THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE DECISIONS IN DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE DECISIONS IN DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD INNA REZNIK* In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court announced a new heightened scrutiny standard for exactions, holding that the exaction must be roughly proportional to the harm the development causes. The Court proceeded to limit the application of the rough proportionality standard to adjudicative, and not legislative, land use decisions, reasoning that the risk of municipal extortion is much greater in the adjudicative context. In this Note, Inna Reznik surveys the lower courts applying Dolan and finds that there is much confusion over the legislative/adjudicative distinction. She argues that it is difficult to draw a line between legislative and adjudicative land use decisions, and that the distinction does not solve the extortion problem, which is just as likely to occur in the legislative context. Looking to the scholarship of Carol Rose and Vicki Been, the Note concludes that the Court should develop a new exactions standard that identifies those situations with the potential for government overreaching, specifically those in which the landowner has not had the opportunity of voice or exit. INTRODUCTION For years, the city of Tigard, located outside of Portland, Oregon, has been struggling with several problems in its Central Business District and Fanno Creek floodplain area flooding, traffic congestion, and insufficient open space. 1 Like other municipalities trying to develop solutions to similar problems, Tigard promulgated regulations requiring that construction in these areas leave some land free of structures. Tigard hoped that these regulations would add to the quality of life in the town, prevent flooding by assisting drainage, and relieve traffic problems by allowing for a bicycle and pedestrian pathway. Florence Dolan owned a plumbing and electric supply store in Tigard. 2 Her property was located in the Central Business District and in the Fanno Creek floodplain area. Dolan wanted to expand her * I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Vicki Been for her thoughtful guidance throughout the development of this Note. I would also like to thank the entire staff of the New York University Law Review, especially Keith Buell, Carol Kaplan, Derek Ludwin, and Troy McKenzie, for their remarkable editorial talents. 1 The following facts are taken from the case with which this Note is concerned, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379-83 (1994); see also infra Part I. 2 At the time of the initial application and through the appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, Florence Dolan and her husband, John T. Dolan, owned the store. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993). She was the sole owner of the property by the time 242

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 243 business by increasing the size of her store and by paving the parking lot. She applied to the town s planning commission to obtain a construction permit. The planning commission was willing to grant the permit, but only on the condition that Dolan allow the city to use 7000 square feet of her 1.67-acre parcel as a public greenway; this dedication included a fifteen-foot strip of land lying to the east of the floodplain boundary that was to be used for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. Dolan was not satisfied with this condition; from her point of view, the requirements had nothing to do with her project. She appealed several times without success, until the Supreme Court finally heard her case in Dolan v. City of Tigard. 3 Dolan is a regulatory takings case 4 specifically dealing with land use exactions, 5 the type of conditions on development that Tigard placed on Florence Dolan. The Court in Dolan held that when exactions are challenged under the Takings Clause, the local government has the burden of proving that the condition is roughly proportional to the harm the land use sought by the property owner would have caused. 6 The Court reasoned that the burden of proof should be shifted to the government because the city made an adjudicative dethe case made its way to the Supreme Court because her husband had died. See Petitioner s Brief at ii, Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) (No. 93-518). 3 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 4 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation, U.S. Const. amend. V applies to both the power of eminent domain, where the government literally takes property for its preferred uses, and to government regulation of property. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 1101 (4th ed. 1998). The latter assertion of government power is referred to as a regulatory taking. Dolan is one example of a regulatory takings case in which the Supreme Court has moved in a conservative direction by affirming the importance of private property rights and affording them a high degree of judicial protection. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 513, 555 (1995) (stating that Dolan must be seen as the latest of several recent Supreme Court decisions affirming the importance of property rights and that recent decisions demonstrate the Court s resolve to take property rights seriously ). See generally Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 509 (1998) (reporting on Takings Project of conservatives and libertarians to convince judiciary to protect developers rights by striking down federal health, safety, and environmental regulation). 5 Exactions are conditions that municipalities place on the approval of a development project. They can take the form of public facilities dedications, construction of public facilities, purchase or donation of equipment for public use, or payments to defray the costs of public land or facilities. The definition excludes ordinary regulation, such as restrictions on building size, but makes no assumptions about whether the exaction is fixed and certain or results from open-ended negotiations. See James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes, Introduction, in Development Exactions 1, 2-3 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987). For a review of exactions jurisprudence, see generally James A. Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Condition for Public Development Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist Court, 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 53 (1992). 6 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.

