Overcoming the Danger of Incumbency: The Case of Smer Party in Slovakia

Overcoming the Danger of Incumbency: The Case of Smer Party in Slovakia Peter Spáč, Vlastimil Havlík Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University Email: spac.peter@gmail.com, havlik@fss.muni.cz Prepared for the ECPR General Conference, Montréal, 26-29 August, 2015. Work in progress. Please, do not cite without prior permission of the authors.

The term populism has become an important issue in the current political science. However there are very few studies dealing with development of populist parties after they gain electoral success or even become part of a governing coalition. The main idea is that populist appeals are best suited for parties outside the establishment. However, when populists succeed to enter the national parliament or even the government, the credibility of their populist appeals becomes difficult to sustain. Consequently, the support of populist political parties is expected to decrease after they enter the system and become part of the establishment. However, the results of the empirical research up to date are somewhat mixed. Some populist parties have been characterized by flash performance, on the other hand there are examples of populist parties that survived their initial electoral success and even their electoral support increased (or at least did not drop) after participation in government. The question is what happens to populist parties arfter they enter the government and, consequently, which factors (and how) determine their survival in the system. Trying to fill the gap in the field, we focus on the case of Slovak political party Smer Social Democracy (Smer sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD). Why have we selected this case? First, Smer was established as a so-called centrist (Učeň 2004) or exclusively (Havlík, Pinková 2012) populist party, i.e. a political party which policy platform was based on populist appeals without any other coherent set of values (in other words the populism of Smer was not accompanied by any host ideology ). Consequently, the theoretical expectations about the negative impact of the entry of populist parties into the system are even more relevant in case of exclusively populist parties in comparison to other populist parties which legitimization is based not only on populism but also on another set of values as nativism of populist radical right parties (Mudde 2007) or anti-capitalism and egalitarianism of populist socialist parties (March 2011). In other words, if populism of ideological populist parties does not work anymore, there is still another policy programme that is more easily to pursue even within government. Second, despite its bigger vulnerability caused by the centrist populist profile of Smer, the party has emerged as one of the most successful cases of populist parties in Europe not only to be able to win an electoral contest but also to form a single-party majority government. Last but not least, although there are several studies dealing with (the effects) of governing participation of (mostly) populist radical right parties in Western Europe, only very little attention has been paid to centrist populist parties is Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, by analyzing the Smer party the presented study aims to contribute to understanding the nature and perspectives of centrist populist party in the region of Central and Eastern Europe after they enter the government. Even more importantly, it shows that populist parties may resist the danger of incumbency successfully. If populists become aware that their profile is rather incompatible with the new situation, a shift of their character may be expected. First, in ideological terms, these parties may drop the populist appeal and seek another programmatic basis. Second, this change may be reflected in the structure of the electorate as different voters may be attracted by the new party's ideology. Finally, the adaptation process of a populist party may be present also in reforming its internal organization and building a structure resembling classical parties. The main aim of the paper is to analyze the Slovak party Smer SD (Direction) and its pathway from populism to social democracy. The party emerged in 1999 and in the following years it has become the core of the system with power influence on both national and subnational level of domestic politics. The paper seeks to study its shift in three areas the ideology, electoral support (using national election studies and data from European Social Survey) and internal organization. It

