On the Entry into Force of the CTBT

On the Entry into Force of the CTBT LIN Guojiong 1. Special features of the CTBT (1) The establishment of the Preparatory Commission for CTBTO The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated formally at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva from 1993 to 1996 but failed to reach a consensus on the drafted treaty text. It was finalized by a vote at the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 and adopted a resolution (50/245). The adopted treaty was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York and a total of 71 states signed on that day including the five nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It entailed a Meeting of States Signatories and a resolution which established the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) on 19 November 1996. The Commission held its organizational sessions at the United Nations Headquarters in November 1996 and in Geneva in March 1997. [1] (2) Definition of nuclear test Article I of the CTBT stipulates the basic obligations of the Treaty and prohibits States Parties from carrying out any nuclear explosion in any environment. In this connection, the ban of nuclear weapon test is defined as banning only nuclear weapon test explosion or nuclear explosion, so as to provide room for various other nuclear tests, such as computer simulation or sub-critical nuclear test similar to the U.S. science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. Based on such a particular definition of nuclear test, the five nuclear-weapon States were able to reach agreement on the CTBT without compromising their national security. (3) Requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty Unlike all other arms control and disarmament agreements, Article XIV of the CTBT sets out the rigid requirements for the Treaty s entry into force. This will take place 180 days after all specifically designated 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The designated 44 States are those who formally participated in the 1996 session

of the Conference on Disarmament and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at the time. It appears logical for those States with nuclear capability to become states parties of the Treaty without exception, similar to the consensus rule of the Conference on Disarmament. On the other hand, however, all these 44 States have a veto power to the entry into force of the CTBT, unlike for instance, the Chemical Weapons Convention that would enter into force after 180 days when any 65 States have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Obviously, the structural hurdle of the CTBT would make its entry into force more difficult than any other disarmament agreements. Therefore, Article XIV also includes a mechanism to accelerate the Treaty s entry into force, if this had not taken place three years after the anniversary of its opening for signature. Ratifying states can request the Secretary- General of the United Nations, who is the depositary of the Treaty, to convene a Conference to examine how the ratification process can be accelerated. The Conferences can be convened at subsequent anniversaries until the Treaty enters into force. Therefore, the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held its first session in 1999 and its latest session in 2011. (4) Designation of specific nations as states parties for the CTBT Article XIV provides a list of 44 States in annex 2 of the Treaty as designated nations to become states parties, a specific requirement for Treaty s entry into force. This unprecedented arrangement provides those states a special and privileged status against other states but also imposes political pressure and obligation on them. Those states are nuclear capable states with the potential to develop nuclear weapons, particularly the nuclear threshold states. That is why this unique provision was criticized by India and others as a discriminatory measure against them and the negotiated draft treaty had failed to reach consensus in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1996. Alternatively, the identical text of the Treaty was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption by a vote. It is interesting to note that this designation of states parties for the CTBT eventually forced India and Pakistan to conduct nuclear test explosions in 1998 and proclaimed their nuclear-weapon states status. Otherwise, they may continue to claim themselves to be a non-nuclear-weapon state while maintaining nuclear-weapon capability, maneuvering their best national security interest as Israel has been doing.

Indeed, Article XIV is designed to force nuclear threshold states to make a choice, preferably a non-nuclear-weapon state party to NPT, to consolidate the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Unfortunately, it failed to do so. 2. International Politics and the Issue of Entry into Force of the CTBT (1) U.S. domestic politics and the CTBT After intensive nuclear tests during the 1950s and 1960s by the United States and the Soviet Union, The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT), was signed in 1963, without China and France as states parties of the Treaty. The political situation prevailing in subsequent decades of cold war, little progress was made in nuclear disarmament issues until 1991. Parties to the PTBT held an amendment conference that year to consider a proposal to convert the Treaty into an international instrument banning all nuclearweapon tests, particularly a special meeting of parties to the Treaty on 10 August 1992. Due to the preference of the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate a new treaty containing a comprehensive and effective verification system, negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty began in 1993 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, when the negotiations of a chemical weapon convention concluded in 1992. As the United States and other western States took lead in the negotiations of CTBT, China and France faced tremendous political pressure to cope with the pace, particularly when President Bill Clinton planned to conclude treaty negotiations by September 1996 so as to boost his presidential election campaign in November of that year. The draft treaty failed to reach consensus at the Conference on Disarmament but it was adopted by a vote of the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 as Resolution 50/245. After the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for CTBTO and the number of States Signatories and ratifications increased, President Clinton of the United States made efforts to seek the Senate s consent for treaty ratification. Meanwhile the Stockpile Stewardship Program was created in order to maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the absence of nuclear test explosions. However, the Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999 on the grounds of national security concern that the new approach might not satisfy the need of safety and reliability. Under the Republican controlled Senate, President George W.