244 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:242 cision to condition petitioner s application for a building permit on an individual parcel, rather than a legislative determination[ ] classifying entire areas of the city or a generally applicable zoning regulation[ ]. 7 In the end, the Court ruled that Tigard s conditions violated Dolan s right not to have the government take her property without adequate payment. The decision in Dolan arises not only in the midst of the conflict between the regulatory needs of cities and the business realities of development, but also in a climate of intense debate about the extent to which government can interfere with private property in order to promote social goals. 8 In fact, much of the impetus behind Florence Dolan s continuing appeals came from organizations representing developers concerned about their ability to do their work at a reasonable cost, and political and ideological groups interested in shrinking big, intrusive government. 9 Florence Dolan and the special interests supporting her may indeed have succeeded in their goal of less government interference. The Dolan standard places a heavy burden on local governments because it requires them to make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 10 In order to pass the Dolan test, local governments have been forced to prepare detailed research reports and present complex calculations. 11 Local gov- 7 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, 391 n.8. I shall refer to this as the legislative/adjudicative distinction. Many commentators also believe that the Court made an important distinction between land dedications and other types of exactions. Compare Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. et al., Nollan/Dolan: The Emerging Wing in Regulatory Takings Analysis, 28 Urb. Law. 789, 791-95 (1996) (finding that lower courts apply Dolan to impact fees as well as land dedications, but only to fees that are individually imposed or adjudicative), with Nancy E. Stroud & Susan L. Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 Stetson L. Rev. 719, 792 (1996) (arguing that [t]he most narrow reading of Dolan suggests that its principles apply only to conditions of a permit requiring land dedications or easements ). 8 Twenty-three amicus briefs were filed in the Supreme Court for the two sides in the Dolan controversy. See Search of Lexis, Genfed Library, BRIEFS file (Oct. 10, 1999). 9 Various organizations filed amicus briefs in support of Dolan s position. See, e.g., Brief of Defenders of Property Rights, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Dolan (No. 93-518), available in Lexis, Genfed Library, BRIEFS file; Brief for Amici Curiae National Association of Home Builders et al. in Support of the Petitioner, Dolan (No. 93-518), available in Lexis, Genfed Library, BRIEFS file. Many briefs were filed supporting Tigard as well. See, e.g., Brief of the National Association of Counties et al. in Support of Respondent, Dolan (No. 93-518), available in Lexis, Genfed Library, BRIEFS file. 10 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 11 See, e.g., National Ass n of Home Builders v. Chesterfield County, No. 95-3213, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18838, at *1, *3-*4 (4th Cir. July 30, 1996) (unpublished disposition) (noting county s use of complex methodology to calculate necessary capital improvements); Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (App. Div. 1995) (relying

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 245 ernments may bear heavy costs in preparing such detailed reports. 12 In addition, armed with the Dolan decision, developers are more likely to go to court because their chances of winning are higher. 13 This increased litigation against municipalities creates even more costs, both in litigation expenses and the large awards the municipalities are forced to pay when they lose. 14 By 1998, the number of decisions addressing the scope of Dolan appeared to have decreased relative to previous years. 15 One explaon town s individualized determination, as well as environmental assessment form, which discussed specific environmental impacts of proposed construction and best ways to ameliorate them); Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738, 745-46 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (relying on detailed report that documented projected problems with adjoining streets, calculated likely increase in traffic, and specifically explained why dedication was necessary); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (relying on comprehensive report assessing park needs, which included specific calculations of how much additional park land was needed to provide for population increases). 12 See Edward J. Sullivan, Dolan and Municipal Risk Assessment, 12 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1, 1-2 (1997) (explaining that most scholars agree that local governments have been hurt because they now shoulder a greater burden of showing that their imposed land use conditions are justified ). 13 Builders are now more likely to use the legal system in their fight against municipalities. In recent years, the National Association of Home Builders Legal Action Fund has seen a rise in applications for monetary assistance in lawsuits. See Gerry Donohue, Swimming with the Sharks, Builder, Feb. 1998, at 86, 88; see also Sullivan, supra note 12, at 2 ( [Local governments] face a greater risk of litigation. ); Jane Bowling, Land Use Attorneys Debate Impact of High Court Decision, Daily Rec. (Baltimore, Md.), June 2, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL 3165880 (quoting land use lawyer as saying that Dolan gives you more arrows in your bow and provides opportunity for developers to use threats in order to gain leverage [in] attacking unreasonable conditions ); David W. Dunlap, Community Interests vs. Property Rights, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1996, 9 (Real Estate), at 1 (describing view of lawyers for Town of Mamaroneck, involved in takings case, that Dolan has given developers asserting takings claims a new arrow in the quiver and has provided a new way of asserting the claim ). 14 The City of Tigard settled Dolan by paying $1.5 million to obtain the bikepath it had originally required as a condition for development approval. Before this case arose, the city could have bought the bikepath for about $14,000. See City of Tigard Will Pay Dolans $1.5 Million in Bikepath Takings Case, Bus. Wire, Nov. 21, 1997, available in Lexis, News Library, BWIRE file. 15 See Jonathan M. Davidson et al., Where s Dolan? : Exactions Law in 1998, 30 Urb. Law. 683, 696-97 (1998). One hypothesis for this trend is that developers do not believe their challenges will be sustained in court now that municipalities are aware of how to fashion exactions that avoid the Dolan test. See id. Municipalities may have heeded the advice of commentators who have suggested ways for municipalities to deal with the decision. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 4, at 553 (suggesting switch to impact fees because by their very nature impact fees lend themselves to the quantification and individualized assessment required by Dolan ); Sam D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan, Land-Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 Land & Water L. Rev. 415, 464 (1995) (urging Rocky Mountain towns to develop strict legislative mandates for exactions, dispensing with all discretion); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 19 (suggesting that impact fees with mathematical formulas have a good chance of withstanding a challenge under Dolan ). Some lawyers predicted that local governments would do just

