Non-State Actors & Non-Military Security guest lecture An Vranckx, University of Ghent - Belgium Conflict Research Group & Third World Studies + United Nations University - CRIS Programme Typology of Non State Actors (NSA) -> Focus on for-profit illegal NSA of particularly violent extraction Delineate the type s habitat, beyond military security crises Case descriptions What to do about these? -> Ideas for discussion later on Analytic proposal: typology Delineate the State vs organized groups of private individuals, which indulge in activities that are not initiated by a State not (entirely) financed by a State not (entirely) regulated by a State These NSA come in different types, which we can categorize with respect to what motivates the NSA s activities? for profit / non-profit whether means employed in its activities are in line with the law? legal / illegal -> Criteria construct an analytical grid LEGAL MEANS NON-PROFIT M O T I V E S FOR PROFIT ILLEGAL 1
-> Means/motives grid Classifying means: where to draw that line? NON PROFIT NON PROFIT LEGAL ILLEGAL NON PROFIT NON PROFIT LEGAL ILLEGAL LEGAL ILLEGAL FOR PROFIT FOR PROFIT LEGAL ILLEGAL FOR PROFIT FOR PROFIT According to which legal system? Use the grid or map to Render explicit our expectations about specific NSA types +/- profit legality of the means employed to meet that motive Compare a type s expected grid-positions with empirical findings on Real World concrete representatives of such NSA type Plot the movement on the grid that a particular Real World representative of an NSA type is seen to make over time Conceive of NSA that extend over more than one quadrant corner on the grid Today s focus NSA that move towards the illicit for profit NON PROFIT LEGAL PMCs LEGAL FOR PROFIT NON PROFIT ILLEGAL ILLEGAL FOR PROFIT 2
Not all illegal NSA are violent Examples of un-violent Real World NSA defined (locally) as illegal Falung Gong meditation groups are illegal by Chinese Law Discrete white collar fraud execs don t usually do wet jobs <-> Today s contribution does focus on violent types of illegal NSA Organized crime syndicates Revolutionary acronym groups ETA, IRA, FARC, M-19, EZLN, KLA Sendero Luminoso,... Death squads @ UGLA: excerpt from chapter by Bruce Campbell & Arthur Brenner, Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability Where to find that type nowadays? Clue from Mary Kaldor Balkan wars-informed definition of the Global Era s new form of organized violence (more @ UGLA) defined as a combination of old war (armed combat, bullets & bombs ) massive violations of human rights (> IHR violations) organized crime Combined -> high morbidity figures = Post Westphalian State context, where armed conflicts are waged for more than political motives, by more than (agents of) the State State armies thrive on State funds <-> NSA in armed combat live off...? E.g. Kosovo Liberation Army financed its part in Bosnian War from drug trafficking Visualization of KLA in armed conflict KLA post-conflict trajectory NON PROFIT LEGAL NON PROFIT ILLEGAL KLA became a political party, that legalizing trajectory is not necessarily being taken by each individual ex-kla combatant... NON PROFIT LEGAL NON PROFIT ILLEGAL LEGAL FOR PROFIT ILLEGAL FOR PROFIT LEGAL FOR PROFIT ILLEGAL FOR PROFIT 3
What indicator(s) for new form of violence? (Old) armed conflict defined as any situation that corresponds to > 1000 battle deaths / 1 year / location = circular reasoning (you have to know it is a battle then count), that disregards size of a country s population in absolute terms (this way, we d have missed the KOSOVO War and the KLA!) -> Propose a simple alternative morbidity indicator # intentional violent deaths / year / location / 100 000 inhabitants (quits circularity and puts figures in proportion to population size) -> Kosovar New War had around 67 / 100 000 (male) casualties -> +/- 35 / 100 000 casualties, men and women taken together, is a Kosovo New War level of intentional homicides Calibrating indicator & evolutions The latest data on country average murder indicators give reasons to put the global murder indicator at 7,6 / 100 000 people Iceland +/- 1 / 100 000, so 4 Icelanders get killed each year Where were > 35 / 100000 intentional killings recorded in past years? Is that indicator for the Global Era s new form of organized violence pointing upwards or down? -> Comparison of country specific data on murder rates, over the 2002-2008/2009 interval Which countries became relatively safer, which less? How bad is it, really? Regional patterns? # people killed per 100000 inhabitants in 2002, in # people killed per 100000 inhabitants in 2008 (compared to 2002 murder rates) + 2006 Kosovo New War level 4