Bush shelved the CTBT until 2009. When President Barack Obama took office and vowed to get CTBT ratified, little progress however, had been made in this regard due to continued critics of some senators, despite the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been much improved for the past years trial. [2] Moreover, the Democrat President Obama had been unable to gain support of a two-thirds majority in the Senate because of traditional party politics. As the current unfavorable economy continues, the Democrats seem to face difficulty in controlling l the Senate floor in the future, and the chance for a CTBT ratification is fading. It is interesting to note that the United States was the country pushing for a CTBT and became the first signatory state, but could be one of the last states parties to the Treaty. (2) Current status of the CTBT As of September 2012, the CTBT has been signed by 183 nations, including the five recognized nuclear-weapon States, and ratified by 157, including France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. Among the 44 designated nations listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, 36 have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary- General of the United Nations. There are eight remaining holdout nations for the entry into force of the Treaty, namely China, the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Pakistan and the United States. All of the eight holdout states have signed the Treaty except India, DPRK and Pakistan. (3) CTBT and the specific holdout states The ratification of the United States is critical for the entry into force of the CTBT but not essential because other holdout states are equally important to the Treaty. For the prospect of the entry into force of the CTBT, it seems necessary to give a full analysis of each nation, as follows. (A) China: As well known, the nuclear arsenal of China is far behind the United States in terms of quality and quantity. The limited weapons of Chinese nuclear arsenal are prepared for defensive deterrence purposes and are still in the improvement process. China announced its nuclear test moratorium when she secured the technology for safety and reliability of nuclear weapons without nuclear test explosions. China is barely holding a strategic balance with limited nuclear weapons against the United States and

other nuclear-weapon States. Such a balance depends greatly upon the present status of the United States, particularly the ongoing American ballistic missile defense system. Therefore, China will definitely not deposit its instrument of ratification for the CTBT before the United States decides to do so, as in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997. (B) DPRK: The United States and the DPRK encountered a dispute on the compliance of NPT in the early 1990s, a post-cold war heyday for the West. The said dispute on nuclear nonproliferation was finally culminated in a reasonable and balanced Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK in 1994. Regrettably, due to its ideological value judgment and party politics, the United States and its allies failed to deliver the promised nuclear reactors by 2003 and other measures contained in the Agreement, and thus created a confidence crisis and mutual distrust. The situation was further deteriorated when Republican President Bush denounced the DPRK as one of the three Axis of evils and included it in the list of seven countries which were subject to American use of nuclear weapons under the so-called preemptive strike policy in 2002. The U.S. drastic move pushed the DPRK to resume and accelerate its nuclear weapon program and to withdraw from the NPT. The diplomatic Six-Party Talks led by China from 2003 did not slow down the DPRK from developing nuclear weapons, which ended up conducting nuclear test explosions in 2006 and 2009. It is clear that the DPRK is striving for a nuclear weapon program which would provide a minimal nuclear deterrence. On many occasions, the DPRK proclaimed itself a nuclear-weapon state. In this regard, it is ascertained that the DPRK will continue to speed up its nuclear weapon program through nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests, unless a diplomatic agreement similar to that of 1994 could be reached, in which the United States would normalize its relations with the DPRK and provide the unconditional negative security assurances, as requested. (C) Egypt: In view of the Middle East security situation, Egypt is keeping its nuclear program option open and its ratification of the CTBT is contingent upon the ratifications of Israel and Iran as well as upon the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of

