A TRIPARTITE BATTLE ROYAL: HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE ASSERTION OF SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES

A TRIPARTITE BATTLE ROYAL: HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE ASSERTION OF SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES Sean Mulryne I. INTRODUCTION Traditionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has granted a certain degree of judicial deference to the Executive s decisions concerning war, military and foreign affairs, and national security. 1 The Court, however, began to exercise a more scrutinizing judicial review over these matters in 2004, when it decided Rasul v. Bush, 2 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 3 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla. 4 A reasonable perception drawn from those cases 5 is that the Court, in defiance of its traditional deferential approach, began asserting a more proactive role for itself inasmuch as it sought to curtail the Executive s unilateral actions during the war on terror. 6 This Comment addresses J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Gettysburg College, 2003. For all they have done for me and this Comment, respectively, I would like to thank Barbara and Kevin Mulryne, Sr., Kevin Mulryne, Jr., Valerie Silver, and, of course, Professor Baher Azmy and Cristina Finetti. 1 See infra Part III.A. 2 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 3 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 4 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 5 Throughout this Comment, these cases, along with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), will be collectively referred to as the war on terror cases. 6 See, e.g., David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125 (2005). Professor Martin writes at the outset: The Supreme Court struck an important blow for civil liberties and human rights in its trilogy of enemy combatant decisions.... It rejected the Administration s remarkably sweeping claims to a unilateral power to detain anyone the executive branch pronounced an enemy combatant in the war on terrorism, a power assertedly beyond the effective review of any court. at 125 26; see also Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme Court s Enemy Combatant Decisions: Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and the Rule of Law, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 409, 410 (2005) (arguing that the war on terror cases left unresolved 279

280 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 the disputes surrounding our nation s three branches and their appropriate spheres of authority in light of the Court s most recent decision concerning Executive power in a time of active hostilities: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 7 In Hamdan, the Court struck down the Executive s use of military commissions to try alleged terrorist suspects at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, thereby culminating this series of cases that question and ultimately rebuke, to some extent, executive power in regard to military affairs during wartime. 8 In so doing, the Court implicitly and explicitly emphasized the need for Congress to assert itself in checking and balancing the Executive and its anti-terrorism measures. 9 At its outset, this Comment assumes that our tripartite national government requires reasonable restraints on the Executive s use of power that must be externally imposed by another branch. 10 This Comment will argue that through Hamdan and the war on terror progeny of cases, the Court asserted a more pronounced separationof-powers principle to countervail the Executive s questionable actions. 11 While reserving a role for itself, the Court in Hamdan has justifiably positioned Congress into the center of the debate. 12 Likewise, this Comment will suggest that, despite Congress s contrary reasoning and initiative, the Court s role in the war on terror should be preserved. 13 Part II of this Comment will outline the factual and procedural background of Hamdan, followed by an account of the Court s opinions in the case. 14 Part III will then briefly highlight the separation-ofpowers doctrine; the Court s traditional deference to the Executive in war, military and foreign affairs, and national security; and the war on terror progeny of cases. 15 Part IV will explore the heightened scrutiny implored by the Court in Hamdan and its implications upon many questions, Hafetz still acknowledges that these decisions affirmed the important role of the federal courts in limiting executive power in the war on terrorism ). 7 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 8 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 66 (2006) ( Hamdan v. Rumsfeld is a rare Supreme Court rebuke to the President during armed conflict. ) (footnote omitted). 9 See infra Part IV.B. 10 See infra Justice Souter s Hamdi dissent at note 290. 11 See infra Part IV.B. 12 See infra Part IV.B. 13 See infra Part V. 14 See infra Part II. 15 See infra Part III.

2008] COMMENT 281 our tripartite national government. 16 Thereafter, this Comment will explain why the Court s decision and its invocation for congressional action are justified, especially in light of the war on terror. 17 Finally, in Part V will briefly examine Congress s response to Hamdan and offer several criticisms of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 18 A. Factual Background II. HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD Like the other Guantanamo Bay cases, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld arose in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the consequent hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. 19 Following the September 11 attacks, Congress adopted a joint resolution known as the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 20 which authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 21 Pursuant to this authorization, U.S. Armed Forces were deployed to Afghanistan, where they combated the Taliban, an international terrorist organization suspected of aiding al Qaeda, the international terrorist organization responsible for the September 11 attacks. 22 During the subsequent battles, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, along with hundreds of others, was arrested by the U.S. Armed Forces and detained in the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 23 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a military order declaring that any non-citizen allegedly involved or participating in terrorist activities shall, when tried, be tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including 16 See infra Part IV.A. 17 See infra Part IV.B. 18 See infra Part V. 19 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006). 20 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107 Pub. L. No. 40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 21 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting AUMF, 2, 115 Stat. 224). 22 23