shows that populist parties may successfully modify their original profile if they find it harmful for their further ambitions and adapt for an existence within their earlier enemy - the establishment. Power as a challenge for populists? In recent period there has been a vast and increasing interest of political scientists in populism in general and populist political parties in particular (Canovan 1999; Canovan 2004; Taggart 2000; Mudde 2007; Pop-Eleches 2010). The main focus has been paid to the ideological features and consequently - conceptualization of populism (Rooduijn 2013, van Kessel 2014). This discussion contains several difficulties. As states populism is as unusual concept typical by conceptual slipperiness (Taggart 2000). In other words this label is used in different fashion by various groups of people including scholars, elite and voters. In a more narrative way populism is often presented as a reaction to the failure of democratic elites to keep the citizens satisfied with the quality of democracy (cf. Arditi 2004). This concept is more elaborated by Margaret Canovan (1999) who differs between two faces of democracy, the redemptive and pragmatic. While the former represents some kind of ideal the latter falls down into power struggle. With politics taking more the shape of the latter face the environment becomes more open for populists to appear. As Canovan implies populism is a shadow cast by the democracy itself. Although the term populism remains still a bit fuzzy there is an agreement on so-called analytical core of populism. To sum up this discussion three points are worth mentioning (cf. Havlík and Pinková 2012). First, populism operates with a division of society into two solid blocs the people and the elites. Second, these two homogeneous blocs are set against each other and a conflict between them is often stressed by populists. From the populism s point of view the elites are depicted in a fully negative way. The establishment is understood as a corrupted force which has betrayed the people and its interests. Rather than representing the people the elites are accused of following their own interest at the expense of a general good of the society. The third and final point of populism is a call for a return of power back to the people. Populist parties often claim that the people as a sovereign should have the upper hand with the elites subordinated to their will. In real politics populists use to seek this ambition by demanding the introduction or strengthening of tools of direct democracy. While the concept of populism is vastly covered only a little focus has been devoted to development of populism after these parties succeed in elections and/or become part of the government (for exceptions see De Lange [2008], and most recently Albertazzi, McDonnell [2015]). It seems unchallenged that all political parties seek power. Thus, becoming a parliamentary or governmental party is usually understood as a success on this path. However, this may not be fully true for populists. When populist parties succeed in national election their character may become a potential burden. To summarize theoretical discussion of the effect of incumbency on electoral fortunes of populist political parties, two different kind of explanations for the incumbency challenge are provided. First, populist political parties will be affected negatively by their government participation because of their inexperience and lack of competent personnel. The lack of experience and competent policy-makers may be typical for all newly arisen political parties but

typical loose and leader oriented organizational structure makes it even worse for populist political parties. As put it by Heinisch (2003): [the] movement character of populist parties that is their high level of mobilisation, the frequent rotation of personnel and the de-emphasis of institutions tends to pose major problems when such groups enter the government, one of the most institutionalised settings imaginable. Second, popularity of populist parties in power is expected to decrease due to the values the ideology of populism is based on and due to unrealistic promises delivered by populists during election campaigns. This expectation lies in the tension between the two faces of democracy (pragmatic and redemptive) explained by M. Canovan (1999). In other words, there is a gap between high voters` expectation about democracy and democratically elected politicians (redemptive vision) and only limited capacity of politicians to meet this expectation (due to the fact that democracy is just a polity in which a peaceful way of conflict resolution is taken place, typical by comprimises and institutional constraints). On one hand, it opens the space for populist mobilization based on anti-establishment sentiments stressing the redemptive face of democracy. On the other hand, once populists get into power, its own inability to live up to its promises will be revealed (Canovan 1999: 12). As Canovan (2004) correctly announces populists are most comfortable in opposition. This insight is fully backed by the nature of populism. As mentioned above the criticism of the political establishment is a prime mobilizing tool for populists. Objectively it is easier to use this appeal when standing outside of "the system". In other words attacking the elites is more persuasive when done by an outsider rather than by a member of the establishment. This raises a question what may happen to populists after they lose their outsider status and whether there is something they can do to prevent the expected decline of popularity. To limit the comparative disadvantage of populist parties in power, two strategies seem to be open for these parties. First, populists may remain on their original ideological background. Following their roots these parties may continue with dividing society into two blocs and further attack the elites from their betrayal on the people. Although it is unclear how this combination of "insider" status and "outsider" profile allows them to keep the trust of their voters it definitely limits the potential of populists to engage into long-term cooperation with mainstream parties. Populists thus may seek a second option. If they become aware that their character is rather incompatible with the new situation, a twofold shift based on theoretical discussion above may be expected. First, the adaptation process of a populist party may be present also in reforming its internal organization and building a structure resembling classical parties thus to be able to recruit personnel to to govern both on national and subnational levels of a political system. Second, in ideological terms, these parties may drop the populist appeal and seek another programmatic basis. This change may be reflected in the structure of the electorate as different voters may be attracted by the new party's ideology. In order to ensure the survival of a populist party in power, the change needs to be effective and credible. Consequently, besides the agency role of the populist party (its willingness to change and the actual change), several other factors need to be taken into consideration. The character of the party system in which populists operates is crucial in this context. In other words, the party system has to provide opportunity for a successful populist transformation, i.e. a niche suitable for a transformed populist party. To explain the story of successful transformation of SMER party in Slovakia, we will analyze the ideological and organizational changes the party underwent after in entered the parliament and government and will put into a broader context of party politics in Slovakia. A detailed analysis of the

