Centre for Social Studies, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, Portugal

CRITICAL REVIEW Climate Migrants: Victims and Actors of Environmental Violence Chrislain Eric Kenfack Centre for Social Studies, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, Portugal A BSTRACT Most scholars tend to deny the reality of climate migrations, arguing that climate migrants cannot be singled out as a specific category. They suggest that migration is always a result of multiple factors and cannot be understood in isolation from a combination of socio-environmental, economic and political factors. I argue against this academic position by raising the issue of scale. Based on evidence drawn from environmental/climate change-induced catastrophes around the world, I demonstrate that climate/environmental migrants can be properly singled out if the appropriate geographical and numerical scales are considered. To this end, climate migrations need to be considered starting from the micro-scale silent displacements both within and between countries that result from climate catastrophes. I subsequently define the category of climate migrants in relation to environmental violence. In fact, once settled in new lands, displaced climate victims are forced to participate in violent conflicts to secure basic vital resources. In sum, I argue that we can only properly define the concept of climate migration and develop suitable policy responses if we take into account the issues of scale and environmental violence. Climate Migration, Environmental Violence, Climate Change, Climate Security, Climate Racism. A RTICLE I NFO Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to Chrislain Eric Kenfack at chrislaineric@ces.uc.pt Cite this article as: Kenfact, C.E. (2015). Climate Migrants: Victims and Actors of Environmental Violence. Human Welfare, 4, 11-22. Introduction The debate on the concept of climate migration, and the quasi-unanimous agreement that it is quite difficult, or even impossible, to determine its specificities with regard to other forms of migration is of great interest in the contemporary world. Most authors construct climate migrations in terms of future possibilities, if nothing is done now (Baldwin, 2012), and in so doing, discard the category of climate migration as a current phenomenon (e.g. Black, 2001; Castles & Rajah, 2010). This view neglects the fact that, in the mid-1990s, it was widely reported that up to 25 million people had been forced from their homes and off their land by a range of serious environmental pressures including pollution, land degradation, droughts and natural disasters (Brown, 2008). In contrast to the common denial of climate migration as a specific and contemporary category, this paper argues that the acceptance or denial of the category of climate migration depends on the numerical and geographical scales considered, and that climate migration does exist as a specific and contemporary phenomenon. I base my arguments on two basic claims: Climate migrants can ISSN: 2048-9080 11 Human Welfare. Volume 4. Fall 2015

only be identified if, first, we consider climate migration starting from the micro-scale silent internal and international displacements that result from climate catastrophes and, second, if we read the reality of climate migrations from the perspective of environmental violence for survival in the receiving lands. As opposed to migrations induced by other environmental and socio-political conflicts where people are displaced at a macro-scale, climate migrants move in more reduced numbers and without great media coverage. This article is therefore based on the postulate that severe environmental problems play a role in causing migration, which, at times, leads to conflicts in receiving areas (Reuveny, 2007). In other words, climate migrants can be understood as both victims and actors of environmental violence. Therefore properly identifying this group of migrants and responding to their specific needs is of great importance for political and security reasons. It is important to note that, for the purpose of this paper, I will not dwell on the highly controversial debate of environmental security where environmental violence is determined in relation to resource scarcity (Libiszewski, 1992; Homer-Dixon, 1999), or in relation to site specific phenomena deeply rooted in local histories and social relations and connected to space, historical conjuncture, transitional processes of material change and political power relations (Peluso & Watts, 2001). Instead, I will base my argument on environmental violence in its relation to the quest for survival: Climate migrants do not participate in environmental conflicts for power reasons, accumulation or control over resources but merely in order to survive situations of total destitution. The paper develops this argument in three main parts. The first part focuses on the definition of the concept of climate migration, while the second and third parts are respectively dedicated to the understanding of climate migrants as victims and as actors of environmental violence. The data for this paper is drawn from secondary and primary accounts of several climate/environmental displacements that have taken place around the world in recent years. Who are environmental/climate migrants? Origin and definition of the concept It is important to note that the concept of climate migration only entered political discourse and practice with a UNEP report published in 1998. In this context, El-Hinnawi coined the term environmental refugee to highlight the potentially devastating effects of pollution and other environmental problems on the concerned populations (Mcadam, 2011). Yet, as early as 1948 William Vogt used the term ecological refugees in his book Road to Survival. His concept referred to those who are forced to move as a result of a reduction of resources and conservation practices (Quoted by Gemenne, 2009). Since the 1990s there have been growing concerns about migrations linked to environmental degradation and a variety of concepts such as climate migrants, ecomigrants, environmental migrants, climate changeinduced migrants, ecological refugees, environmental refugees, climate change migrants and environmentallyinduced forced migrants are found scattered throughout the literature. Defining these terms is challenging, however. This is due to difficulties in separating environmental from other socio-political or economic factors pushing people to migrate (Terminski, 2012; Dun & Gemenne, Consulted on 25/02/2013). Despite these difficulties the 2010 World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth offered a definition of the concept of climate migrants as those human groups which are pushed, against their will, to abandon their place of 12