282 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 imprisonment or death. 24 Around February 2004, military counsel was appointed to represent Hamdan, and, in turn, counsel filed applications seeking disclosure of the charges against Hamdan and for a speedy trial pursuant to Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 25 On February 23, 2004, the legal advisor to the Appointing Authority for Military Commissions ( Appointing Authority ) denied Hamdan s applications, having determined that Hamdan was not entitled to the protections of the UCMJ. 26 In response to the Appointing Authority s denial of UCMJ protections, Hamdan attempted to challenge his detainment by filing habeas corpus and mandamus petitions in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. 27 Thereafter, the government finally charged Hamdan with a conspiracy offense, specifically alleging that from on or about February 1996 to on or about November 24, 2001, Hamdan willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to commit the following offenses triable by military commissions: attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism. 28 The government also accused Hamdan of committing four overt acts. 29 B. Procedural History The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington transferred Hamdan s petitions to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 30 During this time, the Combatant Status Review 24 (quoting Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57834 (Nov. 13, 2001)). 25 ; see also 10 U.S.C. 810 (2006). 26 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760. 27 28 at 2761 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted). 29 These acts included (1) act[ing] as Osama bin Laden s bodyguard and personal driver, believ[ing] all the while bin Laden and his associates were involved in terrorist acts prior to and including the attacks of September 11, 2001 ; (2) arranging for and actually transporting weapons used by al Qaeda members and bin Laden s bodyguards ; (3) [driving] or accompa[nying] [O]sama bin Laden to various al Qaida sponsored training camps, press conferences, or lectures, at which bin Laden urged terrorist acts against the United States; and (4) receiv[ing] weapons training at al Qaeda-sponsored camps. (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 30

2008] COMMENT 283 Tribunal convened and determined that Hamdan s detention at Guantanamo Bay was justified since he was an enemy combatant. 31 Nevertheless, the district court granted Hamdan s habeas petition and stayed the military commission s proceedings, concluding that: (1) the President s authority to convene military commissions extends only to offenders or offenses triable by military [commission] under the law of war ; 32 (2) the law of war includes Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; 33 (3) Hamdan is entitled to the Geneva protections; 34 and (4) the proposed military commissions violate the UCMJ and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 35 because the military commissions allow for convictions based on evidence that the accused would never see or hear. 36 Upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that: (1) the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable and, two judges believed, would not apply to Hamdan anyway; 37 (2) Ex parte Quirin 38 foreclosed any separation-of-powers objection to the military commission s jurisdiction ; 39 and (3) Hamdan s trial by commission would not violate the UCMJ or U.S. Armed Forces regulations intended to implement the Geneva Conventions. 40 C. The Supreme Court s Decision On November 7, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to Hamdan s appeal 41 in order to decide the narrow questions of whether the military commission convened to try Hamdan has authority to do so, and whether Hamdan may rely on the Geneva Conventions in these proceedings. 42 31 at 2761. Enemy combatant was defined as an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban and al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. at 2761 n.1 (citation omitted). 32 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761. 33 ; see also Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. 34 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 62. 35 See Common Article 3, supra note 33. 36 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. 37 38 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 39 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. 40 41 at 2759, 2762. 42 at 2762.

284 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 With Chief Justice Roberts abstaining from the decision, a majority of the Court, including Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay were not authorized and thus violated the prescribed standards of the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. 43 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. 44 1. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 45 The Court began its opinion by denying the government s motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari. 46 The government s motion claimed that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) foreclosed the Court s jurisdiction to hear Hamdan s complaint. 47 Relying on [o]rdinary principles of statutory construction, 48 the Court found that the DTA did not preclude its judicial review in this case because there is a presumption against retroactive statutory effect and a negative inference drawn when particular language included in one statutory provision is excluded from another provision in the same statute. 49 2. Abstention The government argued that the Court s precedent in Schlesinger v. Councilman 50 dictated that the Court adhere to the judge-made rule that civilian courts should await the final outcome of on-going military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceedings. 51 In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that two comity considerations warrant judicial abstention: that military discipline and efficiency are best served by the military justice system without interference from civilian courts; and that civilian courts should respect the congressional consideration given to servicemen through the establishment of military courts and appellate review procedures, including the Court of Military Appeals and its independent, unbiased civilian judges. 52 The Court concluded that neither considera- 43 at 2775, 2786, 2793. 44 at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2849 (Alito, J., dissenting). 45 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 199 Stat. 2739. 46 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762. 47 at 2763. 48 at 2764. 49 at 2764 66. 50 420 U.S. 738 (1975). 51 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 (citation omitted). 52 at 2770.

