Exploring aspects of Radicalization and De-Radicalization

1 With the volume of literature on this subject growing, and with the sometimesover-use of the terminology of terror this brief ICRA background paper aims to layout the main points for discussion giving a useful list of references for those who study the topic. Exploring aspects of Radicalization and De-Radicalization May Muhtadi Introduction This background discussion paper is organized around themes to enable understanding on how de-radicalization can be approached. The discussion is informed by the growing body of literature on the subject as well as on terrorism and radicalisation, which are integral components of the same debate. 1 It is also important to define the word radicalization before discussing de-radicalization, and possible approaches to how that process might be achieved. The paper also looks at the literature surrounding the effect of economics on terrorism - a key component in the execution of terror as well as its resolution. The prominent literature surrounding de-radicalization is examined in order to give the background knowledge needed for rounded discussion. TERRORISM & RADICALIZATION There is a need to clarify the key concepts. Terrorism is a broad term which many countries struggle to agree upon when it comes to its definition. Some definitions of terrorism include: Schouten (2010): (a) the use of force or violence (b) by individuals or groups (c) that is directed toward civilian populations (d) and intended to instil fear (e) as a means of coercing individuals or groups to change their political or social positions. 2 The definition that will be used in this paper comes from Title 22 of the United States Code 2b56f(d) and defines terrorism as: politically motivated violence 1 This literature review will focus primarily on Islamic terrorism, however, it is important to acknowledge that there are other forms of radicalization. 2 Ronald Schouten, Terrorism and the Behavioural Sciences, Harvard Review of Psychiatry 1, no. 1 (2010): 369.

2 perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 3 Radicalization can be conceptualized as an ideological process or transformation that individuals or groups experience: radicalization is the development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict. 4 It does not necessarily amount to violence, but, as in the case of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, may lead to violent behaviour. In conceptualizing efforts to combat radicalization, Brandon and Vidino (2012) see counter-radicalization as a sort of catch-all term that includes three types of initiatives, each with a specific objective: de-radicalization, disengagement, and radicalization prevention. 5 Radicalization and de-radicalization are seen by the United Nations Working Group on Radicalization and Extremism in terms of prevention in the case of radicalisation, and social re-integration in the case of de-radicalisation. 6 A definition of de-radicalization will be discussed later. Cause Mental instability? De-radicalization cannot be considered without discussing its precursor, radicalization,. which is framed in the broader discussion on the causes of terrorism and terrorist behaviour. In recent years, a wealth of literature has emerged attempting to answer the fundamental question as to why a civilian would turn to violence to achieve their political or cultural aims. A detailed study of radicalization is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief consideration of what leads a person to become radicalized is important. This is because a sound de-radicalization programme needs to learn from how individuals become radicalized in the first place. It is also because radicalization is seen as a relatively new trend (although it may not be). In the past there was a less nuanced view about the motivational forces that turned to terroristic activities. The first common misconception on the root causes of terrorism is that the recruit is mentally unstable. Venhaus (2010) claims that while individual actions "may appear utterly insane and irrational to an outside observer, the young person who entered the process was mentally stable". 7 He did not find any "signs of clinical psychosis", but did note, "Antisocial behaviour was clearly present in all". Merari (2010) likewise found that although "none of the would-be suicides was diagnosed as psychotic, most of them had personality 3 Taylor Donald and Louis Winnifred, Terrorism and the Quest for Identity, in Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions, ed. Fathali Mohaddam and Anthony Marsella (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), 170. 4 Clark R. McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (London: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. 5 James Brandon and Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in Europe, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (2012): 9. See also Hamed El-Said, Introduction: Definitions and Conceptual Framework, in De-radicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-Radicalization and De-radicalization programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States, e.d. Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 6. 6 Institute For Strategic Dialogue, Comparative Evaluation Framework For Counter Radicalization, PPN Working Paper (2010): 1. 7 John Venhaus, Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda, United States Institute Of Peace 236, No. 1 (2010): 4.

