Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 1 of 22 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION SHANNON PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR STATE OF TEXAS, et al., [Lead Case] Defendants. MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. SA-11-CA-361-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated Case] STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, et al., Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. SA-11-CA-490-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated Case] RICK PERRY, Defendant. MARGARITA V. QUESADA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-592-OLG-JES-XR RICK PERRY, et al., [Consolidated Case] Defendants. 1
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 2 of 22 JOHN T. MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-615-OLG-JES-XR STATE OF TEXAS, et al., [Consolidated Case] Defendants. EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-635-OLG-JES-XR RICK PERRY, et al., [Consolidated Case] Defendants. WENDY DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. SA-11-CA-788-OLG-JES-XR [Lead Case] RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants. LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC), DOMINGO GARCIA, Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. v. SA-11-CA-855-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated Case] RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants. JOINT RESPONSE BRIEF ON INTERIM MAP ISSUES As directed in the Court s Order of February 2, 2012 (ECF #598), certain Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors the Rodriguez plaintiffs, the Quesada plaintiffs, the Davis plaintiffs 2
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 3 of 22 (through Part III), the LULAC plaintiffs, the Texas NAACP plaintiffs, and the African-American Congressional plaintiffs jointly submit this response brief on interim map issues. I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT MAKE INTERIM MAP DECISIONS UNTIL AFTER THE D.C. SECTION 5 COURT HAS ISSUED A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. This Court should not try to maintain an April primary date by publishing an interim plan in advance of the D.C. court s issuance of a Section 5 declaratory judgment. A May 29 or, even better, June 26 primary date offers a way to give as much certainty to the upcoming election process as is reasonably possible in the circumstances of this case. There are both practical and legal reasons for taking such a position. First, it comports with what the state told the Supreme Court, both implicitly and explicitly, when it sought a stay of this Court s late November interim map orders. By seeking a stay of the November interim map orders, the state effectively announced that having legally valid interim maps in place took primacy in the state s eyes over maintaining an early primary date. More directly, the state told the Supreme Court that having legally correct interim maps in place is more important than keeping an April primary date. At oral argument, Justice Alito questioned the state s attorney about moving back the primary dates, asking if the state would entertain the possibility of moving the primary back? Perez Oral Arg. Tr. at 10 (Jan. 9, 2012). The state s attorney answered that Texas wants the Court to have the opportunity to get this right? Id. (emphasis added). A similar theme was explored later in the argument in questioning from Justices Scalia and Sotomayor, who tried to work through the timing of lower court decisions in this case if a later primary (for example, in June) were to be held. Id. at 59-60. Even in arguments before this Court in late January, the state s attorney adhered to the position that getting the interim maps right took precedence in the state s view over an early primary. There, the state s attorney essentially threatened to seek a Supreme Court stay of any interim map decision by this Court if 3
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 4 of 22 the interim maps were not to the state s liking. Tr. of Jan. 27, 2012, at 134 (remarks of Mr. Mattax). The plaintiffs here agree that establishing a schedule and mechanisms to get legally valid interim maps in place should take primacy over adherence to a primary election schedule that already has been disrupted. The plaintiffs also understand that, as the first-round interim map effort demonstrates, there is no ironclad way to ensure that legally correct interim maps are in place. But, the Court should do what is within its authority to improve the chances of that happening. Establishing a primary schedule that essentially eliminates the possibility of a clash of decisions between this Court and the D.C. court on the crucial issue of Section 5 is the best way to do this. Avoiding having to make a Perez-guess on Section 5 is both critical to the legal and public policy issues involved in this case and, at the same time, more readily at hand in terms of the orderly administration of elections in the state. Contrary to some