2008] COMMENT 285 tion applied in the present case, because Hamdan was not a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, and because the military commission neither is a part of the integrated military justice system nor guarantees insulation from military influence. 53 Moreover, the Court found that Ex parte Quirin provided precedent for hearing Hamdan s case and for refusing to abstain from the issues at bar. 54 3. Congressional Authorization for Military Commissions After briefly recounting the history of military commissions and the constitutionally assigned roles of the Executive and the Legislature in matters of war, 55 the Court examined Article of War 15 ( Article 15 ) and its contemporary embodiment in Article 21 56 of the UCMJ. 57 The Court explained that the Ex parte Quirin Court did not view [Article 15] as a sweeping mandate for the President to invoke military commissions when he deems them necessary, but rather recognized that Congress had simply preserved what power, under the Constitution and the common law of war, the President had had before 1916 to convene military commissions with the express condition that the President and those under his command comply with the law of war. 58 Therefore, the Court accepted Article 15, and its current incarnation in Article 21, as a congressional preservation of the use of military commissions under certain circumstances. 59 Turning its attention to the AUMF, the Court concluded: 53 at 2771. 54 at 2772. In relevant part: That course of action was warranted, [the Court] explained [i]n view of the public importance of the questions raised by [the cases] and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the public interest required that we consider and decide those questions without any avoidable delay. (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)). 55 at 2773. 56 10 U.S.C. 821 (2000). Article 21 reads: The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. The Court explained that Article 15 is essentially preserved in the contemporary Article 21. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. 57 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. 58 59 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 29) (other citations omitted). See id.

286 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 [W]hile we assume the AUMF activated the President s war powers,... and that those powers include the authority to convene military commissions in appropriate circumstances,... there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ. 60 Thereafter, the Court similarly posited that the DTA contains no language authorizing that tribunal or any other at Guantanamo Bay, but does reserve judgment on the applicability of the Constitution and other U.S. laws to, and thus the constitutionality and legality of, the standards and procedures used in these military commissions. 61 In summary, the Court declared: Together, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances where justified under the Constitution and laws, including the law of war. Absent a more specific congressional authorization, the task of this Court is, as it was in Quirin, to decide whether Hamdan s military commission is so justified. 62 4. Legality of Military Commissions Having established that Hamdan s military commission was not specifically authorized by any congressional action, the Court then examined whether the Executive s unauthorized use of a commission was appropriate in the given context. 63 The Court began this evaluation by identifying three historical scenarios for which military commissions are commonly reserved. 64 Next, the Court looked to the famous work of Colonel William Winthrop to discern the four preconditions necessary to exercise jurisdiction by military commission over a person such as Hamdan. 65 Conceding that these precon- 60 at 2775 (citations omitted). 61 (citations omitted). 62 at 2775. 63 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 75. 64 at 2775 76 (quotations omitted). The three scenarios, identified by the Court, in which military commissions are invoked include: (1) at times and in places where martial law is declared; (2) when temporary military government occupies enemy territory or where civilian government is non-functional; and (3) as incident to the conduct of war when there is a need to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. 65 at 2777 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957)). The four preconditions for exercising jurisdiction by military commission are that: (1) the charges are for offenses committed within the field of the command of the convening commander, or in a theatre of war ; (2) the offenses charged must have been commit-