246 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:242 nation for this trend is that increased litigation has had a chilling effect on local governments exactions practices. 16 For municipalities, this effect may prove onerous because exactions have long been a way for municipalities to put the enormous costs associated with growth and sprawl on the parties creating the costs. 17 Even more troubling is the possibility that the Dolan test is inhibiting cities in regulating land use and environmental matters more generally. 18 In fact, some lower courts have applied Dolan s rough proportionality test outside the exactions context. 19 However, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 20 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Dolan s rough proportionality standard is applicable to regulatory takings outside of the context of exactions, 21 thereby removing a weapon to challenge all sorts of government regulation. Even after Monterey, though, courts can expand the application of heightened scrutiny the rough proportionality test through an inconsistent application of the legislative/adjudicative distinction. Some courts are applying the demanding standard to exactions arguably characterized this. See, e.g., Bowling, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting land use lawyer as saying that although he wishes Dolan would force local governments to decrease use of exactions, he really thinks effect will be that planning departments will be more clever in crafting their exactions ). Alternatively, local governments may have switched to other financing techniques, such as financial development charges that resemble taxes. See Davidson et al., supra, at 697. 16 See Davidson et al., supra note 15, at 697; supra notes 10-10 and accompanying text; see also Bowling, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that even threat of suit can chill government use of exactions). 17 See Alan A. Altshuler & José A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Regulation for Revenue: The Political Economy of Land Use Exactions 62-63, 77, 95-96 (1993) (describing need for exactions because of local infrastructure demands and because development does not pay for its costs). Furthermore, exactions long have been considered valid for such purposes. See id. at 16, 34-43 (describing evolution of exactions practices); Kim I. Stollar, How Much is Enough? Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 193, 201-02 (1995) (describing government use of development exactions in this century); infra note 126. 18 Because land use restrictions are often tied to environmental programs, increased success in challenging exactions creates a higher risk of thwarting environmental protection. See, e.g., K & K Constr., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 551 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that Dolan standard is applicable to denial of building permit in order to comply with Wetland Protection Act); Bowling, supra note 13, at 1 (describing Maryland s environmental legislation and restrictions it imposes on development). 19 See, e.g., Templeton Coal Co. v. Shalala, 882 F. Supp. 799, 823 n.12 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (stating that essential nexus requirement is met to extent that Dolan is applicable to employment agreements); Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634, 641-42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (applying Dolan to denial of developer s request for rezoning). 20 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999) (holding that takings questions were properly submitted to jury). 21 See id. at 1635-38.

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 247 as legislative, thereby further threatening continued municipal use of exactions. 22 This Note focuses on the legislative/adjudicative distinction with a view toward understanding and critiquing it. Part I discusses the facts and holding of Dolan and the lower courts confusion in applying Dolan s legislative/adjudicative distinction. Part II argues that the distinction is prohibitively difficult to make and is misplaced in the context of local government. Local government structure combines legislative and administrative functions, and the land use process relies heavily on administrative discretion and flexible piecemeal decisionmaking, making it difficult for courts to determine when a decision is sufficiently legislative in character. Part III argues that applying rough proportionality to adjudicative decisions alone does not solve the problems of extortionate behavior and inequitable results associated with exactions. Extortionate behavior describes those circumstances where a local government demands costly concessions from a developer to receive an unrelated benefit that the government desires. Inequitable results occur when this extortion randomly hits some permit seekers harder than others. Those problems are just as likely to occur in legislative decisionmaking processes as in adjudicative settings. This Note concludes by urging the Court to reformulate a judicial review standard for exactions by identifying which situations create the potential for government overreaching. Several proposals have already been advanced, and they suggest that courts should scrutinize the fairness of the negotiation process and only engage in substantive review of the rough proportionality of the exaction if that process was flawed. Commentators have identified the components of a well-functioning exactions process as voice, the full participation of all affected interests in negotiation with the municipality, and exit, the ability of the landowner to leave the municipality if dissatisfied with the result. Such an analysis better explains the Dolan Court s concerns with exactions practices, and may ultimately be helpful in developing a new exactions model of review to replace the legislative/adjudicative distinction in applying rough proportionality. 22 See infra Part I.B.