interpretations, the Supreme Court s Perez decision was not a directive to this Court to forge ahead with an April primary, regardless of the consequences of making a Section 5 guess that may be revealed to be wrong in one particular or another in the coming two or three weeks. Nothing in the opinion says that is what is being done, and several colloquies during argument of the case indicate that the Supreme Court was well aware that a later primary date in June was well within the realm of possibility. The lead-in premise to the Supreme Court s discussion in Perry v. Perez of the Section 5 not insubstantial standard is that, because only the D.C. Section 5 court may determine whether the state s enacted plans comply with Section 5, this Court must... be careful not to prejudge the merits of the outcome of the D.C. case. Perez at 6. The Supreme Court devised the not insubstantial standard as a way to honor this statutory and jurisdictional command in the 4
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 5 of 22 narrow circumstance where a local court such as this one has no choice but to devise an interim plan in the absence of a preclearance determination by the D.C. court. But, the Court does have a choice. Unlike at the time of the Supreme Court s January 20 th decision, the D.C. court has concluded trial and argument in the Section 5 case. It has indicated that a decision can be expected in early March, roughly two weeks from now. 1 This Court, therefore, is not faced with an open and indefinite schedule for a Section 5 decision to actually be reached. It is reasonably certain that a decision will issue in the coming two or so weeks. Forcing an April primary in these circumstances would not seem consistent with the Supreme Court s admonition that this Court be careful not to prejudge the Section 5 issues. The plaintiffs discuss this issue at some length even though they have taken due note of the Court s most recent statement of its desire to have redistricting plans in place for an April primary. Order of Feb. 10, 2012 (ECF #616), at 2. The only way that appears even theoretically possible to achieve the Court s desired schedule is an agreement of the parties on interim maps. But, that effort has thus far foundered. Moreover, even were it to succeed and some agreement reached among all the parties, significant legal questions would still have to be addressed if the primaries were to go forward. It is doubtful that the state could avoid having to preclear such an agreement by simply averting its eyes if the Court adopts such plans. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Sanchez,452 U.S. 130, 151 (1981) ( if covered jurisdictions could avoid the normal preclearance procedure by awaiting litigation challenging a refusal to redistrict after a census is completed, the statute [section 5] might have the unintended effect of actually encouraging delay in making obviously needed changes in district boundaries ). 1 The plaintiffs understand that the D.C. court has indicated that its decision will not issue until at least then and that this is not a firm commitment that the decision will issue then. Still, it is a fair reading that the Section 5 decision is imminent. 5
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 6 of 22 And, there are major issues in terms of the authority of the Attorney General about whether such plans, indirectly blessed by the Texas Attorney General but not legislatively developed, could even be adopted without further hearings on the plans. 2 II. THE STATE BEARS THE PEREZ-GUESS BURDEN, AND IT CANNOT ASK THIS COURT TO SECOND-GUESS THE SECTION 5 DECISIONMAKER. In the event this Court decide to make a Perez-guess on Section 5, the burden of proof issue on the not insubstantial standard is an issue, but probably more theoretical than real at this stage of the dispute. That is because the plaintiffs meet this standard, even if they bear the burden on establishing that the Section 5 issues raised in the D.C. court action are not insubstantial. To be clear, though, the plaintiffs take strong exception to the state s position that Perez places the Section 5 burden in these situations on those challenging an unprecleared plan. The state s argument on this point is one paragraph long. Defendants Brief on Issues Relating to Interim Redistricting Plans (ECF #631) ( State Interim Plan Br. ), at 20. It simply asserts that assigning the Section 5 burden to the plaintiffs is consistent with the general framework governing interim plans. Id. But the Supreme Court decision specifically said that there is a different calculus when it comes to Section 5 issues in this context. Perez at 6. And considering that the different calculus comes into play precisely because the state bears the burden in Section 5 cases, that different calculus must mean that the burden shifts in this Court, too. This view is consistent with the position staked out by the United States, the principal enforcer of Section 5. U.S. Interim Map Statement (ECF #591) at 5 (state retains its burden ). 