IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CHARLES WILLIAMS, pro se, Defendant/Petitioner, CASE NO.: SC13- I v. 4th DCA NO.: 4D11-4882 STATE OF FLORIDA, PlaintifflRespondent. PETITIONER'S JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF On Review from the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, State of Florida Charles Williams, pro se #L15671 SU, South Florida Reception Center 13910 NW 41 ' Street Doral, Florida 33178-3014
TABLEOFCONTENTS TABLEOF CITATIONS... ii STATEMENTOF THECASEANDFACTS... 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................... 2 JURISDICTIONALSTATEMENT... 3 ARGUMENT... 3 THE ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT EXPRESSLY AND DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IN LONG V. STA TE, 793 SO. 2D 1141 (FLA. 1ST DCA 2001), THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN JORDAN V. STA TE, 760 SO. 2D 973 (FLA. 2D DCA 2000); AND THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN MORGAN V. STA TE, 983 SO. 2D 1230 (FLA. 5TH DCA 2008) ON THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW CONCLUSION... 9 OATH... 10 CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE... 10 CERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCE... 10 APPENDIXINDEX... 11-1-
TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases: Ford Motor Company v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1981)...................5 Jordan v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)..................3, 6, 7, 8 Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)...................3, 6, 7, 8 Morgan v. State, 983 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).................3, 6, 7, 8 Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007).................................9 Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002)............................3 State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)............................passim Thomas v. State, 1 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)..........................8 Constitutional Provision: Art. V, 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1980)......................................3 Court Rules: Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a)(2) (2012).......................................10 Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2012)..................................3 Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 (2012)..............................................1 Fla.R.Crim.P.3.800(2012)...6,7 Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 (2012)....................................... 1, 6, 7 Other Authority: Philip J. Padovano, "Florida Appellate Practice" (2013 Edition) 3:10..........3-11-
STATEMENTOFTHECASEANDFACTS The Fourth District Court of Appeal's "Order" (dated December 5, 2012) states, "[A]ppellant has filed various untimely and successive postconviction motions." [Petitioner will track the filing of his two (2) pro se motions, and (to maintain continuity) will point out facts germaine to the contents and disposition of those motions. The motion-facts relate to pertinent facts in the "Order," as will be discussed in the "Argument" (below)]. On May 5, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se bifurcated, Newly Discovered Evidence, Postconviction Motion. The first, and primary, claim of said Motion was Fraud on the Court (1.540, Fla. R. Civ. P.), and a second claim was predicated on defective Miranda warnings (3.850, Fla. R. Crim. P.). On August 12, 2008, both claims were summarily denied, allegedly for being "conclusory and speculative." Rehearing was denied on September 2, 2008. On September 29, 2008, Petitioner appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal (4th DCA), which, on December 10, 2008, affirmed the lower court's decision, but ruled solely on the Petitioner's secondary claim, concerning defective Miranda warnings. (Rehearing denied on February 6, 2009, and Request for Review denied on October 2, 2009). On March 14, 2011, Petitioner filed a second pro se, Newly Discovered Evidence, Postconviction Motion. Said Motion was based solely on the original claim of Fraud on the Court, in that the merits, thereof, had not been addressed by a_ny court. On April 6, 2011, the lower court ordered the State to respond to Petitioner's Fraud allegations; however, in its April 25, 2011 Response, the State neither addressed nor denied said allegations. 1
On May 12, 2011, the lower court "agreed with the State's response," and (in an identical manner) never addressed, nor denied, those allegations, but (instead) immediately dismissed Petitioner's Postconviction Motion, whereby ordering Petitioner [in accordance with State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)] to "show cause" why Petitioner should not be prohibited from filing further pro se motions. On 6/8/l1, Petitioner responded to the Show Cause Order, and on November 10, 2011, the lower court "Ordered and Adjudged that the Petitioner is prohibited from filing any further pro se postconviction motions or petitions, with this [lower] court, attacking or challenging the convictions or sentences imposed on this case." On January 19, 2012, Petitioner appealed to the 4th DCA, and Petitioner appealed only the Spencer Sanction Order. On December 5, 2012, the Fourth DCA Per Curiam Affirmed, with an attached Court Order. Rehearing was denied on January 4, 2013, and Petitioner's Notice to Invoke [this Court's] Discretionary Jurisdiction was timely filed on February 4, 2013. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The Fourth DCA applied the Spencer rule of law to deny relief in Petitioner's appeal of the lower court's Spencer Sanction Order. Decisions in the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, applied the Spencer rule of law to grant relief in cases with substantially the same facts as in the Petitioner's case, and Petitioner contends that the 4th DCA's Order expressly and directly conflicts with the previous decisions of the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal. 2