2008] COMMENT 287 ditions are embodied in the UCMJ and dictate whether military necessity justifies the use of a military commission, 66 the Court determined that the use of a commission to try Hamdan for his alleged crimes was illegitimate and unlawful. 67 To begin, the Court articulated at length the inadequacy of the conspiracy charge against Hamdan and the inability of a military commission to try such a claim. 68 First, the Court doubted whether Hamdan s alleged crimes satisfied Winthrop s temporal and geographic preconditions. 69 Second, the Court found that Congress did not definitively designate conspiracy as a war crime, nor did precedent or the government s examples suggest that conspiracy is incorporated by reference into Article 21. 70 In addition, the Court clarified that international law, including the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and the laws of European countries in general, have not recognized conspiracy as a punishable crime in the law of war. 71 In the end, the Court found the legal insufficiency of Hamdan s charges emblematic of the Executive s utilization of military commissions when military necessity was not present. 72 Thus, the Court held that the circumstances surrounding Hamdan and his military commission did not constitute a situation in which, by any stretch of the historical evidence or this Court s precedents, a military commission established by Executive Order under the authority of Article 21 of the UCMJ may lawfully try a person and subject him to punishment. 73 ted within the period of the war ; (3) the only individuals at trial must be [i]ndividuals of the enemy s army who have been guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation of the laws of war and members of one s own army who, in time of war, become chargeable with crimes or offences not cognizable, or triable, by criminal courts or under the Articles of war ; and (4) the individuals alleged crimes must be [v]iolations of the laws and usages of war cognizable by military tribunals only and which are [b]reaches of military orders or regulations for which offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the Articles of war. (quotations omitted). 66 67 at 2777 86. 68 at 2778 86. 69 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 79. 70 at 2779 84 (citations omitted). 71 at 2780 81, 2784 85. 72 at 2785 ( The charge s shortcomings are not merely formal, but are indicative of a broader inability on the Executive s part here to satisfy the most basic precondition at least in the absence of specific congressional authorization for establishment of military commissions: military necessity. ). 73 at 2785 86.

288 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 Regarding the legality of the military commission s standards and procedures, the Court first outlined the most controversial aspects of the commission, including: (1) the detainee, and possibly his counsel, may have limited if any at all access to certain evidence presented against the detainee; 74 (2) the detainee may be precluded from attending closed sessions ; 75 (3) any evidence, including testimonial hearsay and evidence obtained through coercion as well as non-sworn statements, may be fully admissible; 76 and (4) any appeal by the detainee will be heard by a three-judge panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense and comprised of military officers, only one of which need have judicial experience. 77 Upon dismissing the government s objections and distinguishing In re Yamashita 78 from the military commissions at issue, 79 the Court explained that the President may promulgate some procedural rules for courts-martial and military commissions, but is restricted by Article 36 of the UCMJ, 80 which requires that the adopted rules not be contrary to or inconsistent with the UCMJ and that the adopted rules for military commissions be uniform insofar as practicable to those rules of courts-martial. 81 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the uniformity requirement precluded the government from justifying the military commission s variant procedures. 82 In other words, the President failed to prove why the procedures of courts-martial are impracticable and warrant deviation in the form of the military commission in question. 83 The Court was especially skeptical of the com- 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786. at 2786 87. at 2787. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788 89. 10 U.S.C. 836 (2000). Article 36 reads: (a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers them practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter. (b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (quoting 10 U.S.C. 836 (2000)). at 2791. See id. at 2792.

2008] COMMENT 289 mission s jettison of the basic and essential right of a defendantdetainee to be present at his trial. 84 As a result, the Court held that the standards and procedures of the military commission unjustifiably differed from those of a court-martial, and thus the commission violated Article 36(b). 85 Thereafter, the Court summarized: The military commission was not born of a desire to dispense a more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial; it developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed when courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over either the accused or the subject matter. Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy, but did not further justify the wholesale jettisoning of procedural protections.... Article 21 did not transform the military commission from a tribunal of true exigency into a more convenient adjudicatory tool. 86 5. Geneva Conventions and International Law After rejecting the military commission s procedures as violative of the UCMJ, the Court also proclaimed that the commission violates the Geneva Conventions. 87 In reversing the D.C. Circuit s determinations that the Geneva provisions are judicially unenforceable and, alternatively, inapplicable to Hamdan, the Supreme Court held that Hamdan s rights under the Geneva Conventions are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war[,]... [a]nd compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted. 88 Therefore, the Court found the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions judicially enforceable insofar as they, as part of the law of war, were incorporated into U.S. law by Article 21. 89 Furthermore, acknowledging the Executive s argument that Hamdan was an alleged member of al Qaeda and that Geneva protections do not extend to the U.S. conflict with al Qaeda, 90 the Court clarified that Common Article 3 applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories. 91 The Court defended this interpretation by explaining that Common Article 3, unlike Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 at 2792 93 (citation omitted). Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793. at 2794. at 2795. at 2794 95.