the Middle East. Although a resolution on such a zone has been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly for years, it is far from its realization. (D) India: India conducted its first nuclear test explosion in 1974 for so-called peaceful uses and continued to proclaim itself as a non-nuclear-weapon state, but refused to become a state party to the NPT ever since. With an intention of seeking a world-class big power status, India developed its nuclear weapons program for decades and culminated in its nuclear test explosions in May 1998, as a response to the conclusion of the CTBT and the provision contained in Article XIV. It seems clear that India will not give its adherence to the NPT unless it is recognized as a nuclear-weapon state. India will continue to improve its nuclear weapons program, including its delivery system. India s moratorium of nuclear testing is fragile until the time she obtains the technology similar to the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program. Only until that time India may consider its accession to the CTBT. (E) Iran: Since its break with the United States in 1979, Iran has been under economic sanctions and arms embargos by the Western countries for decades. The decade-long Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s further weakened Iran until the new century in 2000. Iran s nuclear program of uranium enrichment for peaceful use under the provisions of NPT from 2003 has caused suspicion of developing nuclear weapons by the Western states, in particular the United States and Israel. The decade-long diplomatic negotiations did not produce a satisfactory result while the Iranian technology of uranium enrichment has been improved significantly. The dispute is heightened and the situation is deteriorating in 2012 as Israel urged a drastic move against Iranian nuclear facilities. It is clear that Iran would like to keep its nuclear options open and nuclear-weapons capability ready for any contingency. Therefore, Iran will definitely not ratify the CTBT in the foreseeable future unless a satisfactory solution among the concerned countries could be made, including the normalization of relations with the United States and other Western states. Nevertheless, a settlement of the Middle East problems is the key solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, notwithstanding the motive of struggle for leadership among major powers in the region.

(F) Israel: The creation of the state of Israel is the root cause of the Middle East problem for decades, particularly the territorial occupation and disputes as the result of three wars in the region. The problem has been further deteriorated since Israel became a nuclear state in the 1980s in order to deter the surrounding hostile neighboring countries. [3] Israel is now a de facto nuclear-weapon state and refused to participate in the NPT as a nonnuclear-weapon state. In the case of the CTBT, Israel did sign the Treaty, which could be interpreted that a technology of computer simulation and sub-critical tests has been operating. It can be said that Israel s ratification of the CTBT will be contingent to American ratification of the Treaty, without prejudice to its nuclear-weapon capability for deterrence. (G) Pakistan: The Indian and Pakistan border disputes has been decades long through two wars, even ended up with the creation of Bangladesh, the former Eastern part of Pakistan. Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons program contingent on India, which was culminated in nuclear weapon test explosions in May 1998 following the Indian nuclear tests. Pakistan is now a de facto nuclear-weapon state and will not participate in the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. It is clear that Pakistan is improving its nuclear weapon capability including the delivery system. Pakistan will not ratify the CTBT, unless India decides to do so and a technology of computer simulation and sub-critical test is ready for operation. (H) United States: The U.S. ratification of the CTBT is critical for the entry into force of the Treaty. However, the American party politics will not provide such an opportunity in the foreseeable future, particularly if the Republican Party controls the Presidency and the Senate. Because of American party politics, various nuclear experts and institutions may release controversial opinions or studies on current nuclear safety and reliability, despite the existing nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program being well improved. Moreover, the U.S. decision of developing a complicated and world-wide ballistic missile defense system has added to the controversy of the debate on the readiness of American ratification of the CTBT. Nowadays, as the sole superpower in the world with a mentality