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT The Florida Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a decision of a District Court of Appeal (DCA) that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another DCA, or with a Florida Supreme Court decision, on the same question of law. Art. V, 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1980); 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv), Fla. R. App. P. (2012). ARGUMENT THE ORDER OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT EXPRESSLY AND DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IN LONG V. STA TE, 793 SO. 2D 1141 (FLA. 1ST DCA 2001), THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN JORDAN V. STA TE, 760 SO. 2D 973 (FLA. 2D DCA 2000); AND THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN MORGAN V. STA TE, 983 SO. 2D 1230 (FLA. 5TH DCA 2008) ON THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW On December 5, 2012, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (4th DCA) issued a Per Curiam Affirmed decision, with an attached Court Order (of the same date). Petitioner respectfully submits that said attached Court Order is an explanation of the principles the DCA used to support their decision, and, as such, it should be reviewable by this Court. In Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974, 978 (Fla. 2002), this Court held that per curiam denials of relief, issued with an "explanation... by way of an unpublished order," are reviewable by this Court. That same principle should apply to Petitioner's Per Curiam Affirmed denial of relief, issued with an explanation by way of an unpublished order. In Appellate Judge Philip J. Padovano's, "Florida Appellate Practice" (2013 Edition), 3:10, the author states, "[A]n unpublished order that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision... by another district court of appeal is now... an order that is reviewable by the Supreme Court." (FN17). 3
Petitioner will demonstrate that the Fourth District Court of Appeal's Order should be considered an explanation of the decision by that court, and that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of three (3) other District Courts of Appeal. The Fourth DCA's Order refers to the Petitioner's instant appeal (to that court) as "this appeal." The Statement of the Case and Facts, herein, confirms that Petitioner filed said "appeal" as an appeal of the trial court's State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999) Sanction Order. The referred to, "this appeal," is concisely described below: The cover page of said appeal reads (in part): "APPELLANT'S INITIAL BRIEF" "On Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, on an Order Prohibiting Defendant From Filing Any Further Pro Se Postconviction Motions" The "Argument" of the appeal reads: "TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED A SPENCER SANCTION ORDER AGAINST DEFENDANT WITHOUT FIRST ADDRESSING THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF FRAUD ON THE COURT, THEREBY VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS" Page 7 of the appeal reads (in part): "The crux of this appeal is:... that the trial court must first address the merits of the claim before pursuing the Spencer sanctions." Thus, "this appeal" (identified in the instant Statement of the Case and Facts) is within the four corners of the Fourth District Court of Appeal's Order, and was the sole instant "appeal" before the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Further, "this appeal" does not relate to the "rejected 2008 defective warning claim" cited in said Order. 4
Additional support for this Petition is the following statement (from the DCA's Order): "Appellant appears to have brought false information before the courts as his allegations of fraud in his 1998 trial are unfounded." [Above (and below) underlining, added for emphasis]. The Fourth DCA presents: "... his allegations of fraud... are unfounded," as if factual; however, the preliminary words, "Appellant appears to have...", clearly show that this supposed fact is not a result of the trial court's ruling. Thus, the trial court did not address and rule on the merits of the "allegations of fraud," nor rule the same to be "unfounded." The Fourth DCA reviewed Petitioner's appeal of the lower court's Spencer sanction Order, wherein said sanction consisted of: "Prohibiting Defendant From Filing Any Further Pro Se Postconviction Motions." The Fourth DCA's Order (now before this Court) announces and applies the Spencer rule of law, by way of discussing the legal principlesl' of the Spencer sanction, and thus, they apply to this Petition for review of conflict with opinions of the other DCA's. The Fourth DCA's Order deems the Petitioner's underlying-motion-allegations to be: "untimely and successive," "wholly frivolous," "repetitive,""false information," and "unfounded," which are all reasons for sanctions to be imposed (through the Spencer rule of law), but only after the merits have been addressed by the trial court. The Fourth DCA judged the Fraud allegations, without the trial court (as the trier of fact) ever having addressed the allegations, or determining said allegations to be frivolous, which is contrary to Spencer. In the conclusion of the DCA's Order, the DCA repeats said judgments of Petitioner's 1/ Ford Motor Company v. Kikis, 401 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1981), a "discussion of the legal principles which the [district) court applied supplies a sufficient basis for a petition for conflict review." 5