290 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory Power who are involved in a conflict in the territory of a signatory. 92 Common Article 3, the Court explained, guaranteed Hamdan a trial by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 93 Relying on commentary 94 to the Geneva Conventions and Yamashita, 95 the Court stated that the regularly constituted court[s] prescribed by the Geneva Conventions must be ordinary military courts, and that Geneva provisions definitely exclud[e] all special tribunals including military commissions that do not conform to courts-martial or that are subject to change in mid-trial. 96 Regarding the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples, the Court posited that it must be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized by customary international law. 97 Citing to Article 75 of Protocol I 98 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 99 among other sources, the Court concluded that these protections include a detainee s right to be tried in his own presence and the right to have access to evidence against him. 100 Therefore, the Court held that the Executive s military commission implemented to try Hamdan was unlawful insofar as it failed to meet these requirements. 101 6. Justice Breyer s Concurrence Justice Breyer s concise concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, directly repudiated Justice Thomas s complaint that the majority s decision would hamper the Executive s abil- 92 at 2796. 93 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 (citation omitted). 94 See 4 Int l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 21 (1958) [hereinafter Geneva Cmt.]. 95 327 U.S. at 44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 96 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 97 (quoting Geneva Cmt., supra note 94, at 340). 97 at 2697. 98 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 99 Art. 14, 3(d), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 100 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 98 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy did not entirely agree with the majority on this point. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 101 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (majority opinion).

2008] COMMENT 291 ity to combat terrorism. 102 In particular, Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of congressional authorization and the role of Congress in justifying the Executive s exercise of powers, especially when an absence of immediate danger allows for consultation between the governmental branches. 103 7. Justice Kennedy s Concurrence In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined in part by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, acknowledged the separation-ofpowers principles implicated by the Executive s military commissions. 104 In particular, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority opinion, and posited that Article 21 of the UCMJ imported Common Article 3 into U.S. military law 105 and that Article 36 required uniformity between military commissions and courts-martial barring any exigent circumstances. 106 The military commission at issue, according to Justice Kennedy, exceeded these congressional limitations 107 and had no practicable justifications for its deviations from courts-martial. 108 Finding the military commission unlawful, Justice Kennedy refrained from expounding upon some issues that the majority decided. 109 8. Justice Scalia s Dissent Joined in his dissent by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia criticized the majority s interpretations of the DTA on the grounds that the statute prohibits any exercise of jurisdiction, even by the Supreme Court, over the military commissions at Guantanamo, and that the statute became effective as to all cases on its date of enactment. 110 Justice Scalia concluded that the Court had no jurisdiction absent an explicit reservation of pending cases, since the DTA expressly and unequivocally ousted the Court s jurisdiction over the present matter and precedent supports statutory jurisdiction ousting for cases pending at the statute s effective date of enactment. 111 102 at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 103 104 at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 105 at 2803 04. 106 at 2801. 107 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808. 108 at 2807. 109 at 2809 (refraining from deciding whether the accused has a right to be present at all stages of a criminal trial, whether Article 75 of Protocol I is binding law, and whether Hamdan s conspiracy charge is valid). 110 at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 111 at 2810 11.

292 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 Responding to the majority s statutory interpretation of a negative inference that would enable the Court to exercise jurisdiction in this case, 112 Justice Scalia emphasized that the DTA is clear in its jurisdiction stripping, and that precedent and a negative inference in the opposite direction support a presumption against jurisdiction. 113 Furthermore, Justice Scalia criticized the majority s reliance upon the DTA s legislative history as evidence of Congress s intent for the Court to have jurisdiction over cases such as Hamdan s. 114 According to Justice Scalia, the congressional debates of the DTA represent views by both legislators who wanted to preclude the Court s jurisdiction and legislators who wanted to preserve it, and that many statements relating to jurisdiction were undoubtedly opportunistic and crafted solely for use in the briefs in this very litigation. 115 Likewise, the DTA s drafting history, Justice Scalia argued, is no more legitimate or reliable an indicator of the objective meaning of a statute than any other form of legislative history. 116 In addition, Justice Scalia pointed to several other considerations that disputed the majority s conclusions and underlying assumptions. 117 Finally, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority s refusal to adhere to Councilman s precedent and to abstain from adjudicating these ongoing military proceedings. 118 Considerations of military necessity, final review bestowed upon the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, and interbranch comity at the federal level between the judiciary and the military necessitate, in Justice Scalia s opinion, the Court s abstention from interfering with the military commission at issue. 119 112 See at 2765 (majority opinion). 113 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2812 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 114 at 2815 17. 115 at 2815 16. 116 at 2817. 117 at 2817 19. These considerations included: (1) by exercising jurisdiction, the Court would retain jurisdiction over, and burden itself with, all Guantanamorelated habeas petitions ; (2) Guantanamo Bay is beyond U.S. sovereign territorial jurisdiction ; and (3) the DTA does not eliminate but merely defers the Court s jurisdiction over habeas petitions from Guantanamo Bay, insofar as the Court may still review the D.C. Circuit s decisions relating to such petitions. 118 at 2819 22. 119 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2821 22.