Observations No real interstate military war zones in these homicide graphs New War-like situations in Sierra Leone, Angola, Somalia and Liberia show for 2002, when Colombia was the far less safe country Since then, countries taken to be involved in some kind of war (including Colombia, Iraq and Russia) have become relatively safer Intentional murder on a sharp rise elsewhere in Latin America, moving far into Kosovo New War level (and not in the poorest countries of that region!) 12 of the world s 15 most insecure countries in that region Figures calculated per city rather than country-wide indicator, show very high homicide peaks in some Latin American towns, such as in Mexico (as a country, is only 25th in this ranking) Juarez = the world s murder capital since 2007 Observations and assumptions Apart from Russia, violent hotspots concentrate in Global South Short blibs on the homicide radar in Iraq and African Wars <-> Chronic violence epidemics in Latin America (+ South Africa) peak high(er) as compared to normal armed conflict blibs chronic cases include top holiday destinations (e.g. Jamaica, Belize, Mexico, Brazil, Trinidad and the Dominican Republic) Causes of such homicidal violence in Latin America? Agents of the State are agents of violence? Agents of the State unable to enforce monopoly on violence, leaving the door open for all sorts of violent NSA? If so, where, since when and how comes? Violent State agent hypothesis Until mid 1980s, military dictatorships ruled in most Latin American States, enforced the State monopoly on violence rather convincingly: State wolf stopped others from biting More than convincing in e.g. Chile during the early Pinochet years (1973-1975), disappeared +/- 3000 political opponents Countries infamous for State terror in the 70s, are still the least violent of Latin America today (Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia) Meanwhile, unelected military dictators disappeared from the area (- Cuba, relatively unviolent, +/- Venezuela: elected) Violence began to increase very sharply in 1990s, AFTER electoral democracy systems were restored in almost all States in region More hypotheses on Latin American violence Interstate Wars? Not in Latin America since the 1930s, a fac which allowed these States to scale down to very modest defense spending Internal Wars ( civil war ) Traces (cold now) in some of the most violent spots: Central American civil wars, concluded with Acuerdos de Paz in 1992 (El Salvador), 1996 (Guatemala) Colombia? Government doesn t recognize armed conflict violence peaked around 2002 (country-wide) in 2008 ranking among the least violent in the area -> Overly repressive State agents involved at best nowadays. So who or what causes the current Latin American carnage? 5
Organized violence by NSA? Would not explain all in the intentional homicide peaks: Unorganized spouses killed > 5000 Guatemalan women in the 2000-2009 era, but these are exception, as in all other areas male casualties are +/- 10 to 1 killed woman NSA-induced organized violence hypothesis is worth probing for the wider area nevertheless -> Have a closer look at the violent NSA in current & former most violent countries in the region Colombia Central America 2 most populous violent countries, that had no (recent) war Mexico & Brazil What to look for in each of these cases? Determine nature of the violence on that ground Including history of violence (if there is one in view) Identify local violent NSA(s) Typology Tease out the funding issue Conflict financing ( where do these NSA live of?) -> Plot their dynamics on the NSA quadrant model (+/- profit) Indicate how (non-)state entities are responding to these NSA Colombia Low intensity guerrilla warfare since the 1960s From the 1980s, illicit narcotics production shifted to Colombia Colombia became main source of cocaine consumed in USA Colombian cocaine cartels declared war on the Colombian State that sought to prevent drug production and export and sought to extradite Colombian cartel bosses to the USA jails. As it serve their interests, the Colombian cocaine cartels bought protection against the State in concluding deals with the old guerrilla groups and private militia who fought the guerrilla Fighting mainly in rural areas, killing mainly male farmers and sending > 3 million Colombians on the run (IDPs) Current Colombian violence Country-wide homicide average > homicide rates in largest cities (remarkably: Bogotá 18/100000, while the legendary homicidal city of Medellín got at 26/100000 in 2006, is up again now) -> Rural areas & peripheral cities are far more violent than the large cities and push up the country-wide homicide indicator, indicates: Territory of Colombia is still larger than the State Colombia absence of State agents to stop private justice in periphery Lethal fighting is mainly over arable land Lethal fight to control narcotics exporting routes (border and coastal towns) Who are the victimizers? 6
