Radicalizing Electoral System Effects on Support for Nationalist Hardliners in Serbia Daniel Bochsler Supplementary material, 16 December 2010

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Radicalizing Electoral System Effects on Support for Nationalist Hardliners in Serbia Daniel Bochsler Supplementary material, 16 December 2010 Appendix A: Results of the expert survey on the position of Serbian parties on the ethnic-nationalist conflict dimension Position 0 signifies that a party is ultra-nationalist, and position 1 marks extremist parties among ethnic minorities (ethnic separatists). For the ranking of the parties, expert interviews were conducted with three experts on Serbian parties and ethnic relations in April 2007, addressing the parties positions in 2003/04 regarding two political questions which are strongly related to what we refer to as the ethnic/nationalist axis of party orientation. We contacted academic experts with relevant publications in the field of representation and political participation of ethnic minorities, and minority specialists in human rights organisations. The two questions were measured on a sixpoint-scale (1 to 6) and a four-point scale (1-4) respectively, and were z-standardised, so that each of the two questions contributed equally to the overall scale. The new scale was transformed to include the range 0 to 1. Table A1: Classification of Serbian political parties along the ethnic-nationalist axis, based on scores of an expert survey. party mean position ethnic minority affiliation (if any) SSJ 0 JS 0 SRS 0.04 SNS 0.17 SPS 0.19 PSS 0.23 DSS 0.31 DA 0.56 DHSS 0.57 SPO-NS 0.58 LS 0.68 G17 0.69 SDP 0.71 DS 0.73 SVM 0.74 Hungarian min. OTPOR 0.75 ZZT 0.79 Joint list of minority parties SDP-LJ 0.85 Bosniak minority GSS 0.85 SDU 0.85 RV 0.87 Lista za Sandžak 0.89 Bosniak minority PDD 1 Albanian minority Parties with no explicit ethnic minority affiliation are non-ethnically defined parties; some of them promote Serbian dominance (see scores).

Appendix B1: Runoffs in municipalities where the median voter is a moderate nationalist The demonstrated effect mainly relies on municipalities where the median voter is a moderate nationalist. Tables B1 and B2 illustrate the runoff elections in these cases. The tables distinguish these municipalities according to the two strongest candidates in the first round of the two-round elections. The tables analyse 62 municipalities, where none of the three party blocs (Democrats and ethnic minorities D+E, Radicals R, moderate nationalists DN) won an absolute majority of votes in the first round of the elections, and where DN is the smallest of the three blocs. These municipalities were the most common ones in the 2004 mayoral elections Serbia, we further distinguish them base on whether D+E were the largest bloc in the first round of the elections (34 municipalities D+E > R > DN, left table), or whether this was R (28 municipalities of the type R > D+E > DN, right table). In all them, a second round of elections took place. Most often, we find pairings of Democrats versus Radicals in the second round: this setup occurs in 21 out of 34 municipalities where the Democrats were the strongest bloc, and in 18 out of 28 municipalities where the Radicals were strongest (including one municipality where a joint candidate of the Democrats and ethnic minority parties wins). Every cell in the tables displays such a pairing of candidates, with the second number indicating the number of such pairings, and the first number indicating the number of times the party on the left-hand side won the runoff election. For example: the cell entry 14/21 indicates that there were 21 occasions where candidates of the Democrats (D) were running against candidates of the Radicals (R) in the second round of the elections. They were won by the Democrats (D, party shown on the left) 14 times. In other cases, moderate Nationalists (DN), citizen groups or other small parties reach the runoff, or two candidates of the same bloc, Democrats or Radicals. DN candidates, when entering the second round, were typical winners, since the pivotal voter belonged to their bloc. Tables B1 & B2: Municipalities where D+E and R are the two largest blocs in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. D+E > R > DN R > D+E > DN D R citizens others R citizens D 1/1 14/21 3/6 0/1 D-E 1/1 R 1/1 0/1 0/1 D 3/17 citizens 2/2 DN 2/3 2

