TEAM CODE: FC-16 IN THE HON BLE COURT OF SESSIONS JUDGE, BAMBI THANE S. C. NO. 123OF 2014 STATE OFBAMBI (PROSECUTION) VERSUS PANNA AND OTHERS (DEFENCE) MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION (STATE OF BAMBI) SURANA&SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION- 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS I TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS II INDEX OF AUTHORITIES IV STATUTES.IV BOOKS..IV DICTIONARIES.V CASES.V STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION VI STATEMENT OF FACTS VII STATEMENT OF CHARGES VIII SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IX ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 1-15 ISSUE 1: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 120B READ WITH 34 OF BPC i ii iii THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT AMONGST THE ACCUSED THAT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CORROBORATES THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED THAT THERE EXISTED COMMON INTENTION AS UNDER S. 34 OF BPC ISSUE 2: THAT MR PANNA BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 227OF BPC ISSUE 3: THAT MR PANNA, MR SABA, MR JAIMIL BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 501& 502 BPC THAT 4: THAT MR SABA AND MR JAIMIL BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 385 OF BPC P RAYER X
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS II LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 1. Paragraph 2. & & 3. AD Apex Decision 4. All Allahabad High Court 5. AIR All India Reporter 6. Anr. Another 7. A. P. Andhra Pradesh 8. Bom Bombay 9. Bom L. R. Bombay Law Reporter 10. b/w Between 11. Cal. Calcutta 12. Co. Company 13. Cri Criminal 14. CrLJ Criminal Law Journal 15. CrLR Criminal Law Reporter 16. DB Division Bench 17. Del. Delhi 18. Ed. Edition 19. Gau Gauhati 20. Guj Gujarat 21. Hon ble Honourable 22. HP Himachal Pradesh 23. IEA Indian Evidence Act, 1872 24. i.e. i.e. (that is) 25. IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860 26. J&K Jammu and Kashmir 27. JT Judgment Today 28. Ker Kerala
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS III 29. LR Law Reporter 30. Mad Madras 31. MP Madhya Pradesh 32. NOC Notes of Cases 33. Ori Orissa 34. Ors Others 35. P&H Punjab and Haryana High Court 36. p. Page 37. para Paragraph 38. PLJ Punjab Law Journal 39. Punj. Punjab 40. RCR Recent Criminal Reports 41. SC Supreme Court 42. SCC Supreme Court Cases 43. S. Section 44. Supp. Supplement 45. U.P. Uttar Pradesh 46. u/s under section 47. UOI Union of India 48. Vol. Volume 49. v. / vs. Versus 50. W.B. West Bengal
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES IV INDEX OF AUTHORITIES TABLE OF STATUTES: 1. Maharashtra Prison Manual, 1979 2. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) 3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860) 4. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872) 5. The Prisons Act, 1894 6. The Prisoners Act, 1900 TABLE OF BOOKS: 1. Civil & Criminal Practice Manual,Eastern Book Company, 1st Ed. 2008. 2. KELKAR R. V., Criminal Procedure,Pillai Eastern Book Company, 4th Ed. 2007 (Revised by Dr. K. N Chandrasekharan). 3. BASU N. D.,Indian Penal Code., (edited by A.N. Saha) 8th Ed.1998. 4. SIR JOHN WOODROFFE & SYED AMIR ALI, Law of Evidence, LexisNexis Butterworth s, 17th Ed. Vol. II, S V Joga Rao, 5. VIBHUTE K. I,P S A Pillai s Criminal Law,.,LexisNexis Butterworth s, 11 th Ed., 2012. 6. SOONAWALA S J.K, Supreme Court Criminal Digest(1950-2006) 4 th Ed. 2008, Volume 2, Wadhwa& Company Nagpur 7. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL,The Code of Criminal Procedure,,Wadhwa& Company Nagpur, 20th Ed. 2011 (Y V Chandrachud J. & V R Manohar J.). 8. GAUR K. D,The Indian Penal Code, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 4 th Ed., 2013 Reprint, 9. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL,The Indian Penal Code,LexisNexis Butterworth s Wadhwa & Co., Nagpur, 29th Ed. 2004,. 10. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL,the Indian Penal Code,Wadhwa& Company Nagpur, 30th Ed. 2008 (Y V Chandrachud J. & V R Manohar J.). 11. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL,the Law of Evidence,Wadhwa& Company Nagpur, 24th Ed. 2012 (Y V Chandrachud J. & V R Manohar J.).
