Conventional weapons and humanitarian disarmament Ambassador Carlo Trezza IASD April 28 2014
Conventional weapons The humanitarian factor was the original motive that prompted the international community to engage in the field of disarmament and non proliferation. The question of use and possession. Limitations and prohibitions of weapons which cause excessive sufferings or unacceptable harm both to warriors and civilians go back to antiquity. Conventional weapons are the ones being used in current international and domestic conflicts and cause practically all the victims and sufferings(300,000 casualties every year). 2
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, with its five protocols, is the main corpus of humanitarian law dedicated to humanitarian disarmament. Prohibition of use. Concluded in 1980 under UN auspices,117 parties, contains five protocols: 1.non-detectable fragments; 2.mines and booby-traps(indiscriminate use, restrictions, recording of minefields amended in 1996; 3. incendiary weapons(weapons primarily designed to set fire to objects and cause burns to persons); 4.blinding lasers(cause permanent blindness even to combatants); 5. explosive remnants of war(post-conflict clearance removal or destruction, recording).. Multilateral nature of CCW Convention 3
Mines 1/2 A landmine is usually a hidden weight-triggered explosive device which is intended to damage a target by means of a blast and/or fragment impact. The use of land mines is controversial because of their potentially indiscriminate nature. They can remain dangerous many years after a conflict has ended, harming the economy of many developing nations. History Some sources report that the 3rd-century Chancellor Zhuge Liang in China invented a land mine device. Explosive land mines were used in 1277 AD by the Song Dynasty Chinese against an assault of the Mongols, who were besieging a city in southern China. The Ming Dynasty (1368 1644) text of the Wubei Zhi (Treatise on Armament Technology), outlined the use of land mines that were triggered by the heat. The Chinese also employed naval mines at sea and on the rivers of China and elsewhere in maritime battles. The first land mine in Europe was created by Pedro Navarro (d. 1528), a Spanish soldier, in Italy in the beginning of the sixteenth century. At Augsburg in 1573, a German military engineer Samuel Zimmermann invented a mine known as the fladdermine. In Europe in the early eighteenth century, improvised land mines or booby traps were constructedintheformofbombsburiedintheearth. 4
Mines 2/2 The first modern mechanically-fused high explosive anti-personnel land mines were created by Confederate troops of Brigadier General Gabriel J. Rains during the Battle of Yorktown in 1862. Improved designs of mines were created in Imperial Germany in 1912, and were copied and manufactured by all major participants in the First World War. Poison gas mines were manufactured at least until the 1980s in the Soviet Union. The United States was known to have at least experimented with the concept in the 1950s. Nuclear mines have also been developed, both land and naval varieties. 5
Antipersonnel landmines Anti-personnel mines are designed to interdict entrance into a specific area. To kill or injure enemy combatants or non-combatants To injure rather than kill in order to increase the logistical support burden(evacuation, medical) on the opposing force Examples of anti-personnel mines. From left to right: an M14, Valmara 69, and VS-50 6
Minefields Minefields may be laid by several means. The preferred, wayisto burytheminesto maketheminvisibleandreduce thenumberofminesneededtodenytheenemyanarea. Mines can be laid by specialized mine-laying vehicles. Mine-scattering shells may be fired by artillery from a distance of several tens of kilometers. Mines should not explode when they are layed. 7
Demining Whereas the placing and arming of mines is inexpensive and simple, the process of detecting and removing them is expensive, slow, and dangerous. This is especially true of irregularwarfarewheremineswere usedonanadhocbasis in unmarked areas. Anti-personnel mines are most difficult to find, due to their small size and the fact that many are made almost entirely of non-metallic materials specifically to escape detection. Manual clearing remains the most effective technique for clearing mine fields, although hybrid techniques involving the use of animals and robots are being developed. Animals are used due to their strong sense of smell, which is more than capable of detecting a land mine. Rats and dogs are usually used. 8
The Ottawa Convention of 1997 on the ban of antipersonnel land mines 1/2 ItsprovisionsgobeyondthenormonminescontainedintheCCWProtocol2. Was launched in 1986 by a relatively small number of countries animated by a common desire of a more ambitious norm to be finalized within a short time frame. Total prohibition of the possession, use, transfer and stockpile of a whole category of weapons which kill and maim civilians and military during periods which go well beyond the duration of the conflicts in which they were used. Key provisions Preamble: Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement Article 1. General obligations Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances: a) To use anti-personnel mines; b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, antipersonnel mines; c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. Article 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provision of this Convention. 9
The Ottawa Convention of 1997 on the ban of antipersonnel land mines 2/2 Article 3. Exceptions 1.Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes. 2.The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted. Article 4. Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than FOUR YEARS after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Article 5. Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than TEN YEARS after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. 10
The Ottawa Convention of 1997 on the ban of antipersonnel land mines Article6. International cooperation and assistance 1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and RECEIVE ASSISTANCE, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible. 2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall PROVIDE ASSISTANCE for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. 11