Appendix B2: Municipalities where one of the blocs wins an absolute majority of the votes in the first round In tables B3 to B7, municipalities are classified into three types according to the vote distribution in the parliamentary elections by PR in 2003. In the first group, the Radicals (R) won more than 50% of the votes in the 2003 PR elections. Table B3 analyses the municipalities where, for the most part, the Radicals (R) could secure the most mayoral offices. However, in some municipalities mostly in the group of municipalities with 0-10% ethnic minority populations citizen groups or the Democrats (D) won the race. These exceptions emerged because candidates of other parties were particularly strong, or because the vote distribution in the mayor elections 2004 did not correspond with the vote distribution in the parliamentary elections in 2003. Two important outliers occur among the municipalities with more than 50% minority population; these are two predominately Albanian municipalities in the Preševo valley, where the Albanian population majority boycotted the 2003 parliamentary elections, allowing the Radicals to win the majority of the votes. Table B3: Who wins the Mayor s office in municipalities with a Radical majority? minority share obs nr E D DN R citizens others total N % % % % % % % 0-10% 17 0 21.99 10.77 55.05 8.14 4.05 100 10-20% 6 0 9.39 0 52.66 37.95 0 100 20-30% 2 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 30-40% 1 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 >50% 2 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 Total 28 10.71 13.54 5.67 55.76 12.19 2.13 100 Classification according to the vote share in the 2003 parliamentary elections. Municipalities weighted by their size. Only in very few municipalities did the Radicals also win an absolute majority of the votes in the first round of the mayoral elections. This is not due merely to the outliers in the Preševo valley, but also to the fact that citizen groups were doing particularly well in municipalities with an absolute majority of the votes for Radicals in the first round. In 13 out of 28 cases, candidates of citizen groups garnered more than 20% of the votes in the first round; seven other times, they were stronger than the Radical candidates. Consequentially, the Radicals won an absolute majority of the votes in the first round in only two municipalities. In one of these 3

municipalities, Despotovac, two Radicals competed against each other, and in the other case, Jagodina, a Radical won against a Democrat in the second round (table B4). Table B4: Municipalities where R have an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. R D 0/1 R 1/1 In municipalities where the Democrats and ethnic minority parties won an absolute majority of the votes, they were the most frequent winners of mayoral elections, occasionally with joint candidates (table B5). Ethnic minority parties were most successful with their own candidates in municipalities with more than 40% minority shares. Other candidates won the mayoral offices in only three cases. In Nova Crnja, an SRS candidate was victorious (winning narrowly in the second round against a DS candidate); in Ada, a citizen group candidate won (against another citizen group candidate); and in Bečej, a candidate of a non-classified party won against an ethnic minority party candidate in the second round. Table B5: Who wins the Mayor s office in municipalities with a majority of the Democrats and ethnic minorities? minority share obs nr E D-E D R citizens others total N % % % % % % % 0-10% - 10-20% - 20-30% 3 0 0 78.64 21.36 0 0 100 30-40% - 40-50% 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 >50% 14 60.18 9.52 18.79 0 3.76 7.76 100 Total 18 57.54 8.08 22.76 1.85 3.19 6.58 100 Classification according to the vote share in the 2003 parliamentary elections. Municipalities weighted by their size. Based on the results in the first round of the mayor elections, table B6 illustrates the shifts between the first and the second round in municipalities where the Democrats candidates (D) and the ethnic minority parties candidates (E) had already won an absolute majority of the votes in the first round. Unsurprisingly, the Democrats or a coalition of Democrats and ethnic minorities (D- E) were the most frequent winners when he median voters voted for them. In all 27 municipalities 4