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES V DICTIONARIES: 1. BLACKS LAW LEXICON, 7th Ed. (1999). 2. Stroud, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Ed. 3. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Vol. I. 4. Whartone's Law Lexicon, 14th Ed. TABLE OF CASES: 1. Abdul Kader v. State. AIR 1964 Bombay 133 5 2. Abdulvahah A. shaikh v. State of Gujarat (2007) 4 SCC 257...15 3. Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India &ors. 1993 AIR 1637 1,2,5 4. A.kGopalan AIR 1949 Mad 233...14 5. Alma v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1991 CrLJ 1791.6 6. Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana 1995 CriLJ 3559...14 7. Auuradha R. Kshirsagar v. State of Maharashtra 1991 Cri LJ 410..14 8. Barinder Kumar Ghose v. EmperorAIR 1925 PC 1..2 9. B.N Singh v. State of Gujarat 1990 Cr LJ 1601..6 10. B.N Srikanth v. State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC 672. 6 11. BhagwanSwarup v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC...7 12. Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa 1956 SC 469, (1956) Cr LJ 831 (SC) 2 13. ByomkeshBhattacharaya v. L N Datta 1978 CrLJ 848..6 14. Chandra Paul Singh v. State 1990 CrLJ 826 All 6 15. Chander Kala v. KamKishan (1985) 4 SCC 212..15
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 16. Dadu @ Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra (2000) INSC 511...9 17. Damodar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 4414 5 18. Dhansaiv. State of Orissa AIR 1969 Ori 105...6 19. EG Barsay v. State of Bombay (1962) 2 SCR 299..1 20. Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja (1869) 3 Beng LR (PC) 44, 45 6 21. GaribSingh v. State of Punjab 1972 Cr LJ 1286 5 22. GungaCunder Sen v. GourChunderBanikya (1888) 15 Cal 671,...14 23. Hajee Abdul Rehman v. GulamNabi (1964) 1 CrLJ 40 (J&K).14 24. Jainaram Singh v. Emperor AIR 1941 Pat 9, 41 CR LJ 814 11 25. Jogengra Kumar Sarkar v. Hem Chandra Roy (1964) 1 CrLJ 285 (Cal).14 26. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1787..8 27. K.Hashim V. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 1 SCC 237, (2005) Cr LJ 143 (SC)..5 28. Krishnan v. State of Kerala AIR 1997 SC 383...6 29. KR Purushothaman v. State of Kerala (2005) 12 SCC 631. AIR 2006 SC 35 2,5 30. LallanRai v. State of Bihar AIR 2003 SC 333...7 31. LennariSchussler&Anr v. Director of Enforcement &Anr (1970) AIR 549 1 32. M.C Verghese v T.J. Ponnan&Anr 1969 SCR (2) 692..11 33. Mepa Dana (1959) 62 Bom LR 269 (SC).6
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 34. Mohd Hussain Umar Kochra v. KS DalipSinghji AIR 1970 SC 45..2,4 35. Mohammad Yusuf Monin v. State of Maharashtra (1971) 1 SCR 119...1 36. Mohd Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002) 7 SCC 334...3 37. Nazir Khan &ors v. State of Delhi (2003) 8 SCC 461.. 4 38. Parameshwar v. Krishna Pillai (1986) 1 Mad CJCr 430...6 39. Periamalaisomi v. Poosariambalam 1969 Mad LW (Cri) 202 14 40. Puttulal v. Rex AIR 1949 All 88 6 41. Ramesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1985 SC 766.5 42. Ram Dev Kahar v. State of Bihar 2009 (1) JIC 740 (SC 8 43. R.K Dalmia&Anr v. The Delhi Administration (1963) 1 SCR 253..1 44. Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana (1987) 2 SCC 34.6 45. Rameshwar v. State of M.P 1993 CrLJ (2004) M.P 6 46. Sarafat Ali v. State of Assam 1993 CrLJ 1943 6 47. SardarSardul Singh Laveeshar v. State of Maharashtra (1964) 2 SCR 378.4 48. ShivanarayanLaxminarayan Joshi &ors v. State of Maharashtra &ors. (1980) 2 SCC....4 49. Shafiahmed (1925)31 Bom LR515. 6 50. State of Bihar v. Paramhans1986 Pat LJR 688.3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 51. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru AIR 2005 SC 3820 4 52. State of Himachal Pradesh v. KishanlalPardhan AIR 1987 SC 773.8 53. State of Tamil Nadu v. NaliniAIR 1999 SC 2640.2,3,4 54. State of U.P v. Iftikhar Khan AIR 1973 SC 863 6 55. State of U.P v. Prem Singh 1982 CrLJ 1982 All 6 56. State of Punjab v. Mann Singh AIR 1983 SC 172..6 57. Sunil fulchand Shah v.union of India 2000 SCC (Cri.)659...9 58. Sunilakhya v. M.H Jadwet AIR 1969 Cal 266...13 59. Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC 473..6 60. Tehal Singh v. State of Punjab 1978 CrLJ 1031.6 61. Tellu vstate 1988 CrLJ 1062 (Delhi).6 62. ValmikimiFaleiro v. M.Jadwet AIR 1968 Cal 266...11 63. V.C shukla v. state (delhiadmn) AIR 1980 CrLJ 965.2,4,5 64. VencilPushpraj v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1991 SC 536...6 65. WasidUllahAhari v. Emperor AIR 1935 All 743 11 66. Yashpal Mittal v. State of Punjab 1978 CrLJ 189....1,4 67. Yogendra v. State of Bihar 1984 Cr LJ 386( SC)...5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION VI STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The Prosecution has approached the Hon ble Court of Sessions under Section 26 read with schedule II of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in consonance with commitment order passed under section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 209 of Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 states: When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is bought before the magistrate and it appears to the magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall- Commit, after complying with the provisions of section 207 or section 208, as the case may be, the case to the court of session, and subject to the provisions of this code relating to bail, remand the accused to the custody until such commitment has been made. Send to the court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence Notify the public prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the court of session.
