State of Minnesota Dakota County CHRISTIAN RYAN PETERSON 404 EAST 1 STAVE SHAKOPEE MN 55379 District Court First Judicial District Court File Number: 19AV-CV-13-1136 Case Type: Implied Consent Notice of Filing of Order Justin Anthony Peterson-Fuller vs Commissioner of Public Safety You are notified that an order was filed on this date. Dated: July 3, 2013 Carolyn M. Renn Court Administrator Dakota County District Court 14955 Galaxie Avenue Apple Valley MN 55124 952-891-7256 A true and correct copy of this notice has been served by U.S. Mail upon the following parlies at the last known postal address of each, pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Proeedure. Rule 77. Enclosure(s) cc: CHRISTIAN RYAN PETERSON KRISTI ANN NIELSEN MNCIS-CIV-141 STATE Notice of Filing of Order-Service by Mail Rev.12/2002
STATE OF MINNESOTA COUNTY OF DAKOTA DISTRICT COURT FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT Stare of Minnesota, Court File No. 19AV-CV-13-1136 Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. AND ORDER Anthony Peterson-Fuller, Defendant. The above-entitled matter came before the Flonorablc Arlene M. Asencio Perkkio, Judge of District Court, on June 11, 2013, at the Dakota County Western Service Center in Apple Valley. State of Minnesota, hereinafter State, was represented by Kristi Nielsen, Assistant Attorney General. Anthony Peterson-Fuller, hereinafter Defendant, was not present and represented by Christian Peterson. This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to suppress the alcohol test result under Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). The parties stipulated to the facts as outlined in the police report filed March 15, 2013. The only issues before the Court are Defendant's motion to suppress, motion to dismiss, and the application of McNee/)*. Now, therefore, based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court makes the following: FILED DAifJTA COUNTY CAROLYN M, RENN, Court Admintstralor JUN 2 8 2013
FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The parties stipulated to the facts of the case as outlined in the police report dated March 15, 2013. 2. On March 15, 2013, at 4:16 a.m., Apple Valley Police were dispatched to a one vehicle crash. 3. Police arrived on scene and located two vehicles parked on the shoulder of 157'h Street with one vehicle attempting to tow the other vehicle, with a substantial amount of front tend damage, out of a snow bank. 4. Officer Tschida of the Apple Valley Police Department spoke with the Defendant and Defendant.said he was the driver of the damaged vehicle. 5. Defendant denied medical attention. 6. While speaking with Defendant, Officer Tschida noticed numerous signs of impairment. 7. Officer Tschida noticed Defendant had a difficult time maintaining his balance. 8- Officer Tschida noticed Defendant's eyes were red, puffy, glassy, and watery. 9. Officer Tschida noticed the majority of Defendant's words were very slurred. 10. Officer Tschida detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Defendant's breath. 11. Defendant admitted consuming several beers earlier in the evening, 12. Defendant was given the standard field sobriety tests (Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Walk and Turn, One Leg Stand) and a preliminary breath test. 13. Defendant provided a breath sample with a final reading of.232. 14. Defendant was placed under arrest and transported to the Apple Valley Police Department. 15. At approximately 4:55 a.m.. Defendant was read the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Implied Consent Advisory' Form (1CA). Line l(a) of the ICA states, "Minnesota law requires you to
take a test to determine if you are under the influence of alcohol." Line 2 of the ICA states, "refusal to take a test is a crime." 16. Defendant waived his right to an attorney and agreed to provide a breath sample. 17. At 5:13 a.m., Defendant submitted to a breath test wirh a result of.22. 18. The police did not attempt to obtain a warrant in this case, 19. The State does not argue the police were unable to obtain a warrant. 20. Minnesota Statute section 169A.20(1)(5) (Driving while impaired) gives law enforcement two hours from the time of driving to obtain a person's blood alcohol concentration. 21. In this case, the Apple Valley Police had time to obtain a warrant prior to requesting Defendant submit to breath testing. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." A warrandess search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception. See United Slates v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 2. At the point an encounter becomes coercive, when the right to say no ro a search is compromised by a show of ofhcial authority, the I'ourth Amendment intervenes. Stale v Dcyo, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994). 3. The State bears the burden of showing at least one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies in order to avoid the suppression of the evidence acquired. Slate v. Johnson, 689 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. App. 2004).
4. Consent is a well-recognized exception to the search warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. ftttstamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). To be valid, such consent must be freely and voluntarily given. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1997). 5. Consent is voluntary only if it is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice... rather than the product of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth v. ftustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), 6. Breath tests, blood tests, and urine tests for alcohol are searches protected by the Fourth Amendment. See State v, Net/and, 762, N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 2009); State v. Sbnfier, 751 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 2008); Scbmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Minnesota's Implied Consent Statute 7. Minnesota Statute 169A.50 to 169A.53 comprise Minnesota's Implied Consent Law and states: Any person who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a motor vehicle within this state or on any boundary water of this state consents, subject to the provisions of sections 169A.50 to 169A.53 (implied consent law), and section 169A.20 (driving while impaired), to a chemical test of that person's blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, a controlled substance or its metabolite, or a hazardous substance. The test must be administered at the direction of a peace officer. (Minn. Stat. 169A.51(1)). 8. A person who refuses to submit to the testing outlined above is guilty of third-degree driving while impaired, a gross misdemeanor. (Minn. Stat. 169A.20(2), Minn. Stat. 169A.26.) 9. Consent given under the Minnesota implied consent law is not true consent since the statute does not give the police the authority to administer the blood, breath, or urine test
without the driver's voluntary consent. State Dept. of Highways v. Beckey, 291 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1971). 10. The consent implied by the Minnesota implied consent law is insufficiently voluntary for Fourth Amendment purposes. State v. Netland, 742 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. App. 2007). Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 11. The courts fashioned the exclusionary rule to deter unconscionable invasions of privacy by law enforcement officials. State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35, 41 (Minn.1982). 12. The exclusionary rule was designed to give practical reinforcement to the Fourth Amendment by deterring lawless conduct by government agents. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383(1914). 13. Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 14. The Minnesota Supreme Court has "consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the... 'good faith' exception." State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 180 (Minn.2007). Missouri v, McNeelv 15. The natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream docs not constitute an exigency in ever)' case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant. Missouri v. McNeety, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013). 16. The determination of exigency in the above context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances, A/at 1563.
