Poland and the EU: Internal disputes, domestic politics and accession

The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics ISSN: 1352-3279 (Print) 1743-9116 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs20 Poland and the EU: Internal disputes, domestic politics and accession George Blazyca & Marek Kolkiewicz To cite this article: George Blazyca & Marek Kolkiewicz (1999) Poland and the EU: Internal disputes, domestic politics and accession, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 15:4, 131-143, DOI: 10.1080/13523279908415423 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523279908415423 Published online: 12 Nov 2007. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 790 Citing articles: 8 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalinformation?journalcode=fjcs21

Poland and the EU: Internal Disputes, Domestic Politics and Accession GEORGE BLAZYCA and MAREK KOLKIEWICZ In 1998 'Europe' generated a noisy political debate within Poland, leading to the sacking of the minister for Europe, Ryszard Czarnecki. EU affairs appeared to be becoming more contentious with potentially serious consequences for Poland's accession. Feuds within the governmental coalition and the loss of EU funding, arising from the development of a range of issues of contention between Warsaw and Brussels, seemed to undermine Poland's prospects for early membership of the Union. This was enhanced by an apparent cooling of public opinion towards the idea. The coming presidential and parliamentary elections (in 2000 and 2001 respectively) will show how far the country has shifted to a 'Eurosceptic' position. The goal of entry by 2003 may prove optimistic. I. Events One striking feature of the Polish political landscape over the period since the 'post-solidarity' AWS-UW government was formed in November 1997 was the way in which matters relating to EU accession suddenly emerged from the shadows of political life to dominate the domestic political scene, at least for a time. In the early months of 1998 the new authorities in Poland faced an epidemic of uncomfortable EU-related events: first, finding a chief negotiator for EU accession talks took longer than most observers expected, hinting at an intense internal politicking; second, a 'turf war' broke out between ministers over which government department should be responsible for EU aid funds; third, a number of Poland's PHARE applications 2 were rejected by the Commission on the grounds of poor quality, casting the country's EU ambitions and preparations in a particularly unwelcome light while generating a glare of damaging international publicity; fourth, within Poland, soon after the PHARE fiasco, the deputy minister of the 'Europe committee' 3 complained that working with his chief was frustratingly like being involved in sand-pit competition with a child to see who could 'spit furthest', so raising the George Blazyca is Professor of Economics and Marek Kolkiewicz is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Paisley, Scotland. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.15, No.4, December 1999, pp.131 143 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

132 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS temperature of a domestic quarrel that was already well fired up; fifth, Dutch media reports, suggesting that after losing PHARE money a Polish government minister had telephoned his congratulations to Brussels, were seized on and amplified by the Warsaw press, further raising the domestic political temperature; and finally, in July 1998, the minister in charge of the Europe Committee, Ryszard Czarnecki, was sacked, as the prime minister, Jerzy Buzek, eventually asserted his authority and restored some order to management of EU affairs. Thus, in its first months in office, 'Europe' had commanded the domestic political scene and buffeted the ruling parties in a way that had not happened, openly at least, through the entire life of the previous SLD-PSL" administration. Fortunately some better news on EU developments was also around the corner. In November 1998 the European Commission, in its assessment of candidate countries' preparedness for membership, noted that Poland was doing relatively well. The EC reported that Poland and Hungary were making noticeable progress in transformation generally and in adapting to EU norms in particular, whereas the one-time 'star reformer', the Czech Republic, together with the previously strongly growing Slovenia, were slipping back. 5 With 'EU turmoil' evident in Poland in the first half of 1998, but better marks awarded by the Commission in the second part of the year, Poland seemed to hang on to its place as one of the countries likely to be in the leading wave of EU enlargement. But it is worth asking whether the events of 1998 indicate, in the Polish case, new risks to the accession process. If so, what is their source and how are they likely to develop? How do internal and external factors interact in shaping enlargement developments? In short, what can be learned from the most recent chapter of Poland-EU relations? II. Internal Features: Domestic Political Tensions Feuds within the AWS-UW Coalition It seems that the source of Polish difficulties in managing, in early 1998, its relationship with the EU had mainly a domestic origin and can be traced back to the construction of the AWS-UW government following the 1997 general election. The first problem faced then was how to reach a broad policy consensus, a coalition agreement, between the dominant AWS 'party' led by the Solidarity trade union leader Marian Krzaklewski, and the UW led by the liberal economist Leszek Balcerowicz. This was not easy. Apart from differences of political philosophy and doctrine between AWS and UW, the internal structure of the AWS also created problems. AWS, with its 35 constituent groupings, had the largest number of seats in