3 traits which made them more amenable to recruiting for suicide missions". 8 Therefore the relationship between mental illness and likelihood of becoming a radicalized terrorist is tenuous. Post et al. (2009) refers to the issue: terrorist groups attempt to screen out mentally disturbed recruits - after all, they present a security risk. 9 ICRA Comment: Whilst not disagreeing with the premise that mental instability is not necessarily part of the motivation of a would-be terrorist or suicide bomber it may be more correct to link this premise to individuals who are part of a group as there is evidence to link mental illness to those who act alone; the so-called lone wolf. The group has the benefit of being able to screen-out those it deems unsuitable through the recruiting process. Economics & Education? Another common misconception is that terrorists come from poor backgrounds. A number of programmes for de-radicalization of terrorists often involve some form of economic incentive. However, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2003) are most often cited as giving evidence of the lack of relevance of economic factors in causing individuals to become radicalized. They argued that there is little direct connection between poverty and education on terrorism. 10 They find no evidence that improving education or reducing poverty would meaningfully reduce international terrorism. 11 To reach their conclusion, they studied individual characteristics of terrorist operatives from Hezbollah and Hamas. They find within the context of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, individuals who engage in terrorist activities are neither poor nor poorly educated. In fact, they were more educated and generally more affluent than the average citizen in their societies. This paradoxical result leads to the conclusion that the economy and education must not be important determinants of terrorism 12, although economic incentives can arguably be a motive for the young disaffected would-be terrorist. Krueger and Maleckova concluded available evidence suggests that individuals are more likely to commit property crimes if they have lower wages or less education. The occurrence of violent crimes, including murders, however, is typically found to be unrelated to economic opportunities. 13 Religion? Another misconception that has proven to be false about the majority of Islamic terrorists is that they have a deeply held understanding of the Islamic faith. Venhaus (2010) conducted a study of individuals who are "foreign fighters" for al-qaeda and found that the majority of terrorists have an inadequate misunderstanding of their own religion. This was either because they had an incomplete religious education or were raised in a non-practising religious household. This would consequently make them more susceptible to being 8 Ariel Merari, Driven To Death: Psychological And Social Aspects Of Suicide Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 268. 9 Jerrold Post, Farhana Ali, Schuyler Henderson, Stephen Shanfield, Jeff Victoroff And Stevan Weine, The Psychology Of Suicide Terrorism, Psychiatry: Interpersonal And Biological Processes 82, No. 1 (2009): 14. 10 Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty And Terrorism: Is There A Casual Connection? Journal Of Economics Perspectives 14, No. 4 (2003): 141. 11 Ibid., 60. 12 Claude Berrebi, Evidence About The Link Between Education, Poverty And Terrorism Among Palestinians, Peace Economics, Peace Science And Public Policy 13, No. 1, (2007): 22. 13 Krueger And Maleckova, 2002, P. 7).