248 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:242 I DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD AND THE CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS A. Dolan v. City of Tigard In Dolan, plaintiff Florence Dolan, the owner of a plumbing and electric supply store, applied for permission to redevelop her property nearly doubling the size of the store and paving a parking lot. 23 Tigard s Planning Commission granted the permit on the condition that Dolan comply with the provisions of the city s comprehensive plan and Master Drainage Plan, both codified in Tigard s Community Development Code. 24 The applicable provisions required property owners seeking development approval in or adjacent to the Fanno Creek floodplain area to: (1) dedicate sufficient open land area for a greenway, free of structures, in order to combat flooding problems; and (2) use portions of the dedicated land for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway, in order to relieve traffic congestion. 25 The city required Dolan to dedicate 7000 square feet lying in the floodplain as a greenway, roughly ten percent of her property; this dedication included a fifteen-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain which was to be used as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. 26 The dedicated property was sufficient to satisfy the fifteen-percent open space requirement for any development in the Central Business District. 27 Dolan sought to avoid the conditions by applying for variances from the code requirements but was unsuccessful. 28 She then appealed to the city s Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), claiming that the required dedication was not sufficiently related to the development proposal and thus constituted an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 29 Once again, she was unsuccessful; LUBA found that a reasonable relationship existed between the dedication and the effects of the store expansion. 30 In subsequent appeals, the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court found 23 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994). 24 See id. at 377-80. 25 See id. at 378-82. 26 See id. at 380. 27 See id. 28 See id. at 380-81. 29 See id. at 382. This challenge rested on the argument that the conditions the government placed on her development application did not meet the essential nexus test of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which described the necessary relationship between a condition and the problem created by the development. See Petitioner s Brief at 19-29, Dolan (No. 93-518). 30 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382-83.

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 249 the conditions to be valid because they were reasonably related and had an essential nexus to the impact of the development. 31 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a question it had left unanswered in the earlier exaction case, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: 32 [W]hat is the required degree of connection between the exactions imposed... and the projected impacts of the proposed development? 33 Looking to the decisions of state courts, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared a middle ground between very loose and very strict standards for the required relationship. 34 He articulated a new test of rough proportionality: 35 No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 36 The Court held that the City of Tigard had not met its burden of proof under the rough proportionality standard because it did not justify why the floodplain dedication needed to be used as a public greenway, instead of a greenway for which Dolan retained title, and its traffic calculations only proved that the pathway could, instead of will or is likely to, relieve traffic congestion. 37 Although the Court claimed that the new standard was consistent with the reasonable relationship test, the intermediate position of the state courts, 38 some commentators have argued that the Court actually introduced a more intensified level of scrutiny into the exactions 31 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443 (Or. 1993) (holding that Tigard s conditions satisfied Nollan test), aff g 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 32 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission granted a rebuilding permit to the Nollans on the condition that they grant the public access to pass along their beachfront property. The Court held that a taking occurs when there is no essential nexus between the exaction and the harm that the exaction seeks to address. See id. at 837. 33 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377. In Nollan, the Court concluded that since even the most untailored standards were not met, it did not need to reach the question of the required relationship between the condition and the development s impact. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838. 34 The state court decisions included: Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966), an example of a standard employing very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed development, which Chief Justice Rehnquist described as too lax to adequately protect petitioner s right to just compensation ; Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961), which introduced the specifi[c] and uniquely attributable test rejected by the majority as an exacting scrutiny not constitutionally required; and Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980), whose reasonable relationship test the Court purported to adopt. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90. 35 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 36 Id. 37 See id. at 393, 395. 38 See id. at 391.

