International Workshop on the Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition, Geneva (8-9 December 2016) CHAIR S SUMMARY

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA Federal Department of Defence Civil Protection and Sport DDPS International Workshop on the Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition, Geneva (8-9 December 2016) CHAIR S SUMMARY Introduction 1. The International Workshop on the Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition (hereafter: the workshop) was held on 8 and 9 December 2016 at the WMO-Building in Geneva, upon the invitation of Switzerland. The workshop was attended by delegations from 71 States and 29 international, regional and non-governmental organizations. 2. The workshop provided a platform to follow up on the discussions related to the safe and secure management of ammunition (SSMA) which were initiated at the Consultative Meeting on the Safe and Secure Management of Conventional Ammunition in 2015. In particular, the aim was to discuss among policy-practitioners and technical experts the challenges in implementing international guidelines on ammunition management, and to develop concrete elements paving the way to address these challenges. The workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule. 3. Discussions were structured in three plenary and two working sessions: a) Plenary Session 1 recalled the relevance of SSMA for non-proliferation and the prevention of explosions at munitions sites and underscored the importance of effective ammunition management practices and procedures to curb these risks. b) Plenary Session 2 presented existing ammunition-related international instruments and their scope related to SSMA and discussed how this initiative can contribute to existing processes. c) Working Session I aimed at defining what is needed to enhance the effective implementation of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and to overcome implementation challenges. Three working groups dealt in parallel with (i) the sustainable implementation of the IATG, (ii) the integration of the IATG into national regulations and (iii) the implementation of the IATG in conflict-affected settings. d) The second working session aimed at defining how the needs identified in Working Session 1 can best be addressed. Participants discussed the issue in the three thematic working groups. e) In a last plenary session a common understanding on the needs to enhance SSMA was sought and possible measures to achieve these needs. 4. The present Chair s summary outlines core elements discussed during the workshop. The summary was prepared by the Chair (Switzerland) under its own responsibility and seeks to reflect in a factual manner the main points under discussion. It does not represent a full record of all issues discussed, nor does it seek to reproduce the positions of delegations. First Plenary Session: Safety, Security and Sustainability 5. The first plenary session gave an introduction to the relevance of SSMA. The threats and risks related to deficient ammunition management practices in the context of both the proliferation of ammunition and unplanned explosions were outlined. 6. With regard to illicit transfers of ammunition, the difficulty to control cross-border trafficking was highlighted. In particular as the diversion of arms and ammunition can quickly become a regional problem, not only affecting neighboring countries but impacting an entire region. It becomes even more complex when illegally proliferated ammunition from government stockpiles end up in the hands of non-state armed groups and are used in attacks on civilians and peacekeepers, sometimes for terror-related purposes. Considering the difficulty of cross-border trafficking, securing ammunition in governmental depots was considered essential to prevent their diversion. 7. As regards unplanned explosions, it was noted that they can have considerable long-term humanitarian, socio-economic and political impacts. Not only do they cause numerous victims and displacements, the risk of proliferation also arises as basic security provisions are lacking on destroyed ammunition sites. It was noted that the impact of explosive incidents increases

significantly depending on storage practices. Speakers underlined that awareness and political buy-in at the national level are guiding principles for sustainable SSMA to prevent explosions. 8. The IATG were introduced as an existing set of international guidelines to assist national authorities, as well as relevant private actors, in enhancing the safety and security of ammunition stockpiles. They were mandated by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and placed under the UN SaferGuard Programme, which was established as the corresponding knowledge management platform. The IATG are based on existing national and regional standards, which were aggregated to a comprehensive reference guide to assist States in combatting the dual risks of unplanned explosions and illicit diversion. As the IATG are built modularly for basic, intermediate and advanced levels, they are highly flexible and globally applicable taking into account the diversity of State capacity and needs. The IATG are reviewed every five years. The SaferGuard Programme is considered under the biennial UNGA First Committee Resolution Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. UNODA noted the resolution s potential to serve as an instrument to reflect new dynamics with regard to SSMA. 9. Experts also highlighted the link with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a political framework and in particular Goal 16, which aims to reduce armed violence and illicit arms flows. Specific indicators on ammunition management could be developed. Efforts to measure progress in this field should be enhanced. Assistance provided to improve ammunition management may be recognized as official development assistance within the framework of the 2030 Agenda. 10. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) noted various efforts conducted under the UN SaferGuard Programme that support the objective of the safe and secure management of ammunition, inter alia: the validation of relevant ammunition expertise with a view to national capacity-building (in partnership with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the Small Arms Survey), the enhancement of the user-friendliness of the IATG and its webpage, the provision of supplementary resources such as technical notes, specific roadmaps for different actors (peacekeepers, police, EOD professionals, humanitarian actors, industry) and the translation of the IATG into various languages. 11. The IATG were further described from a more technical level and it was underlined that they are composed as guidelines and not as standard operating procedures and need to be integrated into national and local regulations to ensure their applicability in each context. 12. Last but not least it was highlighted that several challenges may arise when applying the IATG. These are mainly related to the sustainable implementation of the IATG, their integration into local regulations and their implementation in conflict settings. Accompanying measures need to be in place, such as a proper division of labor at the national and international level, national ownership at high levels, sustainable procedures and infrastructure, functional legal frameworks, training, occupational satisfaction. Second Plenary Session: Political developments at the international level 13. Plenary Session 2 gave an overview over the wide array of existing global and regional instruments that cover different aspects of SSMA. A few of them were presented in more detail. 14. At the international level, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) were mentioned as relevant frameworks. Protocol V is a legally binding framework regulating the clearance of ERWs and establishing generic preventive measures. Its implementation process fosters the exchange of information and knowledge related to the promotion of best practices. The ATT contains legallybinding obligations regulating the international trade of conventional arms to prevent their misuse and proliferation to illicit markets. It covers ammunition, parts and components by requesting States Parties to establish and maintain national control systems to regulate their export. 15. On the regional level, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunition and other associated material represents a legally binding framework that considers SSMA extensively. Nevertheless, several challenges at the national level limit the impact of this instrument. Most prominently, national capacities are often lacking to support particular action plans. Moreover, there is a deficit in national appropriation and legal systems at different levels. 16. Other relevant regional instruments include the politically binding OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) and the OSCE Handbook on Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition. The OSCE Document on SCA entails an assistance mechanism through which participating States can seek expert advice as well as financial and material assistance for the improvement of their stockpile management. The OSCE Handbook provides a guide for national policy making for stockpile management and disposal of conventional ammunition. 17. The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) endeavors to prevent and combat 2

illicit manufacturing and trafficking by promoting and facilitating exchange of information, experiences and cooperation between OAS Member States. CIFTA does not address SSMA in particular, rather it focuses on all aspects of firearms. 18. Presentations and discussions during the second plenary session emphasized a profound need for information exchange, cooperation and coordination on all levels and among different instruments and actors to improve SSMA. Furthermore, delegations have postulated technical guidelines as essential for SSMA, however without any operational accompanying tools their integration into national regulations was considered to be challenging. Working Session I: What is needed to enhance the effective implementation of the IATG? Working Group 1: Sustainable implementation of the IATG 19. Working Group 1 aimed at identifying whether the IATG require further guidance to contribute to sustainable SSMA. It became clear right at the beginning that the IATG are not meant to be taken as national standards, but as guidelines for the development of a national normative framework. The existence of such a framework and the consideration of pre-existing local circumstances was deemed to be an essential component of sustainability. Often national norms are already in place and the IATG can be used to adapt and improve them. 20. An introductory presentation shed light on the relevance of sound organizational structures, personnel management, training, facility standards and standard operating procedures in order to ensure sustainability in ammunition management. Participants emphasized a two-edged need; namely the need for technical improvements of the IATG and the need for clarifying implementation tools beyond the IATG. 21. Regarding technical improvements within the IATG, participants stated the need for developing readily useable inventory management tools, the inclusion of a UN Hazard Classification Code conversion table for ammunition with no such classification and the provision of guidelines on occupational health hazards. Translating the IATG in local languages was also seen vital for their implementation as there is a lack of awareness of the IATG at national and sub-national level. 