of hegemony, the United States seems to prefer a status quo with regard to the CTBT and the current international balance of power, particularly in view of the emerging powers such as China, Russia, India, and Brazil etc. It could be said that the United States is not in a hurry to ratify the CTBT and may be more interested in keeping the status quo notwithstanding as a signatory state of the Treaty. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the United States signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol in 1925 but only deposited its instrument of ratification in 1975, 50-year later. Similarly, it signed the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention in 1982, but only deposited its instrument of ratification in 1995. [4] Moreover, the United States did sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but has not deposited its instrument of ratification as of yet. (4) The issue of nuclear-weapon state status Today, the definition of nuclear-weapon state is controversial. To date, the only official and formal definition provided is contained in section 3 of Article IX of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which states: For the purpose of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. In this regard, only China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States would be recognized officially as nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the NPT is the treaty to which it is most universally adhered among disarmament agreements thus far, because only DPRK, India, Israel and Pakistan are not states parties of the Treaty. Since the signing of NPT in 1968 and its entry into force in March 1970, five countries have conducted nuclear test explosions, namely India in 1974 and 1998, Israel and South Africa jointly in 1979, Pakistan in 1998, DPRK in 2006 and 2009. Among them, South Africa abolished its policy of apartheid and joined the NPT in 1991 as a nonnuclear-weapon state, while India, Pakistan and the DPRK proclaimed their nuclearweapon state status. Only Israel kept its nuclear status vague and silent. As to those selfproclaimed nuclear-weapon states, the international community adopted a policy of nonrecognition as reflected in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998) and in the Final Documents of the NPT Review Conferences in 2000 and 2010. Thus,

officially there are five nuclear-weapon States as recognized by the NPT and the international community. In reality, there are nine nuclear-weapon States today, among which four are referred to as de facto nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon capable States. However, there is a common understanding that in order to safeguard the current international nuclear nonproliferation regime the NPT-definition of nuclear-weapon States should not be changed. 3. U.S.-China Relations and the CTBT (1) U.S. strategic shift from Europe to Asia and the CTBT Since 2010 the United States has announced on various occasions its strategic shift from Europe to Asia, in terms of pivoting or rebalancing, particularly the East Asia. In this regard, it was concretely stipulated that sixty percent of U.S. armed forces and six aircraft carrier battle groups would be stationed in Asia by 2020. In addition, the United States is vigorously seeking bases to deploy its ballistic missile defense system in East Asia, as reflected in the recent agreement with Japan to install an X-band radar system in Okinawa. More such installations will be made at other places such as the Philippines and Australia. Other advanced weapons and systems have been deploying in the region from time to time, such as F-22, F-35, MV-22, nuclear submarines etc. All such military moves would indicate that the United States is desperately trying to contain China s rise in all aspects, in particular its military rise, although American senior officials denied such an assertion and expressed the hope of a strong and prosperous China for world peace. To this point, Confucius said: Listen his words and watch his behavior. 听其言观其行. The current U.S.-China relations has particularly encountered inherent structural contradictions in terms of struggle for power, as political realism put it, despite China repeating its assertion in terms of peaceful rise or peaceful development and new concept of security. The great power rivalry will definitely contribute new dimensions and uncertainties to the national security decision-making on the issue of ratification for the CTBT on both sides, adding further interdependence situations. (2) The Taiwan Issue and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons/CTBT By General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of the United Nations, adopted on 25 October 1971, China restored its lawful rights in the United Nations and expelled the

representatives of Taiwan out of the Organization. The United States later also adopted the One-China Policy when it decided to establish diplomatic relations with China, although the U.S. Congress also adopted the Taiwan Relations Act simultaneously. The Chinese civil war has not concluded yet and Taiwan Strait is still under the theoretical hostile conditions even today. Under the framework of the United Nations, Taiwan is a part of China legally but, in reality, it is still out of Chinese Government s administrative control ever since the establishment of the People s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The Chinese Government is desperately seeking a final reunification of China, which has been the crux of Sino-American relations for decades. In this connection, it should be pointed out that under the administrations of Chiang Kai-shek ( 蒋介石 ) and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo ( 蒋经国 ), Taiwan secretly set up clandestine Hsin-Chu Programs ( 新竹计划 )for developing nuclear weapons from 1960s to 1980s, with a view to deter nuclear weapons program on Chinese Mainland. Taiwan s nuclear ambition was interrupted three times by the United States under the framework of NPT,since Taiwan (as Republic of China, ROC) joined the Treaty in 1968 as a non-nuclear-weapon State due to American pressure. Such nuclear-weapon ambition was once again revived in Taiwan when tension in Taiwan Strait became high during 1995-1996 and when the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party ( 民主进步党 ) was in power from 2000 to 2008. As some American scholars observed, when Taiwan (as Republic of China ) joined the NPT in 1968 as a non-nuclear-weapon State, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) immediately initiated the negotiation of a safeguard agreement according to the relevant provisions of the Treaty. However, the negotiation was short-circuited in 1971 when the United Nations adopted its Resolution 2758 (XXVI) and, thus IAEA, transferred its official recognitions to the PRC. To ensure the non-nuclear-weapon status of Taiwan, the United States, Taiwan and the IAEA finally reached a trilateral nuclear safeguard agreement on 6 December 1971 with the title Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America (INFCIR/158). This transfer arrangement is also titled A Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to a Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of China and the United States of America, which incorporated