STATEMENT OF FACTS VII STATEMENT OF FACTS -I- In March 2013, Panna boy was convicted and was sentenced to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment under the Arms Act, 1959. Before he was convicted, he had signed for a movie Hit Factory which was almost complete and only a few scenes were left to be shot. After Panna boy got convicted under the Arms Act, 1959 the lead actress of the film Ms.Naika categorically refused to be a part of the film by returning the advance. -II- Panna boy was granted parole in December 2013 and in February 03, 2014 to look after his ailing wife who was admitted in Star- Hospital. On February 6, 2014 Mr.Jaimil complained of chest pain and got himself admitted in Star Hospital. In Star- Hospital a shoot for a project was going on. Ms.Poonam who had a striking resemblance to MsNaika was a part of that project. Panna boy was spotted with MsPoonam at the sets of the unrevealed project. On February 8 2014, Panna boy was seen with Ms.Poonam in Central mall where a set-up for a shoot was prepared. -III - On February 14, there were ads of releasing shortly the movie Hit- Factory. Ms.Naika on February 16, 2014 filed a suit in the high court of Bambi for the permanent injunction of the film. That evening she received two anonymous calls threatening her of dire consequences if she will not withdraw the suit against them. She filed a FIR in the Bambi central police station against Mr Panna boy, Mr Jaimil and Mr Saba.
STATEMENT OF CHARGES VIII STATEMENT OF CHARGES A. WHETHER MR. PANNA BOY IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 120 B READ WITH 34, 227, 501 & 502 OF BAMBI PENAL CODE? B. WHETHER MR. SABA IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 120 B READ WITH 34, 385, 501&502 OF BAMBI PENAL CODE? C. WHETHER MR. JAIMIL IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 120 B READ WITH 34, 385, 501 & 502 OF BAMBI PENAL CODE?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IX SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS The counsel for prosecution humbly pleads: A. MR. PANNA BOY,MR. SABA AND MR. JAIMIL ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 120 B READ WITH 34 OF BPC. The offence of criminal conspiracy is complete as soon as an agreement is made to do an illegal act. As per the facts of case Panna boy along with Mr.Jaimil and Mr. Saba illegally went on to shoot for the completion of the film Hit- Factory. In pursuance of their plan Panna boy applied for parole on false ground and was even granted parole on February 3, 2014 owing to his political connections and illustrious family background. The trio made best use of this opportunity and went on to complete the remaining part of the movie as a result the movie was completed by February 14, 2014. Thereby the accused be held liable under section 120B read with 34 of BPC. B. MR. PANNA BOY IS LAIBLE UNDER SECTION 227 OF BPC. Mr. Panna boy applied for parole on fictitious ground citing the ailing condition of his wife. Once he was granted parole he went on to shoot for his pending film Hit- Factory thus violating the conditions of his parole and incurring liability under section 227 BPC. C. MR. PANNA BOY, MR.SABA AND MR. JAIMIL ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 501 & 502 OF BPC As per the facts of the case after the conviction of the accused under the Arms Act, 1959 MsNaika had categorically refused to be a part of the film as she didn t want to tarnish her reputation by being associated with an Anti- national. Despite her repeated refusals to work in the film,the accused than used a look alike of MsNaika to complete the film and thus intentionally published and circulated the posters of the
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS film Hit- Factory starring Ms.Naika and Mr.Panna boy and thus incurring liability under section501 and 502 of BPC. D. MR. SABA AND MR. JAIMIL ARE LIABLE U/S 385 OF BPC In the pertinent case Mr Saba and MrJaimil made threatening calls to MsNaika intentionally inducing her to withdraw the suit which she had filed for the permanent injunction of the film Hit Factory in the high court of Bambi. Thus the accused be held liable under section 385 of BPC
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 1 of 15 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 1. Mr. PANNA BOY, Mr. SABA AND Mr. JAIMIL ARE LIABLE under section 120B read with 34 OF BPC The counsel on behalf of the prosecution pleads before the Hon ble court that Mr. Panna Boy, Mr. Saba and Mr. Jaimil are liable u/s 120 B r/w 34 of BPC as they have conspired for the completion of the film Hit-Factory while MrPanna boy was out on parole. A. An agreement among MrPanna, MrJaimil and Mr Saba As per Section 120A when two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement; 1 (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal object which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate objects. 2 A crime is complete as soon as the agreement 3 is made, but it does not end with the making of the agreement. It will continue so long as there are two or more parties to it intending to carry into effect the design. 4 1 EG Barsay v. State of Bombay (1962) 2 SCR 299, Yashpal v State of Punjab (1977) SCR 2433, Mohammad Yusuf Monin v. state of Maharashtra (1971) 1 SCR 119, R.K Dalmia&Anr v. The Delhi Administration (1963) 1 SCR 253, LennariSchussler&Anr v. Director of Enforcement &Anr (1970) SCR (2) 760, 1970 AIR 549 2 Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India &Ors AIR 1993 SC 1637, (1993) Cr LJ 2516(SC) 3 Hussain umarv.dalipsinghji AIR 1970 SC 45: 1970 SC CrR 76 4 Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1637, (1993) Cr LJ 2516(SC)
