Institutions Rules, Norms and Shared Strategies Chapters 2, 10 & 11 in Anderies, J. and Janssen, M., 2016. Sustaining the commons. Arizona State University. Chapter 5 in Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
Cow jail If three adult members of the local irrigation system agreed that a village member had not followed the irrigation rules. How much water a farmer was allowed to take from the irrigation system and how much labor was to be contributed to maintaining the canals of the irrigation system. If your cow is seen grazing in the center of the village, everybody would know that you were cheating the community. Anderies, J. and Janssen, M., 2016. Sustaining the commons. Arizona State University.
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Defining Institutions The prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions (households, schools, hospitals, companies, courts of law to international treaties) These prescriptions can be one of three broad types: RULES NORMS SHARED STRATEGIES These statements describe opportunities and constraints that create expectations about other actors behavior. Anderies, J. and Janssen, M., 2016. Sustaining the commons. Arizona State University.
Institutional diversity During a typical day (this can be at work, in the classroom, on the sports field, in the supermarket, during commuting, when we use social network and ), we use different types of norms and rules. Participation in all these diverse sets of situations without thinking too much about the rules and norms. The situations we can experience change over the generations. We have a lot of implicit knowledge of expected dos and don ts in a variety of situations. Anderies, J. and Janssen, M., 2016. Sustaining the commons. Arizona State University.
Crafting rules and norms is not something that is undertaken exclusively by parliament. We ourselves create rules and norms too. Distinction between rules-on-paper (de jure) and rules-in-use (de facto) Anderies, J. and Janssen, M., 2016. Sustaining the commons. Arizona State University.
The effectiveness of a set of rules SHARED MEANING: no confusion about what actions are required, permitted, or forbidden. ENFORCEMENT: Participants in an action arena always have the option to break rules, but there is a risk of being caught and penalized, because of the feedbacks in action arenas, the likelihood of rule breaking can grow over time.
Rules, Norms and Shared Strategies
Rules can be written down on paper, such as formal laws, but might not be common knowledge to everyone. In fact, many rules are actually unwritten, socalled rules-in-use. Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
The institutional grammar tool Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
If we look carefully the institutional statements we can detect regularities: certain types of persons who are or are not allowed to do certain activities and if they do something that is not allowed there might be consequences. Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
ADICO ATTRIBUTE (A): is a place holder for any value of a participantlevel variable that distinguishes to whom the institutional statement applies. DEONTIC (D): is a place holder for may (permitted), must (obliged), and must not (forbidden). AIM (I): is a place holder that describes particular actions or outcomes CONDITIONS (C): is a place holder for those variables that define when and where an action or outcome is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden. OR ELSE (O): is a place holder for the assigned consequence for not following a rule. Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
Shared strategies contain components AIC; the attributes, aim and conditions. Strategies can thus be written as [ATTRIBUTES] [AIM] [CONDITIONS]. Norms contain the elements ADIC. Compared to shared strategies, norms include whether an activity is permitted, obliged or forbidden. But norms do not explicitly include the consequences for doing something that is forbidden or not doing something that is required. Norms can thus be written as [ATTRIBUTES] [DEONTIC] [AIM] [CONDITIONS]; Rules do contain all five elements (ADICO). Regardless of how institutional statements are expressed in natural language, they can be rewritten or summarized in the ADICO format: [ATTRIBUTES] [DEONTIC] [AIM] [CONDITIONS] [OR ELSE]. Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
رداوشج ی کبرشىبسی ارشذ :(A) ATTRIBUTE ثبیذ (D): DEONTIC دريس را ثب ومر ثبالتر از 14 پبس کىذ :(A) AIM در طی سى ات مجبز :(C) CONDITIONS م فق ث دریبفت مذرک وخ ا ذ :(O) OR ELSE شذ کلی اگرو Rule
ایه ق اویه را در سىگبپ ر رعبیت کىیذ - استفبد از سیف ن را فرام ش وکىیذ اگر در سفر ث سىگبپ ر از سريیس بی ث ذاشتی عى ان یک ش ريوذ ایه است ک از سیف ن استفبد مسئل آن قذر جذی وجبشذ امب در سىگبپ ر اگر ایه ش یذ. عم می استفبد کردیذ يظیف ی شمب ث کىیذ. ممکه است در کش ر بی دیگر ایه کبر را اوجبم وذ یذ 1۵۰ دالر جریم می - ثر ريی زمیه زثبل وریسیذ زثبل ریخته ي حتی اوذاخته آة د بن ثر ريی زمیه را در سىگبپ ر فرام ش کىیذ چرا ک ثب ایه کبر شمب مرتکت جرم شذ ایذ ي ثر اسبس قبو ن ملسم ث پرداخت جریم ی 1۰۰۰ دالری خ ا یذ ث د.حتی ممکه است از جبوت ديلت ث ثرخی خذمبت اجتمبعی مبوىذ جمع آيری زثبل ب محک م ش یذ.
ATTRIBUTE (A): رفردی ک از سريیس ث ذاشتی استفبد کىذ می ثبیذ (D): DEONTIC ثکشذ را سیف ن :(A) AIM در ىگبم خريج :(C) CONDITIONS OR ELSE (O): - لطفب سیف ن فرام ش وش د Norm
Shared Strategy خریذاران (A): ATTRIBUTE DEONTIC (D): - AIM (A): خریذ خ د را در کیس بی غیر پالستیکی د ىذ قرار CONDITIONS (C): OR ELSE (O): - در س پرمبرکت ب ي فريشگب ب
Three qualifications must be met for an OR ELSE to exist: The consequence stated in the OR ELSE must be the result of collective action (individual revenge is not a valid) The threat in the OR ELSE component of a rule must be backed by another rule or norm that changes the DEONTIC assigned to some AIM, for at least one actor, under the CONDITION that individuals fail to follow the rule. A prescription must affect the constraints and opportunities facing an actor or actors with the responsibility of monitoring the conformance of others. Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.