origin as a result of climate change effects: floods, pests, climate cycle disorder, global warming, as well as the implementation of the capitalist economic model that deforests, degrades, and uncontrollably extracts non-renewable resources and encourages monoculture (2010). According to this perspective, climate migrants can be defined in relation to natural disasters and the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. However, factors related to the use and disposal of chemicals are not considered. This omission makes the definition incomplete. Hens provide a conceptualization that addresses this gap. According to Hens: Environmental refugees consequently refer then to the people who are being forced to leave their homes; to retreat after losing battles with their environment, both natural, such as droughts, floods, cyclones and earthquakes, and permanent human-caused changes, such as dams, the slow degradation of farm land ( ) and from industrial accidents (Hens, Consulted on 30/01/2014, p. 5). This approach appears more complete as it includes sudden natural disasters, gradual deterioration of the ecosystems and industrial manipulations. This paper will therefore build on Hens approach and use a working definition of climate migrants as those people who are forced to leave their habitual places due to the sudden- or slow-onset degradation of their environment and the slow or silent violence caused by human-made destruction of the environment, provided these factors are the main or the most important reasons for their decision to move, be it within or between countries. In search of a legal statute for climate migrants The definition of the statute of climate migrant poses serious challenges for several reasons. First, as discussed in the introduction, displacements related to climate change are usually discussed in terms of future possibilities rather than current realities (Baldwin, 2012). Second, according to international law, inspired by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the concept of refugee applies only to people who have crossed international borders and who seek protection from individual persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality or membership in a particular social group (UNHCR, 2006). International law therefore does not provide a legal statute to people who are displaced on a daily basis because of environmental degradation and environmental conflict. Third, it is difficult to determine the degree of causality between climate change and people s decisions to migrate. After all, in most cases, environmental factors motivating the displacement coincide with economic, social or political ones (Foresight, 2011; Mayer, 2011; Baldwin, 2012; European Commission, 2013). However, the lack of agreed definition and legal instruments does not mean that there is not a considerable number of people who are forced to flee from their natural milieus because of sudden or gradual environmental and climate degradation. The lack of agreement on a definition of climate migration is due to continued debate between minimalists who suggest that the environment is only a contextual factor in migration decisions, and maximalists who claim that the environment directly forces people to leave their homes (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). Defining the concept of climate migration requires considering a combination of both natural and socioeconomic factors. In fact, we can agree with Laczko and Aghazarm that climate change, in itself, does not directly displace people but produces environmental effects that make it difficult or even impossible for people to survive where they are. Such conditions can be related to loss of productivity, destroyed landscape or aggressive, unlivable climatic situations. Yet this perspective may have some limitations when it comes to certain clear-cut cases such as small 13