SMER success will contribute not only to better understanding of Slovak politics but also to understand the reasons why some populist parties survive and other disappears quickly. SMER-SD from an outsider to the core of the establishment Party SMER (Direction in Slovak) was established in 1999 by Robert Fico a former high profile representative of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). The party was created as an act by Fico who left SDL several months after national election in 1998. This election - crucial for the Slovak political development replaced the government of Vladimír Mečiar with a new cabinet led by Mikuláš Dzurinda. Although Fico's occupied the post of a vice-chairman in SDL he did not get any executive position which might have been one of the factors of his demise from his party (cf. Kopeček 2007). In the second half of the 90s the Slovak party system was highly polarized. The crucial line which divided the system was the stance towards the leader of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Mečiar. All the relevant parties aligned according their position to Mečiar which led into existence of two separate blocs with no ability to cooperate. After Dzurinda s government was installed in 1998 this division started to fade, however it still divided political parties for several further years. Party SMER fully used this situation and declared itself as a subject standing beyond this division and against the both mentioned blocs. Until 2002 election it kept its strong protest appeal and scored third with more than 13 per cent of votes hence becoming a parliamentary party. With four center-right parties able to create a majority government SMER remained in opposition, however now turning to a more leftist profile (see more below). Since that it kept strengthening its support and starting with 2006 it has won all national elections so far. Table 1 shows the party s electoral results since 2002. Table 1: Results of SMER in national elections Election Votes Votes (%) Seats (out of 150) 2002 387,100 13.5 25 2006 671,185 29.1 50 2010 880,111 34.8 62 2012 1,134,280 44.4 83 Source of data: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. On the national level the party joined two governments till the present day. First it created a coalition government in 2006 with HZDS and Slovak National Party (SNS). The government lasted for the full term until 2010 election. The next two years witnessed SMER in opposition as the centerright government led by Iveta Radičová was formed. The government did not survive a veto of

confidence in 2011 which led to early election 2012. In this election SMER obtained a majority in parliament and created a single-party government. Apart from the national politics the party was able to secure strong positions on the other levels. With the years following its emergence it gradually strengthened its gains in the elections on the subnational level. The same counted for the elections to the EP as SMER clearly won this competition in both 2009 and 2014 leaving its rivals well behind. In 2004 and 2009 the party supported the winning candidate for the presidential office however in 2014 its chairman Fico was defeated in the runoff to the independent Andrej Kiska. To sum up the pathway of SMER to political power this began in 1999. During the time of its emergence the party stood outside of the system and its only official representative was its chairman Fico elected as MP in 1998 on the SDL list. Since that time the party continuously enhanced its influence and spread its power into all levels of Slovak politics. During its peak in 2012 the party held the majority in parliament, formed a single-party national government, had strong links with the president, controlled the most of regions and finally was the most successful party on the local level only behind the traditionally successful independents. In a nutshell in a relatively short time period the party starting as an outsider became the main core of the political establishment and by doing so it fully abandoned its populism. The further parts of the paper analyze the changes of SMER in three dimensions the ideology, the internal structure and the voters characteristics. Shift of ideology The ideological profile of SMER since its emergence went through a substantial modification. In period before 2002 national election which Kopeček (2007, 284) labels as the "founding era", the party openly refused any left-right inclination. On the contrary SMER adopted a hostile position to any ideological classification. The party interpreted this stance by pointing to vast and important problems of country and society which were also without ideological affiliation. Hence, SMER proposed pragmatism as its leading principle and stressed the need to come with solutions based on common sense. From the beginning the party adopted a strictly negative appeal against the existing establishment. SMER blamed all the elites from failure which was best portrayed in its theme "as they stole under Mečiar, so they steal under Dzurinda" (Wienk and Majchrák 2003, 168). Although pointing to specific persons this slogan was rather meant as a criticism of the whole politics before emergence of SMER with names of both prime ministers as the main figures of these previous years. The party accused the elites from being distant from people and this gap could be resolved only be replacing the whole generation of political representatives (cf. Spáč 2012, 245). The depicted profile of the party led authors to a consensus about characterizing it as populist (cf. Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; Učeň 2004; Mesežnikov 2009; Spáč 2012). In his work Peter Učeň (2003) claimed SMER to be a representative of the so called "centrist populism" based on a combination of its populist features and negative stance towards any ideological classification. Although SMER included some features which could lean it somehow to the left this

