Quiz #5 1. According to the textbook, North America accounts for what percent of all transnational terrorist attacks in the past 38 years: a.) 1%, b.) 4%, c.) 9%, d.) 27%, e.) 42%. 2. Which is NOT a right listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?: a.) life, liberty, and the security of persons, b.) rest and leisure, c.) employment, d.) privacy. 3. The strategy of terrorist attacks intended to sabotage a prospective peace between the target and the moderate leadership from the terrorists home society is called?: a,) outbidding, b.) coercion, c.) spoiling, d.) provocation.
Institutions and Collective Goods Erik Gartzke POLI 12, Lec. 5a August 23, 2010
What in the world? A world in common: The world is increasingly interdependent Issues take collective action A world apart: Roughly 195 nations in the world The need for collective action and collective action are two different things --> problem
Collective action problems Private good: Rival: My consumption reduces your consumption Excludible: property rights can be enforced Public good: Non-rival: my consumption does not reduce your consumption Non-excludible: property rights are difficult to enforce.
Collective action, cont. Excludible Non-excludible Rival (individually supplied) Non-rival (not individually supplied) Private goods (food, clothes) Club goods (Disneyland, Free Trade Area) Common pool [externalities] (fisheries) Public goods (national defense, lighthouse)
What is an IO? What is an international organization? Def: group designed to achieve collective action, usually across international borders. Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs): international organization of states Non-governmental organizations (NGOs): international organization of non-states
What is an IO?, cont. International organizations deal with problems that span international borders (global/regional). A problem becomes international when either the problem, its side-effects, or solutions are not physically contained within national boundaries (pollution, trade, piracy, health, migration, war). Examples of early IGOs International Telecommunications Union (1865) Universal Postal Union (1874)
Theories of IO Theories of international organization and international institutions can be organized along conventional lines of the paradigms: Realism Constructivism Liberalism But there are also some unique traditions: Functionalism
Theories of IO, cont. Most agree that IGOs matter in some form or in certain contexts No consensus exists as to the extent of IGO influence and how best to think about IGOs By matter, scholars usually mean that IGOs should be capable of altering state behavior.
Theories of IO, cont. 2 On one side, constructivists, functionalists, and liberal institutionalists claim that IGOs are (or can be) a central component of world order. On the other side, realists argue that IGOs are only marginally influential in world politics, and that IGOs reflect status quo power relations.
Realism Realists typically see international organizations as unnecessary, unhelpful, or even harmful: Mearsheimer (1995a) argues that international organizations are epiphenomenal. Power relations determine action IOs reflect, rather than effect, power Schweller and Priess (1997) argue that IOs can assist powerful states in managing the system. IOs still reflect existing power relationships
IO Optimism Global politics is increasingly organized around regimes and institutions that foster cooperation Provide information and organization structure Promote norms and common belief systems Reduce transaction costs in cooperating
IO Optimism, cont. Realpolitik should become less important: With rise of multiple channels of interaction Growing salience of non-state actors Increasing overlaps between state interests Rising difficulties of going it alone in an interdependent and interconnected world
Functionalism Functionalists argue that the world is becoming more interconnected (Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye 1989; Young 1986, 1992; Ruggie 1983) The dense network of dependencies in the international system is like a web Traps states and forces them to cooperate Could violate one agreement or IO Cannot disentangle from many treaties
Constructivism Constructivists take this argument a step further (Wendt 1995; Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 2004) It is not just that IOs condition relations IOs and other forms of interaction lead states want different things Participation in IOs make states have different preferences -- prefer to cooperate, not fight
Liberalism Neoliberal-institutionalists accept Kantian/ functionalist prescription for world politics Also accept realist tenets of systemic anarchy, centrality of power, primacy of state interests (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984, Powell 1991; Snidal 1991; Keohane and Martin 1995).
Liberalism, cont. Collective security/cooperation are nevertheless feasible where states possess common interests + where states value absolute > relative gains. Snidal (1991): predictions of absolute and relative gains depend on number of actors IGOs can foster cooperation by encouraging reciprocity and regularizing interaction. Recent research shows how shadow of the future can inhibit cooperation (Fearon 1998)
Where s the Beef? Empirical literature on institutions is sparse. We do not actually know whether IGOs are as effective (or ineffective) as partisans claim. Theory stands to advance most quickly when confronted with contrasting evidence. Several studies offer preliminary tests of IOs (Singer and Wallace 1970; Wallace and Singer 1970; Domke 1988; Young 1992; Martin and Simmons 1998) Much remains to be done
Dem Peace Spillover Dem peace researchers have become interested in IGOs (Russett et al. 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Oneal et al. 2003). Perhaps the strongest evidence that IGOs alter state behavior is found in these studies. Oneal and Russett argue that dyads that share many IGO memberships less often fight. Yet, this result only occurs under special cirumstances (politically relevant dyads and the GEE estimator, Oneal and Russett 1998)
Dem Peace Spillover, cont. In their own analysis, IGOs increase conflict or have no effect under other conditions. Other studies find no indication that IGOs bring peace (Jacobson 1986; Domke 1988) Oneal and Russett 1999b and Gartzke et al (2001) provide evidence implying that IGOs increase interstate conflict among members.
Mixed Effects The most recent research suggests that IOs have a mixed effect on conflict and interstate peace IOs with strong institutional structure and a mandate to intervene in security affairs tend to be the most effective in promoting peace IOs with limited institutional structure, a divided membership, or no mandate have no effect on whether nations fight or are peaceful IOs with an economic mandate are actually associated with increased conflict - spurious.
Conclusion Paradox: IOs very popular as a solution to warfare Not much evidence that they are effective Limited role may have more to do with their cumulative effect -- many IOs are important Part of a larger picture of efforts to cooperate Do IOs effect or reflect peace? Could help in ways suggested here Could also manage ongoing cooperation