island States affected by sea level rise, where people are literally displaced by the change in their environment (Foresight, 2011; European Commission, 2013). These limitations also concern those who, faced with sudden natural catastrophes, are forced to leave their usual dwellings to find new settlements, and those who leave their usual places, mostly polluted areas, for individual health reason, at a much more micro scale. The difficulty in defining the concept of climate migrant results in part from the fact that attempts to define it are based on a macro-scale view, that is, high volume displacements with great media coverage. Micro-scale, silent displacements are by contrast neglected. This obscures the fact that people are displaced on a daily basis at a micro scale, that is in small numbers and without great media coverage, to look for new places of settlement with less aggressive climatic conditions. Although they do no move in huge number as in the case of sudden-onset environmental catastrophes and the outburst of socio-economic and political conflicts, the number of climate-scale migrants is significant when considered across time and space. This microscale is the appropriate starting point for viewing and better determining the category of climate migrants. Environmental violence and climate migrations According to Terminski (2012), environmental migration can be divided into 4 categories: Displacement due to the slow and irreversible degradation of natural ecosystems, displacements caused by cyclical environmental factors, displacements caused by natural disasters or human-made catastrophes, and voluntary provisional displacements of those who foresee the occurrence of future environmental diverse effects on their lives. In the context of this analysis, the last category based on voluntary movements is less relevant as I am concerned with the categories of people who have no other option than to migrate. In addition, including voluntary movements in the definition and discussion of climate migration significantly blurs the boundaries of the concept, reducing the likelihood of consensus around a definition (Dun & Gemenne, 2013). I will therefore consider three categories also employed by Renaud et al. (2011) who distinguish environmental migration into three subcategories based on emergency, force or motivation. Environmental catastrophes and emergency migrations Commonly referred to as evacuated, relocated or even displaced, the victims of sudden- onset environmental catastrophes are the most visible category of climate migrants and the one most often understood as displaced because of environmental reasons. This is mostly because of the spectacular and humanitarian aspects of their situation and the consequently significant media attention. Environmental migration in the context of catastrophes occurs as a result of two factors: First, it takes place due to industrial/technological disasters resulting from industrial and technological activities that lead to pollution, spillage of hazardous materials, explosions, and fires. It may also occur as a result of poor planning and construction of facilities or from neglect of safety procedures. The evacuation of more than 135 000 people after the Chernobyl (Ukraine) accident on April 6 th 1986, of which many migrated and settled in Byelorussia and Kiev (Hens, 2014), is a clear example of environmental migration resulting from industrial catastrophes. Second, emergency migrations occur as a result of natural catastrophes. These include natural phenomena such as floods, earthquakes, heat and cold waves, tropical storms, volcanic eruptions, landslides and fires among other things. Their occurrence makes living conditions 14

insurmountably difficult and creates an emergency situation of displacement for large quantities of people. Table 1 briefly summarizes the five numerically most important environmental emergency displacements that took place around the world between 2008 and 2012. It illustrates that environment-induced migrations are a common phenomenon experienced by populations around the world. Degradation of ecosystems and motivated migrations The degradation of natural ecosystems is of great concern in the contemporary world. The natural living milieus of millions of people are gradually being degraded, leaving them no other option than to build up new adaptive mechanisms. Faced with the gradual destruction of their natural landscapes and ecosystems, resulting in aggressive milieus and reduction of productivity, people can either choose to stay and endure the new hard conditions, to use their economic power to build alternative means of living, or to move to new destinations. the tropical forest of South-East Cameroon. Although the fieldtrip had a different purpose, I nevertheless observed that many BakasÚ were forced to leave the forests and migrate to neighboring towns and villages. Strong winds felling trees made life in their natural milieu, the forest, impossible for them. Similarly, according to Grundström, the slow-onset disasters of water scarcity and land degradation caused the mass displacements of more than 2 million people from Bangladesh to the Indian region Assam in the 1970s and 1980s. Another example is the displacement of around 70 000 migrants from Mauretania to Senegal between 1989 and 1990. This was the result of intensified desertification and continuous pressures on the water resources of the Senegal River Valley, which were used by populations of both countries for consumption and agricultural irrigation purposes. These pressures significantly reduced the land available for production (Grundström, 2010). Both displacements not only occurred within states but also between affected areas and neighboring countries. I could witness and observe this type of situation during a fieldtrip that I carried out in Yokadouma in Table 1: The five most large-scale environmental displacements between 2008 and 2012 Year Event Number of people displaced 2010 Monsoon floods (China) 15.2 Million 2008 Earthquake (Wenchuan, Sichuan, China) 15.0 Million 2010 Monsoon floods (Pakistan) 11.0 Million 2012 Monsoon floods (North East India) 6.9 Million 2012 Floods (Nigeria) 6.1 Million Source: Yonetani et al. (2013). 15

