion, or even ideology, communities agreed to a pact on participating in a joint government based on proportional or even equal representation. It is noteworthy that political systems based on power-sharing were long marginal in mainstream political science which laid an emphasis on democratic transitions in homogeneous societies and on socio-economic or cultural prerequisites that facilitate the rise of democracy. However, this changed in the 1960s with the emergence of a new consociationalist school which proposed treating power-sharing systems as a distinct type of democracy capable of overcoming divisive cleavages and of securing coexistence. Since then, the power-sharing model in divided societies has inspired a plethora of writings. Numerous studies elaborated theoretical frameworks that outlined the features of this model and pondered the conditions facilitating or thwarting its applicability. With time, the model acquired normative and prescriptive functions and was even recommended for pacifying conflict-ridden societies in which forceful attempts of homogenization had aggravated dissension. Nowadays, in the wake of the colonial empires collapse and later the break up of the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of so many non-homogeneous states, modes of governance based on power-sharing seem to become the rule rather than the exception. Still, the relevance of power-sharing systems needs to be analyzed with caution. Cyprus unstable consociational experience, Lebanon s power-sharing breakdown
8 Foreword in 1975 and the fragility of its post-war predicament, recent constitutional paralysis in Belgium, doubts pertaining to the effectiveness of the power-sharing model in Switzerland after the country s largest political party was no longer represented in government prompt daunting questions about the sustainability of power-sharing models as well as about their effectiveness in times of polarization. Hence, it seems of paramount importance to reassess the concept of power-sharing, to re-explore its limitations and reexamine its prescriptive value. This book is to be viewed as an eminent contribution to this undertaking. Tamirace Fakhoury proposes to refocus attention on the power-sharing model of governance by identifying its potentialities and its limitations as well as by substantiating suggestions for further theoretical study. She then proceeds to testing the applicability of the model to a major case study which has provided an empirical benchmark to Arend Lijphart s concept of consociational democracy: Lebanon. After examining Lebanon s pre-war power-sharing model as well as the factors behind its collapse in 1975, the study focuses on Lebanon s post-war order by depicting on the one hand its democratic/autocratic components and its power-sharing traits on the other hand. With the ratification of the Ta if Treaty in 1991, Lebanon s consociational democracy turned into an ambiguous system, characterized by a complex mix of democratic, authoritarian, and power-sharing pressures. The emergence of a consociation heavily influenced by external factors impaired power-sharing devices, and disfigured the politics of accommodation. The book proposes a contextual framework for analysing the internal and exogenous factors that affect Lebanon s consociational system. It shows how, beyond the variable of the self-negating prophecy, the small republic s fate remains interwoven with its regional environment and heavily influenced by various institutional, communal and elite conditions. The interplay of internal and external factors in the Lebanese case conditions the resilience of the power-sharing model of governance and reveals its dependence on an auspicious configuration without which consociational settlements are prone to instability. A further merit of this study is its attempt to link the theory of consociationalism with the more recent works on transitology and democratic transition, bringing to the fore the necessity of studying the democratic or un-democratic components of the system as a major variable that impacts power-sharing dynamics. Beyond the implications the study has on the Lebanese case, it reveals broader insights that transcend the Lebanese experience as such and tell much about the shortcomings and benefits of consociational settlements in deeply divided societies. Theodor Hanf
Acknowledgments The idea of writing a dissertation on Lebanon s political transition, initially inspired by a discussion with Lebanese academics in 2001 in Beit Chabab (Mount Lebanon), had several underlying motives. The most important one was an earnest desire to understand the overlapping external and internal mechanisms that contribute to Lebanon s unstable predicament. Yet, this would not have been possible without the precious help of my advisor, Professor Dr. Theodor Hanf, who helped me evaluate Lebanon s complex situation with an objective eye. I thank him for his immense assistance and mostly for his confidence in me. I also thank him for offering me the opportunity to conduct research at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in Freiburg. I would also like to thank my co-adviser, Professor Dr. Jürgen Rüland who offered valuable guidance. A special thanks goes to Professor Heribert Weiland who provided me with significant intellectual