Crea%on of New Regions in Indonesia: Examining Local Public Services A?er the Pemekaran Policy

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Crea%on of New Regions in Indonesia: Examining Local Public Services A?er the Pemekaran Policy Wahyudi Kumorotomo, Ph.D! Master in Public Policy and Administration Programme! Gadjah Mada University! www.kumoro.staff.ugm.ac.id! kumoro@map.ugm.ac.id!

Why Indonesia Should Decentralize? Facts: Area: 4.8 million km square; only 1.9 million km square lands Islands: 13.667 Distance: 5,110 km from West to East; 1,880 km from North to South Population: 235 million (2007) Unbalanced population distribution: 61.7% are resided in Java, which constitutes only 7% of the Indonesian area. More than 300 ethnics and local dialects, diversity in customary traditions and religions.

Decentralized & Fragmented Policy Environment under SBY Presidency (2004 2014) Political; Coalition; policy making less effective Direct local elections (since 2005): policy of politicking Weakening legitimacy due to corruption cases. Better Economic Recovery; Positive sentiments with relatively stable politics (JSE Index doubled, 5.6-6.2% growth, increased exports) Macro economics did not match with micro-economic (household) indicators Bureaucratic Politics, Problems of Local Administrative Capacity; Conflicts among cabinet members & departments (MoF, MoHA, Bappenas, Technical Departments) Lack of local capacity: local autonomy is not supported with competent officials.

Crea%on of New Regions (Pemekaran) 1998 2010 Province 27 33 Districts 301 512

Growth of The New Autonomy Region: 1999-2009!

Crea%on of New Regions It is the consequence of decentraliza%on (Canada, Russia, Nigeria, Pakistan) Problem in Indonesia: it is not based on objec%ve considera%on, weak system of evalua%on (Ferrazzi, 2008) Ques%on: New administra%ve units bring public services closer to the local people? Improve people s welfare?

Contrast A?er Pemekaran District! Bandung! Pop: 4,100,000! Province! East Java! Pop: 37,200,000! Supiori! Pop: 11,800! Gorontalo! Pop: 900,000!

Poli%cal Impetus Direct elec%ons of the heads of regions, since 2005 Vote buying, expensive democracy (Rp 1.8 16 b for district heads, Rp 40 100 b for governors) Poli%cal investment of local businessmen Incen%ves for crea%on of new regions: DAU (block grants); tacit bargaining among candidates and businessmen.

Public Services & People s Welfare Good local govt a?er decentraliza%on (Smith, 1985; Manor, 1999) is s%ll a myth Incumbents have more chances to win local elec%ons using local budget for poli%cal campaigning People are betrayed (Collins, 2007); Democracy is hijacked (Priyono, 2007)

Case #1: Banyuasin Since 2002; 15 sub districts, agricultural based (rice surplus), 5.4% economic growth Informal governance; take & give among public officials & local businessmen Regent (Amiruddin Inoed) is commiked, but might also involved in tacit bargaining (Case: sand mining) Tanjung Api api project: Rp 375 m bribery involving a member of parliament (Yusuf Emir Faisal) Educa%on (34.9% of local budget), but limited for insfrastructures & tangibles. It doesn t solve urbanbiased tendency.

Case #2: Maluku Tenggara Barat (MTB) Since 1999; isolated as forgoken islands ; marine economic poten%als Former regent (S.J. Oratmangun) priori%zed local govt complex building; current regent (B.S. Temmar) priori%zed city garden Local budget deficit Rp 29 b due to pre financed projects from the DAU (block grants) Procurement scam of Terun Narnitu ship (Rp 20 b loss) Poli%cal corrup%on among the DPRD members Marine industry is le? under developed; dependency for basic commodi%es; limited electricity; famine & epidemic outbreaks.

Comparison of Poverty Rate among Provinces (2008) 13! 17 provinces are below the na%onal poverty rate (15,4%) Source: BPS (2008)! 13

Human Development Index based on Provinces, Year 1999, 2004 dan 2007 Tahun 1999 Tahun 2004 Tahun 2007 NTB 54.2 NTB 60.6 Papua 63.41 Papua 58.8 Papua 60.9 NTB 63.71 TERENDAH NTT 60.4 NTT 62.7 NTT 65.36 Kaltim 67.8 DIY 72.9 R i a u 74.63 DIY 68.7 Sulut 73.4 Sulut 74.68 TERTINGGI DKI Jakarta 72.5 DKI Jakarta 75.8 DKI Jakarta 76.59

Conclusions Decentraliza%on raises new hopes for par%cipatory development, but the ideals of decentraliza%on are not posi%vely supported by crea%on of new regions. Tacit bargaining among local authori%es and local businessmen has resulted in budget inefficiency. Crea%on of new regions is not linked to quality of public services and local people s welfare. Urgent need for moratorium of pemekaran, thorough & objec%ve evalua%on of new regions.