Agenda: Regulating the use and trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons keeping in mind the thriving illicit trade Message from the Executive Board Greetings Delegates, Welcome to APLMUN 2018. This year DISEC will be addressing the agenda: Regulating the use and trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons keeping in mind the thriving illicit trade. This agenda covers the very pressing and current issue of the lack of appropriate universal regulation that allows for the misuse and misplacement of these dangerous weapons as well as the illicit trade that is oftentimes resultant of this. As DISEC will only be addressing one agenda for the duration of committee this year, I expect that all delegates will focus their efforts and research this topic and their country s stance on it thoroughly. The background guide will serve to get you started in the right direction, so please make sure to read through it properly before getting started on your research to get optimal results. I would also recommend that delegates come up with possible solutions and engaging moderated caucus suggestions prior to the day of the MUN in order to make the most of our time. I look forward to two days filled with constructive debate and the spirit of international cooperation. Introduction to the Disarmament and Security Council (DISEC) The disarmament and security is the first committee of the general Assembly of the United Nations. The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.
The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. Small Arms and Light Weapons While there is no internationally accepted definition, for the purposes of this committee it is generally agreed that Small arms and Light weapons (SALW) are any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. Small arms are weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. Light weapons are weapons designed for use by two or three people serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, general purpose or universal machine guns, medium machine guns, heavy machine guns, rifle grenades, under-barrel grenade launchers and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, man portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, man portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres. Threat posed by SALW The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence. It is, therefore, an issue of legitimate
concern for the international community. Groups and individuals operating outside the reach of State and government forces make extensive use of such weapons in internal conflicts. Insurgent forces, irregular troops, criminal gangs and terrorist groups are using all types of small arms and light weapons. The illicit trafficking in such weapons by drug cartels, criminals and traders in contraband goods has also been on the increase. There are over 600 million small arms and light weapons (SALW) in circulation worldwide. Of 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, 47 were waged with small arms as the weapons of choice. Readily available and easy to use, small arms and light weapons have been the primary or sole tools of violence in almost every recent conflict dealt with by the United Nations. In the hands of irregular troops operating with scant respect for international and humanitarian law, these weapons have taken a heavy toll of human lives, with women and children accounting for nearly 80 per cent of the casualties. We must also consider that for many years the global trade in major conventional weapons has been well documented. By comparison, the global trade in small arms and light weapons has proved much more difficult to track. Few national governments publish statistics on the sale or transfer of light weapons or release information about the sales activities of private companies, although it is known that at least 1,134 companies in 98 countries worldwide are involved in some aspect of the production of small arms and/or its ammunition. Not to mention the portion of small arms and light weapons lost to the illicit trade. While official statistics indicate that the trade in major weapons systems has fallen sharply with the end of the Cold War, many analysts believe that global transfers of light weapons have increased during this period. Since weapons in this class are capable of being carried, if a small arm, by one person or, if a light arm, by two or more people, a pack animal or a light vehicle, they allow for mobile operations where heavy mechanized and air forces are not available or are restricted in their capabilities owing to difficult mountain, jungle or urban terrain; Under these conditions, mortars or mounted anti-aircraft guns sometimes constitute the main armament of light
forces, providing them with high firepower that often causes heavy casualties among the civilian population if used indiscriminately. Light anti-aircraft and anti-tank missile systems not only provide the capability to sustain operations in favourable terrain against forces supported by tanks and aircraft but can also be used by terrorists against civil air traffic with devastating effects. Since many small arms require a minimum of maintenance and logistics they are suited for protracted operations. Since they can easily be concealed they are suited to covert actions and transfer. Since they are less complex and, therefore, normally of lower cost than major conventional weapons, especially if they are used or surplus, they are affordable by actors other than the State. While not by themselves causing the conflicts in which they are used, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons affects the intensity and duration of violence and encourages militancy rather than a peaceful resolution of unsettled differences. Perhaps most grievously, we see a vicious circle in which insecurity leads to a higher demand for weapons, which itself breed still greater insecurity, and so on. In some States and sub regions there is a culture of weapons whereby the possession of military-style weapons is a status symbol, a source of personal security, a means of subsistence, and, in some cases, a symbol of ethnic and cultural identity. By itself, such a culture does not necessarily lead to a culture of violence in which the possession of these weapons connotes political power and a preference for the resolution of conflict by the use of arms. The transformation of a culture of weapons to a culture of violence, resulting in the increasing demand for weapons, most often occurs when a State cannot guarantee security to its citizens or control the illicit activities in which these weapons are utilized. Source of SALWs As of 2013, more than 1,000 companies in about 100 countries are involved in some aspect of small arms production, with significant producers in about 30 countries. The granting of licenses and production rights and the spread of technology have enabled many countries to produce small arms and light
weapons without undertaking expensive or time-consuming research and development programmes. Conservative estimates mention 7.5 to 8 million small arms being produced per year. Most of the top manufacturing countries are also the top exporting countries. Some countries, however, such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea, also have substantial small arms industrial production capacities to accommodate sizeable domestic markets. Main producing countries include all the top exporters (USD 100 million or more in a single calendar year) as well as several countries with significant industrial capacities that meet the needs of the domestic market. According to the Arms Survey top producers would include the following 15 countries (in alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, India, Italy, North Korea, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The companies producing arms in these countries may be state-owned or private or a combination of the two. Many of these companies also produce and export firearms for civilian markets (personal defence and sporting). Direct sales from weapons manufacturers to foreign governments or private entities are a principal source of supply. Such sales are usually regulated (that is, licensed for export) by national governments. In 1996, for instance, the U.S. State Departments licensed over $470 million of light military weapons for export. The Commerce Department, which has jurisdiction over industry-direct sales of shotguns and police equipment, approved an additional $57 million of exports. While these amounts are small in the context of the overall arms trade, at $100-300 per gun these figures represent enormous quantities of weapons. Cold war-era surplus stocks are a second major source of light weapons supply today. In the past few years the U.S. military has given away or sold at discount vast quantities of excess assault rifles, carbines,.45 caliber pistols, machine guns and grenade launchers. Germany, the Netherlands, the former Soviet republics and several Eastern European countries have been unloading surplus guns on the world market.