250 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:242 context. 39 Furthermore, the decision shifted the burden of proof to the government. 40 Both the heightened standard of scrutiny and the burden of proof shift seem misplaced in the exactions context. Modern judicial review generally defers to legislatures on economic regulation matters and issues unrelated to protection of minorities and fundamental rights. 41 Therefore, in order to justify its standard and burden allocation, the Court characterized Tigard s exactions as adjudicative decisions, as opposed to legislative decisions that would deserve deference. 42 The Court distinguished cases, such as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 43 and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 44 in which land use regulations were upheld as constitutionally permissible. 45 The Court characterized those cases as legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, while asserting that the present case was an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner s application for a building permit on an individual parcel. 46 Thus, as a matter of doctrinal necessity, the 39 See Robert J. Hopperton, Standards of Judicial Review in the Supreme Court Land Use Opinions 77 (1999) ( Notwithstanding Chief Justice Rehnquist s characterization of this new test as one akin to an intermediate position, the rough proportionality test is an activist standard of review because it reverses the presumption of validity and places the burden of proof on the non-judicial decisionmaker. ); Cordes, supra note 4, at 543-50 (noting that state courts reasonable relationship test is not synonymous with Court s rough proportionality standard because many state courts apply reasonable relationship test in very deferential manner); Bowling, supra note 13, at 1 ( I think rough proportionality goes beyond the reasonable relationship standard Maryland has in place.... I think it s truly a far stricter standard. (quoting Stuart Kaplow, attorney representing developers)). 40 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8. 41 In this way, the Dolan Court, continuing a trend in its regulatory takings doctrine, risks returning to the infamous era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), when the Court used substantive due process arguments to strike down social reform legislation for interfering with economic liberty. See Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected Through the Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 Envtl. L. 155, 155-56 (1995); J. Freitag, Note, Takings 1992: Scalia s Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment Doctrine to Avoid Lochner Redivivus, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 743, 744-46 (1994). It is widely accepted today that Lochner was misguided and that courts should accord legislatures much deference when reviewing economic regulation. See generally 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 8-6 to 8-7, at 1357-62 (3d ed. 2000). 42 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, 391 n.8 (acknowledging that for challenges to generally applicable zoning regulations, burden of proof should rest on challenger, but distinguishing this case as an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner s application for a building permit on an individual parcel in order to place burden of proof on city). 43 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 44 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 45 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384-85. 46 Id. at 385.

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 251 Court limited its new rough proportionality standard and burden shifting declaration to adjudicative government actions. 47 The majority did not clarify the distinction between legislative and adjudicative decisions, and Justice Souter argued in dissent that the majority mischaracterized the case as one involving an adjudicative decision. 48 The permit conditions, Souter recognized, were imposed pursuant to the city s development code; he thus concluded that the only adjudication was over whether to grant a variance from the permit conditions. 49 Furthermore, Justice Souter criticized the rough proportionality test. He noted that the Court placed the burden of producing evidence of relationship on the city, despite the usual rule in cases involving the police power that the government is presumed to have acted constitutionally. 50 He also disagreed with the Court s extension of the Nollan test. 51 According to Justice Souter, the heightened scrutiny and burden shifting were ultimately unjustified. 52 The lower courts attempting to apply Dolan echoed Justice Souter s questions about the meaning of the legislative/adjudicative distinction. In the section that follows, these lower court cases will be examined in order to show the confusion and inconsistency the Court created by invoking the distinction. 47 See Donald C. Guy & James E. Holloway, The Direction of Regulatory Takings Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era, 102 Dick. L. Rev. 327, 346 (1998) ( [T]he rough proportionality test represents the application of heightened scrutiny under the Takings Clause to adjudicative actions. ); see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 48 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 413 n* (Souter, J., dissenting). 49 See id. But see James H. Freis, Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings Back into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use Planning After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 103, 130-31 (1996) (arguing that adjudicative label was correct because of discretion in granting permits); Starritt & McClanahan, supra note 15, at 442-43 (explaining that discretionary decision included whether proposed development was linkable to existing path, thus triggering land dedication condition). 50 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting). 51 See id. at 414 ( [T]he city s conditions should not be held to fail a further rough proportionality test or any other that might be devised to give meaning to the constitutional limits.... [T]he Court s conclusions about the city s vulnerability carry the Court no further than Nollan has gone already.... ). 52 See id. at 413-14. In his dissent, Justice Stevens also concluded that the rough proportionality standard was unjustified: The Court has made a serious error by abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid comprehensive land use plan. Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Marshall S. Sprung, Note, Taking Sides: The Burden of Proof Switch in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1301, 1326-36 (1996) (arguing that burden of production shift is justified because it improves fairness and availability of evidence, but burden of persuasion shift would have devastating effects).