Manufacturers The ICBL has identified the following countries as MANUFACTORING land mines as of August 2004. None are signatories of the Ottawa Treaty: Burma People's Republic of China Cuba India Iran Iraq (although production had presumably ceased since the invasion of 2003) Nepal North Korea Pakistan Russian Federation Singapore Vietnam The United States stopped manufacturing land mines in 1997 12
161 Countries Party to the Ottawa Convention 13
36 Non-signatory states 14
Cluster Munitions 1/3 The Ottawa process was used as the main term of reference and precedent for the latest achievement in the field of humanitarian disarmament: the Oslo Convention on the prohibition of cluster munitions whichenteredintoforceonaugust1of2010. Cluster munitions are large weapons which are deployed from the air and from the ground and release dozens or hundreds of smaller submunitions. Submunitions released by air-dropped cluster bombs are most often called bomblets, while those delivered from the ground by artillery or rockets are usually referred to as grenades. 15
Cluster Munitions 2/3 Air-dropped or ground-launched, they cause two major humanitarian risks to civilians. Their widespread dispersal means they cannot distinguish between military targets and civilians especially whentheweaponisusedinornearpopulatedareas. Unlike mines, Cluster munitions are supposed to explose immediately, they are visible and not hidden underground. Many submunitions fail to detonate on impact and become de facto similar to antipersonnel mines killing and maiming people long after the conflict has ended. 16
Cluster Munitions 3/3 At least 15 countries are reported to have used cluster munitions: Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Israel, Libya, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia (USSR), Saudi Arabia, Former Yugoslavia (Serbia), Sudan, United Kingdom and United States. Some non-state armed groups have used the weapon (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006). Billions of submunitions have been stockpiled by some 85 countries. Atotalof34statesarereported tohaveproducedover210different typesclustermunitions. More than two dozen countries have been affected by the use of cluster munitions including Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Grenada, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Montenegro, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, Vietnam and Zambia, as well as Chechnya, Falkland/Malvinas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Western Sahara, and Yemen. Cluster munitions kill and injure civilians and combattants. The weapon caused more civilian casualties iniraqin2003andkosovo in1999thananyotherweaponsystem. Extensive use of the weapons in Lebanon in August 2006 was the catalyst for governments to seek to create a legally binding international instrument on cluster munitions in 2008. 17
The OSLO Process Like the Ottawa negotiation, the Oslo process was initiated by a small number of likeminded countries. In February 2007, 46 governments met in Oslo to endorse a call by Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre to conclude a new legally binding instrument in 2008. The Convention s aims are to prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, as well as to destroy existing stockpiles of the weapons, clear contaminated areas and assist survivors and affected communities. The treaty was signed by 94 countries at the Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 and entered into force as binding international law on 1 August 2010. The main difference is that, unlike the landmines agreement, which provides for a total ban, the Oslo convention allows exceptions for some very specific munitions which are considered as not causing unacceptable harm. 18
THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS DUBLIN 19 30 MAY 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions The States Parties to this Convention, Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict, Determinedto put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the timeoftheiruse,whentheyfailtofunctionasintendedorwhentheyareabandoned, Concerned that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss of livelihood, impede postconflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use. 19
Convention on Cluster Munitions 1/5 Article 1 General obligations and scope of application 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) Use cluster munitions; (b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions; (c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. 20
Convention on Cluster Munitions 2/5 Article 2 Definitions for the purposes of this Convention 1. Cluster munition means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following: (a) A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role; (b) A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects; (c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics: (i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions; (ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms; (iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object; (iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic selfdestruction mechanism; (v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic selfdeactivating feature. 21
Political value of the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions In both cases the entry into force was achieved in a relatively short time if compared to the longer period which is usually necessary to finalise an agreement in a genuinely multilateral framework. The other side of the coin is that many of the international major players, the main possessors, producers and in some cases users of such weapons did not participate in the negotiating process. Countries like the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, most countries in the Middle East and others have as a common denominator the fact that they have not adhered neither to the Ottawa nor to the Oslo conventions. This is probably the main weakness of the two processes and makes universalization one of their main goals and challenges. Nonetheless, with 161 ratifications for Ottawa and 83 ratifications for the more recent Oslo Convention, a critical mass of participation has been reached and the very existence of these conventions has conditioned the behaviour even of countries which have not adhered to them. States possessing such weapons would now be much more prudent before using or even exporting weapons which have been universally stigmatized through the two conventions. 22