SACT s lecture at. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. New York City, 16 Apr 2018,

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION SACT s lecture at FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force New York City, 16 Apr 2018, 1400-1600 Général d armée aérienne Denis MERCIER

1. Introduction Overview of NATO today. Ladies and Gentlemen, I m very happy to be here this afternoon to exchange some thoughts with you on how NATO as an Alliance is adapting to the rapidly changing security environment to respond to the current threats that include the fight against terrorism. But first what is NATO? NATO is a political and military organization, assembling 29 nations from Europe and North America to pursue the common goal of protection and defence of its territory and populations, and more broadly committed to maintain peace and stability. The aim to collectively defend itself against any potential aggression forms the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington in 1949 to, I quote: safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, to promote stability and wellbeing in the North-Atlantic area. In the aftermath of the 2 nd World War and the beginning of what would later be called the Cold War, the ultimate goal was of course the preservation of peace and security by all means. Today, almost 70 years later, the principles and the content of the North Atlantic Treaty still stand, and if you haven t, I encourage you to read it. It is very short, but absolutely remarkable. Should we rewrite the Treaty today, we would probably not change a single word. 2

This does not mean that the Alliance has not been able to adapt itself throughout its existence. On the contrary, NATO, like many successful and enduring organizations, has evolved on pace with a changing environment, devoting the resources and the resolve to ensure a leading role as an international security hub. Let me therefore briefly illustrate 4 phases in NATO s history: o 1949-1991: collective defence (post WWII and Cold War period as I mentioned earlier), defence and deterrence with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, stating that an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all. The first and only time Article 5 was invoked was on 9/11 during the terrorist attacks against the US, NATO did not act on US territory, but outside to defend the US collectively with all Allies against the threat posed by these terrorist attacks. o 1991-2001: cooperative security with the eastern enlargement but also the development of partnerships (Partnership for Peace, including with Russia). o 2001-2014: and then 9/11 happened (by the way: this was the first and only time in NATO s existence that Article 5 was effectively invoked, on 12 September 2001, the day after the terrorist attacks on the United States), and NATO focused on expeditionary operations and crisis management, with a strong emphasis on Afghanistan (non- article 5 operations, fight against terrorism). 3

o Since 2014: Ukraine crisis - the current phase, with the returning emphasis on collective defence, and at the same time projection of stability and cooperative security (360 degrees approach, and the interrelation of crises). 2. How does NATO work? NATO is the only organization of its kind that has a permanent command and control structure, which defines the decision making process from the highest political level (Heads of State and Government) down to the lower military-tactical level (troops on the ground, vessels at sea, planes in the air). How does this decision making process work? o NATO is a political-military organization of 29 Allied nations. o At the highest political level, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is composed of 29 permanent representatives or ambassadors. These permanent representatives with their national delegations are in direct contact with their governments. o At the highest military level, the Military Committee (MC) is composed of 29 military representatives that are in close contact with their respective national Defence Staffs. o Every day, member countries consult and take decisions on security issues at all levels and in a variety of fields. o A NATO decision is the expression of the collective will of all 29 member countries since all decisions are taken by consensus. 4

o Both civilian and military experts help prepare these decisions, in cooperation with the national delegations, the international staff and the international military staff at NATO Headquarters. o The NATO Headquarters is connected to the two Strategic Commands (one in Belgium, responsible for the day-to-day operations and my Command in Norfolk, responsible for the adaptation for future operations). Both Strategic Commands are then further connected to subordinate military commands that form what we call the NATO Command Structure (NCS). o Connected to the NCS are national headquarters that form what we call the NATO Force Structure (NFS). It is within the NFS that we find the member nations capabilities that contribute to NATO s core tasks and missions. This is a huge task that requires a NCS that is fit for purpose to execute its three core tasks (Collective Defence Crisis Management Cooperative Security) with the complexity of the constantly and rapidly evolving security environment. 3. Today s security environment what has changed? What has changed in the current phase (4 th phase) I described earlier that makes NATO s adaptation efforts different today? The Wales Summit (2014) symbolizes the beginning of this 4 th phase (shortly after the Ukraine crisis) of NATO history. But the Warsaw Summit (2016) is the one that really acknowledged the complexity of 5