labeling quite precisely defined its true position. A criticism to this could be raised by pointing to the addition of "Third Way" to the name of the party before 2002 election but this change did not prove to have any substantial impact. First, the concept introduced by Giddens was rather or even fully unknown to Slovak voters and second its usage rather pointed to the aim of SMER to stand beyond the two blocs of parties in the polarized party system. SMER entered the 2002 national election with a clear intention to win and become the main governmental party with Robert Fico as the Prime Minister. The third position behind HZDS and Dzurinda's newly created Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) and a gain of only slightly more than 13 per cent of votes was however a disappointment. The party entered the parliament but stayed in opposition as a center-right government led by Dzurinda was created. As the further years showed the 2002 election was a crucial point in the party's development. The party's low electoral result led to substantial modification of the ideological profile as SMER began its publicly announced shift to social democracy. To support this trend the party successfully merged with smaller leftist parties in 2004 including Fico's former SDL. This integration was symbolically confirmed by a change of SMER's name to SMER Social Democracy (SMER-SD). The choice why to modify the party's profile particularly to social democracy had at least two favorable reasons. First, Robert Fico spent the 90s as an important figure of the leading leftist Slovak party SDL which secured him a substantial support among the voters oriented to the left. Second, while first Dzurinda's government formed in 1998 was heterogeneous in ideological sense, this did not work for his second cabinet. The government created after 2002 election comprised of four center-right parties and began to conduct vast liberal economic reforms. Together with a disastrous result of the leftist parties in 2002 election (cf. Fitzmaurice 2004) a gap on the electoral market was open on the left part of the spectrum. Hence, SMER made a pragmatic decision to move to area where it already had some links due to its chairman's past and where it was able to mobilize significant amount of new supporters. The ideological changes of SMER-SD affected also its populist face. The main attributes of populism were kept however they became milder and oriented not universally against elites in general but against the parties of Dzurinda's government. Before 2002 election the party openly called for "order" and even for a rather far right understanding of social policy aimed against people parasitizing on the society. After this election SMER-SD abandoned such claims and set the concept of social justice as its main theme. Altogether during years 2002 and 2006 the party significantly weakened though not eliminated its populist profile and parallel it gradually adopted the ideas of social democracy (cf. Učeň 2007). National election in 2006 was another breaking point in development of SMER-SD. The party entered government as a senior partner with HZDS and SNS and Robert Fico became Prime Minister. Hence, SMER-SD became the core of the ruling coalition and with rising strength on the other levels of political arena (e.g. local and regional) also the core of the whole political system. The later years only secured this trend as SMER-SD became the dominant part of the party system with no rival of comparable power. The governmental experience enhanced the changes of SMER-SD's profile launched after 2002 election. The party improved and deepened its social democratic agenda. This was fairy visible in the party's campaign before 2012 election with the theme "People deserve securities" referring to

the need for a more generous social policy. On the other hand since 2006 SMER-SD nearly fully abandoned its once dominating populist profile. In its new role of the main core of the establishment the party was unable to continue with its anti-elite appeals. On the contrary, on several occasions Robert Fico started to divide the Slovak party system into "standard" and other parties. While the former referred to SMER-SD and several other established parties the latter term was pointing to a group of new subjects including the populist Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO) created in 2011. The irony is that although the profile of OLaNO fairly resembles the ideology of SMER before 2002 Robert Fico assigns this party in a group of "political fools and half-fools". Hence, with such a terminology SMER-SD officially proclaimed its affiliation as a mainstream party firmly attached to the establishment. To sum up this part in less than one decade SMER-SD changed from a clearly populist party refusing any ideological classification to a social democratic formation openly stressing this affiliation. The ideological transformation had three main stages. First, which occurred after party's emergence and lasted until 2002 election, witnessed SMER-SD as an anti-establishment party calling for a change of the whole generation of politicians. The failure in 2002 election led to reassessment of its own profile and to adaptation to new conditions as a parliamentary opposition party standing against a center-right government. During this period SMER-SD officially adopted social democratic profile and gradually weakened its populist appeals. The third and final stage began after 2006 election when the party entered the government. Since then SMER-SD secured its social democratic profile, proclaimed its alignment to the mainstream parties and even adopted a negative stance against populists which happen to resemble its beginnings in 1999. Although the social democratic profile of SMER-SD somehow differs from an agenda of its Western European counterparts (cf. Učeň 2007) it might be concluded that the party of Robert Fico has accomplished a successful major shift of its ideology which allowed it to endure in the Slovak party system and even become its strongest part. Changes of organizational structure After its emergence in 1999 the party SMER aimed primarily at mobilizing voters at the expense of building a thorough organizational structure. The party was created as a sole act of its founder Robert Fico what was reflected in its internal framework and processes. The original "structure" of SMER consisted only of chairman, general manager and a central executive committee, however overshadowed by the party leader. No positions of vice-chairmen were created. The party also fully resigned on forming a territorial organization and for the first two years of its existence the regions were maintained only by regional managers. This partly changed in 2001 after the national parliament passed a law which led to emergence of regional self-government. In September of this year SMER approved creation of "classical" regional structures and started to build its own organization on the county level (cf. Kopeček 2007, 286). During its "founding era" the organizational face of the party was in full accordance with its populist profile. In his work Pop-Eleches (2010) includes populists into a group of parties based not primarily on ideology but on rather other sources. According to him one of the features of populist