252 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:242 B. Confusion in the Lower Courts This section surveys the federal and state cases that applied Dolan s rough proportionality test to exactions imposed on the approval of development applications, found Dolan s rough proportionality test or the legislative/adjudicative distinction inapplicable, or failed to mention Dolan s distinction between legislation and adjudication even though it was relevant. 53 Because the focus is on the role of the legislative/adjudicative distinction in each court s decision of whether to apply Dolan, the cases are grouped according to whether the exaction is: (1) scheduled an amount of money or land specified in advance by a legislative body; (2) negotiated authorized by a legislative body but individually determined, by either the legislature or an administrative body, in response to a specific development proposal; 54 or (3) not clear. 55 1. Scheduled Exactions Of the eleven cases involving exactions that were scheduled by the legislative body, three explicitly stated that Dolan reaches legislative, as well as adjudicative, exactions. 56 For example, in Curtis v. 53 The research for this section of the Note was conducted through Westlaw by searching for all lower federal and state court cases that cited to Dolan. Search of Westlaw, ALLCASES database (Aug. 27, 1998). The search initially yielded 171 results, most of which were not relevant to the project because they mention Dolan for reasons other than resolving challenges to the proportionality of exactions: for general takings propositions; to apply the Agins takings test that land use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests and does not den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land, Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); or to mention the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In addition, many cases discussed the rough proportionality standard either applying it or rejecting its application in the context of challenges to nonexaction land use regulations. For discussion of the Supreme Court s recent rejection of the relevance of Dolan to regulations that are not exactions, see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. These cases do not apply to the analysis and thus have not been included in this section. 54 All that is fixed is the process for negotiation, but the outcome is uncertain unless a pattern can be discerned from previous negotiations. See Frank & Rhodes, supra note 5, at 9 (describing difference between scheduled and negotiated exactions). 55 In these cases, the reported opinion does not provide enough information on the context of the exaction s imposition to be able to determine whether the exaction was scheduled or negotiated. 56 See National Ass n of Home Builders v. Chesterfield County, 907 F. Supp. 166, 168-69 (E.D. Va. 1995) (applying rough proportionality to facial attack of widely applicable county cash proffer policy and upholding policy because it is possible to apply it in accordance with rough proportionality ), aff d, 92 F.3d 1180 (4th Cir. 1996); Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (concluding that Dolan should apply to legislatively enacted dedication exaction for highway expansion); Curtis v. Town of South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998) (stating that legislative nature of exaction was only one factor in analysis of fire protection ordinance under Dolan).

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 253 Town of South Thomaston, 57 a fire protection ordinance required all developers of subdivisions with inadequate water supplies to construct a fire pond and to convey an easement to the town to maintain and use the pond. 58 The court stated that the legislative nature of the exaction is but one factor in our takings analysis, thus rejecting the notion that legislation is automatically shielded from a rough proportionality analysis. 59 On the other hand, five cases found Dolan inapplicable because the exaction was legislative, and not adjudicative. 60 For example, San Mateo County Coastal Landowners Ass n v. County of San Mateo 61 involved the voter-enacted Coastal Protection Initiative, which included a requirement that applicants for land division grant the county a conservation or agricultural easement as a condition for approval. 62 Here, the court explained: The [Dolan] Court went to some lengths to distinguish the situation in Dolan, involving an adjudicative decision by the city, from the traditional legislative and land-use function undertaken by local governments at issue in this case. 63 Thus, the court concluded, rough proportionality was inapplicable to a legislatively adopted zoning scheme. 64 Two other cases, however, applied the rough proportionality test without discussing the issue of legislative versus adjudicative exactions. 65 57 708 A.2d 657 (Me. 1998). 58 See id. at 658-59. 59 Id. at 660. 60 See Home Builders Ass n v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (finding Dolan inapplicable to impact fee ordinance because instant case involves a generally applicable legislative decision ); GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc., v. City of Tucson, 949 P.2d 971, 978 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding Dolan inapplicable to legislatively imposed fee that served as condition for approval of long distance carrier s application for telephone rights of way); San Mateo County Coastal Landowners Ass n v. County of San Mateo, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117, 132 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding agricultural and open space easement requirements to be part of legislatively adopted zoning scheme and thus shielded from Dolan analysis); Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994) (holding that Dolan does not control impact fee ordinance because of its legislative nature); Home Builders Ass n v. City of Beavercreek, Nos. 94- CV-0012, 94-CV-0062, 1996 WL 812607, at *17-*18 (Ohio Ct. C.P. (Greene County) Feb. 12, 1996) (same). For the cases that involved impact fees, the courts also were persuaded that Dolan did not apply because the exactions did not require dedication of land. Impact fees are one-time charges imposed on a developer as a condition to receiving a building permit. Noreen A. Murphy, Note, The Viability of Impact Fees After Nollan and Dolan, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 203, 213 (1996). They may be imposed on any new development, and they often have been used to fund a variety of projects unrelated to the particular development. See id. 61 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117 (Ct. App. 1995). 62 See id. at 121, 129. 63 Id. at 131. 64 Id. at 132. 65 See Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (upholding ordinance imposing dedication exaction for compliance with rough proportionality );