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 2 of 15 In Barinder Kumar Ghose v. Emperor 5, Jetkins CJ observed though to establish the charge of conspiracy there must be an agreement, there need not be proof of direct meeting or combination, nor need the parties be brought into each other s presence; the agreement may be inferred from circumstances raising a presumption of a common concerted plan to carry out the unlawful design. 6 In the pertinent case there was an agreement 7 among Mr. Panna, Mr. Saba and Mr. Jaimil to complete the remaining part of the film Hit-Factory at any cost. They obtained parole for Panna using influence (illegal means) and used a look alike actress in place of Ms. Naika to complete the film discreetly when MsNaika refused to be associated with the convict. As per section 48-A ofthe Prisons Act 1894 if any prisoner fails without any sufficient cause to observe any of the conditions on which his sentence was suspended or remitted or furlough or release on parole was granted to him, he shall be deemed to have committed a prison offence. In the present case Mr Panna boy was granted parole for the purpose of looking after his wife but it is humbly submitted before the Hon ble court that he used the parole grant to complete his film illegally which is an offence u/s 48-A of prisons act 1894. Thus his act is an illegal 5 AIR 1925 PC 1 6 State v. NaliniAIR 1999 SC 2640: (1999) 5 SCC 253: 1999 SCC(Cri) 691:1999 CrLJ 3124: 1999 (2) Crimes 59, V.C Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1980 SC 1382:(1980) 2 SSC 665: 1980 SCC(Cri) 561:1980 CrLJ 965 7 The agreement is the gist of the offence Mohd Hussain Umar Kochra v. KS DalipSinghji AIR 1970 SC 45, KR Purushothaman v. state of kerala (2005) 12 SCC 631. AIR 2006 SC 35, Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa 1956 SC 469, (1956) Cr LJ 831 (SC)
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 3 of 15 act under section 43 of BPC 8. Therefore it is submitted that MrPanna boy had an agreement with other accused to accomplish an illegal act. Thus making him liable u/s 120B of BPC. B. Circumstantial evidence to corroborate the guilt of the accused As per section 11(2) of Indian evidence act Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant, if by themselves or in connection with other facts highly probable or improbable In State of Bihar vs Paramhans 9 it was observed that Conspiracy can be proved by circumstances and other materials 10, the evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. In State v. Nalini 11 it was observed that Mostly conspiracies are proved by circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair, usually both the existence of a conspiracy and its object have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused In the present case MrPanna, was spotted with Mr Saba and MrJaimil on the alleged sites. In pursuance of their agreement MrJaimil got admitted in the same hospital in which Panna boy s wife was admitted complying the same dates when Panna boy was on parole.the trio was also spotted along with Ms.Poonam at the Central Mall where the shoot was discreetly arranged. As per the submissions made by the police officer the dress which Panna boy wore was the same as was seen in the previous scenes of the movie, which has further been 8 Section 43 of BPC the word illegal is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be legally bound to do whatever is illegal in him to omit 9 1986 Pat LJR 688 10 Mohd Khalid v. State of W.B (2002) 7 SCC 334; 2002 SCC (Cri) 1734; JT 2002(6) SC 486: 2002 4 Crimes 132 11 AIR 1999 SC 2640: (1999) 5 SCC 253: 1999 SCC (Cri) 691
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 4 of 15 corroborated by the camera man, Ganesh. The release of the advertisement in prominent newspapers and magazines confirms the same. Further the very fact that the film Hit factory was completed in a very short duration while MrPanna was on parole and was allegedly spotted shooting for the film in the hospital and at the central mall corroborates the guilt of the accused. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru 12 the apex court opined that as conspiracy is mostly proved by circumstantial evidence 13, usually both the existence of conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct 14 of the accused. 15 In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab 16 it was observed that it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each other and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co- participators in the main object of conspiracy and in which each one must be interested. 