The 1998 German Federal Election

The 1998 German Federal Election Peter James Politics (2000) 20(1) pp. 33 38 The federal election held in Germany on 27 September 1998 marked the end of the Kohl era. It was one of the closest-fought postwar elections, which made the result difficult to predict and the election evening extremely exciting. In the event the ruling Christian Democrats recorded their worst result since 1949, a sitting federal chancellor, Helmut Kohl, was voted out of office for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic and the main opposition party, Germany s Social Democrats, became the largest party in parliament for only the second time since the war. Musical chairs the parliamentary parties swap places This was the last federal election to the Bundestag in Bonn. By the time of the next one, in the year 2002, the German seat of government will be in Berlin. It was claimed that this election would be won or lost in the eastern part of Germany. In fact it was there, in the so-called new federal states (die neuen Bundesländer) that Kohl s party, the rightof-centre Christian Democrats (the CDU, which forms a joint parliamentary party with the Bavarian CSU) lost 10 per cent of the vote compared to their 1994 victory as well as losing around 5 per cent in the west, dropping to an overall result of only 35 per cent, a figure predicted by only one of the German polling institutes (Allensbach). At the same time and this was unusual the left-of-centre Social Democrats (the SPD) gained 3 per cent of the vote in the east and 5 per cent in the west, passing the 40 per cent mark for the first time since 1980, when Helmut Schmidt ruled with a social/liberal coalition. The German Greens, known as Alliance 90/the Greens (Bündnis 90/die Grünen) since the merger of the all-german Greens and Alliance 90 in 1993, gained 6.6 per cent. They will now experience their first taste of power at federal level, with their charismatic personality Joschka (Josef) Fischer as deputy chancellor and foreign secretary, forming a red green coalition government under the leadership of the new SPD Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder. The Free Democrats, the liberal FDP, a party that has spent more years in government than either the CDU or the SPD, owing to its (until now) indispensable role as coalition partner, performed its usual lastminute Houdini act at federal level, defying the predictions that it might not clear the German electoral system s 5-per-cent clause. On the evening of 27 September 1998 the German Liberals were on the one hand celebrating their return to the Bundestag, but on the other hand commiserating with each other over being confined to the opposition benches again for the first time since 1966 1969. Their influential position in the party system disappeared at regional level Peter James, University of Northumbria at Newcastle Political Studies Association 2000. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 33

The 1998 German Federal Election James Politics (2000) 20(1) pp. 33 38 many years ago: the FDP is currently the coalition partner in only three of the 16 Land governments with the CDU in Baden- Württemberg and the SPD in the Rhineland Palatinate, and since April 1999 in a conservative/liberal coalition in Hesse. The Liberals now have neglible support in the east. The fifth party to return to the federal parliament was the the left-wing PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), which has now established itself as the ostdeutsche Volkspartei (east German people s party). Although two-thirds of the membership of the PDS (the party has around 98,000 members) have celebrated their sixtieth birthday, its voters are much younger (about 40 per cent are under 30). The party had, under German electoral law, two ways of entering parliament: it could either clear the 5-per-cent hurdle, which it was not expected to do, or win three (direct, first-vote) constituency seats. Two constituency seats were almost guaranteed those of Gregor Gysi and Christa Luft but the final result was another nail-biting affair. At the PDS headquarters in Bonn only days before the vote, we were told (some thought optimistically at the time) that the party s prediction was for at least three or four constituencies and 5.2 per cent. 1 In the event, the PDS surprised many and sent their supporters into ecstacy by qualifying on both counts. They gained 5.1 per cent (only 1 per cent in the west, nearly 20 in the east), and also won four constituencies, all in east Berlin. The party also celebrated gaining full parliamentary rights and privileges and