Slow environmental violence and forced migrations Slow violence here refers to attritional violence, a violence of delayed effects scattered across time and space that is typically not viewed as violence at all. We are accustomed to conceiving violence in terms that are immediate, explosive and spectacular, as erupting into instant, concentrated visibility (Nixon, 2011). The silence about displacements related to the slow degradation of the environment does not mean that the phenomenon does not exist. In fact, in the silent and hidden contexts neglected by the media people are displaced on a daily basis because of natural or humanmade destruction of their milieus, and because of the long-lasting effect of such destructions on their health, resources and lives. As Nixon rightly puts it, in an age that genuflects to the divinities of spectacle and speed, we tend not to seriously consider the forms of environmental slow violence that are deficient in instant drama but high in long-term catastrophic effects (Nixon, 2011). The deferred casualties of those unsustainable practices are at the origin of daily smallscale silent migrations. Beside slow violence as a motivation of forced migration, another factor can be related to the silent violence that environmental victims endure. Faced with everyday silent violence, people are displaced because of the continuously degrading conditions of their ecosystems, without anybody paying special attention. In some cases, they are even prevented from migrating internally by the authorities. The actions of the police preventing the movements and actions of environmental activists in the Niger State and the populations frustrations constantly controlled by the army are clear examples of this silent environmental violence (Reuveny, 2007; Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009). Further examples include the displacements of 12 to 17 million Bangladeshis who have moved to India and half a million who have moved to other localities of Bangladesh since 1950 because of scarcity of resources exacerbated by frequent storms, floods, and droughts. Similarly, 2.5 million people left the Great Plains in the United States in the 1930s because of strong winds, prolonged drought, and aggressive soil tilling resulting from many large dust storms in the region. The police was deployed to limit the entry of these migrants in California, where they faced ugly slurs, beatings, and discriminations and their shacks were burned (Reuveny, 2007). These cases clearly demonstrate that despite being rarely discussed, slow or silent violence resulting from the gradual destruction of their immediate environment motivates people to move on a daily basis. Climate migrants: actors of environmental conflicts In most cases, climate migrants turn from victims of environmental degradation in their places of origin into actors and instruments of violence in the new milieus where they settle. Mobility and the condition of climate migrants make them highly vulnerable populations. Deprived not only of their livelihoods, but also of their vital space and part of their dignity and identity, climate migrants are highly exposed to multi-origin exploitations. According to Werz and Conley (2012), their vulnerability makes them a suitable recruitment ground for extremist movements of all sorts. From a Malthusian perspective, it is also believed that conflicts over depleting natural resources are one of the main challenges for twenty first century security (Libiszewski, 1992; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Consequently conflict resolution mechanisms and policies at the intra-national, national and international levels have to consider environmental variables (PBSO & UNEP, 2008). Defining the specific concept of climate migration is therefore the first step towards considering the environmental and climate variable in the conception of security and conflict resolution policies. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, I will not dwell on the highly controversial field of environmental security. Instead I will mostly focus on ISSN: 2048-9080 Human Welfare. Volume 1. Issue 1. Spring 2012 16

small-scale conflicts for the environment and against the environment that occur when migrants are fighting for their survival. Such conflicts are, in fact, conflicts by necessity, conflicts for survival rather than for power logic, accumulation or control of resources. In general, environmental migrants engage in conflict to fight for survival by ensuring access to natural resources, to the means of production, and to protect their culture and identity. Such conflicts are mainly the results of Horizontal inequalities or inequalities among culturally defined groups (Stewart, 2010, p. 5), namely between displaced groups and populations already inhabiting the receiving lands. In the context of climate migrations these inequalities mostly consist of economic, social and cultural horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2010). In fact, in this context, the differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, [and] this can cause deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles (Stewart, 2010, p. 5) in receiving lands. Based on these considerations, this section will investigate links between climate migrations and socio-environmental conflicts for survival. Conflicts over natural resources Resource scarcity or accessibility is often cited as a first factor for violent conflicts. As climate change dramatically alters landscapes that formerly supported human populations and their economies, resource availability will become a significant challenge (Wolt, 2011). The debate over the relation between climate induced migrations and conflicts is a two dimensional one, with conflict discussed both as cause and a consequence of climate migration. In the first, causal case, conflicts over access, exploitation, control and management of natural resources in a continuous degrading ecosystem are at the root of environmental migrations (Grundström, 2010). Those who do not have the necessary power to fight and secure access to resources are forced to migrate. In the second, consequential case, environmental migrants become actors of violence where they settle. Here, conflict can be related both to the scarcity created by the high pressure on natural resources (Licker & Oppenheimer, 2013) and the fight for the preservation and sustainable use of resources by the receiving group. The conflicts resulting from the Bangladesh-India and Mauretania-Senegal cases mentioned above demonstrate that the presence of a critical mass of climate-induced displaced people in a given area is likely to generate conflicts. Similarly, in 2007, UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon cited the Darfur crisis as an example of climate change conflict. In fact, even though there had always been some animosity between the pastoralist Arab and the agrarian non-arab communities living in the area, the conflict intensified after the 1980s when access to grazing lands decreased drastically. Traditional animosity then turned into conflicts for the control and exploitation of limited lands and resources available (UNFPA, 2009). Even if it can be argued that these and other conflicts over resources were not exclusively caused by climate-related factors it is nevertheless worth noting that resource wars encompass a variety of rational and non-rational motivations. Expressions of power over rival ethnic, religious, and regional groups, existing as dormant social primers, can be translated into a conflict that is seemingly only about resources (Wolt, 2011). These conflicts over natural resources also contribute to destroying the environment and biodiversity of the receiving communities, creating another arc of violence and potential migrations. The case of Western Tanzania can help demonstrate this. Here the settlement of refugees in the forest ecosystems over the past decades has greatly contributed to deforestation, depletion of water resources, soil erosion 17

