Seminar Report THE POLITICS OF RADICALISATION: REFRAMING THE DEBATE AND RECLAIMING THE LANGUAGE London Muslim Centre, Whitechapel Thursday 18 th October, 2007 SUMMARY On Thursday 18 th October 2007, a unique group of scholars, activists, officials and Muslim leaders met at the London Muslim Centre in Whitechapel to discuss the language and politics of radicalisation in contemporary British politics. Presentations were made by a number of prominent speakers, including Dr Daud Abdullah, Dr Salman Sayyid, Dr Mohammed Khan, Moazzem Begg and Maggie Bierne, which were followed by small group discussions and plenary sessions. The overall consensus of the meeting included the following points, among others: The current language and discourse surrounding the term radicalisation is highly problematic, in large part because: (1) it assumes simplistic and mono-causal explanations for political violence based on notions of brainwashing, extremist infection or radicalisation pathways or escalators ; (2) it constructs everyday Muslim practices, Islamically-inspired political activism and the broader Muslim community as inherently suspect ; (3) it restricts the scope of legitimate debate about foreign policy and divisive political domestic issues; and (4) it is counter-productive, inconsistent and highly negative in terms of government goals of preventing further terrorist violence. The current use of the language and discourse of radicalisation should be vigorously resisted by leaders, scholars, activists and concerned individuals. There are a variety of strategies that can be adopted to resist the discourse, including: (1) challenging inaccuracies and the unreflective use of language by the media and experts ; (2) critiquing terms such as terrorism, radicalisation and extremism and discussing the deeper issues raised by contemporary political violence and counter terrorism policies; (3) employing such terms in a consistent manner which recognises that there are other forms of radicalism (e.g. liberal, socialist, fascist) and that to be radical is not inherently bad (democracy and women s rights were once radical positions); and (4) documenting the effects of radicalisation and counter terrorism policies and engaging in educational activities at a variety of levels to undermine popular stereotypes and misconceptions. Department of International Politics University of Wales, Penglais, Aberystwyth, SY23 3DA Ffôn/Tel: +44 (0) 1970 622702 Ffacs/Fax: +44 (0) 1970 622709 Post-e: gwleidyddiaeth@aber.ac.uk E-mail: interpol@aber.ac.uk Gwefan/Website: www.aber.ac.uk/interpol/
In contrast to current political posturing, there are many lessons to be drawn from the experiences of Northern Ireland; policy-makers, security practitioners and Muslim human rights activist should be encouraged to study, visit and engage with Northern Ireland groups whilst remaining cognisant of the unique challenges facing Muslims in Britain today. There was widespread agreement that forums where Muslims could safely and freely discuss controversial political issues such as those surrounding extremism, radicalisation, terrorism and current UK policies were greatly needed. There was a broad recognition that the present moment presented an ideal opportunity to advance a progressive agenda and improve the level of public debate, as there is currently a great deal of political and public dissatisfaction with the progress of the war on terror. Muslim groups need to recognise and accept their differences, but then make an effort to forge strategic links with one another. There is also a genuine need to form broadly-based alliances with non-muslim groups, particularly those working for human rights and justice. There is a real need to invite the Christian churches into the conversation, as they have an important role to play in influencing the way Muslims and Islam are thought of. BACKGROUND TO THE SEMINAR Since we established the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in 2005, the increased usage and shifting meaning of the term radicalisation, and the way it has since become deployed politically, has greatly concerned us. In particular, we have been concerned by the way in which radicalisation has become synonymous with particular political-religious orientations, how it has functioned to construct Muslims as a suspect community and how it has informed specific government programmes and perspectives on de-radicalisation. We are also concerned that current perspectives on radicalisation have a distorting effect on scholarly research and research funding. Nor are we as scholars alone in our concerns. In February 2007, the Islamic Human Rights Commission organised a seminar on the topic of radicalisation, which was generally welcomed by participants and provided a forum for useful discussion. In order to take the discussion further, and to help clarify how current approaches may be contributing to the problem and what should be done differently, we organised a follow-up event. For the meeting, we had a number of specific aims: (a) to critique the way in which the term radicalisation is used in contemporary Britain; (b) to identify the political, academic, social and other effects of that usage; (c) to explore alternative frameworks for speaking about and understanding contemporary forms and processes of radical activism, both violent and non-violent; (d) to strive towards a language within which real and perceived threats to security might be discussed, considered, researched and understood more fully and respectfully. 2