greater financial support from Bundestag funds as a recognised parliamentary party (Fraktion, instead of simply a Bundestagsgruppe). Right-wing extremists do badly After the extremist DVU (German People s Party), run by the Munich media mogul, Gerhard Frey, secured 12.9 per cent of the vote in the Saxony-Anhalt state election in April, there was apprehension in some quarters regarding both the Bonn result and the state election in the eastern state of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, held on the same day. In the Land election the rightwing vote was split between the DVU, the REPS (Republikaner), and the NPD (neo- Nazi National Democratic Party). Despite attempts to whip up anti-foreigner feeling with slogans linking the words Ausländer (foreigners) and Verbrechen (crime), and also trying to blame foreign workers for taking jobs away from Germans, the DVU polled only 2.9 per cent in Mecklenburg, and the other two right-wing parties even less. In the federal contest the DVU could manage only 1.2 per cent and the REPS 1.8 per cent overall. Nevertheless, there was a small protest vote in the east, mainly by young, unemployed male voters. One of the founders and the former leader of the Republican Party, Franz Schönhuber, actually stood as a DVU candidate at the federal election, but attempts at co-operation between the DVU and the REPS came to nothing. In the eastern part of Germany there is now an established three-party system (SPD,CDU, PDS), with the Liberals in particular, and also the Greens, gaining very little support. In the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Land election the SPD usurped the CDU s position as the largest party and the PDS recorded its best ever result of over 24 per cent. The new government in Mecklenburg now provides the Federal Republic s first red red (SPD/ PDS) coalition. Kohl versus Schröder As usual, the question of which of the two main parties could offer the better chancellor candidate was crucial. There was undoubtedly a strong feeling amongst the electorate that Kohl, after 16 years in office and at the age of 68, had nothing new to 34 Political Studies Association 2000

Politics (2000) 20(1) pp. 33 38 The 1998 German Federal Election James offer. It was generally seen as a mistake that he allowed himself to be persuaded to stand for a possible fifth term, after saying in 1994 that he was standing down. The German polling institute Forschungsgruppe Wahlen reported that its surveys suggested that the CDU would have stood a better chance with Wolfgang Schäuble. This was, however, not confirmed by the Allensbach institute. 2 Schäuble, now confined to a wheelchair, is to take over from Kohl as CDU party chairman and leader. Helmut Kohl even lost his own Ludwigshafen constituency to Doris Barnett of the SPD, although he automatically entered parliament by being placed at the top of the CDU party list in the Rhineland Palatinate. He became the first sitting postwar chancellor to be voted out of office by the electorate. In Germany the so-called chancellor-bonus is usually worth a lot to the incumbent. On previous occasions a change in power was brought about by the FDP transferring their loyalty, first to Brandt in 1969, and then back again from Schmidt to Kohl in 1982, or by a chancellor standing down, for example Adenauer in 1963. Whatever else people might say about him, Kohl certainly had staying power (Ausdauer). He defeated four different SPD challengers Vogel, Rau, Lafontaine and Scharping between 1983 and 1994. This time the SPD put forward Gerhard Schröder and pursued a well-orchestrated, media-dominated campaign. Schröder was careful not to engage in personal attacks on Kohl, complimenting him on his earlier achievements (German unity, etc.), but always using the past tense. Kohl had been a good chancellor, but now it was time to move forward. With the SPD becoming the biggest party again (the only other time was 1972: SPD 45.8, CDU/CSU 44.9 per cent), it seemed that the Social Democrats had, in the former minister president of Lower Saxony, at last found a candidate who could present the right image to the voters. Easily the most important issue of the campaign, in so far as there was any mention of policy, was of course the question of Germany s record levels of unemployment. The polls recorded that whilst around 42 per cent of voters thought the SPD was best placed to tackle the problem, only 24 per cent said the same of the CDU/CSU. This was a crucial factor. On the whole, the election placards and slogans were unimaginative. The CDU poster calling for Sicherheit statt Risiko (safety rather