and the loss of wild animal habitat. This has also led to the impoverishment of farming lands (Berry, 2008; Warnecke, Tänzler & Vollm, 2010). Conflicts over land It is important to note that most conflicts over land are not environment conflicts. They are normally motivated by the desire to conquest new territories. They become environmental conflicts only when the lands become an object of contention as a result of soil erosion, climate change, change of river flow or any other environmental degradation factor (Libiszewski, 1992). In these situations, the most important motive for conflicts is not occupation, but exploitation, and people are not forced to fight for land by their greed, but by the struggle for survival through access to and use of diminishing exploitable lands. Examples of such struggles can be found in a number of border clashes between Senegal and Mauretania along the Senegal River Valley during wider conflicts. As part of the lands the pastoralists moved into were disputed territories, each group tried to control and use the remaining productive lands (Grundström, 2010). Similarly, a study on the causes of conflicts in the eastern part of Chad recognizes that: The majority of so-called traditional conflicts have their roots in quarrels between farmers and livestock herders living alongside each other and in disputes between rival ethnic groups over access to grazing land or wells ( ). The long drought experienced by the region in the mid-1980s fundamentally altered the make-up of the local population. It forced communities living in the north, in Biltine and Ouaddaï, to emigrate southwards to Dar Sila, where the land is said to be more fertile. Demographic pressure has thus steadily intensified; as a result, conflicts between communities over access to grazing lands and wells have become more frequent (International Crisis Group, 2009). These conflicts between the community and newcomers or even among community members themselves can be understood from a climate change perspective because they are rooted in the scarcity of cultivable lands resulting from the degradation of the environment due to global warming. Environmental migrants and environmental racism The forced, unexpected and unprepared encounter between environmental migrants and local receiving communities can easily bring about a rise of racist feelings. Faced with scarcity of resources, the latter group is likely to build certain isolationist mechanisms. These can result in new forms of environmental racism, where groups will be formed and characterized in terms of natives and non-natives, causing mutual rejection. In this context, group identity conflicts will continue to arise as a result of large-scale movements of populations caused by environmental degradation. As different ethnic and cultural groups are pushed together by these migrations, we should expect people in these groups to see themselves and their neighbors in terms of us and them. In other words, they are likely to use the identity of their own group to judge the worth of other groups, often negatively (Homer-Dixon, 1991). Environmental refugees are expected to dramatically shift the ethnic and cultural makeup of communities as they flee ecologically unsustainable areas to find new economic opportunities (Okwechim, 2013). Competition for resources can be mapped onto existing perceptions of inequality, resulting in a hardening of group identities and providing a catalyst for hostility towards out-groups (Martin, 2005). This environmental clash of identity resulting from the fight 18

