Comments on AAI Transition. Enforcement

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Comments on AAI Transition Report s Chapter on Private Enforcement Einer Elhauge Petrie Professor of Law Harvard Law School

Area of AAI-AMC AMC Consensus Treble damages good Single damages too low given Detection ti odds Deadweight loss Umbrella effects Lack of actual cases or evidence treble damages leads to overdeterrence.

AAI Positions on Which AMC Provides Some Indirect Support Agencies should help dispel myths of private overenforcement. AMC treble damages analysis suggests it shares some AAI views about what these myths are. Agencies have a direct interest in dispelling any myths because fears of private overenforcement lead to narrow interpretations of statutes that agencies enforce. Agencies should encourage foreign nations to develop effective private rights of actions. Given Empagran that may be necessary for optimal deterrence of global misconduct. Consistent with view of Dennis Carlton and AAG Garza that should go beyond treble damages when foreign victims cannot recover, but a more direct solution.

AAI Positions on Which AMC Is Totally Silent Ban Waivers of Class Arbitrations. Class actions reduce duplication and solve collective action problem in cost sharing and fear of defendant e da retribution. Nuisance settlement fear wrongly presumes defendants bear more litigation costs. Massive exposure fear wrongly presumes defendants more risk averse. No evidence frivolous antitrust t suits getting significant damages. Investigate Misuses of Twombly, Daubert, and Antitrust Injury.

AAI Proposal Rejected by AMC AAI says should award pre-judgment interest. AMC argues treble damages already compensate and hard to calculate damages at time of injury. But: Trebling poor fit because does not vary with time lag. Nominal trebling = single damages when one considers lack of prejudgment interest, deadweight loss, and umbrella effects, so fails to deter adequately when one considers odds of detection & successful adjudication. Have to calculate damages at time of injury anyway. AAI side favored by Dennis Carlton, AAG Garza, and djudge Easterbrook.

AMC Contribution Proposal Rejected by AAI AMC would allow nonsettling defendants to get offset for allocated liability share of settling defendants and contribution from other nonsettling defendants. AAI concerns: Would reduce deterrence. Would reduce incentives to settle private leniency program. Apportioning liability share would be hard. Easterbrook Landes & Posner side with AAI Easterbrook, Landes & Posner side with AAI position on burden of proof grounds.

AMC Indirect Purchaser Proposal Rejected by AAI AMC would combine overruling Illinois Brick, consolidation with state indirect suits & clarifying class certifiability of direct purchasers despite pass-on. AAI concern this lessens deterrence. But: Keeping duplication where state indirect purchaser statutes exist to sometimes increase deterrence is second best to fixing other doctrines that systematically undermine deterrence. Current direct/indirect law itself undermines deterrence Illinois i Brick often reduces deterrence when direct buyers benefit from anticompetitive profits or fear defendant retribution. Procedural complexity and uncertainty worsens deterrence. Specter of sextuple damages part of what drives courts to be hostile to class actions by indirect purchasers. Perhaps better to combine this AMC reform with Rule allowing prejudgment interest Rules clarifying i class certifiability for both direct and indirect purchasers.