POLAND AND THE EU 133 parliament (201 out of a total of 460), but was a political party only in a very general sense. It was first of all an electoral coalition and then a parliamentary club. Its core element was a Solidarity trade union bloc, predominantly of a 'Christian-social' 6 orientation, but it also included distinct political parties ranging from liberal conservatives to patriotic conservatives, Christian democrats, Catholic nationalists and others. Internal discipline within the AWS was therefore weaker than in the case of its UW partner. In January 1999, in line with the constitutional requirement that only properly registered political parties may contest elections, the trade union Solidarity grouping of AWS plus some other of its elements re-formed as the political party, AWS-Ruch Spoleczny (AWS-Social Movement) with Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek as its leader - one of the very few occasions in history when a prime minister has found a party to lead only after winning an election! The development of AWS-Ruch Spoleczny has been sluggish, however, contributing again to the weakness of AWS in relation to its UW partner. In the light of the foregoing it is little surprise that differences between the liberal-dominated UW and the broad centre-right, yet syndicalist, grouping of the AWS have emerged across several areas. These include economic policy (in November 1998, AWS deputies initially voted down the UW-inspired state budget for 1999) and Europe. In this article we concentrate on the latter. In general terms the new government's line was that it alone could make up for the time lost by the dilatory attitude of its predecessor postcommunist (SLD-PSL) coalition towards fundamental economic and social reform. AWS-UW claimed that it alone possessed the determination needed to complete the Polish transformation that was started in 1989 by Poland's first Solidarity government. In particular, the new government would, it said, push through 'missing' economic reforms (especially of the pensions and health systems, and also including decentralization of administration) and speed up the privatization of sectors where 'post-communism' had been afraid to tread (energy, steel, airlines and telecommunications). Within the UW, its leader, backed by the party's technocrats from its 'modernizing' wing, was particularly keen to construct a 'Balcerowicz plan, Mark IF to complete the work of the first Balcerowicz plan of 1990. 7 Most members of the AWS were more interventionist in nature and suspicious of UW economic policy despite the high regard of the international financial community for Balcerowicz himself. Closely related to the future shape of the Polish economy was the issue of European integration and the preparations necessary for Poland's future EU membership. AWS was the only one of the four major parliamentary parties after the 1997 election with no track record in managing Poland-EU relations. This was in sharp

134 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS contrast to UW, whose prominent members (at that time in the precursor parties of the UW) had, in the early 1990s, set the scene for the current pattern of Poland's relationships with Brussels and pushed EU membership to the centre of Poland's foreign policy. They were also deeply involved in negotiating the Europe Agreement 8 of 1991 and ensuring its ratification. The AWS, by contrast, contained elements decidedly cautious of integrationist developments. Indeed, some of its constituent parties had voted against the ratification of the Europe Agreement in 1992 either for fear of the consequences of competition and privatization on a weak Polish economy, or for fear of losing sovereignty to Brussels. Some critics of the agreement argued that too many concessions had been made and suggested re-negotiation. By 1997 those parties had become part of AWS, some even holding positions in the leadership. 9 Although the more noticeably Eurosceptic groups were not numerically significant in terms of the total number of parliamentary seats they held within AWS, they could bear comparison with the UW's 60 MPs, particularly if allied with other Catholic, nationalist, rural, pro-family, right-leaning members of the trade union Solidarity and others under the AWS umbrella. Ambiguity on European integration was reflected in the AWS electoral programme. If this repeated the orthodox position that entry to NATO and the EU would add dynamism to Polish economic growth and development, the AWS also suggested that for Poland the preferred EU model was a Europe of free nations understood as a 'Europe of Fatherlands'. 10 This reflected the language of the Catholic Nationalist Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe (ZChN). 11 The coalition seems, however, to have had little difficulty in agreeing that EU accession should be one of the ten high-priority tasks facing the new government. The coalition protocol's preamble explained that the government would aim to ensure effective preparation and negotiation of Polish entry to the EU. This would, it went on, guarantee the country's security by strengthening Poland's international political and economic position. 12 Yet there was always a sneaking doubt that, despite the AWS's predominantly pro-european public stance, it was an organization that was vulnerable on this issue and subject to pressure from its right wing. In November 1998, one AWS member of parliament, Adam Glapinski, told Hans van den Broek (EU commissioner responsible for enlargement) that Poland had development options other than the EU. These, he said, perhaps with an element of bluff, could focus on the USA and South-east Asia. If Poland restructured its agriculture and heavy industry under EU pressure, he added, then it should get something in return, including a firm date for entry. 13 Alongside the problems posed in establishing a modus vivendi between AWS and UW some very practical matters had to be dealt with after