2 See, e.g., Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 718-19 (Tex. 1992) (limiting Texas Attorney General settlement authority with respect to redistricting legislation and indicating that, in some cases, judgment cannot be rendered without evidence and a hearing ); see also LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 845-46 (5 th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (court must ensure that a settlement in such circumstances is fair and does not put the court s sanction and power behind a decree that violates, Constitution, statute or jurisprudence ). See also Fouts v. Harris, 88 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1352-53 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (redistricting case in which court denied request to approve proposed settlement if the objectives of those disagreeing with settlement would be frustrated by it). 6
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 7 of 22 More significant for present purposes is the underlying approach of the state to whether the not insubstantial burden has been met in this case. In contrast to what is likely to be the most common scenario in the future for development of interim plans in the context of an unprecleared plan, the Section 5 proceedings in this case are at an advanced stage. There is not a vacuum on the Section 5 side of the ledger. There has been a complete trial of the Section 5 case, and, of special significance, there has been an extensive legal memorandum by the Section 5 decisionmaker on critical Section 5 issues in the case. See D.C. Summary Judgment Op. (EDF #115). This circumstance means that this Court, should it engage in a Perez-guess rather than waiting on the soon-to-come Section 5 declaratory judgment, does not have anywhere near a blank slate on which to hazard its guess. There are substantive determinations already made in D.C. that, under Perez, bind this Court. 3 Stated another way, in the Section 5 specifics where the D.C. court already has made a determination, this Court cannot second-guess the D.C. court. The state s argued-for approach is for this Court to act as though nothing of consequence has happened in the D.C. court. For example, the state tries to relegate the December 22 summary judgment decision in D.C. to the legal trash-heap as far as this Court is concerned. It argues that its failure to win summary judgment does not inform the not insubstanial inquiry. State Interim Plan Br. at 22. The import of such a reading of the D.C. court s summary judgment ruling would be that, in applying Perez s Section 5 standard, nothing that happens in a pending Section 5 proceeding preceding an interim map decision in a local court matters. In short, the state is arguing that this Court may completely disregard what the D.C. court has actually done and said and, at best, look at the evidence presented there and determine completely independently of the Section 5 decisionmaker whether the not insubstantial test is met. This 3 One example is the determination that crossover districts are counted as ability-to-elect districts under Section 5. That determination means that this Court does not have to guess on that particular Section 5 point. The answer is already there in black and white. 7
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 8 of 22 would make a mockery of what the Supreme Court said about Section 5 in this context in the Perez decision. In another part of its argument on this issue, the state asks the Court to jettison the Perez standard altogether. Working from an only modestly expanded version of the evidence it had used to try to obtain summary judgment on discriminatory purpose in the Section 5 case, the state argues that it had no discriminatory purpose in its actions with regard to CD 23and in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex. State Interim Plan Br. at 53-56. But, as to the issues in these areas at the time of its summary judgment ruling, the D.C. court pointed out that the sttae has not disputed many of the specific allegations of discriminatory intent. D.C. Summary Judgment Op. at 43. The court then explained that the United States and defendant-intervenors had provided sufficient evidence... to require further review of the claims of discriminatory purpose. Id. In other words, the court determined that, on the factual record then before it (on a motion for which the state was the proponent), the assertions of discriminatory purpose in C185 in several parts of the state were anything but insubstantial. The state s invitation to disregard this chain of events in the not insubstantial inquiry cannot be taken seriously if the Perez Section 5 standard is to be taken seriously and given actual legal effect. That the state is asking this Court to effectively ignore the Perez Section 5 standard is made even clearer in another way it seeks to avoid the problems confronting it on the Section 5 purposeful discrimination front. The state s argument centers not on what Section 5 requires but on the constitutional constraints on such requirements. State Interim Plan Br. at 20-21 (arguing that, if Section 5 requires the state to bear the burden on the purposeful discrimination issue, it would exceed constitutional limits). That is, the state is asking this Court to not apply Section 8