DETAILED SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The seminar was divided into two main parts. In the morning session, discussions were focused on the question of current understandings and approaches to radicalisation and the political and social effects of this discourse on Muslims. The afternoon session explored the possibilities of reclaiming the language and finding a way forward. In the following sub-sections, we summarise some of the main issues and perspectives raised during presentations by speakers, small group discussions and plenary sessions. 1. Reframing the Debate about Radicalisation Both speakers and delegates acknowledged the importance of language and the way in which it is constitutive of political reality. They pointed out that the power to name currently rested with the media elite and the London elite of politicians and security officials, who had at first named foreign radicals as the main threat, but now named home-grown extremists as the primary threat. A delegate from Northern Ireland underlined the material effect of such labelling, pointing out that there were 12,000 ex-prisoners in West Belfast who had been directly affected by the decision whether to name them terrorists or freedom fighters. There was general discussion about the effectiveness and legitimacy of violence in advancing political causes such as resisting occupation, and about the seemingly inescapable violence associated with being human. It was pointed out that state violence is frequently judged by different standards to that waged by non-state actors, which is most often condemned as terrorism. It appears to be legitimate for the West to wage war, but not for others. The war on terror is a war of the rich and powerful, and the term radicalisation has become part of it, and of the battle of ideas. There was also some discussion of the ways in which radicalisation had become associated with violence and religious extremism, and how it missed the historical context in which various radicals had helped to end slavery, champion democracy and bring about equality for women among other things. It was recognised that the term involved a value judgement, and that in the future, current positions seen as radical could be widely accepted as moderate and mainstream. One of the speakers noted how the term was used to depoliticise individuals and groups who challenged the social and political consensus, and how it had become an issue of identity : attitudes towards religion and violence is now the litmus test of British (and European) identity. Radicalisation had become a tool for drawing boundaries of what is permissible, delegitimizing Muslims mobilising as Muslims as this challenged the fundamental basis of European self-identity. Another delegate argued that the radicalisation discourse was aimed at getting Muslims to police themselves through self-censorship and informing on each other; Muslims discipline each other and themselves by identifying radical discourse. 3
Delegates suggested that there was little acknowledgement of the role of foreign policy in radicalising young people, and that it was officially frowned upon to suggest such causal links. One participant argued that it appeared as if government were not truly interested in countering radicalisation within Muslim communities, since they let many extreme imams continue to operate, whilst labelling prominent imams such as himself as extreme, even though he was working positively with young Muslims at a grass roots level to create alternatives to the (violent) radical path. It was also noted that policies such as pre-trial, indefinite detention were making the situation worse, and so-called de-radicalisation policies were not only failing, but inflaming the situation. Some delegates also felt that current government counter-radicalisation approaches were based upon a divide and rule strategy, a strategy reflected in the choices they make regarding which groups to recognise and enlist within the Muslim community and which to marginalise. Instances were also noted of the police using informers within the Muslim community, which was both dangerous for the informers and highly damaging to community relations and perceptions of the police. Northern Ireland delegates concurred on the dangers of such practices. Other problematic police practices identified included the frequent use of profiling, the harassment of lawyers who defend terrorists and the closing down of mosques and university groups where radical discourse and debate occurred. Delegates felt that there was a real need to educate the police in Muslim practices, as many ordinary Muslim practices were treated with suspicion. The tendency to link Muslim practices such as headscarves, reading the Quran, demonstrating concern for Palestinians and the like with terrorism serves to alienate and demoralise Muslims. Similarly, the closing down of debate restricted the space in which Muslims can legitimately debate controversial political issues and drove young people underground. Divisions between different parts of the British Muslim world were also discussed, and it was suggested that different alliances between various factions were required for different purposes, rather than aiming at a rather unrealistic overall Muslim unity. Exchange of information between Muslims was also recognised as important to foster. One participant recounted how she was at a speaking engagement, speaking as part of a panel, when she realised that she had been selected because she was regarded by the organisers as a moderate, and moreover, that she was talking like a moderate, while unself-consciously censoring her more radical thoughts. People in a position to articulate the depth of frustration amongst sections of Muslim Britain do not do so because of the powerful processes of silencing and self-censorship which currently operate. This led to a discussion of the importance of outlets such as Ramadan Radio, where Mujahideen are prayed for, the language is reclaimed, and jihad as a notion is presented as legitimate and empowering. One participant highlighted the importance of learning to challenge the law more effectively. The question was raised if there were a set of common principles that can be agreed upon as a basis for 4