4 misguided by their superiors who have very narrow interpretations of Islam. 14 The individuals would then use selected passages of religious texts to manipulate and justify violent behaviour. Atran (2015) agrees with Venhaus but claims that the young recruits of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) are even less religiously or ideologically motivated than those recruited by al-qaeda in the late 1990s. 15 Even though ISIS' founders and higher-up members may have an in-depth knowledge of one particular interpretation of Islam, religion was certainly not a major motivating factor for the members themselves. They certainly do not have to "prove" their knowledge of the text or that they are believers as al-qaeda members had to. Atran claims: None of the ISIS fighters we interviewed in Iraq had more than primary school education, some had wives and young children, said Atran. When asked what is Islam? they answered my life. They knew nothing of the Quran or Hadith, or of the early caliphs Omar and Othman, but had learned of Islam from Al Qaeda and ISIS propaganda, teaching that Muslims like them were targeted for elimination unless they first eliminated the impure. 16 Understanding the process of terrorism and de-terrorism From discussing the root cause of terrorism discussion turned to psychological processes. John Horgan (2008) argues that (the) reductionist approach to understanding terrorists behaviour has failed. 17 This has made us blind to the dynamics that shape terrorists. Instead, he explains how we should re-focus our attention on the processes and psychological approaches, which can lead to a better understanding of how people become terrorists. These processes should focus on three distinct phrases; i) becoming involved, ii) being involved and iii) disengaging (not necessarily involving de-radicalization). Horgan argues that once there has been critical study of these phases, there could be targeted counterterrorist and antiterrorist interventions in what is a complex psychological process of terrorist involvement. Understanding paths to radicalization Moghaddam (2005) was one of the first to shift thinking away from root causes to processes. In his paper, "The Staircase to Terrorism", he observed that societal-level variables, such as social inequality, weapon availability, lack of democratic processes and rapid demographic changes do not explain why only a small number of disaffected people in society living under the same adverse conditions as others end up committing acts of terrorism. 18 He proposed a staircase model, which involved a metaphorical narrowing staircase in which a specific psychological process influences each step and that very few people reach the top. He proposed that the higher an individual moves up the staircase, the 14 Venhaus, Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda, 5. 15 Scott Atran, Mindless Terrorists? The Truth About ISIS Is Much Worse, The Guardian, Http://Www.Theguardian.Com/Commentisfree/2015/Nov/15/Terrorists-Isis (Accessed June 16, 2016). 16 Ibid., 17 John Horgan, From Profiles To Pathways And Roots To Routes: Perspectives From Psychology On Radicalization Into Terrorism, The ANNALS Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science 618, No. 1 (2008): 80. 18 Fathali Moghaddam, The Staircase to Terrorism, American Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005).

5 fewer alternatives to violence they would encounter. This would eventually result in the destruction of themselves, others, or both. Moghaddam acknowledges the fact that this is not a formal model, but just a framework that can organize the current psychological literature and knowledge on terrorism. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) 19 suggest what is described as a pyramid model of radicalization. There are three groups of pathways; individual, group, and mass. The apex of the pyramid includes so-called terrorist radicals who believe violence is necessary to achieve their goals. The next level on the pyramidal scale comprises a much larger group of sympathizers who lend passive support in practical terms but do not get actively involved. The bottom of the pyramid consists of those who are neutral but do not actively vocalize or stop extremist s activities. They argue that (current) research on radicalization is focused too much on individual actors and not enough on the dynamics of the group in conflict. Halafoff & Wright-Neville (2009) propose that social exclusion plays a part in radicalization. This became known as the social exclusion model. 20 It begins by the individual feeling as if they have been unfairly treated by the system or society. They feel political helplessness and cultural alienation. Religious or ideological extremist views then play a catalysing role in the radicalization process as like-minded coalesce as a group. Something that this model highlights is the fact that (de-) radicalization is an interactive process. The fact that it also involves an other i.e. society/system is also an interesting point that is often brushed aside. The findings of Halafoff & Wright-Neville also came at the same time as Atran. Scott Atran (2014), an American anthropologist argues that strong group cohesion is more important than ideology or religion in explaining why terrorists act violently. 21 After years of talking to terrorists, from Gaza to Afghanistan, to Indonesia and Europe, he looks into the mind-sets of terrorists in the 21st century. He demonstrates how terrorists are social beings influenced by social connections and values. They are members of sports teams or community organizations, and have groups of friends and family. When they decide to commit a terrorist act, they are doing it for each other and not necessarily the cause. Al-Qaeda a group or a social network? Similar thinking came from Marc Sageman, a clinical psychologist and former CIA officer, who argued that Jihad was leaderless. His first book, Understanding Terror Networks (2009) essentially challenged the motion that the war on terror can be won if it kills Bin Laden, his main ideologue, Ayman al-zawahiri, and other members of the al-qaeda leadership. 22 According to Sageman, al-qaeda is not an organization but a social network 19 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Poltiical Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008). 20 Anna Halafoff and David Wright-Neville, A Missing Peace? The Role of Religious Actors in Countering Terrorism, Studies of Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 10 (2009): 108. 21 Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010). 22 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004).