support during my stay at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute. I also wish to thank the German Service for Academic Exchange (DAAD) that funded my research project at the Albert-Ludwigs University in Freiburg. Furthermore, I extend many thanks to my friends, especially Coralie Hindawi, and Ulrike Ostertag, for their support during the writing phase, and to my colleagues at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, especially to Margret Rae, Leslie Tramontini, and Matthias Seifert, who assisted me with the correction. Many thanks go also to my colleagues Martin Adelman, Petra Bauerle, Marcel Baumann, Hannelore Fladerer, Angela Hermann, Clemens Juergenmeyer, Beatrice Schlee, Jan Voelkel, and many others who have made my stay at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute pleasant and enriching. I would particularly like to thank my family in Lebanon. I am mostly grateful to my mother Amal and to my sister Tala for their encouragement and valuable advice. I am also thankful to my brothers, Omar and Wael, for their inspirational remarks. A special note of gratitude goes to Jörg Muehlbacher who offered valuable help during the writing and editing phases. Finally, I hope that this study of Lebanon s power-sharing and democratization since 1943 will shed some light on Lebanon s conundrum and prospects for stability. Tamirace Fakhoury
Contents Introductory Overview........................................ 17 A general review of the literature on Lebanon....................... 21 Statement of the problem....................................... 27 Hypotheses and study structure................................... 28 Long-term implications and contributions of the study................ 31 The method of research......................................... 32 Further methods of inquiry...................................... 33 1. Review and Critique of the Literature on Consociational Democracy 35 Theorizing consociationalism: The evolution of the theory............. 40 Consociational democracy as a prescriptive model in deeply fragmented societies.................................................. 45 The other side of the medal...................................... 47 A criticism of the consociational model............................ 48 A criticism of the consociational theory............................ 54 Lijphart s reaction: A struggle against all odds?...................... 70 The survivability of consociational democracy....................... 73 The consociational model and its relation to our case study............. 75 2. Pre-War Lebanon: A Dance into the Abyss of Consociationalism.... 77 Consociational democracy in pre-war Lebanon: The characteristics of the model................................................. 77 The factors conducive to consociational democracy: Why are they problematic?............................................... 79 Performance of the pre-war consociational model (1943 1975).......... 85 The strengths of the pre-war consociational model.................... 86 The defects of the pre-war consociational model..................... 93 An inevitable collapse? An inquiry into the reasons behind consociational failure.................................................... 102 A zone of turbulences.......................................... 114 The elite factor in the consociational breakdown (1967 1976)........... 126 The economic factor in the consociational breakdown................. 130 Synthesis: The status of the favorable factors revisited................. 135
12 Contents 3. Post-War Lebanon:The Lost Republic s Peregrinations........... 137 The rise of a competitive semi-authoritarian regime (1990 2005)........ 137 The deconstruction of the democratic myth in the Second Republic....... 139 The transition paradigm........................................ 143 Hybrid regimes, types and characteristics........................... 145 Lebanon in the transition paradigm: A peculiar tale................... 157 The architecture of semi-authoritarianism: The indicators (1990 2004)... 158 The Ta if setting, background and aftermath......................... 159 The truncated implementation of the Ta if agreement.................. 164 Syrian predominance and the Lebanese-Syrian riddle of semi-authoritarianism (1976 2004)............................. 176 Post-war elections: A tool of semi-authoritarianism................... 195 Points of elite authority......................................... 207 The triumph of authoritarian pressures in 2004....................... 225 Synthesis: The games that Lebanese semi-authoritarianism played....... 243 4. Post-War Lebanon s Long and Perilous Road to Democracy....... 245 Lebanese democracy: A question of relativity?....................... 246 Democratic pressures in the 1990s................................ 249 The endurance of the Lebanese civil society......................... 249 Political opposition............................................ 251 The role of religious elites....................................... 253 The 2000 opening............................................. 254 A gust of political liberty after 2000?.............................. 256 The limitations and aftermath of the 2000 opening.................... 258 Lebanon s 2005 transition: the end of the competitive authoritarian regime? 