254 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:242 In conclusion, for scheduled exactions, those closest to legislative decisions, just as many courts applied Dolan s rough proportionality test as refused to apply it because of the Supreme Court s limitation of the standard to adjudicative decisions five courts on each side. For those applying the standard, however, two out of five did not acknowledge that the case involved a legislative decision. 2. Negotiated Exactions Of the nine cases that involved exactions that were determined on an individual basis, three concluded that the burden-shifting rough proportionality test only applies to adjudicative, not legislative decisions, but those courts differed as to their characterization of the exaction. In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 66 the Supreme Court of California determined that a monetary exaction imposed on the approval of a development application was adjudicative; it reasoned that the recreational facilities fees at issue were not legislatively formulated development assessments imposed on a broad class of property owners but instead were exactions imposed on an individual and discretionary basis. 67 On the other hand, the court in Loyola Marymount University v. Los Angeles Unified School District 68 found a school development fee to be legislative because it fell within the general category of development fees. 69 The impact fees in these two cases were identical because they were both determined on an individual basis, although different governmental bodies determined them. 70 Another negotiated exactions case vaguely referred to the legislative/adjudicative distinction in order to shift the burden of proof to the Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 189 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (same); see also McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (finding Dolan inapplicable for other reasons). 66 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996) (concluding that impact fee is subject to Dolan because it is imposed on an individual and discretionary basis ); see also Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding Dolan to be applicable to individually determined road dedication condition). 67 See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444. 68 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 434-35 (Ct. App. 1996) (declining to apply Dolan test to legislatively authorized school development fee imposed on broad class of property owners but individually determined by school district board). For an explanation of a development or impact fee, see supra note 60. 69 Id. at 435. 70 In Ehrlich, the city council imposed the fee after conducting studies to determine the cost of constructing replacement recreational facilities. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434-35. In Loyola Marymount University, state law authorized governing boards of local school districts to determine and levy school development fees against individual development applications. See Loyola Marymount Univ., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427-28.

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 255 government. 71 The court stated that the government bears the burden of justifying its conduct... at least when its conduct is quasijudicial in nature. 72 It is unclear whether the court was limiting the application of Dolan to adjudication. Furthermore, two cases applied the Dolan standard without reference to the legislative/adjudicative distinction, 73 and three other cases declined to apply Dolan s rough proportionality test for other reasons. 74 The results show that for those courts presented with challenges to negotiated exactions, those closest to adjudicative decisions, five out of nine applied Dolan s rough proportionality standard, although three of those five were unclear as to whether the application depended on the adjudicative characterization of the exaction. 3. Indeterminate Exactions In nine cases, the courts did not clarify whether the exaction was specified by the legislature or determined on an individual basis. In three cases, the Oregon Court of Appeals applied Dolan and admitted that it was disregarding the Supreme Court s statement that heightened scrutiny should turn on the characterization of the exaction as legislative or adjudicative. 75 The first case to take this position was Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 76 in which the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that the character of the restriction remains the type that 71 See Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343, 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding Dolan to preclude imposition of individually determined road dedication exaction). 72 Id. at 351-52. 73 See Lordan v. Feld, No. CA945144, 1995 WL 809480, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. March 16, 1995) (holding that Dolan precluded application of planning board regulation imposing road extension exaction on subdivision approval); Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 537 N.W.2d 301, 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that city s individually determined road dedication condition met rough proportionality test). 74 See Snider v. Board of County Comm rs, 932 P.2d 704, 709 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to apply Dolan because of distinction between dedications and other types of exactions); Kiewit Constr. Group, Inc. v. Clark County, 920 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing Dolan because access ramp condition was not sole means of obtaining conditional use permit); Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Comm n, 563 N.W.2d 145, 153 (Wis. 1997) (finding Dolan inapplicable because condition was not statutorily authorized and would contravene legislative procedures, and because takings claim was not ripe). 75 See, e.g., Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227, 1235 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) ( [T]he fact that a specific condition that, by its nature, is subject to the rough proportionality test is mandated by general local legislation does not alter the Dolan analysis in any way. ); J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that Dolan applies whether it is legislatively required or a case-specific formulation and that [t]he nature, not the source, of the imposition is what matters ); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (disregarding Dolan s legislative/adjudicative decision, and focusing instead on character of decision to determine whether to apply rough proportionality standard). 76 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).