the new strategic environment and led to critical decisions for NATO adaptation. In my opinion, Warsaw was a historical summit. Before elaborating on the Warsaw Summit outcomes, it is important to understand what triggered these decisions. And the starting point is to have a proper understanding of today s security environment. This security environment is evolving at a rapid pace, but several defining trends can be identified: o The interrelation of crises: every event in a regional crisis can have an impact on another crisis in another region (example of Russian actions in northern Europe that can influence their actions in Syria and their relations with other countries). o The interrelation of threats: state and non-state actors present in different crises and following a different agenda, or interacting differently according to the crises. o The variety of threats, sometimes simultaneously present in one region (example of the Balkans, confronted to Russian influence, rise of radical Islam, massive migrations, organized crime). o The emergence of new operational domains (cyber, but also space, and information environment) o The blurred transition from peace to crisis (the difference between peace and conflict is clear, but crisis is in a sort of grey zone). o Finally, the easier access to technology, which tends to increase the potential danger posed by any threat (Russia, China, non-state actors). 6

Consequently, we have transitioned from a complicated world to a complex world. o Complicated meant interacting with many factors, but that we could analyse them, and draw reasonable conclusions to drive our decisions. o Complex means that there are so many factors interacting with each other that it is impossible to comprehend all the possible outcomes, thereby making surprise more possible, decision-making based on imperfect information more commonplace, and failure an option thus making resilience a necessity. These strategic trends, coupled with transnational challenges such as organized crime, climate change or economic instability deepen even further the uncertainty and complexity of our security environment. These are the challenges we face. So what do we do to overcome them? In other words, how do we adapt NATO to our current environment? First, let us now have a closer look at the Warsaw Summit s decisions that form the basis for NATO s adaptation efforts in our current environment. The main theme of the Warsaw Summit was to build a renewed and robust defence and deterrence posture and to project stability across NATO s borders. What we call projecting stability is the development of actions to prevent a crisis, and when necessary, the ability to intervene not 7

necessarily in our natural area of operations before it degenerates and reaches our borders. The adaptation of NATO s posture, for which the foundation was laid 2 years earlier at the Wales Summit, was confirmed and reinforced. Several measures were decided in Warsaw. I ll describe the most important ones. First, in defence and deterrence : o The deployment of 4 Multinational Battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland forming the Enhanced Forward Presence in the North-East, and the formation of a Tailored Forward Presence in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, constitute what we can call a first wave or line of forces contributing to deter any potential aggression. o In this context, the renewed commitment of Canadian and US troops in Europe is a very strong sign, and it is the first time since the end of the Cold War. o Cyber defence: in the Hybrid environment we cannot imagine anything without Cyber it is now recognized as an operational domain (together with land, air, sea and space). o Missile Defence: the NATO ballistic missile defence system has now been declared Initially Operationally Capable. o Nuclear deterrence: a renewed and stronger messaging, which clearly states that any use of any kind of nuclear weapon by any adversary would change the nature of warfare. 8

Second, in projecting stability : o The adaptation of the way we do Partnerships is an important effort to improve the support to the projection of stability. o The creation of a Hub for the South, to increase the understanding of the challenges in the Mediterranean region, and to improve the relationship with Partners, both nations and IOs. o A stronger focus to increase our relationship with other International Organizations. o In particular, also a strong focus on NATO-EU: a Joint Declaration identifies key areas for expanding our cooperation, in seven areas: hybrid threats, operations, cyber defence, defence capabilities, exercises, maritime security, and capacity building for our partners. Allow me to expand on Projecting Stability. NATO s core mission remains to defend the forces, populations and territories of Allies (Article 5, Collective Defence as I explained earlier). At the same time, NATO conducts efforts to project stability outside its borders, through conflict prevention, crisis management and cooperative security efforts that include partnerships and capacity building = strengthening security outside our territory, or beyond our borders, to improve the Alliance s security overall. This means that Collective Defence and Projecting Stability are not two completely separated concepts: all underlying work strands are conceptually coherent and mutually supporting to deliver the same effects on safeguarding Alliance security. 9

We are currently developing a Military Concept for Projecting stability: The scope lies on military efforts contributing to prevent the development of a crisis or a threat in a selected area. It is based on the complementarity of Defence and Deterrence with Projecting Stability efforts, that are - as I described earlier coherent and mutually supporting (In other words: one does not go without the other). Its implementation will involve activities that encompass both military and non-military efforts that contribute to stability, or that prevent or fight against instability. NATO s actions are mainly military actions. This means that NATO s actions should be complementary to, and coordinated with other IOs and NGOs, in particular the EU, the UN, the OSCE and the AU because all these actions should serve a political aim within a comprehensive framework. The Projecting Stability activities must allow NATO to operate in a proactive posture to prevent crises, or escalation into conflict. This is about having eyes-on emerging crises, and we can do this by developing: Strategic Awareness Crises inside and outside Europe, could develop rapidly and reach a high level of intensity or involve major powers. We must enhance strategic awareness to ensure that we have eyes-on emerging crises before they become strategic shocks. 10