Colombian victimizers State From 2002 onwards, Colombian army and policy began to crack down on guerrilla and militia, even if until recently dark elements in the Armed Forces caused +/- 1000 civilian deaths ( falsos positivos ), which is NOT State policy Guerrilla groups Several revolutionary acronym groups (FARC, ELN, M-19,...) were offered possibility to hold peace talks since 1980s, even if some combatants demobilized, the groups continue in arms Anti-guerrilla private militia ( self defense groups, known as AUC) +/- 31000 combatants the groups as such ) demobilized from 2003 onwards, penal benefits promised (NOT full amnesty) (other) non-political organized crime, on the rise again from 2007 Details on the Colombian guerrilla type These guerrillas root in civil war (1948-1953) that uprooted farmers -> pushed them into uncolonized land beyond state control, where some create their own farmers armies & independent republics Colombian State (+ US urge) to crack down on these groups in 1960s inspired the survivors to build real guerrilla armies -> Array of revolutionary acronym groups (rather than 1 big one) Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 1962 inspired by CubA Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 1964 = soviet-style marxism Ejercito de Liberación del Pueblo (EPL), 1964, ~ Mao Second generation guerrilla group created in 1980s (M-19, etc) WHAT WERE THE AMBITIONS OF THESE COLOMBIAN NSA? HOW WERE THEIR ACTIONS FINANCED? 7
hawks stayed in arms The groups hawks remain in arms, refuse to participate in demobilization 8
- Mexico - Central America - Brazil 9
Mexican army deployed against cartels Colombian illicit drugs increasingly trafficked over land, consequence of progress in enforcing airspace and seas Old traffic routes Areas of influence of the different Mexican drug trafficking cartels, (situation until end of 2006) 2007-2010 Calderon Administration crack down on cartels, zero tolerance Record seizures & cartel kingpins arrested (extradited to US) Violence escalates from 2007 onwards -> 5900 cartel-style killings in 2008 and more still in 2009 (displays in macabre theatre of death ). These very high number of intentional killings is explained by: Second-in-command impose violence to become new boss Trafficking turfs redefined through inter-cartel violence -> hostile take-overs, new alliances & competitors Cartels target police, soldiers and magistrates Indiscriminate violence used as tool to create fear 16 youngsters arbitrarily shot at disco in Juarez January 2009 fragmentation grenade into crowd in Morelia in 2007 10
Mexican NSA incursion in Guatemala Mexican enforcement successes create a violent balloon effect into States below Mexican southern border, where are a series of far smaller, poorer and weaker States, beginning in Guatemala Los Zetas not only expanded their corridors of safe-houses into Guatemalan territory, they also began sending death threats to authorities, including President, Justice minister, etc. Already violent Central American States explain in terms of a relatively new plague : EL NARCO, as if it were EL DIABLO or some supernatural force to which they as mortals do not relate Mexican cartel enforcers also encounter in Central America rich pool from which to recruit new soldiers 11
@ UGLA 12
Anything done to stop Brazilian gangs? Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE) = (by now) famous State enforcement corps Tropa de Elite, 2007 movie by José Padina Berlin Golden Bear! Nevertheless, this Brazilian elite squad is overmanned, under-armed highly unmotivated to enter gang-controlled favelas 13
Rio, October 2009, gangs shot down a police helicopter above a favela (slum) Anyone else around take on the gangs? Informal, private militia are quite a tradition in Brazil 1960s-1980s military regimes clandestine State-initiated forces for social control and insurgency action used dirty tactics State enforcers were not allowed to employ Resurface these days in battles with prison gangs, mostly in slums (locally known as favelas) Engage in turf battles under promise to bring order Private justice very likely to get out of hand (& to go profit?), that is: take over or tap into the same illicit market, interalia for drug sales What to do (for, in, with Latin America)? Obviously we re not likely to send UN Peace Keepers... Even if killings are at levels comparable (and far above) those recorded in the Kosovo New War, there s no War going on, anywhere in Latin America or the Caribbean UN has no tradition of intervening in this are. Exceptions: MINUGUA to control Guatemalan Peace Agreements MINUSTHA to police Haiti, before the quake Do WE have anything (experience, money, technology) to offer to help Latin American States contain organized crime induced violence of such dimension? Any suggestions? 14