6 that must be disrupted. He emphasises that one must thoroughly understand the web relationship that sustained them in order to defeat them. He continues this argument in his second book, Leaderless Jihad and claims that US biggest threat isn t a revived al Qaeda in the Middle East, but from the loose-knit cells of Western-born Muslims or Muslim immigrants living in the West. These disaffected bunch of guys tend to be friends, roommates, classmates or family members sharing common interests who undergo the radicalization process together. There is no doubt that these informal local terrorists groups are certainly an important aspect of the global terrorist network. 23 Bjorgo (2009) also argued and agreed that deficiency in individual primacy relationships may search for a substitute familial relationship or membership in a close-knit group with people sharing the same ideology. 24 A quest for self-esteem Psychological factors can also predict a person's likelihood in becoming violently radicalized. In Kruglanski et al (2014) explain how the presence of the "quest for significance" can motivate someone to become radicalized. 25 The quest has characteristics, which "constitute a major, universal, human motivation variously labelled as the need for esteem, achievement, meaning, competence, control and so on". 26 What motivates most terrorists to commit a violent act is "honour, vengeance, religion, loyalty to the leader, perks in the afterlife, even feminism". 27 Therefore some individuals would adapt their morality to suit this behaviour and place these needs above others. The desire for significance is causal for a number of reasons, which include prior humiliation, or threat of future humiliation, anticipation of a future loss of significance and personal incentive. 28 In fact, such humiliation can be the motivation for suicide terrorism. Gina DeJacimo (2015) argues that pressure from the group or organization impacts the individual's tendency to engage in acts of suicide terrorism. She then went on to say suicide terrorists do not internalize the ideology that their respective terrorist groups present. She quotes Post et al (2009) in the article, "The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism," that explores the idea that collective identity consolidated by the group social processes play a crucial role in leading Muslim youths onto the path of terrorism and by viewing suicide as martyrdom. He claims, Hopelessness, deprivation, envy, and humiliation make death, and paradise, seem more appealing. 29 This idea that martyrdom and suicidal violence is valued in Islam is taught from an early age. Promises of rewards in the afterlife and the threat of humiliation from other group member s emphasis this "culture of martyrdom", particularly in vulnerable youths. 30 23 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008). 24 Tore Bjorgo, Processes of disengagement from violent groups of the extreme right, in Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009). 25 Kruglanski 2014 26 pg 73 27 ibid 28 pg 74 29 (Post et al., 2009, p. 19) 30 (post et al pg 19).