belonging to this group, either a Democrat or an ethnic minority candidate entered the second round. In half of the cases, Democratic candidates and/or ethnic minority candidates were competing against each other in the second round. In one third of the cases, Democratic candidates were running against a moderate nationalist (DN) or against a Radical (R) candidate, and they always won. In just one of the three remaining, Bečej, where citizen groups candidates or candidates from other parties made it to the second round, the ethnic minority candidate lost the race. Table B6: Municipalities where D+E have an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. E D DN R citizens Other E 4/4 1/3 1/1 0/1 D-E 1/1 D 6/6 1/1 6/6 1/1 Note: In 3 municipalities, the mayor is elected in the first round (twice, a candidate of ethnic minority parties, once a Democratic candidate). Whilst the moderate nationalists (DN) did not win an absolute majority of the votes in any case in the 2003 parliamentary elections, they were able to do so in the first round of the mayoral elections in four municipalities. Twice (in Crna Trava and Topola) their candidate was elected in the first round. In two other cases (Brus and in the predominately Bulgarian settled municipality of Bosilegrad), their strongest candidate emerged victorious against a Democratic candidate in the second round (table B7). This victory was expected, not only because the DN candidate would be likely to gain the votes of other candidates of the same bloc who were competing in the first round, but also because the moderate nationalists reside in the centre of the main issue dimension, and were thus poised to accrue Radical votes in the second round. Table B7: Municipalities where DN have an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. DN D 0/2 Note: In 2 municipalities, the mayor is elected in the first round (in both cases, a candidate of the moderate nationalists DN). 5

The winner of the first round of the elections is not necessarily one of the party blocs. In eight cases, citizen groups won an absolute majority of the votes in the first round. Once, citizen groups and a non-classified party jointly win an absolute majority of the vote. In a different case, a citizen groups candidate was elected in the first round (table B8). In three additional cases, the candidates of two citizen groups ran against each other in the second round. Twice, they won against a Democratic candidate. Twice, a Democratic or a coalition candidate of the Democrats and an ethnic minority party won in the second round against a candidate of a citizen group. Table B8: Municipalities where Local Citizen Groups have an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. citizens D-E 1/1 D 1/3 citizens 3/3 Note: In one municipality, the mayor is elected in the first round (a candidate of citizen groups). Appendix B3, municipalities where the moderate nationalists belong to the two strongest parties In municipalities where the moderate nationalists (DN) reached the second round, we would expect them to win the elections, since they would be likely to gain support from the bloc that is no longer competing. However, as table 2 shows, there was only one municipality where the moderate nationalists emerged among the two strongest blocs in the parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, the moderate nationalists (DN) were able to achieve slightly better results in some of the municipalities in the first round of the mayoral elections. There were twenty municipalities of the type D+E > DN > R. Contrary to our expectations, the moderate nationalists won only 20% of the available mayoral posts. In cases where a Democrat was paired with a moderate nationalist in the second round of the election, the moderate nationalists were able to win (in four out of seven cases). But in all other municipalities, the second round was fought between citizen groups and other parties, among Democrats and Radicals, or among two Democratic candidates. Either the Democrat or the citizen group candidates won these races (table B9). The strong presence of citizen groups and others groups also explains why the vote distribution in the first round of the mayor elections deviates from the expectations established by the parliamentary elections in these municipalities. 6

Table B9: Municipalities with rank order D+E > DN > R in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. D DN R citizens other D 1/1 4/7 2/2 4/7 1/1 DN 0/1 R 0/1 By contrast, the ten DN > D+E > R municipalities fulfil our expectations, with the moderate nationalists winning in all elections against the Democrats and citizen groups. In one case, Smederevo, there was a second round election held with a Democratic and a citizen group candidate, and the latter won the elections (table B10). Table B10: Municipalities with rank order DN > D+E > R in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. DN citizens D 0/7 0/1 DN 1/1 If Radicals and the moderate nationalists are the two strongest blocs, we would again expect the moderate nationalists to win, since they play the role of the pivotal voter. There are 19 municipalities with a rank order R > DN > D+E. Contrary to our expectations, the Radicals are the most frequent winners, doing so in 12 municipalities. However, they win only once when in direct confrontation with a moderate nationalist. More often, they win against Democrats (four cases, of which two are ethnically mixed) and against citizen groups (three out of four cases). In four municipalities, two Radical candidates enter the second round. Local citizen groups win twice, once against a Democrat and once against a Radical (table B11). Table B11: Municipalities with rank order R > DN > D+E in the first round, pairing of candidates in the second round. DN R citizens others D 0/1 0/4 0/1 DN 2/3 R 4/4 3/4 0/2 7

Hence, this type tends to confirm the pivotal voter principle, insofar as the moderate nationalists win the mayoral office if they enter the second round of the elections, and if they are the pivotal party. However, the moderate nationalists candidates often drop out in the first round of the elections; they win the mayoral offices only on rare occasions. 8