Trevor Findlay Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa Senior Research Fellow, Project on Managing

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Trevor Findlay Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa Senior Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School

why a cultural approach? organizational culture theory defining safeguards culture creators, purveyors & guardians cultural context IAEA, UN, national cultural change: IAEA safeguards culture before and after Iraq (1991) safeguards sub-cultures conclusions/recommendations

safeguards culture used by IAEA, government officials, experts no IAEA study or documents or academic or other research no agreed international definition (unlike nuclear safety & security) advances in safety and security cultures suggest need for attention to safeguards culture IAEA set out to change safeguards culture along with strengthened safeguards the cultural approach is revealing

Artifacts Visible organizational structures & processes Espoused values Strategies, goals, philosophies Basic underlying assumptions Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, habits

powerful, latent, often unconscious born of habit: the way we do things around here affects individual & collective behaviour dysfunctional culture may cause organizational failure hard to change change easiest after crisis forced change may have unintended consequences leadership and incentives are key

Safety Culture: assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance (IAEA Glossary) Security culture : assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security (IAEA Implementing Guide, 2008) Safeguards culture: assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals and organizations which supports nuclear safeguards as a vital means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

nongovernmental/ scientific community e.g. INMM, ESARDA, VERTIC, MTA IAEA General Conference, Board of Governors, member states Director General and Deputy DGs Department of Safeguards (policy, management, analysts, labs, inspectors) other departments (Legal, Public Information) states foreign ministries safeguards authorities (State Systems of Accounting and Control) atomic energy authorities and labs nuclear industry regional organizations EURATOM, ABACC, nuclear weapon-free zone organizations

IAEA UN science and technology-based in the UN system but not a UN body interacts principally with member states, not with nuclear industry Spirit of Vienna (fading fast) stove-piping versus One House process-oriented (diplomatic procedures, conferences, documentation, interpretation/translation) deferential to member states geographical balance and political factors in recruitment semi-permanent international civil service National multinational individual cultures in a Western cultural framework

Pre-1991 Now Legal artifacts Planning artifacts Process artifacts IAEA Statute; NPT; INFCIRC/153 agreements; SQPs Programme and Budget inspectors reports; safeguards conclusion; special inspections + Strengthened safeguards; Additional Protocols; revised SQPs + Strategic Plan + State-Level Concept; state evaluation groups; country officers; integrated safeguards; broader conclusion ; open source information; intelligence

Pre-1991 safeguards non-discriminatory; technically based; effective; efficient as possible diversion the most likely noncompliance scenario emphasis on declared materials, activities and facilities inspectors focused on nuclear accountancy; prescriptive, criteria-driven approach only declarations and inspection information valid for drawing safeguards conclusions Now no change all acquisition paths worth considering emphasis on correctness and completeness; undeclared materials/activities/facilities important inspectors expected to be more inquisitive, investigatory, innovative all sources of information useful to draw broader conclusion

Pre-1991 safeguards can only do what states allow effectiveness depends on state cooperation effectiveness depends on adequate funding (zero real growth a constant refrain) safeguards personnel are professional, trained, dedicated special inspections a right in case of undeclared activities now the Agency has more rights states have increased obligations to provide information, access, effective SSACs no change safeguards personnel are better trained than ever special inspections reaffirmed as Agency right in special cases

Pre-1991 detecting undeclared material/facilities not part of the job ( we don t go on fishing expeditions ) inspectors dominate data collection, analysis, planning & management tick the boxes, replace the batteries and go; be deferential to states; don t rock the boat safeguards findings not always taken into account upstairs inspectors not always well recruited, trained or dedicated now (desirable) correctness and completeness vital ( still no expeditions, but we now worry about all types of fish ) close collaboration between inspectors, analysts, planners, labs & managers; all make valuable contribution inquisitiveness, resourcefulness, initiative will be rewarded all safeguards findings taken seriously inspectors well recruited, trained and imbued with new culture

how strong and pervasive is the culture? what do people think of as right, proper, moral, and fair? what do the mission, strategy, goals, and rewards mean to people? what subcultures exist across groups or between managers and workers? what are the consistencies and contradictions in work practices, norms, rituals, role models, symbols, stories, training programs, rules, incentive plans?

Inspectors Analysts traditional star performers scientific/technical, fact-oriented, individualistic professionalism marked by tenacity and respect (ElBaradei) closely-knit due to shared experiences & member states criticism wish to preserve status and benefits relatively new in safeguards; injecting themselves into a 50-year old culture also technical and fact-oriented, but desk-bound and with varied backgrounds (political science, intelligence, IT), more accustomed to collaborative work value all information, not just inspection data, including qualitative (subjective?)

Managers may not have safeguards/inspector backgrounds, but managerial or other concerned with effectiveness, efficiency and strategic planning must take all factors into account in assessing compliance operational divisions may have their own cultures, as may Concepts & Planning; Information Management and Technical & Scientific Services management leadership (personality) key to cultural formation/change

IAEA safeguards culture is robust cultural change has undoubtedly occurred in artifacts and espoused values since 1991 current artifacts and espoused values generally consistent but are underlying assumptions consistent with artifacts and espoused values? different effects of cultural change on subcultures: management, analysts, inspectors

seek agreement on definition of safeguards culture commission baseline study of state of the culture, including interaction of sub-cultures monitor health of the culture periodically (as in nuclear safety and security fields) ensure artifacts, espoused values and underlying assumptions are in line