17 In Abdul Kader v. State 18 it was laid down that conspiracy is a continuing offence and continues to subsist and committed wherever one of the conspirators does an act or series of 12 AIR 2005 SC 3820 13 State of tamilnadu v. Nalini ( Rajiv Gandhi assassination case) AIR 1999 SC 2640, (1999) Cr LJ 3124 (SC) 14 Shivanarayanlaxminarayanjoshi&ors v. state of Maharashtra (1980) 2 SCC 465, SardarSardul Singh Caveesharvs. State of Maharashtra (1964) 2 SCR 378 15 V.C Shukla v. State 1980 Cr LJ 965 16 1978 Cr LJ 189, Nazir Khan &ors v. State of delhi (2003) 8 SCC 461, AIR 2003 SC 4427, (2003) Cr LJ 5021 (SC) 17 Mohd Hussain Umar Kochra v. KS DalipSinghji AIR 1970 SC 45 18 AIR 1964 Bom. 133, Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1637, (1993) Cr LJ 2516(SC), K.R Purushothaman v. state of Kerala (2005) 12 SCC 631, AIR 2006 SC 35
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 5 of 15 facts... And during its subsistence, whenever anyone of the conspirators does an act or series of an act, he will be guilty. 19 In V.C Shukla v. State 20 it was observed that a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. C. THAT THERE EXISTED A COMMON INTENTION IN THE PERTINENT CASE AS UNDER S. 34 It is submitted that S. 34 21 is a rule of evidence 22 that although does not create a substantive offence as against the accused, but provides the opportunity to bind persons committing a criminal act with the prior meeting of minds 23. The said provision emphasizes that if two or more persons intentionally do an act (the act must be a criminal act 24 ) jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually 25 because if the purpose is common so must be the responsibility 26. In other 19 Damodar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 4414, K.Hashim V. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 1 SCC 237, (2005) Cr LJ 143 (SC) 20 1980 CrLJ 965 21 S. 34 Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention: When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone 22 Ratanlal&Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, Twenty-ninth Edition, Pg. 114 23 Ramesh Chand v. State of UP AIR 1985 SC 766; Garib Singh v. State of Punjab 1972 Cr LJ 1286 (SC); Yogendra v. State of Bihar 1984 Cr LJ 386 (SC) 24 PuttuLal v. Rex AIR 1949 All 88; Suresh v. State of UP 2001 Cr LJ 1462 (SC) 25 B.N Srikanth v. State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC 672; Parameshwar v. Krishna Pillai (1966) 1 Mad LJ Cr 430; Dhansai v. State of Orissa AIR 1969 Ori 105; ByomkeshBhattacharaya v. L.N Datta 1978 Cr LJ 848
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 6 of 15 words, it may be submitted that in case it is difficult to distinguish between the acts of the individual members of the party the prosecution may rely upon the principle of joint liability laid down in the above-mentioned section 27. In the present case, the accused with a common intention to execute a common object acted in furtherance of their common intention and hence, each and every one became responsible for the acts of each and every other 28. For conviction under the same it is not necessary to show that each committed an overt act for the achievement of their object 29. The section does not envisage the separate act by all the accused persons for becoming responsible for the ultimate criminal act, as if such an interpretation is accepted, the purpose of Section 34 of BPC shall be rendered infructuous 30. The presence of persons who in a way facilitate the execution of the common design is itself tantamount to actual participation in the criminal act. 26 Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja (1869) 3 Beng LR (PC) 44, 45 27 Mepa Dana (1959) 62 Bom LR 269 (SC) 28 Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja (1869) 3 Beng LR (PC) 44, 45; Shafi Ahmed (1925) 31 Bom LR 515 29 Krishnan v. State of KeralaAIR 1997 SC 383; State of U.P v. Iftikhar Khan 1973 Cr LJ 636: AIR 1973 SC 863; Chandra Paul Singh v. State 1990 Cr LJ 826 All; Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab 1983 Cr LJ 1111: AIR 1983 SC 473: (1983) 3 SCC 565; State of Punjab v. Mann Singh, 1983 Cr LJ 229: AIR 1983 SC 172; VencilPushpraj v. State of RajasthanAIR 1991 SC 536: 1991 Cr LJ 452; B.N Singh v. State of Gujarat 1990 Cr LJ 1601; Rameshwar v. State of M.P 1993 Cr LJ 2004 (MP); Sarafat Ali v. State of Assam 1993 Cr LJ 1943; Tehal Singh v. State of Punjab 1979 Cr LJ 1031; Tellu v. State 1988 Cr LJ 1062 (Delhi); State of UP v. PremSingh 1982 Cr LJ 1982(All); Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana (1987) 2 SCC 34: AIR 1987 SC 690: 1987 Cr LJ 535; Alma v. State of M.P 1991 Cr LJ 1791 30 LallanRai v State of BiharAIR 2003 SC 333