parties is a prominence of their leaders for whom the parties' structures serve only as a tool for achieving their own personal aims. Rooduijn (2013, 33:34) expresses this even more explicitly. Based on him the populist parties tend to be centralistic with a strong position given to their leader. To allow a necessary direct link between the leader and the supporters the organization of these parties is rather loose and does not include intermediate bodies. The rationale is that leaders prefer a direct communication style when speaking to citizens; a way which could be blocked by "inconvenient" party bodies. Taggart (2000) expresses a similar stance about the leaders of populist parties. In case of SMER the above mentioned notes fully fall on its organizational structure. The party emerged from the will of its leader Fico who became a clearly dominant force without any relevant rival. In the first years the party had a very loose organization lacking both strong national bodies and a classical territorial structure. This framework allowed Fico to use direct and unmediated way of communicating with supporters without any obstacles. The changes in 2001 and establishment of subnational organizations had only limited effect at least until 2002 election. The failure of SMER to win its first national election led not only to reassessment of its ideology but also had an impact on its internal structure. The party aimed to follow two objectives. First, it sought for external partners. In a situation where the center-right government provided thorough liberal economic reforms SMER was able to enter cooperation with the Trade unions. This partnership was formalized in 2005 which secured the support of Trade unions for SMER in the subsequent elections. Second, alongside its ideological shift the party succesfully merged with smaller leftist parties in 2004. In December of that year SMER remained the only party on the left side of the spectrum and to confirm this status quo the party adopted a new name SMER - Social Democracy. Merging with smaller parties was highly beneficial form SMER-SD as its membership nearly doubled and the party also inherited an already built territorial organization on local and regional level and a property of relevant amount too. What is more the merging process opened the way for SMER-SD to be internationally recognized (cf. Kopeček 2007, 291-293). In the following years the party pursued its established organizational aims. After the integration process with the leftist parties the membership of SMER-SD stabilized at around 15-16 thousand people; an amount relatively high in Slovak politics. With the fading HZDS which dropped out of parliament in 2010 SMER-SD became the party with the most members leaving other parties fairly behind. The increase of membership allowed the party to maintain strong positions on the local and regional level. While in 2002 local election SMER-SD stood well behind all relevant parties since 2006 its results far outreached all its rivals except the traditionally successful independents. A similar trend was true for regional elections; a competition opened only for political parties. As for the international recognition the integration of the left parties proved helpful to SMER-SD. In May 2005 the party became a member of Party of European Socialists (PES) and later it joined the Socialist International. In 2006 the PES temporarily paused SMER-SD's membership due to its cooperation with far right SNS in the national government. This period lasted until 2009 when PES restored SMER-SD's membership although the government including SNS was still in office. Among possible reasons of this decision might be the party's strength in domestic politics which belonged to the highest in Europe (cf. Mesežnikov 2007; Mesežnikov 2010). Together with change of name from SMER to SMER-SD the formal inclusion to PES represented one of the main symbols of the party's publicly announced shift from populism to social democracy.