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 9 of 22 5 standards in its Perez guess but, instead, to disregard Section 5 s express rules, regardless of what the D.C. court has said and done. This is the exact opposite of what Perez requires. III. CROSSOVER AND COALITION DISTRICTS The state misrepresents the law and facts on crossover and coalition districts. There is no other way of saying it. To be clear about the issues concerning such districts, they raise significant hurdles for the state under both Section 5 and the Constitution. The Supreme Court s statement about CD 33 in the Court s interim plan, and its citation in Perez to Bartlett, does nothing to change this legal problem for the state. At most, the Supreme Court said no more in Perez than it said in Bartlett: Section 2 may not compel the state to create a coalition opportunity district. A. Section 5: retrogression Section 5 is quite another story, though, for such districts. The very court which to which this Court must defer (and not second-guess) in making Section determinations the D.C. Section 5 court has already rejected Texas s argument about the legal insignificance of crossover and coalition districts. The court has bluntly held: Since coalition and crossover districts provide minority groups the ability to elect a preferred candidate, they must be recognized as ability districts in a Section 5 analysis of a benchmark plan. D.C. Summary Judgment Op. at 36 (emphasis added). 4 Given this legal conclusion, the state s statement that [r]emoval of a coalition or crossover district... cannot cause retrogression, State Interim Plan Br. at 14, is incomprehensible and yet another improper request for this Court to disregard its Perez obligation to honor the Section 5 court s determinations. 4 This Court already appears to recognize the distinction that the state disregards. See Order of Feb. 10, 2012 (ECF #616), at 2 n.1 (contrasting creating new coalition or crossover districts with dismantling... those that already exist ). 9
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 10 of 22 Thus, under Perez, this Court must protect preexisting districts under the retrogression standard of Section 5 if there is an evidentiary basis to believe are crossover or coalition districts. The D.C. court ruling on this point binds this Court. As to CD 25, 5 for example, not only is the law established for this case that Section 5 protects its type, but the facts in both this Court and the D.C. court (which latter facts are now before this Court, too) show that, regardless of what burden is applied, it is a crossover district under the Bartlett construct. This assertion can hardly be insubstantial when the state has conceded in the litigation that CD 25 is a crossover district and when this Court has already determined (in its late November interim map order for Congress) that it is indeed a crossover district. The state tries to avoid its previous concession on this point by incorrectly citing record evidence, which it says shows that CD 25 is not a crossover district. State Interim Plan Br. at 16. But the state s characterization of the evidence does not comport with what the evidence is. The main argument posited by the state is that Hispanic and Black voters are not cohesive in the Democratic primary. Id. As the plaintiffs already have explained to the Court, the primaries are not the place where cohesion is determined in this analysis. Joint Br. on Interim Map Issues (ECF # 623), at 14-18. The state s citation to LULAC v. Perry does nothing to alter this point. The state s discussion of LULAC v. Perry is only in the Section 2 context, not the Section 5 context. And the state s assertion that the logic of LULAC applies with equal force to 5, State Interim Map Br. at 16, is belied by the LULAC decision itself which specifically distinguishes its Section 2 discussion on this point from Section 5, which the Court says is guided by different concerns. 548 U.S. at 446. 5 A similar analysis applies to S.D. 10, but it is not discussed in any detail because this brief focuses primarily on congressional issues. The separate post-trial brief in the Senate redistricting case should be consulted. 10