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 7 of 15 D. THAT THE INFERENCE OF COMMON INTENTION IS WELL MADE OUT As per section 10 of IEA, Anything said, done or written, by a conspirator in reference to the common intention 31 of all the conspirators is a relevant fact. In BhagwanSwarup v State of Maharashtra 32 the expression in reference to their common intention in section 10 of IEA is very comprehensive with the result that anything said, or done or written by a co- conspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be evidence against the other.. In the present case the whole plan was executed in pursuance of common intention of all. As per the facts of the case MrPanna, Mr Saba and Mrjaimil were spotted together at central mall when the shooting of the film was in progress. Further when MrPanna was regularly visiting star hospital in the name of looking after his wife MrJaimil who is the Director of the film also found a way for his constant stay in the hospital by getting himself admitted faking a chest pain in star hospital in furtherance of their well sorted plan to shot the remaining part of the film. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab 33 it was observed that going to the scene of offence proves common intention under section 34 of BPC. 31 Black s Law Dictionary (8 th Ed. 2004) The willingness to bring about something planned or foreseen; the state of being set to do something. John Salmond, Jurisprudence (380-81) (Glanville L. Williams ed., (10th ed. 1947) "Intention is the purpose or design with which an act is done. It is the foreknowledge of the act, coupled with the desire of it, such foreknowledge and desire being the cause of the act, inasmuch as they fulfill themselves through the operation of the will. An act is intentional if, and in so far as, it exists in idea before it exists in fact, the idea realizing itself in the fact because of the desire by which it is accompanied. 32 AIR 1965 SC 33 AIR 1961 SC 1787: 1961(2) CrLJ 853
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 8 of 15 In State of Himachal Pradesh v. KishanlalPardhan 34 Every conspirator is liable for all the acts of the conspirator is liable for all the acts of the co- conspirators, if they are towards attaining the goals of the conspiracy, even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of the offences. In Ram Dev Kahar v. State of Bihar 35, it was observed that prosecution is not required to adduce direct evidence as regards formation of common intention. It must be inferred from surrounding circumstances. When a common intention is proved each of the persons showing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. As per Section 8 of IEA 36 all this preparation of the three accused with a motive to complete the remaining part of the film Hit- Factory serves a potent evidence against the trio. Under the principle contained in section 10 of Indian evidence act 37, once a conspiracy to commit an illegal act is proved, act of one conspirator becomes the act of another. 38 Thus making them all liable u/s 120B r/w 34 BPC for this act of conspiracy which was in furtherance of the common intention. 34 AIR 1987 SC 773, (1987) Cr LJ 709 (SC) 35 2009 (1) JIC 740 (SC) 36 As per section 8 of IEA, any facts is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. 37 As per section 10 of IEA, Anything said, done or written, by a conspirator in reference to the common intention of all the conspirators is a relevant fact. 38 ShivnarayanLaxminarayanjoshi v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1980 SC 439: 1980 SCC (Cri) 493: 1980 CrLR(SC)1: 1980 CAR 78
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 9 of 15 2. MR. PANNA BOY IS LAIBLE U/S 227 BPC Section 227 reads whoever, having accepted any conditional remission of punishment, knowingly violates any condition on which such remission was granted, shall be punished with the punishment to which he was originally sentenced, if he has already suffered no part of that punishment, and if he has suffered any part of that punishment, then with so much of that punishment as he has not already suffered" The prosecution pleads before the hon ble court that, in a number of cases 39 it has been determined that furlough for the purpose of section 227 of BPC amounts to remission 40 as stated in Rule 16 41 of Maharashtra prison Manual, 1979. When parole is granted to a prisoner, it runs on the same footing as that of furlough. The liabilities of the parties are same. If a person who violates the conditions of furlough u/s 227 then in the interest of justice the violation of parole terms shall also be covered under this part and if it is not then it will be a violation of Article 14 42 of Indian constitution. 39 Sunil fulchand Shahv.Union of India,2000 SCC (Cri.) 659:Dadu @ Tulsidas v. State of Maharashtra (2000) INSC 511 40 As per Rule 20 of the Maharashtra Prison Manual the period spent on parole shall not count as remission of the sentence. 41 Furlough to be counted as remission of sentence 42 Article 14 of the constitution of India the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of laws within the territory of India