POLAND AND THE EU 135 September 1997. One of the most important was to select a prime minister. Since Krzaklewski refused to be pushed into accepting the post (his eyes are said to be set on the presidential election due in the year 2000), despite Leszek Balcerowicz's warnings that to avoid it was to create a 'politburo' situation where real power would lie once again outside government and parliament, an acceptable substitute had to be found. A relatively unknown academic from Gliwice in southern Poland, Jerzy Buzek, was brought in for this purpose. After the prime minister's chair was filled ministerial positions came next, and in the contest that followed the UW generally managed to win control over the most important economic functions (Leszek Balcerowicz as finance minister and deputy prime minister) and also won the greatest influence over foreign affairs (Bronislaw Geremek became foreign minister and a key player in Europe accession negotiations). The Committee for European Integration (Komitet Integracji Europejskiej - KIE), set up with ministerial rank by the previous coalition in 1996 and presided over at that time by the prime minister, Wtodzimierz Cimoszewicz, posed special problems. On one hand the UW, with its enthusiastically 'pro-european' stance, would have liked also to run the EU accession process. On the other hand the AWS, the dominant force in parliament, with more ambivalent attitudes towards the EU, had no wish to cede the government's entire foreign policy to the UW. Moreover, the AWS has, as noted above, considerable internal problems stemming from its own make-up as a coalition of diverse interests in which some member parties have well-known 'eurosceptic' attachments. The Christian National Alliance Party (ZChN) is, as noted above, a case in point. With the UW's dominance in foreign and economic affairs, pressure from within AWS grew that it should not yield everything in these areas to its junior partner. Nevertheless, the appointment of a ZChN personality, Ryszard Czarnecki, to head the Europe Committee raised some eyebrows in Western Europe, if not in Poland. But it was the loss of PHARE funds in May 1998 that put the weaknesses of government management of EU policy squarely in the spotlight. Skirmishing between politicians with diverse EU perspectives continued over the weeks that followed and finally erupted yet again in July. Worse still, all this took place as prime minister Jerzy Buzek was making his first official visit to Washington. With the prime minister out of the country, it seemed that his weakly integrated ministerial team was at its own throat. Buzek promised sharp words to colleagues on his return as well as determined action to sort out what was fast becoming the mess of Poland's management of EU affairs. In due course Czarnecki was removed, but even this was no easy matter for the prime minister. Critically aware of the relatively fragile parliamentary balance and the damage that might follow the departure of all