The development of the organizational structure of SMER-SD followed a development parallel to its ideological transformation. During the first years of its existence the party adopted only a loose organization which was best suited for a strong leader directly communicating with the supporters. The shift to "classic" internal structure began after introduction of the regional selfgovernment in 2001 and was fostered after 2002 national election. Following this election the party successfully sought both external partners for cooperation and integration with smaller leftist parties. As a result by the end of the first decade of its existence SMER-SD had an established territorial organization, numerous amounts of members, officially cooperated with Trade unions and was integrated in the most important social democratic supranational institutions. The only relict from its initial era which remained nearly unchanged is the strong role of its leader Fico whose position has never been questioned despite huge organizational transformation that his party has accomplished since its creation in 1999. Characteristics of voters The final part is devoted to the changes in the voters' support of SMER-SD. As the prime source the data from European Social Survey (ESS) were used. Note that Slovakia did not take part in the first round of ESS conducted in 2002. For this year data from a Slovak survey conducted shortly before the 2002 election were used for the analysis. Hence the data for 2002 are from a national study while the data starting with 2004 are from ESS. The variables used in both data sources are fully compatible and allow comparisons between the findings. To track the characteristics of voters their gender, age, education, income and left-right orientation were analyzed. First to present are the descriptive results (Table 2). The outcomes clearly show a substantial change in the composition of SMER-SD's voters in time. In 2002 the party's populism was at its peak. In that time SMER-SD had slightly more supporters among men than women. As for the age the party's voters were of younger and middle age. Note that only less than six per cent of the party's voters were of age of 60 and more years. In respect to education most of supporters of SMER-SD had secondary education and nearly all belonged to lower or middle income groups. The most interesting variable is the left-right dimension. Despite the addition of the "Third way" to the party's name until 2002 SMER openly refused any ideological classifications and mostly presented itself as a formation standing beyond such divisions. This was reflected in the support of the party as more than half of the voters positioned themselves in the centre. However some prevalence of left voters over the right was present which might be due to Fico's political past in leftist SDL. Table 2: Composition of voters of SMER-SD in 2002-2012 Gender 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Men 54,9 56,5 49,3 35,8 39,3 41,3 Women 45,1 43,5 50,7 64,2 60,7 58,7 Age 18-24 19,9 10 7,3 2,3 4,6 2,8 25-34 25,7 24,3 20,3 8,4 8,2 8,8

Education Left-Right dimension Income 35-44 28,8 15 16,5 9,9 6,8 13,4 45-59 19,9 32,1 32 32,4 35,1 30 60 and more 5,8 18,6 23,8 47 45,3 45 Primary 17,3 12,5 18,6 16,1 17,3 16,6 Lower secondary 39,1 34 35,3 35,4 31,1 30,6 Higher secondary 33,8 43,1 36,1 37,2 41,4 41,6 University 9,8 10,4 10 11,2 10,1 11,2 Left 31,1 42,9 46,6 62,5 64,6 58,4 Centre 54,4 47,9 44,2 32,6 30,5 30,7 Right 14,4 9,3 9,2 4,9 4,9 10,9 Low 34,5 31,6 17,8 19,9 35,6 Middle 59,5 59,2 61,7 47,1 50 High 5,9 9,2 20,4 33 14,4 Note: Data about the income are not available for 2008. Source: IVO survey 2002; ESS rounds two (2004) to five (2012). After 2002 election SMER-SD began its openly declared transformation to social democracy and alongside it gradually decreased its populist profile. This change found its reflection in the composition of supporters. In accordance with the party's shift to the left the share of its supporters claiming this orientation started to steadily grow. While in 2002 less than one third of voters of SMER-SD had leftist orientation in 2004 this amount rose by more than ten percentage points. After 2008 three out of five party's supporters were of leftist orientation. On the contrary the share of people leaning towards the centre continuously decreased from 54.4 per cent in 2002 to around 30 per cent in 2012. Hence the voters' composition followed the ideological shift that the party presented after 2002 election. Among other changes age is an interesting case. In 2002 only a marginal part of voters of SMER-SD were of old age (60 and more years). In the following years this share dramatically increased and since 2008 this age group made nearly one half of all the supporters. Together with the group of 45 to 59 years these two segments rose from around one quarter of the party's voters in 2002 to more than three quarters. On the other hand the youngest voters who made a relevant part of the supporters in 2002 nearly disappeared with time. While in 2002 SMER-SD had more than 45 per cent of its voters of less than 35 years, ten years after that only one out of ten of party's supporters belonged to such age group. SMER-SD thus witnessed a substantial aging of its voters; a process enhanced by fading of HZDS which was traditionally supported by elder people. This change also explains the prevalence of women supporters visible from 2008 as due to different life expectancy women compose the majority of older people in society. Keeping an eye on the remaining variables the changes here were of lesser size. The structure of voters based on their education remained nearly the same for the whole time with a slight regrouping between the segments of secondary education. Finally the income witnessed some shifts. Interestingly the share of people belonging to higher income groups has risen over time although this trend was not observed in 2012. However in all of the analyzed years the vast majority of supporters of SMER-SD belonged either to lower or middle income groups with the stress on the latter which only once dropped below 50 per cent.