22. As regards the needs beyond the IATG, participants highlighted the value of proper baseline assessments, which would involve external and internal risk assessments for countries to conduct. Participants also considered the lack of guidance regarding resources and capacities an institution needs to sustainably manage ammunition (i.e. legal framework, organizational structure, training as well as personnel, facility and equipment management). Finally, it was highlighted that policy-makers must be approached at high levels to generate political buy-in. Working Group 2: From IATG to national regulations 23. Working Group 2 was tasked to identify whether the integration of the IATG into national regulations requires further guidance to contribute to SSMA. 24. The International Mine Action Standards and their adaptation into National Mine Action Standards were discussed as a useful example of nationalization of international guidelines. 25. In the active discussions participants identified two main needs: national ownership and the development of national action plans to adapt the international guidelines to the local context. 26. With regard to the first, more awareness-raising on SSMA and the IATG was deemed necessary to ensure adequate interest in the issue. High level buy-in is needed to get the necessary support for the establishment of responsible institutions and the provision of adequate resources. In this context, the translation of the IATG into relevant languages was again considered crucial. 27. With regard to the second, it was highlighted that national authorities, institutions and policies are needed to adapt the IATG to local needs and regional realities. They are crucial for leading incountry efforts towards SSMA but also to coordinate international assistance. Close collaboration between international assistance and national authorities is vital for successful SSMA, as it is only through buy-in and trust that information related to national stockpiles will be shared. 28. In this context, the IATG should provide more guidance on what is needed to implement the guidelines at the national level, how to set up a national authority and what its mandate should be. The expansion of the mandate of existing bodies, for example national SALW or mine action commissions was considered a valuable option. Furthermore the IATG should be harmonised with local and regional instruments, which sometimes already contain regulations on SSMA. 29. Participants stressed that once the political buy-in is confirmed and the necessary national institutions are established, there is a need for assistance including technical support and training to the national authorities. 3

30. Finally participants reflected interest to explore mechanisms for mobilizing resources to this purpose at the multilateral level. Working Group 3: IATGs in conflict-affected settings 31. Working Group 3 acknowledged that the IATG aren t designed as a precise instruction to achieve SSMA. They are generic voluntary technical guidelines and represent a benchmark to aspire to. 32. The discussions highlighted that there is a need for flexibility/adaptability in the use of the IATGs in conflict-affected settings. In this regard, participants reflected on the need for improved guidance on an incremental, step-by-step approach in applying the IATGs in such contexts. 33. Furthermore risk reduction and acceptance was raised as a critical element in conflict-affected settings. In particular participants noted on measures to reduce risk with limited resources and to involve national stakeholders in acceptance of risk factors. 34. Coordination of stakeholders, both national and international, was noted as an essential principle in conflict-affected settings. This was deemed particularly important as there may be multiple stakeholders party to a conflict who hold ammunition, as well as multiple actors in country to support SSMA. A leading actor with the capacity and legitimacy to promote and lead an ammunition management program would be useful, also to generate political buy-in at all levels. 