than risk) reminded some people of Adenauer s famous 1957 slogan keine Experimente (no experiments). For many it seemed hard to disagree with the SPD poster claiming that Germany needed a new chancellor (Deutschland braucht einen neuen Kanzler). At the SPD headquarters at the Ollenhauer House on the Sunday evening, only a couple of hours after the result was known, a huge version of the placard appeared. One word had been changed: Deutschland hat einen neuen Kanzler. That just about summed it up. Perhaps it really was time for a change. The CDU leadership had been hoping to gain some advantage for the CDU/CSU federal campaign from the resounding victory, two weeks earlier, by the CSU in the Bavarian state election. Under their politically astute minister president, Edmund Stoiber, the CSU polled an absolute majority, forcing the Bavarian SPD to below 30 per cent, despite several visits to Bavaria by Schröder. The CSU success was taken by some Christian Democrats as a good omen for the federal election. This was a false assessment of the Bavarian poll, at which the CSU and Stoiber had barely mentioned the CDU or Kohl. It is important to remember that voters in Germany behave differently in regional (state) elections and federal elections. On 13 September the Bavarian voters gave 52.9, 28.7 and 1.7 per cent support to the CSU, SPD and the FDP respectively at the Bavarian state election, yet the same voters, only two weeks later, voted 47.7, 34.4 and 5.1 per cent respectively for the same three parties at the federal poll. Political Studies Association 2000 35

The 1998 German Federal Election James Politics (2000) 20(1) pp. 33 38 Clearly some of those who voted CSU at the Bavarian election supported the SPD in their attempt to oust Kohl in Bonn. In 1998 the FRG was again divided into 328 constituencies. Each constituency chooses one candidate, on a first-past-the-post system, via the elector s first vote. However, each German voter has two votes: an equal number of candidates, i.e. another 328, is chosen from the party lists in each of the Länder via the elector s second vote. This produces a total of 656 members of the lower house of parliament (Bundestagsabgeordnete). The second vote is the more important of the two, since that is the one which decides, on the basis of proportional representation, how many seats the parties are allocated, and therefore which party will provide the chancellor. This fact is not fully understood by large sections of the electorate. At the 1998 federal election it was the SPD alone that benefited from additional mandates (Überhangmandate), one in Hamburg and the other 12 all in the east. 3 These extra seats are created when a party actually wins more constituency seats in one Land, via the first votes, than it is strictly speaking entitled to, proportionately, according to the second votes. Because constituency seats must always be retained, if any additional mandates occur, that increases the number of seats in parliament. There will be 669 seats in the new parliament (656 plus 13 additional mandates). Voter realignment In 1998 both the younger voters and manual workers (Arbeiter), many of whom appeared to have deserted the SPD in 1990 and 1994, returned to the fold. Schröder was presented as the candidate of the centre ground (die neue Mitte), and by doing this the SPD succeeded in actually increasing its vote in all sectors of the electorate. It did particularly well amongst manual workers, salaried employees and civil servants; the only groups where the CDU/CSU came off better were the self-employed and the farmers (traditional areas of support for the Christian Democrats). The Greens suffered a slight loss amongst the younger voters Jungwähler aged 18 24. Around 10 per cent of this age-group supported the Greens in 1998 (1994: 14 per cent). Both the major parties did almost equally well this time in terms of support from the over-sixties. In 1994 voters over 60 years of age, especially women, were far more likely to support the CDU/CSU. Although it is on a much smaller scale in terms of absolute numbers, the rightwing extremist parties did best amongst the younger age-group. Approximately 7 per cent of 18 24-year-old voters supported them. Amongst young men the figure rose to 10 per cent. As usual, the SPD received more votes from Protestants than Catholics (46:36 per cent), but also considerable support from those of no religious denomination. With the CDU the Catholic voters outnumbered the Protestants (46:32 per cent). In the case of Catholics who have very strong links with the Church well over 60 per cent favoured the CDU/CSU. Over 