moving forward. It was suggested that Muslims should not be apologetic any more, and that they should recognise that they all have different roles to play Salafis, imams, Islamist activists, etc.. It was suggested that by unproblematically using the language of radicalisation, we help perpetuate the problem. In tackling the Muslim problem head on, Muslims would actually be strengthened. The importance of continuing to point out the origins of the problem, which lie in part with government foreign and domestic policy, was pointed out. Being British, Muslim and politically and religiously active is perceived as a threat to British society. Terrorism, it was argued, is in this sense something of a red herring. 2. Reclaiming the Language the Way Forward The afternoon discussion addressed the issue of censorship, especially self-censorship as a byproduct of government responses to terror attacks. The effect that counter-terrorist measures and other government initiatives have had in terms of driving radical voices underground was a cause for real concern. The importance of humanising the experience of British Muslims and of documenting their experiences of counter-terrorism measures was emphasised, but some felt that the fear of arrest and detention was an obstacle to documentation. One delegated reported being detained at an airport, and deciding that he was going to answer the police s questions about his political views, and that he began to enjoy the interview, expressing his true views. Others thought that documenting Muslim experience could create a risk of backlash against Muslims. The importance of civil society organisations in supporting British Muslims was emphasised, but it was pointed out that there was little funding for casework, and that organisations who did it were at full stretch (Liberty, for instance, did not do it at all); therefore, individuals in need of advice or advocacy often had nowhere to go. This was in stark contrast to the 40,000 that was given to those perceived as representing a quietist safe Islam, such as Britislam, which was founded 3 weeks after Ruth Kelly s speech, and eight months later was funded by government. Pathfinder was mentioned as a project fighting extremism, as was the Brixton project and STREET. The discussion concluded by pointing out that even if policy makers were evidence-driven in terms of what would work, short-term thinking on the part of politicians frequently prevented evidence driving policy, since politicians favoured policies that maximised their chances of being re-elected, irrespective of their likely effectiveness. If they thought that the electorate would favour them being tough on terror, then that was the line they took. Related to this, some delegates suggested that changes in government policy were more important than changes in language, as changing the language could be employed as a smokescreen for continuing self-interested and counter- 5
productive policies. While some delegates were optimistic that real change was possible in the current context, others were more pessimistic about the willingness of political elites to compromise. Some of the practical suggestions from delegates for moving the debate forward and improving the current situation included the following: So-called experts need to be challenged when they publicly discuss Islam in misleading ways, particularly when they misuse terms like jihad, ummah and so on; The problem of radicalisation needs to be tackled without derogating from human rights and civil liberties commitments. The abuse of Muslims is counter-productive and makes the problem worse; We need to adopt an ethical stance that takes into account all humanity. UK foreign policy should be criticised because it is unethical and illiberal, not simply because it is detrimental to Muslims; Debate needs to be expanded and encouraged, not shut down. Space needs to be opened up for dialogue with so-called terrorists and extremists. Those groups and individuals defined as part of the problem have to be part of the solution; There is a need to create a new vocabulary and the safe forums for discussing these divisive political issues, and to become more active in the political process; The language of terrorism and radicalisation needs to be replaced by terms such as politicisation and realisation. Moreover, terms such as Islam and jihad need to be decoupled from terms like terrorism, and their empowering potential reclaimed. There should be a zero tolerance attitude towards terms like Islamic terrorism ; Counter-narratives about Muslims including those documenting the effect of radicalisation discourse and counter-terrorism policies on Muslims need to be promoted in the public domain. The independent media, and sympathetic journalists in the mainstream media, can be a useful way of promoting alternative narratives and discourses. Civic education programmes are also crucial for undermining dominant stereotypes and prejudice; Muslims need to be more courageous in speaking out against prejudice and misconceptions, and need to speak in public in the same open way they speak in seminars such as this one. The onus is on Muslims to take strong action and not be passive victims. The Stephen Lawrence inquiry was mentioned as a model for how to confront Islamophobia A range of different groups, Muslim and non-muslim, need to be mobilised to work together in a broad coalition against counter-productive and damaging government programmes; Christian churches need to be brought into this process, as they are important for the way they discuss Islam; There are important gains to be had by forging links with, and learning from, the experience of groups and individuals in Northern Ireland. 6
PARTICIPANTS Participants at the seminar included private individuals, as well as representatives of the following groups and organisations: Muslim Council of Britain Islamic Human Rights Commission Hizb ut-tahrir Britain Cage Prisoners Liberty Muslim Contact Unit, Metropolitan Police JTAC Aberystwyth University University of Manchester University of Birmingham Ramadhan Foundation 1990 Trust RICU Committee for the Administration of Justice (CAJ) Northern Ireland Muslim Safety Forum ESRC New Security Challenges Programme ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We are grateful to the ESRC New Security Challenges Programme and the British International Studies Association who supported the event financially, and we thank the MCB, IHRC and CSRV for much-needed assistance with its organisation. 7