17. McNeely overturns State v. Netland, 742 N.W.2d (Minn. 2009), which found the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constituted an exigency in ever}' case allowing testing without a warrant, 18. McNeely applies to breath and urine tests as well as blood tests. On April 22, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of firooks v. Minnesota, - S.Ct., 2013 WL 1704706 (U.S.Minn.). The Brooks appeal is a consolidation of three Minnesota cases against Mr. Brooks. Two of the cases involve urine tests and one involves blood tests. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in all three cases. 19. Defendant did not give consent for the breath test. Without consent, a warrant is required for the breath test search. ORDER 1. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's motion to rescind the revocation of his driver's license and license plate is hereby GRANTED. 2. All motions not addressed above are hereby DENIED. 3. The attached memorandum is incorporated by reference, DATED: June 28, 2013 BY THE COURT: Arlcne M. Asencio Perkkio Judge of District Court
MEMORANDUM Minnesota courts have long followed the precedent set in State v. Netland, holding the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constituted exigency in every case and allowing for the testing of alcohol in the blood without a warrant. McNee/y holds the opposite, "... the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." Missouri v. McNeely at 1568. McNeely mandates an examination of the totality of the circumstances in each individual case to determine whether a warrandess test is reasonable. Id. at 1563. McNeely overturns Netland ind. requires an examination of the facts of each case prior to a determination whether a warrant is required. The Fourth Amendment is clear in its requirement law enforcement obtain a warrant prior to a search of a person, unless the circumstances fall under one of the recognized exceptions. The State argues the Defendant in this case provided consent for the search by signing the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory and voluntarily taking the breath test. While the Supreme Court in McNeely does specifically address the prevalence of Implied Consent statutes, the Supreme Court does not hold the presence of such statutes equals consent. In addition, the Supreme Court does not address Minnesota's Implied Consent law specifically and fails to include Minnesota's statute in a lengthy list of state implied consent statutes. Minnesota is one of only nine states making failure to submit to an alcohol test a crime and one of four states to make it crime for a first-time offender. In fact, Minnesota offers the harshest penalty of any state- a gross misdemeanor. This charge is greater than the charge, misdemeanor, for a first-time DWI with a blood alcohol level below.20. The consent given under such circumstances cannot be truly voluntary for purposes of giving up Fourth Amendment rights. The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Net/and held, "Because an individual does not have the right to say no to a chemical test and, indeed, is subject to criminal penalties for doing 7
so, the "consent" implied by law is insufficiently voluntary for Fourth Amendment purposes." State v. Netland, 742 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. App. 2007). Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not address the consent argument. It is the finding of this Court Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the alcohol test as required under the exception to the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment. This Court is also unconvinced by the State's attempt to rely on a reasonableness standard as rccendy outlined in Maryland v. King 569 U.S. (2013). The set of circumstances presented in King differ from this factual situation. In King, the Supreme Court concluded the DNA test was conducted for identification purposes only. In this case, the test was conducted to provide the needed evidence for the charged crime. It is also a stretch for the State to assert the ruling in McNeely requiring a warrant would be altered- fewer than two months later - by the ruling in King. A significant issue presented by this case is whether the exclusionary rule should apply since law enforcement was acting in reliance on the law and precedents at the time of the arrest. In Dam v. United States, the Supreme Court held, "Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule." Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). Minnesota Courts have not specifically addressed the finding in Davis. However, prior rulings suggest Minnesota Courts offer broader protections than the Davis ruling provides. In State v. Jackson, the Minnesota Supreme Court, citing a prior United States Supreme Court ruling on the good faith exception {UnitedStates v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, (1984)), noted, ".., we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, die Leon "good faith" exception." State v.jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 180 (Minn.2007). The Minnesota Supreme Court has not found a good faith exception in other cases. It is the finding of this Court Minnesota Courts offer greater protection than Davis and the exclusionary rule should not apply in this case.
This Court acknowledges the continuing and serious problems posed by drivers under the influence of alcohol. According to the 2011 Minnesota Motor Vehicle Impaired Driving Facts Report issued by the Minnesota Department of Public Safety: 368 people died in traffic crashes in Minnesota, and 111 (30 percent) were crashes involving drunk drivers. 2,375 people suffered injuries in alcohol-related crashes. 29,257 motorists were arrested for DWIs (an average of 81 DWIs per day). 12,103 (41 percent) of these violators had at least one prior DWI. 1,903 (7 percent) of DWIs were issued to drivers less than 21 years of age. One out of every seven licensed drivers in Minnesota has at least one DWI. Based on these statistics, it is clear the societal costs of DWIs in Minnesota remains high. However, the way to reduce these numbers is not by sacrificing the people's rights granted by the Fourth Amendment. The Minnesota Legislature can continue to strengthen the DWI laws and increase the penalties to offenders. There are also alternatives to law enforcement's reliance on the Implied Consent Statutes. Seeking a warrant may not be the easiest path to take, but it is the only path consistent with the Constitution. McNeely alters the landscape of Minnesota's procedure on DWI arrests and testing. The current procedure in Minnesota violates the Fourth Amendment by allowing searches without a warrant and without falling into a clear exception to the warrant requirement. A.M.A.P.