2008] COMMENT 293 9. Justice Thomas s Dissent To begin his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 120 emphasized that the Executive, namely the President, has constitutional and precedential authority to direct national security and foreign affairs, 121 and that congressional authorization is not always necessary for the President to effectuate his actions. 122 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas assumed that Congress authorized the President to try unlawful combatants when Congress enacted the AUMF. 123 Conceding the relevancy of Winthrop s treatise and its four criteria for determining a military commission s jurisdiction, 124 Justice Thomas concluded that [t]he Executive has easily satisfied these considerations here, and that [t]he plurality s contrary conclusion rests upon an incomplete accounting and an unfaithful application of those considerations. 125 First, in Justice Thomas s assessment, the Executive s determinations that the theater of the present conflict includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries where al Qaeda has established training camps,... and that the duration of that conflict dates back (at least) to [O]sama bin Laden s August 1996 Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans, are justifiably supported by the Executive s inherent authority 126 and by extrinsic evidence. 127 Next, Justice Thomas quickly confirmed that Hamdan is a person triable by military commission on account of his being an unlawful combatant charged with joining and conspiring with a terrorist network dedicated to flouting the laws of war. 128 Thereafter, Justice Thomas explained that the nature of the offense charged against Hamdan survives the plurality s arguments because: (1) such charges involving violations of the law of war need not 120 With the exception of several parts including this one, Justice Alito also joined Justice Thomas s dissent. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, all citations to Justice Thomas s dissent will refer to parts in which Justice Alito joined. 121 (citations and quotations omitted). Justice Alito did not join this part of Justice Thomas s dissent. 122 at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981)). Justice Alito did not join. 123 at 2824 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946)). Justice Alito did not join. 124 at 2826. The four criteria include: (1) time and (2) place of the offense, (3) the status of the offender, and (4) the nature of the offense charged. (citations omitted). 125 126 127 128 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2826 (Thomas, J., dissenting). (citations and internal quotations omitted). at 2828. at 2829.

294 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 be stated as specifically as common law indictments; 129 (2) the actions of military commissions are to be upheld unless there is clear conviction that they are unlawful; 130 (3) it is inappropriate for the judiciary to intrude upon the Executive s war management; 131 and (4) a flexible, evolutionary common-law system is uniquely appropriate for the amorphous nature of war. 132 Analyzing the specific charges against Hamdan, Justice Thomas first acknowledged that membership in a war-criminal enterprise and conspiracy to commit war crimes is chargeable before military commissions on account of the common law of war. 133 Likewise, Justice Thomas again acknowledged that, based on precedent, Hamdan is chargeable with and triable before a military commission for conspiring and agreeing with al Qaeda to commit violent and terroristic acts. 134 Furthermore, Justice Thomas posited that military necessity, which the plurality sets forth as the most basic precondition... for establishment of military commissions, is a determination reserved to military judgment and not that of the courts, 135 and alternatively, the jurisdiction of military commissions is not dependent upon the exigency of the circumstances. 136 Regarding the UCMJ, Justice Thomas declared repeatedly that Article 21, in and of itself, authorizes the Executive s use of military commissions. 137 Insofar as the majority s interpretations of Article 36 were concerned, Justice Thomas argued that the President alone has the authority and discretion to deviate the military commission s procedures from those of civilian courts when he has deemed it practicable to do so, and that the commission s procedures are not contrary to the UCMJ since these procedures do not implicate any of the few UCMJ provisions concerning such commissions. 138 In addi- 129 at 2829 (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946)). 130 at 2830 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942)). 131 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2830 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 132 (footnote omitted). 133 at 2830 31. Justice Thomas pointed to Civil War military trials as examples of tribunals prosecuting persons for similar charges. at 2831 n.7. Justice Alito did not join this part of Justice Thomas s dissent. at 2823. 134 at 2834 36 (Justice Thomas pointed to World War II, the Civil War, Winthrop s treatise, and the actions of military tribunals in Nuremberg and several European nations as evidence of tribunals prosecuting persons for similar charges.) 135 at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 136 ( Traditionally, retributive justice for heinous war crimes is as much a military necessity as the demands of military efficiency touted by the plurality, and swift military retribution is precisely what Congress authorized the President to impose on the September 11 attackers in the AUMF. ) (citations omitted). 137 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2825, 2840 41, 2845. 138 at 2840.