136 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS the ZChN deputies from the government benches, Buzek had to handle the party with kid gloves. Moreover, Buzek most probably also calculated that the AWS without the ZChN risked alienating the support of an element of its constituency, the traditional Catholic-nationalist and eurosceptic element closely linked to ZChN. In the open warfare between coalition partners in the summer of 1998 the ZChN demanded that, if Czarnecki were pushed out, then the party should be 'compensated' by a sacrificial dismissal on the UW side. In the event, some weeks later Czarnecki did lose the Europe office but was awarded a brief 'without portfolio' to placate his party, and that, he insisted, still allowed him to play a European role. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Buzek stepped in where his predecessor as prime minister, Cimoszewicz, had been before him and 'solved' the Europe Committee problem by installing himself as its chairman. He also sought to restore a professional image to the committee by appointing a respected academic from the Lodz Europe centre, Maria Karasinska-Fendler, as its day-to-day secretary and effective chief. This solution appeared to have considerable merit and in the latter part of 1998 Poland's EU policy apparently ceased to be the stuff of political intrigue and scandalized newspaper headlines. Unfortunately the calm was short-lived, and by December 1998 Karasinska-Fendler had also resigned from the post. It remains possible that in due course a more technocratic approach to EU affairs may emerge. But even this is not without dangers. In particular, if it were to lead to a lack of wider discussion and social engagement on EU matters, as they become managed by a 'pro-europe' elite, then, it is argued by some, new problems might easily emerge in a country that already reveals a tendency to complacency regarding its place in the enlargement process. The calculation of the EU enthusiasts is that as people learn more about the Union they also tend to give it greater approval. President and Opposition One new feature of Polish domestic politics since the 1997 general election is that the AWS-UW coalition is constrained by a disciplined and effective parliamentary opposition in the form of the SLD. The coalition must also take into account the role of the president, since the parliamentary arithmetic means that AWS-UW cannot muster the necessary two-thirds of parliamentary votes it needs to overturn the presidential veto. While this considerably widens the scope for the domestic political game in general terms (and the SLD-presidential grouping outmanoeuvred the government on local government reform in mid-1998 14 ), there is less scope for mischief over EU enlargement, since both SLD and president are committed to speedy Polish membership.

POLAND AND THE EU 137 It is possible, however, although so far there is limited evidence for this, that president and opposition will try to exploit (and may even excite) the difficulties to which AWS-UW is clearly susceptible on Europe. In 1998, this took the form of righteous indignation that EU matters could be so badly handled by a post-solidarity government, President Kwasniewski even claiming to have warned the government as early as March 1998 that trouble lay ahead. 15 From the perspective of the events of 1998-99 it seems unlikely that the EU will figure strongly as an issue in the presidential election in the year 2000 since all major parties are nominally committed to joining Western structures. Kwasniewski, with his Communist Party past, has little to gain from adopting a harder line on accession and is in any case something of an EU enthusiast. On the other side, Krzaklewski, or whoever represents the AWS in the contest, will be pressed to weigh traditionalist Catholic opinion and the views of strong lobbies (agriculture and heavy industry) against Poland's international standing where much damage might be done by any surge in anti-eu sentiment. Nevertheless, it remains distinctly possible that AWS might be pushed towards or succumb to greater euroscepticism. III. External Features 'Europeanization' of issues and points of contention between Warsaw and Brussels If opinion poll evidence is any guide, the euphoria that Poles felt immediately after 1989 towards all things Western is ebbing. The CBOS public opinion research centre reported that its June 1999 survey showed 55 per cent of Poles to be in favour of EU membership, a proportion that had receded fairly abruptly from 80 per cent in May 1996. 16 The slide coincided with an atmosphere of tougher talking and increased confrontation between the European Commission and at least elements of the Polish government. 17 But, while the events of the summer of 1998 may be set aside as mere episodes, regrettable to most, there is also an inevitable intensification of the 'europeanization' of issues as accession moves from more relaxed discussion of generalities to details and, perhaps, timetables. A by-product of this is that domestic European institutions such as the Europe Committee are likely to assume a much greater significance than was the case in an earlier period. Those running the Europe Committee find many more policy areas passing under their purview if not their control. The Committee has become worth fighting over. In the summer of 1998 it was quite clearly a battleground between crystallizing eurosceptic and europhile tendencies. It remains to be seen whether the more technocratic style it has once more adopted can hold.