256 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:242 is subject to the analysis in Dolan, 77 and that the significant distinction is the one between land dedications and other types of exactions. 78 Five other decisions applied the rough proportionality test without mentioning the legislative versus adjudicative difference at all. 79 Therefore, for those cases in which the court did not clarify the nature of the exaction, the great majority eight out of nine applied the rough proportionality standard, with three cases explicitly rejecting the legislative/adjudicative distinction and five cases not commenting on it. 4. Summary and Implications of Results Overall, Dolan s demanding standard was applied in over half of the cases surveyed (eighteen out of twenty-nine) even though the exactions challenges involved slightly more scheduled than negotiated exactions (eleven scheduled and nine negotiated). This outcome is troubling because of the difficulties for municipalities in the face of an expansion of the rough proportionality standard s application. 80 This survey of the caselaw reveals that the lower courts application of the legislative/adjudicative distinction is inconsistent. 81 There 77 Id. at 573. 78 [W]hat triggers the heightened scrutiny of exactions is the fact that they are not simply a limitation on the use to which an owner may put his or her property, but rather a requirement that the owner deed portions of the property to the local government. Id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)). But see Clark v. City of Albany, 904 P.2d 185, 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) ( For purposes of takings analysis, we see little difference between a requirement that a developer convey title to the part of the property that is to serve a public purpose, and a requirement that the developer himself make improvements on the affected and nearby property and make it available for the same purpose. ). 79 See Reynolds v. Inland Wetlands Comm n, No. 309721, 1996 WL 383363, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1996) (concluding that conservation easement condition fails Dolan standard); Sarasota County v. Taylor Woodrow Homes Ltd., 652 So. 2d 1247, 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Dolan applies to rezoning resolution imposing various conditions); Grogan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (App. Div. 1995) (finding that scenic and conservation easement passed rough proportionality ); Clark, 904 P.2d at 190 (holding that city failed to prove that street improvement exactions satisfy Dolan); Nielsen v. Merriam, No. 40106-8-I, 1998 WL 390442, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 13, 1998) (holding that road extension exaction, creating private easement, failed Dolan test); see also Donwood, Inc. v. Spokane County, 957 P.2d 775, 779 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1998) (finding Dolan inapplicable for other reasons). 80 See discussion supra Introduction. 81 Similar confusion surfaced in the Florida and Oregon courts after those state courts announced a rule differentiating between legislative and adjudicative decisions. See infra notes 86-87, 103. Despite this confusion, however, the Supreme Court has not clarified its position on the applicability of Dolan. The Court denied certiorari in a case that would have allowed it to address the issue. See Parking Ass n of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga.

April 2000] LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE TAKINGS 257 is considerable disagreement over whether legislative decisions are subject to Dolan s heightened scrutiny review. Furthermore, for those courts that do believe the legislative/adjudicative characterization is significant, disagreement exists over how to determine which decisions are legislative and which are adjudicative. Given the state of confusion, the distinction needs to be examined more closely in order to determine whether it is possible to apply such a distinction in a satisfactory way. Furthermore, because rough proportionality is often applied in the context of arguably legislative decisions, it is necessary to discuss whether the standard is an effective answer to the problems associated with exactions. Parts II and III take up this task. II THE IMPRACTICAL NATURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE/ ADJUDICATIVE DISTINCTION The exercise of differentiating between legislative and adjudicative decisions encounters practical difficulties for two reasons. 82 First, local governments are not structured under strict separation of powers principles. Part II.A will address this argument. Second, the nature of the land use decisionmaking process relies on flexibility and discretion. Part II.B will describe this phenomenon and what it means for the viability of the legislative/adjudicative distinction. The Dolan opinion did not specify how lower courts should draw the line between legislative and adjudicative decisions, but the academic literature has proposed a variety of methods. 83 The approaches 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995). Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justices Thomas and O Connor urged that the lower courts needed to receive clarification on the legislative versus adjudicative dilemma since they were in conflict over its effect on the applicability of Dolan. See id. at 1117-18. They stated that the distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference and that the legislative/adjudicative distinction has no merit. Id. at 1118. 82 This Note assumes that adjudicative, administrative, and quasi-judicial are synonymous, but other commentators have attempted to separate these definitions. See, e.g., Robert Lincoln, Executive Decisionmaking by Local Legislatures in Florida: Justice, Judicial Review and the Need for Legislative Reform, 25 Stetson L. Rev. 627, 645-51 (1996). 83 The reason these methods exist is because courts have long treated legislation differently from adjudication. For instance, adjudicative decisions generally are afforded less deference by courts, while legislative determinations are assumed to be constitutionally valid unless arbitrary. See Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls 405, 413-14 (2000). Furthermore, adjudicative decisions are reviewed for rationality based on what is contained in the record rather than on any rational reason that the court can create. See Land Use and the Constitution: Principles for Planning Practice 43 (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989) (stating that, when reviewing administrative decisions, courts consider whether decision was based on the record supported by reasons and findings of fact ). In addition, adjudicative decisions demand greater procedural due process