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 11 of 22 Moreover, the factual underpinnings of its argument are completely misrepresented in the state s discussion of the record. There is no evidence in the record that Hispanics and Blacks are not cohesive in the core portion of the CD25 district, which is to say the part of the district that makes it a crossover district. Dr. Ansolabehere, in a report in the section 5 case (Jan. 16, 2012, report), examined whether the primary election process prevented minority-preferred candidates from emerging and participating in general elections in CD 15. He concludes that there is a very high success rate of minority-preferred candidates inside the Democratic primary and that Black and Hispanic preferred candidates succeed as often, or more often, than White-preferred candidates in the Democratic primaries in Travis County. Ansolabehere Jan. 16 Report at 23. The state s characterization of the David Butts testimony to this Court, suggesting that it said there was not cohesion in the Democratic primary between Hispanic and Black voters is ludicrously at odds with what he actually said which was the opposite of how it is characterized. 6 B. Section 5: purpose The state also tries to scoot quietly by the Section 5 case implications for its argument that coalition and crossover districts receive no statutory recognition. A state s failure to recognize naturally-occurring coalitions of minority voters in its line-drawing, couple with the deliberate fragmentation of such voting coalitions along racial lines, 7 presents a major Section 5 problem. As the United States argues in its most recent submission in this case, U.S. Statement of Interest (ECF #630), the state cannot surmount the Section 5 purpose hurdle in several areas of the state 6 A determination that the crossover status of CD25 is established under Section 5 and that the D.C. court meant what it said about such districts as ability-to-elect districts makes it unnecessary for the Court to have to determine the likelihood of successon the constitutional issue concerning the destruction of this district and, for example, S.D. 10. But, as previously briefed to this Court, Bartlett makes it plain that the purposeful destruction of preexisting crossover districts is constitutionally suspect. 7 Such some might say old-fashioned purposeful fragmentation to reduce or eliminate minority voting power also is unconstitutional. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), is probably the prototypical case for analyzing such efforts. 11
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 12 of 22 under Plan C185. Id. at 13-16. The DFW area is a prime example. There, as the United States points out, the Texas Legislature intentionally divvied up urban, low-income, minority population among four Anglo-controlled Congressional districts with bizarre shapes. Id. at 14. And, this was done in order to ensure that a minority-controlled Congressional district could not emerge naturally, id., within the compact minority communities of the area. 8 The state seeks to elide Section 2 and Section 5 concerns. They are separate, subject to different analysis. Once the difference is understood, the state s effort to erase crossover and coalition districts has to be rejected. Applying Perez to the section 5 issues in this case, in light of the D.C. court s actions thus far, and the evidence there, means that CD 25 and SD 10 will have to be recognized as ability to elect districts in the Section 5 analysis. It further means that at least one new minority opportunity district must be created in any interim map for Congress in the DFW area. III. Gingles 2 and 3 The state once again throws in an argument that partisan voting overrides the proof of racially polarized voting for purposes of Section analysis under the second and third Gingles factors. State Interim Map Br. at 25-27. The first problem with this argument is that it ignores the finding in LULAC v. Perry that Texas as a whole is infected, and long has been, with racially polarized voting within the meaning of Section 2 analysis. That recent decision on this point cannot be ignored, as the state effectively asks the Court to do. The second problem is that the state disregards clear law in this circuit that it is the state s burden to disprove racially polarized voting facts (as we have here) with actual proof about partisan voting patterns. In Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283 (5 th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 8 Recognition of such naturally-occurring minority coalition communities is what appears to have principally informed this Court s interim congressional plan CD33. 12
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 13 of 22 522 U.S. 807, the court (in a panel that included the author of Clements, which is the authority on which the state says it relies) squarely held that it was error for the trial court to have placed the burden on plaintiffs to disprove that factors other than face affect voting patterns in the county. Id. at 290. Once racially polarized voting is established under accepted retrogression analysis (precisely the kind proffered by all the plaintiffs groups here), it is up to the defendants (the state here) to rebut that evidence by showing that no such bias exists in the relevant voting community. Id. If there is a lack of evidence in the record in such a situation, it favors the plaintiffs, not the defendants. Id. The court went on to hold that the results of the statistical analysis (if they reveal racially polarized voting patterns) create a strong presumption in favor of the second and third Gingles factors being present. Id. at 291. The state s chief expert witness, Dr. Alford, undertook no independent proof on this theoretical construct and agreed in testimony before this Court that Texas still faces differential voting based on race. The state offered nothing to disprove its own expert on this point. Nor did it come remotely near shouldering its Teague burden a burden it fails to even acknowledge. CONCLUSION The Court should wait on the D.C. court s final declaratory judgment before drawing interim maps. If it draws interim maps before then, it should correct the legal defects (constitutional, section 2, and section 5) in the congressional map that have previously been identified to this Court by the plaintiffs jointly filing this brief. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Renea Hicks Renea Hicks Attorney at Law State Bar No. 09580400 Law Office of Max Renea Hicks 13
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 14 of 22 101 West 6th Street Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 480-8231 - Telephone (512) 480-9105 - Facsimile rhicks@renea-hicks.com SCOTT, DOUGLASS & MCCONNICO, L.L.P. /s/ Steve McConnico Steve McConnico State Bar No. 13450300 smcconnico@scottdoug.com S. Abraham Kuczaj, III State Bar No. 24046249 akuczaj@scottdoug.com Sam Johnson State Bar No. 10790600 sjohnson@scottdoug.com 600 Congress Avenue, Suite 1500 Austin, Texas 78701-2589 (512) 495-6300 Telephone (512) 474-0731 Facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., TRAVIS COUNTY, AND CITY OF AUSTIN PERKINS COIE LLP Marc Erik Elias Admitted Pro Hac Vice 700 Thirteenth Street N.W., Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005-3960 (202) 434-1609 (202) 654-9126 FAX MElias@perkinscoie.com Abha Khanna Admitted Pro Hac Vice 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4800 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 (206) 359-8312 (206) 359-9312 FAX AKhanna@perkinscoie.com 14
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 15 of 22 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. DAVID RICHARDS State Bar No. 16846000 Richards, Rodriquez and Skeith, LLP 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200 Austin, TX78701 Tel (512) 476-0005 Fax (512) 476-1513 /s/ J. Gerald Hebert J. GERALD HEBERT 191 Somervelle Street, #405 Alexandria, VA22304 (703) 628-4673 Admitted pro hac vice Counsel for Davis Plaintiffs /s/ Luis R. Vera, Jr. LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR. LULAC National General Counsel Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. & Associates 1325 Riverview Towers 111 Soledad San Antonio, TX78205 (210) 225-3300 lrvlaw@sbcglobal.net Counsel for LULAC Plaintiffs /s/ Allison J. Riggs Allison J. Riggs (pro hac vice) Anita S. Earls Southern Coalition for Social Justice 1415 W. Highway 54, Suite 101 Durham, NC 27707 (919)-323-3380 (phone) (919)-323-3942 (fax) allison@southerncoalition.org Robert S. Notzon (D.C. Bar No. TX0020 ) 15
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 16 of 22 Law Office of Robert S. Notzon 1507 Nueces Street Austin, Texas 78701 (512)-474-7563 (phone) (512)-474-9489 (fax) Robert@NotzonLaw.com Gary L. Bledsoe Law Office of Gary L. Bledsoe and Associates State Bar No. 02476500 316 West 12th Street, Suite 307 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone: 512-322-9992 Fax: 512-322-0840 Garybledsoe@sbcglobal.net Victor Goode Assistant General Counsel NAACP 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Baltimore, MD 21215-3297 Telephone: 410-580-5120 Fax: 410-358-9359 vgoode@naacpnet.org FOR INTERVENORS TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, ET AL. GERALD H. GOLDSTEIN Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley 310 S. St. Mary s Street 29th FloorTower Life Bldg. San Antonio, Texas78205 Phone: (210) 852-2858 Fax: (210) 226-8367 /s/ J. Gerald Hebert J. GERALD HEBERT D.C. Bar #447676 Attorney at Law 191 Somerville Street, #405 Alexandria, VA22304 Telephone: 703-628-4673 Email: hebert@voterlaw.com PAUL M. SMITH D.C. Bar #358870 MICHAEL B. DESANCTIS D.C. Bar #460961 JESSICA RING AMUNSON D.C. Bar #497223 CAROLINE D. LOPEZ D.C. Bar #989850 Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C.20001 Tel: (202) 639-6000 Fax: (202) 639-6066 JESSE GAINES TX Bar No. 07570800 PO Box 50093 16
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 17 of 22 Ft Worth, TX76105 (817) 714-9988 Attorneys for QUESADA Plaintiffs CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 13 th day of February, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record. DAVID RICHARDS Texas Bar No. 1684600 Richards, Rodriguez & Skeith LLP 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200 Austin, TX 78701 512-476-0005 davidr@rrsfirm.com RICHARD E. GRAY, III State Bar No. 08328300 Gray & Becker, P.C. 900 West Avenue, Suite 300 Austin, TX 78701 512-482-0061 512-482-0924 (facsimile) Rick.gray@graybecker.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS PEREZ, DUTTON, TAMEZ, HALL, ORTIZ, SALINAS, DEBOSE, and RODRIGUEZ JOSE GARZA Texas Bar No. 07731950 Law Office of Jose Garza 7414 Robin Rest Dr. San Antonio, Texas 78209 210-392-2856 garzpalm@aol.com JOAQUIN G. AVILA P.O. Box 33687 Seattle, WA 98133 206-724-3731 206-398-4261 (facsimile) 17