138 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS It is worthwhile summarizing the growing number of broad policy areas and sectors that appear to have the potential to become serious sources of Polish-EU contention, where negotiation looks likely to be tight and where the strength and professionalism of negotiating teams will play a key role. Most of the sensitive sectors are well known and command much public attention. Probably the most serious obstacle to Polish EU membership lies in the country's vast but archaic agriculture. The 'Polish side' expects in due course to have access to financial support within a reformed CAP, but the EU naturally worries about the cost. Heavy industry (coal and steel) follow closely in the sensitivity league, although it appears that for steel a compromise may be reached based on a plan submitted to the EC in June 1997. In steel and in coal, the Polish strategy promises liberalization and privatization in return, once again, for financial support for restructuring. In the case of steel, the EU's concern focuses on the dangers of EU-wide overcapacity following enlargement. In other sensitive sectors of the economy, such as telecommunications, banking and insurance, the Polish side knows that it is its market size and its prospects of privatization that interest EU members. These are Poland's best cards in the game of enlargement poker. The country has something real to offer and will expect some return - although perhaps yielded elsewhere - in the accession process. Apart from specific economic sectors two of the most controversial enlargement issues concern labour mobility and sales of land to foreigners. Among EU members, Germany and Austria have for some time expressed fears regarding labour flows, and the Poles, for their part, have rarely hidden their reluctance to allow foreigners (by which is usually meant Germans) genuine freedom in buying land. By December 1998 these were being signalled again as areas where compromise would have to be reached. Poland expects transition arrangements in land sales (not uncommon in previous enlargements) and will probably yield on labour mobility. However, this would be, as one German journalist has put it, a very 'un- European' solution to the problem, one out of line with integrationist sentiment. 18 Judging by recent developments on the Polish domestic political scene, different groups and parties can be expected to engage in different ways in the broader EU accession struggle. But, so far, that engagement has been slight. Some observers see few 'lobbies' on the Polish stage pushing hard for speedy entry. Perhaps, however, it is something that could quickly change. As the 'europeanization' of issues continues to gather momentum, parties may be tempted to use Europe as a means of sharper self-differentiation. In this way, the ZChN on the right of the AWS coalition and other narodowcy ('nationalists', although eurosceptic may be a better translation) are

POLAND AND THE EU 139 beginning to present the liberal reformers of the UW as the europejczyki ('Europeans', but europhile is more apt), suggesting that they are so closely identified with Brussels, and hold such strong pro-european views, that they may be incapable of negotiating effectively on Poland's behalf. IV. Prospects If 1998 saw increased turbulence in Polish-EU relationships, what does it add up to? Does it give cause for concern over future developments regarding Polish accession to the European Union? Do domestic political disputes have the capacity to threaten Poland's place as a leading candidate in the next wave of EU enlargement? Few would deny that the post- Solidarity AWS-UW coalition suffers from a distinct lack of internal cohesion. That, in turn, looks like being brought out more forcefully by the intensification of the EU process. As the negotiations move into a more critical and detailed phase, it will become easier to spotlight differences between the EU and Poland which will very likely be used internally by the politicians to mark out domestic differences more clearly. In other words, the 'europeanization' of issues will intensify. The opposition parties will also seek to find political advantage in this, although the SLD's pro-eu stance must constrain its activity. The peasants' party (PSL) may feel less hampered and can be expected to become a more vigorous champion of the generally anti-eu feelings of the farming sector. Despite the difficulties that can be expected in the future, the weight of mainstream elite political opinion remains firmly pro-eu and this looks likely to dominate the noisy but still relatively small nationalist sentiments of the right-wing parties. Nevertheless, what this may lead to is an increasing sensitivity in the political establishment over how much is yielded in accession negotiations.the course of Polish-EU developments is hardly immune to what happens in the EU, where many observers detect a distinct 'cooling' of enthusiasm for speedy enlargement. Kirsty Hughes, for example, notes that in the first half of 1998, 'the British presidency was marked by a distinct faltering in the EU's commitment to enlargement'. 19 Again, individual EU member states can be expected to dig in their heels over specifics as negotiations become more detailed. While they held the EU presidency in the second half of 1998, the Austrians reminded the Poles that the more they argued for special transitional arrangements the more distant the prospect of membership. This reminder is likely to set the tone for future negotiation. No less a figure than Henk Post, the head of the office of the commissioner for enlargement, Hans van den Broek, explained in a London conference on enlargement in October 1997 that 'the process of enlargement of the EU could be very long and very complicated'. At the