35. Some participants noted on a need for greater clarity on mandates in order to work on, or operationalize tasks related to ammunition. In this regard shortcomings of current peacekeeping mandates was raised and discussed. Presentation of results I 36. After having heard the main results of the three different working groups and the succeeding plenary discussion, a lot of congruence was noted and some conclusions from this first working session were drawn: First, considering the fact that the IATG cannot be directly implemented, it is vital to enhance political buy-in and national ownership and to sensitize political actors at high levels. Second, accompanying measures such as institution building, infrastructure and training are crucial to effectively implement international guidelines. A national institution needs to be in place to lead and coordinate ammunition management in the country but also to institutionalize education and training and build capacities. The third aspect identified was the need for a mechanism for assistance and technical support to enhance SSMA in all three dimensions. Working Session II: How can the needs identified in Working Session I best be addressed? Working Group 1: Sustainable implementation of the IATG 37. Working Session II continued the discussion held in Working Session I and explored how the identified needs for sustainable implementation could best be addressed. 38. To promote national risk assessments it was highlighted that baseline assessments tools would be helpful. While the UN SaferGuard Risk Reduction Process Level Assessment Tool was considered, additional assessment frameworks were discussed (e.g. templates). They should include the possibility to assess institutions and associated capabilities. Participants also highlighted the value of defining a clear end-state early on to enable assessing developments. 39. Secondly, coordination at the national level was discussed. Experience from affected states showed that it would be useful to have a national agency which leads and coordinates at the national level. The national agency would also contribute to local ownership and ensure coherence among international donors and operators. National action plans were considered essential to strive for a specific end-state. Guidance in this direction was deemed useful. 40. Thirdly, training was seen as a key element for sustainability. Participants pointed out that training needed to be systemically integrated into national training curricula. Additional personnel management would ensure that trained specialists are posted in relevant positions. 41. Finally, participants underlined that international cooperation is first and foremost based on trust, which requires time. Cooperation should hence take a long-term perspective. Working Group 2: From IATG to national regulations 42. Working Group 2 discussed possible ways to achieve the needs which were identified in Working Session I with regard to the integration of the IATG into local regulations. 43. Discussions focused on how to generate more political buy-in and national ownership. One of the proposed ways to promote SSMA was to make better use of existing UN fora. The UNGA 4

Resolution Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus was mentioned in particular. Meetings under the UN Programme of Action on SALW and Mine Action meetings were deemed opportune to promote SSMA on their margin, for instance with side-events. A group of countries in the context of this initiative could push in this direction. 44. Furthermore regional organizations were considered important actors to enhance national ownership and political buy-in in their regions. This is also crucial to secure the necessary resources over time as the set-up of national institutions may be a lengthy process. 45. It was further highlighted that more assistance was required to ensure SSMA. Coordination of stakeholders and meetings to encourage information exchange was deemed necessary. 46. Finally, the development of indicators to measure progress in SSMA and to bring it into the context of Agenda 2030 was suggested. This link can also help to get political buy-in and funding from development aid. Still national ownership and resources are crucial for sustainable SSMA. 47. The development of a national action plan was deemed vital to steer such a process of nationalization, wherefore guidance including a collection of best practices would be helpful. Working Group 3: IATG in conflict-affected settings 48. The second session of WG 3 discussed whether further guidance can be developed on regional and global levels for the implementation of the IATG in conflict affected settings. 49. Recognizing that political buy-in is crucial for the implementation of security and safety measures for ammunition management, participants considered that on a global level the UN Security Council should recognize the necessity to secure weapons and ammunition in conflict-affected settings and put the issue on the global agenda. Further, a special envoy for SSMA at the UN level could contribute to raise awareness on SSMA-related issues in conflict settings. 50. Participants stated that discussions on international guidelines for nations emerging from conflict would be beneficial, covering both preventive and reactive measures. For an incremental stepby-step approach to implementing SSMA essential control elements would need to be identified. 