7 The role of social media Social media has become a powerful facilitator in increasing radicalization, and in bringing recruits to ISIS and other groups. Vertical web technologies such as YouTube and online magazines like Inspire or Dabiq have long been used. However, hybrid new social media innovations such as Facebook, Twitter, Odnoklassniki, and WhatsApp provide horizontal communication that are far more interactive and personalised. It can be said that these forms of communication lure alienated individuals of low esteem into terrorist groups. Many images of Muslims suffering at the hands of the ideologically -opposed around the world are shown in order to create sympathy and to make the individual appear heroic if they do become jihadist. In addition, visual sophistication of propaganda videos, the speed the propaganda is disseminated across the globe, and the fact that this information is now communicated in various European languages has widened the base of support. 31 There is still disagreement among academics on the centrality of external media and networks on home grown terrorism which is exemplified by the so-called Sageman-Hoffman debate. 32 There have been exhaustive efforts to understand radicalization whereas de-radicalization studies are much fewer in number. 33 Horgan (2008) points out how this subject is of poor relation to radicalization studies as there is overwhelming preoccupation with uncovering the process of radicalization. 34 Alternatively, research on disengagement appears to be the more popular choice of many academics. This could be because data from any initiatives or de-radicalization project (e.g. UK Prevent) are subject to non-disclosure. DE-RADICALIZATION Defining the path If radicalization is a contentious term, then so is de-radicalization. Bjorgo and Horgan (2009) noted that having worked on these issues for a number of years, we find the lack of conceptual clarity in the emerging discourse on de-radicalization striking. They go on to argue that the term often appears to be understood as any effort aimed at preventing radicalization from taking place. 35 Others see de-radicalization more in terms of de-programming those who have already been radicalized instead of being a process of prevention. Demant et al (2009) claims, it is the process of becoming less radical; and the process of becoming less radical applies both 31 Jytte Klausen, Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 1 (2015): 1-22. 32 See Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters, Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 133-138; See also Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, Does Obama Still Call the Shots? Debating the Containment of al-qaeda s Leadership, Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (2008). 33 There are a number of similarities between de-radicalization programmes and the more recent conflict de-escalation programmes that been running in a few countries including Israel. It has the same aims as de-radicalization programmes as they both try and bring their extreme views to a more reasonable, sophisticated view. This will not be discussed in this analysis as it s not an aim of this paper. However, comparing the two different types of programmes would be an interesting research area that could be investigated in future research endeavors. 34 Horgan, From Profiles To Pathways And Roots To Routes:, 4. 35 Tore Bjorgo And John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual And Collective Disengagement (New York: Routledge, 2009), 3.

8 to behaviour and beliefs. Behaviour in this context involves primarily the cessation of violent actions. The idea of beliefs involves an increase in confidence in the system, a desire to once more be a part of society, and the rejection of non-democratic means. [...] In general, the de-radicalisation of behaviour is linked with the de-radicalisation of beliefs. 36 Ashour (2009) has also provided his own definition of de-radicalization in his book, The De- Radicalization of Jihadists. He described the term as primarily concerned with changing the attitudes of armed Islamist movements towards violence. 37 As part of that process, one must recognise that social, political and economic transformations will only occur in a pluralistic society. Ashour s book is the first detailed study on the causes of de-radicalization of militant Islamists movements. The two main questions he attempts to answer are when will the de-radicalization process of change start? And under what conditions will it succeed? His two cases include the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Group as they represent two pioneering cases of comprehensive de-radicalization. 38 De-radicalization of Jihadists shows how a combination of charismatic leadership, state repression, selective inducements and social interactions can make Islamists movements de-radicalize ideologically, behaviourally and organizationally. It is important to note that Ashour focuses exclusively on collective as opposed to individual de-radicalization. The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Radicalization and Extremism describes de-radicalization as programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence. 39 It is important to distinguish between deradicalization and disengagement as they are often used inter-changeably. De-radicalization involves reassigning one s belief system whereas disengagement refers to the discontinuation of active participation in violence. 40 Therefore, the radicalized may be disengaged from terrorist activity but still hold radical views and espouse radical ideology. In this sense they may be disengaged, but they are not de-and may return to violent extremism in the future, still believing this is a morally acceptable means to achieve their aims. A framework towards an end; the possible dangers of labelling A framework to entice those who have been radicalised to turn away from violence and bring them back into society is likely to be similar to models used in combatting the behaviour of gangs and cults where many of the same factors exist as those that have been discussed in this brief paper. In that sense, it is interesting to ask the question; is it right to use the label of de-radicalisation and its cohort, radicalisation? That in itself raises the 36 Demant Et Al, Decline And Disengagement: An Analysis Of Processes Of De-Radicalization, IMES Report Series, Amsterdam (2008): 13. 37 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization Of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamists Movements, (London: Routledge, 2009), 6. 38 Ibid., 13. 39 Institute For Strategic Dialogue, De-Radicalization, PPN Working Paper (London: Institute For Strategic Dialogue, 2010), 1-2. 40 Kruglenski et al (2014) pg 87.