for access to natural resources serves not only the access and control of resources but also the selfassertiveness of groups. During the fieldtrip in Yoadouma mentioned above, I asked a villager about the reasons behind discrimination against to the Bakas. In response he literally told me: We do not hate them. Only that when they settle here, we do not have enough food to feed ourselves and feed them too, especially in these last years where, because of the change of seasons and reduction in the quantity of rains, our crops are not yielding much anymore. More to that, they will start fighting for the remaining small lands that are still productive, they will proceed by taking our wives, and teaching our children bad habits. We just want to protect our lands, our resources, our cultures and our habits. This statement speaks to the level of climateinduced racism displaced people can face when they move to new lands to fight for their survival. Conclusion In conclusion, due to sudden- or slow-onset natural or human-made degradation of their environment, people have been forced, are still forced, and will continue to be forced to leave their places and spaces to relocate to new environments. These environmental migrations, be they motivated, forced or emergency displacements are not only negative for the victims but also for the receiving communities. In fact, pushed by the destitution caused by the environmental degradation that is at the origin of their displacements, environmental migrants have no other options than to fight for their survival. As a result they participate in conflicts for access and use of natural resources, for access to cultivable lands and for self-assertiveness in the receiving communities. As the effects of global climate change increase, it becomes imperative for future research to further examine the contexts in which climate-induced migrations are most likely to occur (Licker & Oppenheimer, 2013). Such research can assist decision-makers and leaders in finding alternative means to prevent and mitigate human disasters that can result both from climate migrations and from environmental scarcity (Wolt, 2011). Beside these climate induced migrations, special attention has to be given to those who lack the resources to migrate and are therefore forced to remain in the affected areas and to silently endure the adverse effects of the changing environments (Foresight, 2011). The difficulty of determining the category of the climate migrant does not mean that such migrants do not form a singular and specific social group. Instead this difficult results from the scale on which we want to see and understand climate migrations. This is why, throughout this paper, I have argued that the absence of macro-scale environmental displacements with high media coverage should not obscure the fact that, at the micro-scale, millions of people are continuously displaced because of sudden- or slow-onset degradation, pollution, or destruction of their immediate living environments. Defining the category of climate migrants, according to Stewart, presents important policy implications, for development policy generally as well as for policy in conflict-affected countries (Stewart, 2010, p. 7). It opens the possibility of building legal and political instruments to protect the rights of this category of people and therefore of preventing conflicts resulting from their settlements in receiving lands. Acknowledging climate migrants and protecting their rights, more than a simple humanitarian act, is then a matter of social security and stability. 19

Footnotes The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth was a global summit of civil society and government representatives hosted by Bolivia from April 19 th to 22 nd, 2010. We carried out this field trip in April- May 2012, in the context of the Congo Basin forests and climate change: Synergy between adaptation and mitigation (COBAM), a project financed by the African Development Bank and jointly carried out by the Centre for International Forestry Research, the Stockholm Environment Institute and the University of East Anglia. The aim of the research was to study the socioenvironmental histories of livelihoods, vulnerability, adaptive response and forest management in the tropical forests of the Congo Basin, and it was coordinated by the Stockholm Environment Institute and the University of East Anglia. In fact, this fieldtrip was not directly dedicated to the study of climate displacements and conflicts, but I observed situations of conflicts related to the displacements of the Bakas towards the villages and the urban areas. This reflection came as a result of such observation, and is just an entry point to a case that needs to be studied in depth. Ú The Bakas are a tribe of pigmies living in the Congo Basin forests. They are mostly found in the Southern and Eastern part of Cameroon. There have been several unfruitful attempts to remove them from the forest both by the government authorities, local and international NGOs. Unfortunately, these recent years most of them are forced to leave the forest because of the extreme weather conditions, and the effects of the strong wings felling trees. They find the new living conditions in villages and towns extremely complicated, but at the same time, they are afraid to go back to the forest and face changing and dangerous environmental situations. References Afinotan, L. A., & Ojakorotu, V. (2009). The Niger Delta crisis: Issues, challenges and prospects. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 3. 5. pp. 191-198, May 2009. Available at: http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir Baldwin, A. (2012). Orientalising environmental citizenship: climate change, migration and the potentiality of race. Citizenship Studies, 16:5-6. pp. 625-640. Black, R. (2001). Environmental refugees: myth or reality?. UNHCR Working Papers. Vol., No. 34. pp. 1-19. Brown, O. (2008). Migration and climate change. Migrations research series N 31. International Organization for Migration. Geneva. Castles, S., & Rajah, C. (2010). Environmental Degradation, Climate Change, Migration & Development. Acción Global de los publos sobre Migraciíon, Desarrollo y Derechos Humanos. Available at: http://www.nnirr.org/~nnirrorg/drupal/sites/def ault/files/pga-paper-on-environment-andmigration-by-castlesrajah.pdf Dun, O., & Gemenne, F. (Consulted on 25/02/2013). Defining environmental migration. Available at: http://www.fmreview.org/fmrpdfs/fmr31/1 0-11.pdf European Commission. (2013). Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/w hat/docs/swd_2013_138_en.pdf Foresight. (2011). Migration and Global Environmental Change. Final Project Report. The Government Office for Science. London. Available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/mi gration/11-1116-migration-and-globalenvironmental-change.pdf Gemenne, F. (2009). Environmental Changes and Migration Flows: Normative Frameworks and Policy Responses. (PhD thesis, 20

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