the U.S.-ROC Nuclear Cooperation Agreement signed on 18 July 1955, as a basis for future safeguards on Taiwan s nuclear program. Under this agreement which may entail a wide-range of political ramifications, the United States became the nuclear supplier with regard to materials and facilities for Taiwan as well as the ultimate legal guarantor of Taiwan s non-nuclear weapon status. It also means that any nuclear materials or facilities that Taiwan acquired from the international community would be treated as if they came from the United States and thus subject to whatever restrictions may apply under American law, such as 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, etc. According to Taiwan Relations Act, all international and bilateral agreements between Taiwan (as Republic of China) and the United States prior to U.S.-China normalization of relations on 1 January 1979 would continue valid. This would also apply to the said U.S.-Taiwan-IAEA trilateral agreement on nuclear safeguards. [5] In this connection, it should be pointed out that under the United Nations system the one China policy is applied and Taiwan is a part of China. However, nowadays the IAEA continues to treat Taiwan as a non-nuclear-weapon Party to the NPT in accordance with the said trilateral agreement. This situation is unacceptable and should be rectified so as to safeguard the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The present trilateral agreement (INFCIRC/158) should be replaced by a bilateral agreement between China and the IAEA which would cover Taiwan s nuclear safeguards issue, or by a China- IAEA-Taiwan trilateral agreement in which Taiwan is treated as a region, like the case in the World Trade Organization. As a serious matter of sovereignty, China, instead of the United States, should be the nuclear supplier and the guarantor of Taiwan s non-nuclearweapon status, so as to close up a gap for the NPT and the CTBT. By the way, it should be noted that, as being stipulated by Chinese senior officials on many occasions, one of the situations for China to use force against Taiwan is that Taiwan decides to develop nuclear weapons. We may also observe that should the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party come to power in Taiwan once again in the future, its intention of developing nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. It would thus pose a serious challenge to the universality of the CTBT, since the ratification of China would not cover Taiwan in the present circumstances, as long as the Chinese reunification is pending. 4. Assessment and Conclusion

(1) As most representatives participating in the Informal Meeting of the General Assembly to mark the Observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 6 September 2012 and the latest General Assembly Resolution 66/64, adopted in December 2011, entitled Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty pointed out, the CTBT constitutes an effective measure for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. Third preambular paragraph of the Resolution stresses that a universal and effectively verifiable Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and that, after more than fifteen years, its entry into force is more urgent than ever before. Indeed, the CTBT is the cornerstone for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament, while the entry into force of the Treaty is the cornerstone for the realization of the CTBT. (2) The United States may be quite satisfied with the current CTBT ratification situation, since the status quo will certainly tie up most countries from conducting nuclear tests while it will keep the potential American test explosions free. The de facto nuclearweapon States like India, Pakistan and DPRK would also prefer the status quo situation, so that they will have more time to improve their nuclear weapons program without too much international pressure for accession, particularly the technology of computer simulation and sub-critical tests. For China, the early entry into force of the CTBT may give certain monopoly advantages for the five nuclear-weapon States of the NPT. In any case, China will not deposit its instrument of ratification before the United States decides to do so, particularly in view of the current American strategic return to Asia and the Pacific in containment of China. (3) India, Pakistan and DPRK, non-parties to the NPT and not signatories of the CTBT, have conducted nuclear test explosions and proclaimed as nuclear-weapon States, despite the non-recognition policy by the international community. In the foreseeable future, they will not yield themselves as non-nuclear-weapon States and will not adhere to the NPT unless they are granted with nuclear-weapon States status, which would require amendments of the Treaty, a catastrophe for the non-proliferation regime. Their decisions to adhere to the CTBT may depend upon the technological achievement for computer simulation and sub-critical tests. Israel will not participate in the NPT as