allegations, citing to Spencer, and cautions Petitioner with the exact same Spencer sanction that was unjustifiably imposed by the trial court. Petitioner has shown that the 4th DCA, after having reviewed Petitioner's appeal of the trial court's Spencer Sanction Order, did issue the instant Order, to explain why they Affirmed the trial court's refusal to address the merits of Petitioner's claim (before the Spencer Sanction Order was imposed), and then went on to caution Petitioner with the same sanction that they had just reviewed. It appears the 4th DCA overlooked that under Spencer, and its progeny, addressing the merits is mandatory, and not discretionary. The 4th DCA Affirmed the trial court's decision NOT to address the merits (prior to imposition of the Spencer sanction), and then (surprisingly) denied relief, by applying the Spencer rule of law. In the cases of Long, Jordan, and Morgan, the courts announced and applied the Spencer rule of law to grant relief, because the merits of a defendant's claim must be addressed, before Spencer sanctions may be imposed. In Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 200 l), the court held: "Under Spencer and its progeny, before prohibiting further pro se attacks on a conviction and sentence, the trial court must first address the merits of the claims...." In Jordon v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the court held: "When a trial court denies a motion for postconviction relief (FN1) and restricts a litigants right to proceed subsequently in court, it must address the merits of the claims advanced by the litigant and determine that they are frivoulous before commencing down the road to bar future filings." Footnote 1: "The phrase postconviction relief as used in this opinion includes motions filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800 and 3.850." 6
In Morgan v. State, 983 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), the court held: "The State commendably suggests, and we agree, that before an order prohibiting further pro se attacks on a conviction and sentence can be rendered, the trial court must first address the merits of the claim claim. If it determines the claim to be frivolous, it may then pursue the Spencer sanction.... See Long v. State; Jordon v. State...." In the Long case, this Court's own Spencer ruling is set forth as controlling the District Court's position on sanctions. In the Jordan case (Footnote 1), the court held that the decision applies to 3.800 and 3.850 motions. In the Morgan case, the State's position is indeed "commendable" in protecting a pro se defendant's right of access to the courts. In addition to those three (3) cases, there are others, with the exact same holding. The ultimate fact in the Petitioner's case, as in the above cases, is that the trial court did not address the merits of the claim(s) before imposing the Spencer sanction, and, as such, the cases are indistinguishable. Any differences in the relative facts should be incidental, and should not frustrate this Petition. Petitioner has demonstrated, above, different results concerning the Spencer rule of law, and that the 4th DCA's Order expressly and directly conflicts with the opinions of the Long, Jordan, and Morgan cases, wherein the District Courts of Appeal reversed the Spencer sanction Orders, and remanded for the trial courts to consider the merits of the defendants' claims. Because the 4th DCA chose not to certify conflict, this Petition is necessary to bring to this Court's attention that not all of the District Courts of Appeal are in conformity concerning this very serious Due Process violation issue. The Petitioner avers that this Spencer sanction violation is a serious issue of exceptional importance, because it restricts a pro se litigant's right to the courts, as noted in 7
State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999): "("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury....."). Thus, denying a pro se litigant the opportunity to file future petitions is a serious sanction, especially where the litigant is a criminal defendant who has been prevented from further attacking his or her conviction, sentence...." Petitioner has demonstrated that previous pro se litigants, Long, Jordan, and Morgan, had been affected by that violation. The purpose of this Petition is for this Court to rectify the non-conformity of the Fourth DCA's ruling, both for the Petitioner, and for any future pro se litigants. Petitioner respectfully wishes to emphasize that this Petition is the culmination of but two (2) pro se attempts to have the 17th Judicial Circuit Court address and rule on the merits of Petitioner's claim of record-evidenced Fraud on the Court, whereas Due Process requires that an evidentiary hearing be held for allegations of Fraud. This is an entirely separate issue from the "previously rejected 2008 defective warning claim," which the 4th DCA cites in its Order. (Please see the Statement of the Case and Facts, herein). This Petition is being made in good faith, and is absolutely neither a frivolous, nor a malicious, attempt to waste this Court's valuable time and resources, regardless of any previous filing. Due Process and Spencer require that the merits of Petitioner's claim must be addressed by the trier of fact (trial court), before Petitioner is deprived of pro se access to any court. Petitioner fervently believes that he has a right to file this Petition, pursuant to Thomas v. State, 1 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), which states: 'The litigant has the right to challenge whether the [Spencer] order was warranted and... an order restricting further pro se filings "cannot restrict or frustrate in any way an appeal taken from that order."' 8