9 risk of creating a separate category of disaffected members in society; when in fact they might all be expected to be treated in the same way for the same reasons. Bjorgo (2009) interviewed former right-wing extremists and found that there are two universal factors involved in disengagement and de-radicalization. Factors motivating exit from terrorist groups are conceptualized either to push or pull the individual away from the group. 41 Push factors include negative internal forces and conditions that would essentially make it unpleasant to stay in the group. These factors could include doubting and disillusionment from the group s ideology, becoming uncomfortable with the brutality of the violence involved, loss of status from the group and burnout. Pull factors are the external positive factors that make another environment appear more attractive than the group s current environment. This includes age, fatigue, maturity, greater freedom and desire to marry and start a family. 42 In addition to examining the factors motivating exit, several authors identify factors that may prevent someone leaving a terrorist organization. In his book, Walking Away from Terrorism, Horgan (2009) draws on an 18-month pilot study that in time will be characterized as a longitudinal project with individual former terrorists. 43 He presents six case studies of former terrorists to make the argument that involvement in, and disengagement from, terrorism are parts of a social process. He also argues that factors that may inhibit exit include threats of severe reprisals from group members, heightened danger of attack by members of opposing groups, loss of protection by the organization and (for practical/ emotional reasons) there is nowhere to go. Demant et al (2008) distinguish between different types of motives that play a role in deradicalisation. 44 lack of ideological appeal social and organizational inadequacy real-life circumstances Other common features of the de-radicalization process include rejection of violence, unachievable future outcomes, changes in the individual s viewpoint, disappointment in the movement and practical life circumstances Making the point that the process of becoming less radical 'applies to both behaviour and beliefs, Demant et al go on to discuss the impediments to the de-radicalization process which he describes as: community loyalty a 'significant' other lack of alternatives and inner barriers 41 Bjorgo And Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 38. 42 Ibid., 39-49. 43 John Horgan, Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts Of Disengagement From Radical And Extremist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009). 44 Demant Et Al, Decline And Disengagement: An Analysis Of Processes Of De-Radicalization, 10.

10 With regard to behaviour, this primarily involves the cessation of violent actions. With regards to beliefs, this involves an increase in confidence in the system, a desire to once more become part of society, and the rejection of non-democratic means. 45 Barrett and Bokhari (2009) provide a brief overview of de-radicalization and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim World. 46 They argue that notwithstanding findings on motivations for entry into or exit from terroristic organizations, current de-radicalization programmes focus largely on ideology. This is odd considering that the literature on terrorist motivations, as reviewed above, indicates that ideological factors play a secondary role. Bjorgo claims, It is probably more common that beliefs change after leaving the group, and as a consequence, rather than before, and as a cause of, leaving the group. 47 They question whether de-radicalization programmes that do focus on ideology are likely to be effective in achieving participant s disengagement. ICRA Comment Attempts to find a generally accepted view of terrorism are complicated by the widely different social and cultural domains in which it exists. Now the scope of literature on the general subject area has moved on to discussing the process of radicalization and deradicalization. In this it is clear that a disjuncture appears between the largely nonideological factors that motivate entry and exit from terrorist organization, as identified in the literature, and the largely ideological focus of current de-radicalization programmes. McCauley and Moskalenko make the point by saying that there are many paths to radicalization that do not involve ideology although they note ideology can be important, however, as a justification for violence. 48 It is evident that understanding the process of radicalization is important in analysing 21 st Century terroristic activity in whatever form. In general terms it is suggested that terrorists are not mentally unstable or economically deprived. They are not religiously knowledgeable or necessarily ideologically driven. 45 Ibid., 13. 46 Richard Barrett And Laila Bokhari, De-Radicalziation And Rehabilitation Programmemes Targeting Religious Terrorists And Extremists In The Muslim World: An Overivew, In Leaving Terrroism Behind Individual And Collective Disengagment, Ed. Tore Bjorgo And John Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009). 47 Bjorgo And Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 37. 48 McCauley and Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism, 220.

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