2.5 million voters transferred their allegiance to the SPD this time. The majority of those votes came from the CDU (about 1.7 million), approximately 425,000 from the Greens and 290,000 from the Liberals. It was estimated that about half a million former non-voters voted SPD this time around. Only the PDS gained votes (around 321,000) from the SPD. The CDU also lost votes to the PDS and some to the Greens too, though they gained some from the FDP The FDP lost votes to the SPD, CDU, Greens and PDS, in that order of magnitude. The transfer of votes from the Green Party in 1998 mainly benefited the Social Democrats and, to a much smaller extent, the PDS. The Greens gained some votes from the CDU and the FDP, as well as from former abstainers. 4 36 Political Studies Association 2000

Politics (2000) 20(1) pp. 33 38 The 1998 German Federal Election James Table 1: Results of the 1998 federal election Germany Gains/ Seats West East (%) losses (%) (%) (%) Turnout 82.3 82.8 80.3 SPD 40.9 +4.5 298 42.4 35.6 CDU/CSU 35.2 6.3 245 37.2 27.6 Alliance 90/ 6.7 0.6 47 7.1 5.2 Greens FDP 6.2 0.7 44 7.0 3.6 PDS 5.1 +0.7 35 1.1 19.5 REPS 1.8 0.1 0 1.9 1.6 DVU 1.2 +1.2 0 Others 2.9 Implications of the change in power The most obvious result of the change in power in Bonn is that the Union parties now have to adapt to life on the opposition benches, after 16 years as the ruling party. This will not be easy and there will be many changes in personnel in key positions. The tiny FDP has now lost its pivotal position in the federal party system, as, for the first time since the Grand Coalition government of 1966 1969, it is no longer in power as the coalition partner of either of the two main parties. The SPD victory means that there are no longer differing majorities in the upper and lower houses of the German parliament. The second chamber, the Bundesrat, which represents the Länder, has the right of veto on certain legislation, and this has sometimes been a problem in the past, with a CDU/CSU majority in Bundestag being overturned later by the SPD majority in Bonn s second chamber. The SPD now has a majority in both houses. The end of the Kohl era also means that the present federal president, Roman Herzog (CDU), who was very ambiguous about whether he wished to stand for a second term, will now almost certainly be replaced by a candidate from the SPD in May 1999. The new coalition in Bonn will require a lot of hard negotiation and practical commitment from the German Greens, about to experience their first taste of government at federal level. This is the party s opportunity to show that it has finally come of age. Whatever happens, a testing time certainly lies ahead for the new government. During the campaign Schröder said he was happy to be judged as chancellor on how he tackled unemployment. No doubt he will be. Foreign policy and Germany s net payments to the European Union, the presidency of which Germany takes over in January 2000, will also be key areas. Democracy is said to thrive on the ability to effect and withstand a change in power. The polity of the new Germany, founded on 3 October 1990, is now well established and the fears of some concerning an enlarged German state have proved unfounded. Over the past eight years, since German unity, it has frequently been said that it will take much longer than at first envisaged for the territories and the inhabitants of the former East and West Germany to merge completely. It could be argued that an examination of Political Studies Association 2000 37

The 1998 German Federal Election James Politics (2000) 20(1) pp. 33 38 the 1998 elections shows that the voting patterns in east and west remain very different and that in fact two party systems currently exist side by side. There is clearly still a lot of work to do. It will be up to the new chancellor and his SPD/Green coalition government to try to integrate those members of German society who feel left out in the cold, whether they be foreigners, unemployed Germans or simply Ossis who feel they have been taken over and forgotten. The electorate will not be slow to judge their efforts. Notes 1 Herr Keller, addressing a DAAD-supported election visit organised by the Association for the Study of German Politics on 24 September 1998. 2 These points were made by speakers from the two research institutes at the postelection press conference held at the Hotel Bristol in Bonn on 28 September 1998. 3 In 1994 there were 16 extra mandates 12 for the CDU and 4 for the SPD. 4 Information taken from Der Spiegel Wahlsonderheft 98, 29 September 1998, p. 34. 38 Political Studies Association 2000