140 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS same meeting Clare Short, UK minister responsible for international development, explained that, although the UK government was in favour of enlargement, the process could, in her view, take longer than generally expected. 20 More recently, in his first official visit to Poland in November 1998, Gerhard Schroder studiously skirted questions on likely dates of Polish entry. 2 ' Moreover, the EU's own internal difficulties, without the reform of which any significant enlargement is hardly conceivable, may force the Union to move more slowly on enlargement. Those problems (administrative, budgetary, political) are well enough known and need not detain us here. On more than one occasion Polish politicians have noted that, without significant progress on such matters by 1999, the enlargement timetable, such as it is, seems bound to slip. Indeed, one wonders whether a much slower pace of enlargement is the almost unmentionable prospect that is in reality favoured by several EU member states. Nevertheless, the EC's progress report of November 1998 gave the Poles (and Hungarians, but not Czechs or Slovenes) considerable encouragement. Enlargement prospects will also be influenced by the new West European political constellation following the defeat in the September 1998 elections of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. His successor, Gerhard Schroder, is, by most accounts, preoccupied with issues of growth and unemployment rather than enlargement. Such concerns may find greater resonance in an EU which, in 1998-99, is predominantly run by left-of-centre governments. The war in Kosovo in early 1999 may also complicate the enlargement process considerably, since it appears that Bulgaria and Romania may expect to be included in enlargement much sooner than was expected. This creates the very real possibility, as Alan Mayhew has argued, of the emergence of unofficial leagues of candidates whereby it will be much easier for a country such as Poland to find itself being 'transferred from the first to the second league'. 22 Whether Poland manages to hang on to its leading role as a transforming economy preparing for not-too-distant EU membership depends on internal politics, external factors and the way in which the interaction between them shapes further developments. Enough has been said to indicate that the risk of something going wrong cannot be dismissed. For the future, much depends on the level of success of Jerzy Buzek's attempts to cool passions both in his cabinet and across the AWS and the AWS-UW coalition. It seems a sensible move to have tried to pull back the Europe Committee from the political fray by giving it a more technocratic character; but whether this means that the Committee will be less able to shape a fruitfully wide public discussion on accession issues only time will tell. We may, however, get a better view of Polish-EU developments through the prism of the election contests that lie ahead: first

POLAND AND THE EU 141 the presidential in the year 2000 when, by all accounts, Marian Krzaklewski will try to oust Aleksander Kwasniewski, and then a general election in or before 2001. Later there will also be a referendum on accession. In 1997 Krzaklewski was able and content to fight for votes essentially by appeals to the past, to invoke a simple choice of 'Church versus communism'; but the passage of time, Kwasniewski's proven competence and, if we are right, a growing 'europeanization' of policy may make such an election programme less tenable for the future. But then where will Krzaklewski and the AWS go in developing a new election appeal? One possibility is that Krzaklewski's basically right-wing political base will urge on him a more visible euroscepticism which may be contrasted with Kwasniewski's more pro-eu position. 'Europeanization' of policy may lead to 'europeanization' of electoral platforms in 2000 and again, if the present parliaments runs its course, in 2001. There is certainly no escaping the 'europeanization' of the referendum on accession, a matter that is beginning to exercise the politicians. Whether the referendum should be held sooner or later is the question that is beginning to cause some concern in view of the slippage in pro-eu sentiment in public opinion poll surveys. 23 To sum up, how should we interpret the Polish political scene from the viewpoint of EU enlargement? It seems to us that the events of 1998 point clearly to new and greater risks that things can go wrong with the accession process. We are conscious, though, of a still weighty Polish political elite view, backed by a clear majority of public opinion, that is strongly pro-eu. Prime Minister Buzek appeared to find a reasonable solution to immediate problems over Europe policy by stepping in himself to sort things out, and that may signal that the head of government is becoming more adept at managing his unruly team. But unruliness is a real problem and one that is likely to recur. This is especially so given the peculiarity of the Polish scene, where politicians and their parties seem only weakly anchored to social interest groups. Indeed, one very clear feature of domestic developments in 1998 is that they demonstrate yet again that in Polish conditions a 'politics of values' rather than a 'politics of interests' dominates. This may be a common feature across post-communist societies, but Poland's size and weight on the European stage give it added significance. It also suggests that one should expect considerable volatility in politics, and that again is an aspect of Poland frequently commented on by observers. Within Poland we detect weakly anchored political parties and politicians, maverick personalities and forthcoming elections that will raise the political temperature. Outside the country we see an EU that has still to agree on fundamental internal reforms and a world economy in a somewhat fragile state. In this climate, Polish suggestions that the country will find itself in the EU at the beginning of the year 2003 may be over-optimistic.