261 The 2005 awakening and its underlying motives: The first signs of transition.................................................. 262 Second phase of the democratic awakening......................... 279 The backstory of the Beirut Spring: A critique....................... 285 Third phase of the transition: Augurs of institutional revival............ 290 Fourth phase of the transition: Syria s departure or the end of the affair... 292 Fifth phase of the transition: Lebanon s summer parliamentary elections... 294 The first post-syrian coalition cabinet and its difficult birth............ 302 The international probe into Hariri s Killing: Towards more transparency?. 305 The opposite side of the coin or the persistence of authoritarian waves.... 309 Residues of the Lebanese-Syrian constellation and surviving loyalties.... 309 An evaluation of Lebanon s transition to a low-intensity democracy...... 317 Analysis of Lebanon s path to system transition in 2005................ 318 Rethinking Lebanon s minimal democracy: A looming backlash?........ 323 A long road ahead............................................. 324
Contents 13 5. What about Post-War Consociationalism?...................... 327 The rise of a chaperoned power-sharing model: The failure of grand coalitions under Syrian tutelage (1990 2005)..................... 328 The Troika or the oligarchic elite cartel: Its effects on coalition-building and institutions (1992 1998).................................. 330 The emergence of a shadow government: A case of coercive consociationalism.................................. 336 The gradual breakdown of the security state and the rise of a bipolar model of consociationalism......................................... 344 The national political schism: A study of prevailing political cleavages.... 345 The implications of political cleavages on power-sharing............... 357 Coalition building during the phase of bipolarity..................... 358 Synthesis: Prerequisites and devices of consociational democracy at peril.. 360 Augurs of a power-sharing reawakening?........................... 361 The resilience of Lebanese consociationalism....................... 362 The 2005 Beirut Spring: Low-intensity power-sharing................. 363 The partial revival of consociational devices in the post-syrian era....... 368 Demystifying the 2005 power-sharing revival........................ 371 Consociation in difficulty: Shaky patterns of elite accommodation....... 371 Lebanon s shackled foreign policy: The impossible condition of non-alignment and the increase of external burdens on the porous republic after 2005.......................................... 391 Communal segmentation in post-war Lebanon....................... 409 Dark clouds over Lebanon s consociationalism...................... 419 6. Final Appraisal............................................ 425 Crafting a Consociational Democracy: The Limits of the Self-Negating Prophecy.................................... 425 The prospects for Lebanon s consociational democracy................ 429 Reinventing consociationalism: For a gradualist path.................. 430 Consociational challenges: How to turn a low-intensity model of power-sharing into a viable democracy?.......................... 432 Institutional engineering: Synchronizing democracy and power-sharing... 432 Institutionalized deadlock-breaking mechanisms..................... 433 A solution to communal desegmentation........................... 435 Reformulating the problem of national identity...................... 442 An external or internal solution to Lebanon s oppressive alignment?: The making of a cautious foreign policy.......................... 447 An ill-timed reform for an agonizing consociation?................... 452
14 Contents Bibliography................................................ 455 Consociational theory.......................................... 455 Democracy and democratic transition.............................. 459 Pre- and post-war Lebanon...................................... 462 Country review............................................... 475 Politics and system transition in the Middle East..................... 476
List of Figures Figure 3.1: System transition..................................... 150 Figure 3.2: System transition..................................... 150 Figure 3.3: Subtypes of pseudo-democracies........................ 150 Figure 3.4: Subtypes of electoral authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes............................................ 151 Figure 3.5: Pattern of gradation................................... 152 Figure 3.6: Pattern of degradation................................. 152 Figure 4.1: The 2005 legislature.................................. 300 Figure 4.2: The path to Lebanon s 2005 system transition.............. 320 Figure 5.1: The bipolar rift between the 8 and the 14 March Coalitions.... 353 Figure 5.2: The rise of a bipolar system in the post-1559 era............ 358 Figure 6.1: Lebanon s chronological system transition since 1943........ 427 Figure 6.2: From a fragmented to a concordant culture................ 442 Figure 6.3: Consolidating the Lebanese identity...................... 447 Figure 6.4: The stability pyramid (from bottom to top)................ 451