CONCLUSION Petitioner wishes to reiterate that the Spencer issue is of exceptional importance, in that it has repeatedly surfaced before the District Courts of Appeal (in a plethora of cases). Absent a conflict-resolving ruling, from this Honorable Court, it will continue to be an issue. Petitioner asserts that this Court does have discretionary jurisdiction to review the Order of the court-below, and that this Court should exercise that jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner's Argument. However, absent that, and as an alternative, Petitioner hereby respectfully asks that this Court would postpone decision on jurisdiction, and give Petitioner an opportunity to submit the merits of his Argument (to this forum), before this Court makes its fmal decision. A brief, on the merits, would reveal many crucial recordfacts that Petitioner is restricted from presenting, herein, and said brief also would give this Court a complete perspective of the validity of this Petition. Consistent with Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007), which holds that a pro se litigant should be allowed one opportunity to amend a pleading, if a court determines that any pleading defects exist, this Petitioner seeks this Court's indulgence. Respect ly submitted by: Charles Williams, pro se L15671 SU, South Florida Reception Center 13910 NW 41" Street Doral, FL 33178-3014 9
OATH UNDER PENALTIES OF PERJURY, I declare that I have read the foregoing Petitioner's Jurisdictional Brief, and that the facts stated in it are true. Charles Williams, pro se #L15671 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioner's Jurisdictional Brief has been handed to the mailroom official at the South Florida Reception Center, South Unit, for mailing to the Office of the Attorney General, 1515 N Flagler Drive, Suite 900, West Palm Beach, FL 33401-2299, on this _L3 day of Fel,w y 2013. Provided to rles Williams, pro se L15671 South Florida Reception Center SU, South Florida Reception Center 13910 NW 41" Street on» D M for mailin9- Doral, FL 33178-3014 l/m Initials C' CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this brief complies with the font requirements of rule 9.210(a)(2) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Charles Williams, pro se L15671 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CHARLES WILLIAMS, pro se, Defendant/Petitioner, CASE NO.: SC13- v. 4th DCA NO.: 4D11-4882 STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff/Respondent. APPENDIX INDEX 1. Fourth District Court of Appeal's Order, dated December 5, 2012 2. Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision, dated December 5, 2012 11 Charles Williams, pro se #L15671 SU, South Florida Reception Center 13910 NW 41 * Street Doral, Florida 33178-3014
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT, 1525 PALM BEACH LAKES BLVD., WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401 December 5, 2012 CASE NO.: 4D11-4882 L.T. No. : 96-24813 CF10A CHARLES WILLIAMS v. STATE OF FLORIDA Appellant / Petitioner(s), Appellee / Respondent(s). BYORDEROFTHECOURT: ORDERED that appellant has filed various untimely and successive postconviction motions. The underlying motion in this appeal was wholly frivolous and repetitive of the claim raised and rejected in Williams v. State, 998 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Appellant appears to have brought false information before the courts as his allegations of fraud in his 1998 trial are unfounded. As explained in this court's written opinion rejecting this claim in 2008, the warning that appellant alleges he actually received from police was clearly sufficient. Williams, 998 So.2d at 651; see also Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204 (2010). The City of Pompano Beach police officer would not have had reason to replace the warning form with a forgery during the 1998 trial as the trial predated Roberts v. State, 874 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), where this court identified the deficiency in the warning form used by the Broward Sheriff's Office. Appellant is cautioned that abusive, repetitive, malicious, and/or frivolous or false filing will result in the sanction of this court no longer accepting his pro se filings. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1999). I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the original court order. Served: Howard Forman, Clerk Charles Williams Attorney General-W.P.B. Hon. Lisa M. Porter Ic
PER CURIAM. Affirmed. DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT July Term 2012 CHARLES WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 4D11-4882 [December 5, 2012] MAY, C.J., WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Lisa Porter, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 96-24813 CF10A and 96-21461 CF10A. Charles Williams, Doral, pro se. No appearance required for appellee. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
RIL9N BEUTTENMULLER, clerk Fourth District Court of Appeal OF