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 10 of 15 As per Rule 22, (Note) of Maharashtra Prison Manual, 1979 "Prisoners who apply for parole on FALSE grounds or who, abuse the concession or commit breach of any of the conditions of parole are liable to be punished u/s 51-B of the Prisons Act, 1894..." Thus Counsel on the behalf of prosecution humbly pleads before the hon ble court that Mr. Panna had sought parole on the fictitious ground 43 of attending to his "ailing wife" whose ailment was never disclosed. Also, as per the submissions made by the police officer Mr. Panna's wife's ailment was not as serious that requires his personal constant attention;he was further spotted resuming the shoot for his upcoming movie "Hit-Factory" in violation of his parole condition which prescribed him to attend to his wife's ill-condition. He was even seen in the Central Mall shooting in secret for his film. Security CD, confirms his presence for the same. Despite being a convict, he was seen spending more time outside the jail than inside it by getting repeated paroles which can only be possible by his strong political connections. That clearly establishes the abuse of judicial process. Thus it can be inferred from the facts of the case that he filed for parole with a motive to complete his pending movie Hit-Factory and actually went to shot for the movie violating the conditions of his parole thus incurring liability u/s 227 BPC. 43 Rule 19 of Maharashtra prison manual explicitly provides that parole may only be granted in case of serious illness, or death of any member of the prisoner s family or of his nearest relatives or for any other sufficient cause.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 11 of 15 3. Mr. PANNA BOY, Mr. SABA AND Mr. JAIMIL ARE LIABLE U/S 501 & 502 OF BPC Section 501 reads whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term whichmay extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Section 502 reads whoever sells or offers for sale any printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter, knowing that it contains such matter, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Publication is one of the most essential ingredients in defamation. As per section 499 of BPC whoever makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, knowing 44 or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person. In Valmikimi Faleiro v. HM Jadwet 45 it was observed that the essence of the offence of defamation is the harm to the reputation of a person. The commission of offence of defamation or publishing any imputations concerning any person must be intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will cause harm. 46 In M.C. Verghese v T.J. Ponnan&Anr 47, the honorable Supreme Court held that, to constitute the offence of defamation there must be making or publication of an imputation 44 Black s Law Dictionary (8 th Ed. 2004) An awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact. John Salmond, Jurisprudence 380-81 45 AIR 1968 Cal 266, WasidUllahAhari v. Emperor AIR 1935 All 743 46 Jainaram Singh v. Emperor AIR 1941 Pat 9, 41 CR LJ 814 47 1970 AIR 1876, 1969 SCR (2) 692;
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 12 of 15 concerning any person and the making or publication must be with the intent to harm, or knowing 48 or having reason to believe 49 that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person. The subject matter of right of the person protected is undoubtedly reputation. Reputation 50 is a composite hearsay and which is the opinion of the community against a person. The prosecution pleads that Ms Naika has an impeccable name in the industry. She belongs to a family of freedom fighters and she has also been the celebrity- representative of Barata to the CTITF 51 of the United Nations. Prosecution counsel brings forth before the Hon ble Court that despite the fact that Ms Naika had completely severed all ties with the film Hit-Factory,had categorically refused to be a part of the film as she didn t wish to tarnish her reputation and she made it very clear to the accused; even then the accused went on to complete the film using a look alike actress of Ms Naika in order to imply that Ms Naika is the lead actress of the film. In pursuance of their illegal act they printed the posters of the movie Hit- Factory starring Ms Naika with the anti-national convict Mr Panna Boy. 47 Blacks Law Dictionary (8 th Ed. 2004) An awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact. John Salmond, Jurisprudence 380-81 48 Blacks Law Dictionary (8 th Ed. 2004) An awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact. John Salmond, Jurisprudence 380-81 49 According to S. 26 of BPC, a person is said to have reason to believe a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise 50 Blacks Law Dictionary (8 th Ed. 2004) The esteem in which a person is held by others 51 Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 13 of 15 In Sunilakhya v. HM Jadwet 52 it was observed that intention to cause harm to the reputation of a person is sine qua non of the offence of defamation The prosecution pleads that as a matter of common sense it cannot be denied that the accused had the knowledge of the fact that the association of the celebrity- representative of Barata to the CTITF of the United Nation with an anti- national would defame her in the eyes of people of Barata. It is further submitted that despite being aware of all the circumstances and the damage it would cause to Ms Naika the accused printed, published and sold the posters of the film to the local