Covert gun-running by governments to foreign governments or--more often-- insurgent groups is a third source of small/light arms proliferation. Such policies are fraught with danger, as evidenced by the disastrous legacy of weapons shipped by the Soviet Union and United States to combatants in Afghanistan, Angola and Central America. These weapons outlived the original purpose for which they were shipped and have since been recycled to other conflicts or to bandits. The black market is another major channel of supply, where private dealers knowingly violate the arms sales laws and policies of the source, transit or recipient state for commercial gain. Legal Trade Legal transfers are defined to occur with either the active or passive involvement of governments or their authorized agents, and in accordance with both national and international law. In 2014, the top exporters of small arms (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), in descending order, were: the United States, Italy, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, Austria, Turkey, the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Croatia, Israel, Spain, Switzerland, and Japan. Brazil exported more than USD 500 million worth of small arms for the first time during 2001 14. In 2014, the top importers of small arms (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), in descending order, were: the United States, Canada, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Australia, Iraq, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
The international small arms trade was worth at least USD 6 billion in 2014. Ammunition accounted for 38 per cent of global transfers. The 2017 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Serbia as the most transparent top and major small arms exporters. Iran, Israel, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are the least transparent major exporters. It is important to remember even the legal trade facilitates a cycle of violence when dealt with carelessly. In particular, often SALWs are traded from a stable stringently regulated country to a far more unstable and loosely regulated country with little care for the consequences. It is quite simple for small arms and light weapons to slip into the illicit trade from there. Illicit Trade One of the major problems in the trade of small arms and light weapons, as mentioned before, is the lack of transparency and documentation. This lack of regulation often makes it easy for SALWs to slip into the illicit trade. There are two aspects to the illicit trade: the grey market and the black market. Illicit grey market transfers are defined as governments, their agents, or individuals exploiting loopholes or intentionally circumventing national and/or international laws or policies. And illicit black-market transfers are defined as in clear violation of national and/or international laws and without official government consent or control, these transfers may involve corrupt government officials acting on their own for personal gain. The grey market includes secret or covert government sponsored shipments such as providing weapons to an embargoed (non) state end-user for commercial or political purposes, or aiming to destabilise or overthrow a government by arming non-state actors among others. While Incredibly dangerous as they run the risk of permanently falling off the radar and integrating into the black-market trade, there is not much that can be done about grey market transfers without further cooperation from countries to allow for the more stringent monitoring of their arms by the international community.