The descriptive results have presented the changes of voters' composition of SMER-SD in time. However to get a better understanding of the variables a binomial logistic regression is applied. The independent variables remain the same and the dependent variable maps whether the respondents have chosen SMER-SD as their closest party. Table 3 presents the results. Table 3: Results of logistic regression Constant Gender Age Education Left-Right dimension Income Men (ref.) Women 18-24 (ref.) 25-34 35-44 45-59 60 and more Primary Lower secondary Higher secondary University (ref.) Left Centre Right (ref.) Low Middle High (ref.) 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 0,196*** (0,373) 0,723* (0,148) 0,889 (0,22) 0,964 (0,202) 0,540** (0,234) 0,192*** (0,342) 0,545* (0,303) 1,103 (0,266) 1,036 (0,268) 2,105*** (0,201) 1,707** (0,17) 0,948 (0,299) 0,920 (0,281) 0,083*** (0,688) 0,920 (0,282) 2,681 (0,541) 1,361 (0,574) 0,939 (0,496) 0,810 (0,539) 0,914 (0,559) 0,947 (0,447) 1,715 (0,431) 9,165*** (0,433) 5,599*** (0,416) 1,147 (0,526) 0,668 (0,47) 0,69*** (0,499) 1,361 (0,207) 2,430* (0,418) 1,739 (0,402) 2,364* (0,375) 1,751 (0,385) 0,819 (0,377) 1,110 (0,323) 1,004 (0,311) 16,473*** (0,305) 5,845*** (0,275) 1,157 (0,351) 1,218 (0,246) 0,100*** (0,603) 1,158 (0,191) 0,752 (0,588) 0,644 (0,561) 0,758 (0,534) 1,307 (0,534) 1,357 (0,336) 1,982* (0,279) 1,307 (0,268) 24,039*** (0,293) 5,520*** (0,284)...... 0,061*** (0,650) 0,919 (0,241) 0,582 (0,625) 0,628 (0,636) 1,742 (0,561) 1,909 (0,557) 1,394 (0,445) 1,148 (0,387) 1,811 (0,358) 65,273*** (0,41) 8,692*** (0,389) 0,396** (0,347) 0,650 (0,269) 0,153** (0,633) 1,174 (0,209) 0,621 (0,606) 0,724 (0,601) 1,083 (0,567) 1,169 (0,567) 3,192** (0,425) 2,145* (0,347) 2,260** (0,317) 10,474*** (0,276) 3,443*** (0,267) 0,934 (0,333) 1,023 (0,293) Nagelkerke R Square,091,203,287,351,502,281 Note: Standard error in parentheses. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. Source: IVO survey 2002; ESS rounds two (2004) to five (2012). In accordance with the previous findings in 2002 lower odds to vote SMER-SD are estimated for women, older age groups and people of primary education. Although the party refused to classify itself in ideological means until 2002 election the analysis shows that its voters were nevertheless rather from the center to the left. This might have been affected by political past of Robert Fico as a high representative of leftist SDL in the 90s.