newspapers and magazines depicting Ms Naika being intimate with Mr Panna boy. Thus making Mr Panna Boy, Mr Saba and Mr Jaimil liable u/s 501 and 502 of BPC. 4. MR. SABA AND MR JAIMIL ARE LIABLE U/S 385 OF BPC Section 385 reads whoever, in order to the committing of extortion, puts any person in fear, or attempts to put any person in fear, of any injury, shall be published with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or both. The essential ingredients of the offence of extortion 53 are: (1) intentionally putting a person in fear of injury; the purpose of which is to dishonestly induce the person put in fear, and (2) to deliver property or valuable security. As per section 44 of BPC, the word injury denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property. 52 AIR 1968 Cal 266; (1968) CrLJ 736 (Cal); 53 Section 383 of BPC whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person and also thereby induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into valuable security, commits extortion
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 14 of 15 A. THE INTENTION - ESSENTIAL TO THE OFFENCE WAS PRESENT Intention 54 must be to cause alarm to the victim 55. The threat must be intended to cause alarm; the degree of which may vary in different cases, but the essential matter is that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates 56. Putting a person in fear is the first step to extortion, it is an attempt, so to say, to excite fear in the victim; and there may not be any delivery of property. 57 In the pertinent case Mr Jaimil and Mr Saba called Ms Naika threatening her of dire consequences to her and her family, if she will not withdraw the case. The prosecution pleads before the hon ble court that the very statement better cooperate or face the consequences and else results will be tragic indicates of the accused intended to cause alarm to the Ms Naika with an ill-intention of putting her in fear of injury in order to induce her to satisfy their demands. In Abdulvahah A. Shaikh v. State of Gujarat 58 it was observed that the fear of injury contemplated under this section need not necessarily be bodily harm or hurt. It will include injuries to mind, reputation or property of the person. 54 A.K GopalanAIR 1949 Mad 233: (1948) 2 Mad LJ 383 55 GungaChunder Sen v. GourChunderBanikya (1888) 15Cal 671; Govind (1900) 2BomLR 55; Jogendra Kumar Sarkar v. Hem Chandra Roy (1964) 1 Cr LJ 255 (Cal); Hajee Abdul Rehman v. GulamNabi (1964) 1 Cr LJ 40 (J&K) 56 Amulya Kumar Behera v. NabaghanaBehera 1995 CriLJ 3559; Hajee Abdul Rahman v. GulamNabi, AIR 1964 J & K 4: 1964 (1) Cri LJ 40 in Auuradha R. Kshirsagar v. State of Maharashtra 1991 CriLJ 410 at 416;Periamalaisami v. Poosariambalam, 1969 Mad LW (Cri) 202; Jogendra Kumar v. Hem Chandra, 1964 (1) Cri LJ 255 (Tripura J.C.) 57 Soonawala s J.K, Supreme Court Criminal Digest(1950-2006) Fourth edition 2007, Volume 2, Wadhwa Nagpur 58 (2007) 4 SCC 257, (2007) Cri LJ 3529
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 15 of 15 As per section 30 the words valuable security denote a document which is, or purports to be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended or transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or where by any person, acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right. The prosecution pleads that the suit which Ms Naika has filed before the Hon ble High Court for the permanent injunction of the film Hit- Factory imbibes a right in her and thus falls within the scope of section 30 of BPC. In Chander Kala v. Ram Kishan 59 it was observed that Blackmailing has come to be known as a crime wherein a person with a view to gain for himself or with an intent to cause loss to another, making an unwarranted demand for money or other benefit with menaces. The nature of the act or omission demanded is immaterial. It is a form of extortion. It is thereby submitted before the hon ble court that within the meaning of section 383 of BPC the accused have induced the accused to wave away her right. Therefore the prosecution humbly pleads that the act of the accused squarely falls under section 383 IPC and attracts liability u/s 385 BPC. 59 (1985) 4 SCC 212 at pp.218,219; 1985 SCC (Cri) 491
PRAYER X PRAYER In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, thecounsel for the prosecution humbly prays before this Hon ble Court to kindly adjudge and declare: THAT PANNA BOY, JAIMIL AND SABA STAND CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 120 B, READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE BAMBI PENAL CODE, 1860 THAT PANNA BOY, JAIMIL AND SABA STAND CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 501 AND 502 OF THE BAMBI PENAL CODE, 1860. THAT PANNA BOY STAND CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 227 OF THE THE BAMBI PENAL CODE, 1860. THAT JAIMIL AND SABA STAND CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 385 OFTHE BAMBI PENAL CODE, 1860. And pass any other appropriate order as the court may deem fit And for this act of Kindness, the Prosecution as in duty bound, shall forever pray. Respectfully Submitted. Sd/- (COUNSEL FOR THE PROSECUTION)