2008] COMMENT 295 tion, Justice Thomas reconciled the procedures of Hamdan s military commission with the uniformity requirement of Article 36(b) by holding that requirement as mandating uniform procedures only across the separate branches of the armed services, and not between military commissions and courts-martial as the majority opined. 139 Turning his attention to the majority s invocation of the Geneva Conventions, Justice Thomas posited that Johnson v. Eisentrager 140 forecloses judicial enforceability of the Conventions, irrespective of Article 21 s authorization, because the Conventions require political and diplomatic, and not judicial, relief. 141 Moreover, Justice Thomas found that an alleged al Qaeda detainee is not entitled to Common Article 3 protection since the conflict against al Qaeda, as determined by the President pursuant to his inherent authority, is of an international character, and Common Article 3, by its very language, applies only to armed conflict not of an international character. 142 Alternatively, even if Common Article 3 was judicially enforceable and applicable to this issue, Hamdan s case would still not be ripe, Justice Thomas argued, since Hamdan has not been subject to a trial by military commission or, consequently, a final judgment and sentence. 143 Justice Thomas further concluded that [i]n any event, Hamdan s military commission complies with the requirements of Common Article 3, because it is regularly constituted, is similar to those commissions that have been employed throughout our history to try unlawful combatants for crimes against the law of war, and affords all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 144 Finally, referring again to the Geneva Conventions text, Justice Thomas argued that the Third Geneva Conventions do not apply to Hamdan because, as determined by the President pursuant to his inherent authority, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party as required by the Conventions in order for a party to fall underneath its protections. 145 139 at 2842 43. 140 399 U.S. 763 (1950). 141 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2844 45 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 142 at 2846 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3318). Justice Alito did not join this part of Justice Thomas s dissent. at 2823. 143 at 2846 47. Justice Alito joined this and all subsequent parts of Justice Thomas s dissent. at 2823. 144 at 2847 48 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3319). 145 at 2849 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation omitted).

296 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 10. Justice Alito s Dissent In his brief dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Alito explained why the military commission at issue constituted a regularly constituted court as required by Common Article 3, and was therefore lawfully authorized by Article 21. 146 According to Justice Alito, for a court to be regularly constituted, the tribunal must have been appointed, set up, or established in accordance with the domestic law of the appointing country, but need not be similar in structure and composition to a regular military court. 147 Because the military commission here was promulgated by a military order and was to be routinely used, Justice Alito concluded that the commission was, in fact, regularly constituted. 148 In addition, Justice Alito held that if the military commission could not satisfy the uniformity requirement of Article 36, the commission would still be regularly constituted, because it is the commission s variant procedures that may be unlawful but not the tribunal itself. 149 Likewise, Justice Alito noted that any procedural improprieties that might occur in particular cases are subject to appellate review. 150 III. THE ROAD TO HAMDAN: THE WAR ON TERROR CASES AND DIMINISHING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE Traditionally, the Court has deferred to the Executive on a range of issues relating to war, military and foreign affairs, and national security. 151 Beginning in 2004, however, the Court granted writs of certiorari to hear cases concerning the Executive s actions in Guantanamo Bay and its practice of indefinite detentions, which are among the most high-profile and contentious aspects of the global war on terror. 152 For the most part, the Court s decisions in these cases, culminating in Hamdan, effectively called into question the Executive s authority to act free of any restraints. 153 This section of the Comment will begin by briefly setting forth the separation-of-powers principles that underscore our tripartite national government and by highlighting some moments from the 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 at 2849 50 (Alito, J., dissenting). Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2851. at 2852. at 2852 53. at 2853 54. See infra Part III.A. See infra Parts III.A C. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.