51. In the preventive dimension the discussion could focus on risk reduction and how local capacities and peculiarities as well as regional realities (e.g. prevalence of illegal transfers, existing international instruments) have to be taken into account when implementing the IATG. 52. With regard to the reactive dimension participants discussed the need for the Security Council to consistently mandate peacekeeping and special political missions to assist host countries in SSMA. Such assistance could include provisions on capacity building of national security forces in arms and ammunition management in line with relevant international guidelines. Presentation of results II 53. After the presentation of the results of the three working groups and the succeeding plenary discussion, some main conclusions of Working Session II were drawn: First, it was deemed necessary to develop tools for baseline assessments for States to conduct national risk assessments. Second, in order to enhance national ownership for SSMA, close collaboration with regional organizations was suggested. Regional workshops could be useful for this purpose. Third, political buy-in at high-levels is needed for all three dimensions to guarantee the continuity of activities with the necessary resources and infrastructure once international assistance has left. Furthermore, guidance for the development of national action plans would be useful to accompany the sustainable nationalization of international guidelines. Finally, specific support could be provided for SSMA in conflict-affected settings, for example by providing more guidance in peacekeeping mandates or by deploying special envoys. The regional workshops could also be used to develop tools which provide further guidance for the implementation of the IATG. The way forward 54. The closing plenary was dedicated to outline the way ahead and provided an opportunity for participants to present their expectations as to the continuation of the process. 55. As regards general issues with regard to the initiative, the following was emphasized: a) While the IATG provide an excellent basis for ammunition management, the safe and secure management of ammunition ought to be at the center of attention of this initiative. The IATG are one tool towards that objective, but need to be complemented by additional elements. b) Political buy-in and national ownership are crucial. The management of ammunition is clearly a national prerogative and accordingly, adaptations in this process need to be triggered by 5

national authorities. In this context, ammunition management needs to be made a higher priority at the national level. It is therefore vital to create political buy-in at high levels. c) Cooperation and assistance in the field of SSMA is decisive to ensure sustainable results, which link security and arms control objectives to development and humanitarian goals. d) Existing ammunition-related instruments need to be revisited and made better use of. The potential of the UNGA Resolution Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus to reflect new dynamics with regard to SSMA could be assessed. Additionally, the way in which peacekeeping operations deal with SSMA could be revisited. With a respective mandate, they can contribute to prevent looting of ammunition depots and illicit proliferation and support host nations in (re-)building sustainable SSMA. 56. Substantially, there is interest in continuing work on the following issues: a) Sustainability of SSMA: Development of baseline assessment tools, which involve both technical and institutional elements and take due consideration of the definition of an end state. b) Nationalization of international guidelines on SSMA: Development of guidance for the elaboration of national action plans, national coordination procedures and for cooperation and assistance frameworks that contribute to achieving an identified end-state. These elements help to bridge the gap between needs for national ownership and assistance (see example of the National Mine Action Standards). c) Implementation of the SSMA practices in conflict-affected settings: Development and better use of mechanisms at the level of the UN and regional organizations that contribute to SSMA (e.g. special envoys, peacekeeping operations, Quick-Response Mechanisms) and identify technical measures to implement SSMA at the national level. 57. With respect to process, there is a common understanding on the following issues: a) There is value in continuing the discussion on SSMA in the framework of this initiative. b) The informal Open-ended Group of Interested States (OGIS) may continue to play a role as an incubator of ideas and strategic body. It should remain open to all interested states. Emphasis should be put on keeping it as cross-regional as feasible. c) In order to generate the necessary political ownership, regional approaches could be relevant. Important for regional approaches is the institutional involvement of the respective organization (i.e. work through existing platforms under the ownership of the regional organization) and the political buy-in from states from the concerned region. Follow-Up 58. This Chair s summary will be tabled informally in relevant fora in the coming months, for example during meetings of experts or formal meetings with a thematic proximity. 59. The informal Open-ended Group of Interested States will continue to meet as an incubator of ideas. It remains open to interested states. Interested delegations are invited to approach the Permanent Mission of Switzerland in Geneva. 60. In 2017, it is proposed to focus on regional approaches. Pending the institutional commitment by regional organizations and/or states of the concerned regions regional conferences could serve the purpose of raising awareness and advancing on the substantive issues outlined above. 61. As this is an entirely open and informal process, any suggestions or ideas delegations might have on the issue of SSMA are welcome. Geneva, 14 February 2017 For further information please contact: Dr. Vincent Choffat Military Advisor, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations in Geneva. Phone +41 79 622 86 46, Email: Vincent.Choffat@vtg.admin.ch 6