Starting with year 2004 the left-right dimension takes the lead and completely overshadows all the other variables. The estimated parameters fully support the expectations of changing composition of SMER-SD's voters. After the party failed in 2002 election and declared its transformation to social democracy this change was reflected among its voters. The results show a clear shift of the party's supporters to left and this trend gradually improved with time. The peak of this trend is found in 2010 when the odds of leftist voters to support the party were more than 65 times higher than for rightist voters. In case of centrist voters the odds are fairly lower however still significantly higher when compared to voters on the right. In 2012 the value of parameters substantially decreased--though still remained strong--which might be due to incredible support of SMER-SD that gained more than 44 per cent of votes in national election; the highest result of any party since 1989 in Slovakia. To accomplish this SMER-SD dominated not only among the leftist voters but gained a relevant support in the more centrist segments and partially also in the group of rightist citizens. In addition the results of logistic regression point to an interesting finding mainly in respect to age. Table 2 showed a substantial aging of SMER-SD's supporters in time. However interpreting this as an important influence of age on the party's support would be incorrect. As the regression analysis showed the impact of age is nearly fully overlaid by the left-right dimension. Hence while the people of 45 and more years gradually became the core of SMER-SD's voters it is not due to their age why they support the party. On the contrary it is the left-right position of voters that matters mostly and leaves the other variables fairly behind. This may be observed from a comparison of Tables 3 and 4; the latter calculated without the left-right dimension variable. With the presence of this variable in Table 4 the parameters estimated in Table 4 get weaker or even fully insignificant. The aim of SMER- SD to transform from a rather non-ideological formation to a social democratic party was successful also in terms of electoral support as it was able to substantially attract the leftist voters and in a lesser extent also the citizens positioning in the center. Table 4: Results of logistic regression (left-right dimension omitted) Constant Gender Age Education Men (ref.) Women 18-24 (ref.) 25-34 35-44 45-59 60 and more Primary Lower secondary 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 0,261*** (0,361) 0,711* (0,147) 0,915 (0,22) 0,989 (0,217) 0,617* (0,230) 0,231*** (0,336) 0,489* (0,300) 1,051 (0,264) 0,267* (0,590) 0,949 (0,258) 2,011 (0,473) 1,1801 (0,497) 0,976 (0,438) 0,922 (0,474) 0,675 (0,524) 1,093 (0,417) 0,240*** (0,405) 1,288 (0,181) 2,772** (0,369) 1,983 (0,359) 2,395** (0,336) 1,998* (0,346) 1,125 (0,327) 1,417 (0,286) 0,394* (0,461) 1,222 (0,160) 1,164 (0,480) 0,813 (0,461) 1,326 (0,434) 1,882 (0,432) 1,425 (0,281) 2,453*** (0,242) 0,206** (0,457) 1,086 (0,192) 1,032 (0,478) 0,784 (0,493) 3,404** (0,426) 3,525** (0,422) 2,972** (0,340) 2,455** (0,295) 0,358* (0,525) 1,062 (0,185) 0,883 (0,517) 1,104 (0,511) 1,735 (0,482) 2,059 (0,480) 2,951** (0,366) 1,936* (0,311)

Income Higher secondary University (ref.) Low Middle High (ref.) 0,982 (0,266) 1,031 (0,297) 0,985 (0,279) 1,701 (0,401) 1,581 (0,487) 0,977 (0,437) 1,170 (0,273) 1,824* (0,301) 1,398 (0,216) 1,466 (0,231) 2,860*** (0,273) 0,529* (0,275) 0,768 (0,213) 1,921* (0,285) 1,137 (0,289) 1,330 (0,259) Nagelkerke R Square 0,074 0,055 0,046 0,063 0,148 0,078 Note: Standard error in parentheses. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. Source: IVO survey 2002; ESS rounds two (2004) to five (2012). Conclusion This paper analyzed the development of Slovak party SMER-SD and its shift from populism to social democracy. The party emerged in 1999 and adopted a clearly populist profile while refusing the traditional ideological division into left and right. From the beginning it used a harsh criticism of the establishment combined with the proclaimed need to change the whole generation of political representatives. Although SMER-SD aimed to win its first national election and become the main ruling party it scored only three and ended in opposition. In the new situation the original populist profile was seen as a rising burden and the party officially proclaimed its transformation to social democracy. This paper sought this shift in three areas. In respect to ideology, the first stage of the changing process took its part between 2002 and 2006. During this time SMER-SD adopted a social democratic stance and largely abandoned its once populist appeals. After 2006 election when the party made it to the government, the ideological transformation was finalized as SMER-SD proclaimed itself to be a "standard" party and a firm member of the establishment. Second, the party realized a transformation of its internal structure. Originally SMER-SD created only a loose structure with no aim to build a territorial organization. Such a structure which is often present in populist parties allowed the leader to have a direct link with the supporters without any mediation by party bodies. After founding the subnational structures in 2001 the failure in 2002 election led the party to integrate with smaller leftist formations; a step which helped SMER-SD to obtain access to higher membership, local and regional representation, property and international recognition among international social democratic institutions. Third, the party's shift found its reflection in the composition of its voters. In its first national election in 2002 SMER-SD was supported by rather younger voters, people of centrist orientation and of middle income groups. In the later years this image substantially changed. The core of party's voters moved to older citizens, women and mainly the people of leftist ideological orientation. The regression analysis confirmed this trend but based on this result it might be concluded that it is the left-right dimension that dominantly influences the odds of people to support SMER-SD.

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