While the grey market trade is concerning, the black-market trade is doubly so. Stemming the flow of these weapons is incredibly difficult. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, small arms and many light weapons have legitimate military, law enforcement, and/or sporting and recreational uses. These uses preclude the types of outright bans on manufacture, stockpiling and sales imposed - with some success - on landmines and chemical and biological weapons. Instead, governments try to prevent the diversion and misuse of SALW without unduly infringing upon legitimate use and trade. This is no small feat. Plentiful, easy to conceal, and lethal, SALW are a smuggler's dream and a law enforcement nightmare. Hundreds of thousands of small arms in leaky government arsenals are vulnerable to theft, loss and diversion. Once acquired by traffickers, these weapons are smuggled across national borders in every conceivable way. They are hidden under sacks of vegetables in the back of pickup trucks, packed into household appliances that are then loaded onto cargo ships, even air-dropped out of old Soviet military transport planes. In the hands of terrorists and other criminals, these weapons have the capacity to kill dozens, even hundreds, of innocent civilians. A shoulder-fired surface-toair missile - available on the black market for as little as a few thousand dollars
- can bring down a commercial airliner. Even a couple of $100 assault rifles can inflict horrendous casualties, as evidenced by the November 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt, during which 6 terrorists armed only with assault rifles, pistols and knives systematically slaughtered 58 tourists. Another aspect to take into account is Craft production. Craft production of small arms refers principally to weapons and ammunition that are fabricated largely by hand in relatively small quantities. Government authorities may tightly regulate and oversee these artisans activities and outputs (expensive replica antique firearms legally produced in the United States are a good example). Often, however, this material is produced outside of, or under limited, state controls. These weapons are often used in crimes and against government targets. For these reasons, small arms trafficking is not a problem you solve; it is a problem you manage. By enacting strong export and border controls, safeguarding (or destroying) stockpiles, dismantling trafficking networks, and addressing the root causes of the civil conflicts and soaring urban crime rates, governments can reduce the supply of, and demand for, these weapons. A summary of factors that exacerbate the SALW trade Globalisation: It has facilitated the illegal arms trade by enabling informal and/or illegal transactions. The networks have had tremendous impact on the ability of the terrorist groups to organise, indoctrinate, unleash propaganda and act with impunity against states. The terrorist organisations are able to plan, move finances and execute operations from far off locations using networks. Using networks, the Pakistani handlers planned, directed and controlled the movement and attack by terrorists during the Mumbai Terror Attacks. Gun Lobby: This is a major factor which dissuades the Governments of source countries from adopting tougher legislations on limiting the quantum of arms that can be produced and transferred to non-state actors. Link between Illegal Weapons, Drugs and Wildlife Trade: An unmistakable link exists between the illegal arms trade, drug trafficking and wildlife smuggling. The illegally traded weapons and munitions are extensively used by terrorist
organisations, drug cartels and wildlife smugglers. The illegally procured weapons and munitions provide much needed protection to the drug and wildlife cartels which, in turn, fuel the demand for more weapons and munitions. As these are extremely profitable commodities, the illegal trade continues to grow by the day. Link between Politics and Arms Trade: The link between politics and arms trade (including illegal trade) is strong and unresolvable. The Politicians, Arms Industry and Gun Lobbies have formed an Iron Triangle which is difficult to breach. Support by Governments: Governments of certain major arms producing countries also overtly/covertly supply weapons and munitions to non-state actors. Arming of Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Syrian rebels are cases that amply exhibit the role of Governments in fuelling the illegal arms trade for short term gains. Current Regulation The international community has taken several initiatives to address this threat by developing a multilateral framework to regulate the manufacturing, possession, transfer and tracing of SALW. Notable initiatives include the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Firearms Protocol under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty.
The Arms Trade Treaty: The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) establishes common standards for the international trade of conventional weapons and seeks to reduce the illicit arms trade. The treaty aims to reduce human suffering caused by illegal and irresponsible arms transfers, improve regional security and stability, as well as to promote accountability and transparency by state parties concerning transfers of conventional arms. The ATT does not place restrictions on the types or quantities of arms that may be bought, sold, or possessed by states. It also does not impact a state s domestic gun control laws or other firearm ownership policies. After nearly two decades of advocacy and diplomacy, a UN conference was convened to negotiate the ATT in July 2012, but fell short of reaching consensus on a final text. Another two week-long conference was convened in March 2013 to complete work on the treaty. However, Iran, North Korea, and Syria blocked consensus on the final treaty text, leading treaty supporters to move it to the UN General Assembly on for approval. On April 2, 2013, the UN General Assembly endorsed the ATT by a vote of 156-3, with 23 abstentions. The treaty opened for signature on June 3, 2013, and entered into force on Dec. 23, 2014. Click this link to view an in depth summary: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty While at first, it was heralded as a huge step forward in the regulation of small arms and light weapons, despite many prominent countries such as Russia and China abstaining or outright opposing it, its many flaws is now becoming apparent. Not only do many countries consider the enforcement of it weak, it s original clauses itself have come under question. It is becoming abundantly clear new regulation is required. Countries that adopted the Arms Trade Treaty: https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xxvi- 8&chapter=26&clang=_en Points to consider
1. How to facilitate a higher degree of transparency while maintaining an individual country s autonomy. 2. Ways to enforce existing and future legislature. 3. Methods to track the flow of SALW that take into account the existing methods to subvert tracking and new technology that may aid in tracking. 4. How to limit the flow of weapons to conflict zones, where they are often subverted into the black market. 5. The lack of financial and human support that many developing countries face in the enforcement of their legislature. Helpful Links https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11889.doc.htm https://worldpolicy.org/2016/02/29/global-trends-in-small-arms-trafficking/ https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/dc3248.doc.htm https://www.havocscope.com/tag/arms-trafficking/ https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/03/201331885519413442.ht ml http://www.poaiss.org/casaupload/members/documents/9@salwguide_legislation.pdf https://www.firstpost.com/world/iran-north-korea-cause-trouble-for-un-armstrade-treaty-678465.html https://www.firstpost.com/world/iran-north-korea-cause-trouble-for-un-armstrade-treaty-678465.html http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers/craftproduction.html https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/killer-facts-the-scale-ofthe-global-arms-trade/