2008] COMMENT 297 Court s aforementioned deferential approach to the Executive and the government at large during times of war and crisis. 154 Thereafter, this section will summarize the war on terror cases so as to provide the recent context and precedent from which Hamdan has arisen. 155 A. Tradition of Judicial Deference to Executive in War, Military and Foreign Affairs, and National Security Within the confines of our tripartite national government, each governmental branch has certain constitutionally prescribed responsibilities and obligations, and certain powers at its disposal to fulfill those responsibilities and obligations. 156 Each branch in turn asserts its powers as a check and balance on the other two branches to protect against the tyranny of accumulated power and to ensure that the three branches operate within their respective spheres of authority. 157 In the interrelated contexts of war, military and foreign affairs, and national security, however, the Judiciary has traditionally deferred to the Executive s judgments 158 so as to enable the Executive to efficiently and effectively fulfill its constitutional responsibilities and obligations as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States. 159 A number of cases and precedents speak to the self-imposed, diminished scrutiny of the Judiciary in these matters. At the outset of the Civil War, President Lincoln unilaterally suspended the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to his executive war powers and proceeded to detain a U.S. citizen without any possibility of habeas relief. 160 Sitting as a circuit judge in Ex parte Merryman, 161 Chief 154 See infra Part III.A. 155 See infra Parts III.B D. 156 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (2d ed. 2002). Chemerinsky writes, in relevant part: The Constitution creates a national government and divides power among three branches.... The division of powers among the branches was designed to create a system of checks and balances and lessen the possibility of tyrannical rule. In general, in order for the government to act, at least two branches must agree. 157 158 at 364 ( The Supreme Court often has generally remarked that challenges to the conduct of foreign policy present a nonjusticiable political question.... The challenges to foreign policy that are probably most likely to be deemed political questions are those directed to the constitutionality of the president s use of the war powers. ). 159 U.S. CONST. art. II, 2, cl. 1. 160 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 26 60 (1998).

298 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:279 Justice Taney declared the President s actions unconstitutional insofar as they exceeded the Executive s constitutional powers and encroached upon those duties of Congress. 162 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Taney deferred to the Executive s strength by acknowledging the unenforceability of his holding since his judiciary powers ha[d] been resisted by a force too strong for [him] to overcome. 163 Predictably, President Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney s ruling, and Congress later authorized Lincoln s unilateral suspension of habeas corpus. 164 The Prize Cases, 165 a conglomeration of Civil War era cases, involved the condemnation of four ships that violated President Lincoln s self-initiated, congressionally unauthorized blockade. 166 The Court not only legitimated the President s unilateral action but essentially deemed it a necessity by proclaiming that the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. 167 To allow the President to effectively resist active hostilities and insurrections, the Court declared that it must defer to the President s decisions and acts and his determinations of what degree of force the crisis demands. 168 Furthermore, the Court held that if the Executive violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and encroached upon Congress s authority, an ex post facto ratification of the Executive s action by Congress would perfectly cure the defect. 169 As the United States entered World War I, Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917, which criminalized any speech that might interfere with military recruitment and was used to suppress political dissent during the war. 170 Through a series of cases, the Court upheld criminal convictions under the Espionage Act against First Amendment challenges. 171 Affirming a conviction for defendants who printed and distributed documents that compared conscription to slavery and petitioned for a repeal of the military draft, Justice 161 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 162 at 149 50. 163 at 153. 164 Steven R. Shapiro, Defending Civil Liberties in the War on Terror: The Role of the Courts in the War Against Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 104 (2005). 165 67 U.S. 635 (1863). 166 167 at 668. 168 at 670. 169 at 671. 170 Shapiro, supra note 164, at 104; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 173. 171 See REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 174, 178 82.

2008] COMMENT 299 Holmes in Schenck v. United States 172 wrote: [w]hen a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. 173 Likewise, the Court sided with the government and continuously upheld the Espionage Act provisions against other defendants who published and circulated articles and pamphlets that were critical of the government, the war, and the draft law, and who attempted to incite resistance. 174 During World War II, the Court infamously upheld the constitutionality of Japanese-American internment in the case of Korematsu v. United States, 175 which followed on the heels of Hirabayashi v. United States and its vindication of governmentally imposed curfews for Japanese-Americans. 176 Korematsu arose from an Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt that preceded a general s military order and a congressional enactment that authorized the internment. 177 In light of this authorization, the Court deferred to the judgment of the military and of Congress and conceded to the exigent circumstances surrounding the war as proper justification for the internment of U.S. citizens. 178 In Ex parte Quirin 179 and In re Yamashita, 180 the Court found permissible, pursuant to congressional authorization manifested in the Articles of War, the Executive s use of military commissions to try en- 172 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 173 at 52. 174 See, e.g., United States v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Fromwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 178 82. 175 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 176 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 177 178 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215 17. at 218. The majority stated: [W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not be readily isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it. (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99) (internal quotations omitted). 179 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 180 327 U.S. 1 (1946).