long as the settlement of the Middle East problems is pending. Its ratification of the CTBT will be contingent upon that of the United States. (4) Should the United States decide to ratify the CTBT it would still not be able to bring the Treaty entering into force, because any one of the 44 States listed in the Annex 2 of the Treaty holds the equal right of veto power, particularly those holdout States. The American ratification of the Treaty may be crucial but not essential. If the United States wishes to play the role as principal promoter and would push for early entry into force of the CTBT, two political options may be considered. One, the United States must drastically change its present hostile foreign policy towards DPRK and Iran and engages in the normalization of relations with them. Two, the United States may choose a policy of more hostile position towards those countries through military operations, like the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, by overthrow of the present political regimes and setup of a favorable and controllable government. The second option would entail a drastic rearrangement of regional balance and certain political and economic consequences, including regional instability and nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the United States would also need to make significant political compromise towards other de facto nuclearweapons States, namely India and Pakistan. In view of so many hurdles ahead, the United States may choose the third option, a policy of status quo. (5) Taiwan s non-nuclear-weapon Status should be secured by a new bilateral agreement between China and the IAEA or an appropriate arrangement under the United Nations framework of a one-china policy. (6) In order to safeguard the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, the provision of Article XIV of the CTBT should not be amended or compromised for the sake of early entry into force. Any compromise may trigger the collapse of the present fragile system of the NPT. The proposal of temporary entry into force of the CTBT is also self-defeating. As Confucius pointed out: Do not be desirous to have things done quickly; do not look at small advantages. Desire to have things done quickly prevents their being done thoroughly. Looking at small advantages prevents great affairs from being accomplished. 无欲速, 无见小利, 欲速则不达, 见小利则大事不成. [6] The entry into force of the CTBT may be a long journey. Let nature run its course.

Notes [1] As Secretary of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) of the United Nations General Assembly, I, the Author, served as Secretary of the Meeting of Signatories of the CTBT as well as the First Session of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in November 1996 and March 1997. Chairman of the Meeting of Signatories of the CTBT was Canadian Ambassador D. Moher, and Chairman of the First Session of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO was South African Ambassador Jacob Selebi. The First Session of the Preparatory Commission in November 1996 was unable to reach agreement on the distribution of senior posts among concerned States on a basis of political and geographical balance. A follow-up meeting was held in March 1997, the Preparatory Commission successfully concluded its organizational session including the distribution of senior posts, annual budget and other administrative matters. [2] See No Going Back: 20 Years Since the Last U.S. Nuclear Test Arms Control Today, Volume 3, Issue 14, September 20, 2012, Washington D.C. [3] In September 1979, it was reported that according to U.S. satellite a strong blink was detected in the sky of South Atlantic Ocean. This suspicious event, which was later confirmed, provided the international community the evidence of a joint Israel-South Africa nuclear test explosion for weapon purpose. Thus, an item entitled South Africa s Nuclear Capability was included in the Agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1980 session as proposed by the Group of African States. The item remained on the annual agenda of the Disarmament Commission until 1990 when South Africa decided to abolish its policy of apartheid and joined the NPT in 1991. [4] See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1997, P. 10 and P. 212. [5] See Derek J. Mitchell, Taiwan s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment, and Honor, The Nuclear Tipping Point, edited by Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2004. Pp. 293-313. Also see David Albright and Corey Gay, Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 Number 1 (January/February 1998).

[6] See Confucian Analects, Book XIII Tsze-Lu, chapter 17, translated into English by James Legge. Brief Biographical Note LIN Guojiong (LIN Kuo-Chung) Ph.D., Principal Political Affairs Officer on disarmament affairs of the United Nations (Retired), Secretary of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) of the United Nations General Assembly (1996-2001), Secretary of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (1986-1996). Secretary, Working Groups of the Committee on Disarmament: Security Assurances, Radiological Weapons, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, (1980-1984). Lecturer in Political Science, University of Nairobi, Kenya (1975-1977). Guest Professor, School of International Relations, Peking University, China (1997-2005).