NATO s area of operations is centered on the Euro-Atlantic space, but we cannot dismiss the possibility that early signs of a developing crisis may appear outside of this space in Asia, or in Africa, or elsewhere. To be able to react accordingly, the Alliance must ensure that it has the capacity to monitor situations across the globe, and the global nature of threats may lead us to consider scenarios that would engage a wider range of partners, out of the Euro-Atlantic area, explore innovative decision-making architectures to face future transnational challenges, and help define the required needs to empower all parties who could play a role in global security. This is illustrated by the developing partnerships we have with Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Georgia, or Jordan, to name a few. Other Partnership initiatives are also ongoing with Mediterranean countries and in the Middle-East region. Strategic awareness also requires an increased exchange of information with a broad range of actors, and the ability to process tremendous amounts of publicly available information we cannot limit ourselves to the traditional boundaries of intelligence anymore, and a much broader information sharing is not only valid between countries but also with other international organizations or even with the private sector. Partnerships To do so, we need a broader global network and better information sharing with a wide range of actors. 11

No nation nor organization can face all challenges or manage a future crisis on its own. Therefore, for NATO, partnerships are not an option, they are a necessity. Regional approach. As NATO is adapting and responding, with our partners, to the security environment, we must not consider nations in isolation but understand the regional situation. An important effort is increasing situational awareness of sensitive regions such as the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and the Mediterranean, by opening our consultations to selected partners. In a similar way we are extending our consultations with our Asian partners to deepen our understanding of the challenges the DPRK poses to international peace and security. In the Western Balkans, KFOR and NATO s liaison presences testify to our commitment to prevent a return to instability. As I mentioned earlier, the Balkans are a region where threats are overlapping (Russian influence, radical Islam, massive migrations, organized crime) that could lead to an imbrication of crises (Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbia Macedonia with closed borders and landlocked by NATO nations) However, NATO s primary effort for Projecting Stability lies in the South, we are working with our Middle East and North African partners to prevent and fight destabilization and its aftermath, especially the fight against the threat posed by terrorism. 12

One of the key factors of instability is Terrorism Since 2015 NATO has developed a Concept for Counter Terrorism. It identifies key areas within which NATO should implement initiatives to enhance the prevention of, and resilience to, acts of terrorism. Terrorism has no borders, but the focus lies on weak and failing states that allow terrorist organizations to establish zones on instability along NATO s borders. The Concept for CT establishes a framework in conjunction with other NATO concepts, such as the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Concept, or the C-IED concept. The Concept for CT is built on three main pillars: awareness, capabilities and engagement. To use the CT concept we developed an Action Plan to enhance NATO s role in the international community s fight against terrorism. First: What is NATO s CT role how do our member nations participate? o I already explained that NATO is an Alliance of 29 sovereign states bound by the North-Atlantic Treaty taking all decisions by consensus with the vast majority of assets and personnel belonging to the member nations. o Our nations align their national CT strategies to the UN Global CT Strategy (2006) that includes Prevention and Combat, and Capacity Building (I will come to that later). 13

In addition, all NATO nations joined the Global Counter ISIS Coalition (2014), providing military support to our partners, impeding the flow of foreign fighters, freezing financing and funding, and addressing regional humanitarian crises and in this way also attacking terrorist activities from their source. Second: What does NATO now? The CT Concept aims to strengthen and streamline all the political and military activities building on the following pillars: o Awareness: - Political dialogue (NATO HQ, nations) - Participation to the International Forum (UN, EU, AU, Shangri-La, etc.) - Information & intelligence sharing and assessments as part of NATO s overall Strategic Awareness with the New Terrorism Intelligence Cell within the NATO HQ (Brussels) and the Regional Hub for the South (Naples). o Capabilities: - A great number of capabilities are built and used via our NATO Defence Planning Process, and are used in operational engagements, such as the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, or Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. Examples of capabilities: AWACs, AGS and JISR. - There is also a significant capability development Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work including: Counter- 14

Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Biometrics Human Networks Analysis and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence (CBRN), and Explosives Disposal. o Engagement: Training and Assistance: outreach and cooperation with partners. (Examples: Afghanistan and Iraq) - The optimization of CT measures requires internal, interagency and international collaboration. - A key part is devoted to supporting partners (especially those facing an active terrorist threat) in strengthening their readiness. Through stepped up individual cooperation, as well as Defence Capacity Building, we are working to strengthen local capacity to deal with CT challenges. - We have 4 ongoing DCB-initiatives (Jordan Georgia Moldova Iraq), but more nations are applying. - We also organize Regional Exercises with partners last year in Jordan, this year in Serbia that include CT scenarios. 15

Building Integrity - Afghanistan is a partner nation and a member of the Building Integrity programme. The NATO Building Integrity programme promotes good practices and provides with tailored expertise and support to make defence and security institutions more effective and efficient. It is a key element of all NATO activities, and based on the following principles: anti-corruption and good governance, transparency and accountability, in accordance with international norms to safeguard freedom, peace, security and shared values. - As it promotes local ownership and enhances institutional and individual capacity building, it also reaffirms a nation s intention, on a voluntary basis, for national related building integrity policies, doctrines and training. Science for Peace and Security - Today, approximately 150 ongoing SPS projects, workshops and training courses help to build capacity in partner countries, support NATO efforts in the fight against terrorism, facilitate the development of security-related advanced technologies and foster expert networks. - The Programme provides the Alliance with a unique channel for nonmilitary communication, including in situations or regions where other forms of dialogue are difficult to establish. It enables NATO to become actively involved in such regions, often serving as the first concrete link between NATO and a new partner. 16

- CT activities include: explosives detection, Cyber and CBRN, with support to NATO-led missions and operations; to foster the development of security-related advanced technologies such as sensors and detectors, nanotechnologies, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and to address human and social aspects of security. The imperative to protect civilians from the effects of an armed conflict - Military Operations, followed or preceded by Training and Military Assistance activities, must be able to transition into Policing Operations. - Aim: avoid, minimize and mitigate all the negative effects on civilians. - We are currently working on a NATO Stability Policing Concept to enhance and to develop the capabilities required for policing operations. - It is based on the NATO Security Force Assistance Concept that addresses the need to train and develop indigenous military security forces, to include Host Nation Police Forces. - Today, we only have a partial solution because not all Allies have Policing Forces in their military structures. - We are in the process to identify and build those requirements needed to implement a coherent Stability Policing capability (in the next NDPP cycle). - We are also working on a Protection of Civilians Concept. Protection of Civilians is a good example of where NATO has worked 17

efficiently and effectively with the International Community. As it is a topic of mutual interest, a diverse community of IOs, NGOs, COEs, nations, academia and industry have assisted NATO as we developed the Policy, Action Plan and Concept. This community have been instrumental in achieving the results to date as NATO could not have developed the high quality products in isolation. This community has also given NATO the opportunity to advertise its approach on this topic in the broader arena which has in turn informed others what NATO can and cannot do in respect to Protection of Civilians. Aim and Way Ahead - Institutionalize Policing Capacity building in our NATO Capability Development. - Develop coherent NATO concepts. - Harmonize the national contributions to a NATO Standard. - Propose, coordinate, exchange with other partners, IOs, NGOs, etc. To conclude: NATO is working hard on a successful adaptation because the security environment calls for it. The Warsaw Summit acknowledged the complexity of the environment at the scale of the Alliance. 18

Defence and deterrence, and Projection of Stability form the bedrock of NATO s strategy to prevent crises, and in case of failure to deescalate conflicts and enforce peace. It is not one or the other, both at the same time. NATO cannot do this on its own we need partnerships and an ecosystem to exchange or share information. The Warsaw Summit decisions can only be enduring if the adaptation measures are put in a larger and longer term perspective, to bring coherence and to leverage a global network of likeminded people and organizations that can help foster innovation through the Alliance. Innovation by the use of new so called disruptive technologies in our military capacity are essential to keep the edge, because they will change the nature of warfare. Today there is a sense of urgency, because for the Alliance, our potential adversaries are already integrating autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and data analytics in their future capabilities. It is also about speed. It is a technological race, and if we combine the strength of our 29 nations and partners Research and Technology to fully explore the new opportunities, nobody can compete with us. It is a very important effort in the adaptation process, and it will require the appropriate policy changes (political, legal and ethical) to fully exploit these advantages in our future military capacity. The principles we use are the same than most innovative companies use in their respective businesses. This should not be a surprise: we have different purposes, but we live in the same environment, complex and 19

unpredictable. Therefore, my Command, Allied Command Transformation, is always very open to share our work with a wide spectrum of actors. I am looking forward to hear your thoughts. Thank you for your attention. I will be happy to answer your questions. 20