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 18 of 22 jgavotingrights@gmail.com MARK W. KIEHNE mkiehne@lawdcm.com RICARDO G. CEDILLO rcedillo@lawdcm.com Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza McCombs Plaza 755 Mulberry Ave., Ste. 500 San Antonio, TX 78212 210-822-6666 210-822-1151 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS NINA PERALES Texas Bar No. 24005046 nperales@maldef.org MARISA BONO mbono@maldef.org REBECCA MCNEILL COUTO rcouto@maldef.org Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 224-5476 (210) 224-5382 (facsimile) MARK ANTHONY SANCHEZ masanchez@gws-law.com ROBERT W. WILSON rwwilson@gws-law.com Gale, Wilson & Sanchez, PLLC 115 East Travis Street, Ste. 1900 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-8899 210-222-9526 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, CARDENAS, JIMENEZ, MENENDEZ, TOMACITA AND JOSE OLIVARES, ALEJANDRO AND REBECCA ORTIZ 18
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 19 of 22 JOHN T. MORRIS 5703 Caldicote St. Humble, TX 77346 (281) 852-6388 JOHN T. MORRIS, PRO SE KAREN M. KENNARD 2803 Clearview Drive Austin, TX 78703 (512) 974-2177 512-974-2894 (fax) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CITY OF AUSTIN DAVID ESCAMILLA Travis County Asst. Attorney P.O. Box 1748 Austin, TX 78767 (512) 854-9416 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF TRAVIS COUNTY CHAD W. DUNN chad@brazilanddunn.com K. SCOTT BRAZIL scott@brazilanddunn.com Brazil & Dunn 4201 FM 1960 West, Suite 530 Houston, TX 77068 281-580-6310 281-580-6362 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY and BOYD RICHIE DAVID SCHENCK Special Counsel to the Attorney General P.O. Box 1254A Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 19
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 20 of 22 GOVERNOR RICK PERRY, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR DAVID DEWHURST, SPEAKER JOE STRAUS, SECRETARY OF STATE HOPE ANDRADE AND THE STATE OF TEXAS GERALD H. GOLDSTEIN State Bar No. 08101000 ggandh@aol.com DONALD H. FLANARY, III State Bar No. 24045877 donflanary@hotmail.com Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley 310 S. St. Mary s Street 29th Floor, Tower Life Bldg. San Antonio, TX 78205-4605 210-226-1463 210-226-8367 (facsimile) PAUL M. SMITH MICHAEL B. DESANCTIS JESSICA RING AMUNSON Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20001 202-639-6000 J. GERALD HEBERT 191 Somervelle Street, # 405 Alexandria, VA 22304 703-628-4673 hebert@voterlaw.com JESSE GAINES P.O. Box 50093 Fort Worth, TX 76105 817-714-9988 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS QUESADA, MUNOZ, VEASEY, HAMILTON, KING and JENKINS LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR. Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. & Associates 1325 Riverview Towers 111 Soledad San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260 20
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 21 of 22 210-225-3300 irvlaw@sbcglobal.net GEORGE JOSEPH KORBEL Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, Inc. 1111 North Main San Antonio, TX 78213 210-212-3600 korbellaw@hotmail.com ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS ROLANDO L. RIOS Law Offices of Rolando L. Rios 115 E Travis Street Suite 1645 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-2102 rrios@rolandorioslaw.com ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF HENRY CUELLAR GARY L. BLEDSOE State Bar No.: 02476500 Law office of Gary L. Bledsoe 316 W. 12th Street, Ste. 307 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-9992 512-322-0840 (facsimile) garybledsoe@sbcglobal.net ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR- PLAINTIFFS TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, ALEXANDER GREEN, HOWARD JEFFERSON, BILL LAWSON, and JUANITA WALLACE JOHN TANNER 3743 Military Road NW Washington, DC 20015 (202) 503-7696 john.k.tanner@gmail.com ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS VICTOR L. GOODE 21
Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 644 Filed 02/13/12 Page 22 of 22 Asst. Gen. Counsel, NAACP 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Baltimore, MD 21215-5120 410-580-5120 410-358-9359 (facsimile) vgoode@naacpnet.org ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFF THE TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES ROBERT NOTZON State Bar No. 00797934 Law Office of Robert S. Notzon 1507 Nueces Street Austin, TX 78701 512-474-7563 512-474-9489 (facsimile) robert@notzonlaw.com ALLISON JEAN RIGGS ANITA SUE EARLS Southern Coalition for Social Justice 1415 West Highway 54, Ste. 101 Durham, NC 27707 919-323-3380 919-323-3942 (facsimile) anita@southerncoalition.org ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR-PLAINTIFFS TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, EARLS, LAWSON, WALLACE, and JEFFERSON /s/ Renea Hicks Renea Hicks 22