142 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS NOTES 1. AWS (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc Solidarity Electoral Action), is the united front of most of the post-solidarity parties and is headed by the leader of trade union Solidarity, Marian Krzaklewski. UW (Unia Wolnosci - Freedom Union) is a distinct post-solidarity party headed by Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy prime minister and finance minister in the coalition. 2. Financial and other assistance channelled through the European Commission for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 3. By 'Europe committee' we have in mind the official Polish governmental department set up to oversee integration. It has in fact evolved through various institutional forms in the 1990s but since 1996 has been known as the Committee for European Integration (Komitet Integracji Europejskiej KIE). 4. SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - Alliance of the Democratic Left), a united front of left-wing parties and trade unions with antecedent links to the Polish Communist Party, and headed since late 1997 by Leszek Miller. PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - Polish Peasants' Party). Some argue that a feature of government dominated by the SLD is a more professional approach to concealing awkward differences between coalition partners. If the SLD had some success in this regard with Europe there were notable failures too, especially over privatization. 5. See 'Kto przyspiesza, kto spowalnia', Rzeczpospolita, 5 Nov. 1998; also, 'European Union Looks Outwards', Financial Times, 10 Nov. 1998. 6. 'Nurtu chrześcijańsko-spolecznego' is how it is put by AWS in its web-based information at www.aws.org.pl 7. The Balcerowicz plan succeeded in stabilizing what was at the time a hyper-inflating economy. 8. 'Europe Agreements' were concluded by Poland and some other Central European countries as a device to deepen trade integration and eventually set the scene for membership applications. 9. Adam Slomka of KPN-OP and Marian Pilka of the ZChN held two of the four deputy leadership positions in the AWS; the KPN and ZChN had opposed the Europe Agreement. 10. Program Akcji Wyborczej Solidarnosc, Warsaw, May 1997, p. 13. 11. Forming a Europe of Fatherlands, 'Europa Ojczyzn', has been a recurring theme in ZChN literature: see, for example, Biuletyn ZChN, No.8/13 (1991), reproduced in Inka Slodkowska, Programy Partii i Ugrupowań Parlamentarnych 1989-1991, Vol.2 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1995), pp.96-105 (p.96, point 2). 12. 'My koalicja: Umowa koalicyjna między Akcją Wyborczą Solidarność i Unią Wolności" Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 Oct. 1997, p.7. point II, 10. 13. 'Członkostwo na własną odpowiedzalność (Membership is your own responsibility), Rzeczpospolita, 27 Nov. 1998. 14. AWS-UW initially wanted a relatively small number of new regions with 12 as the startingpoint; the SLD favoured a larger number, 17; eventually 16 were agreed upon. 15. See Chris Bobinski, 'Poland "Unprepared" for Talks with Brussels', Financial Times, 26 March 1998. 16. See Rzeczpospolita, 12 Sept. 1998; also PAP news agency reports, 9 June 1999, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Another polling organization, Demoskop, found that by June 1999 only 54 per cent of Poles said they would vote 'yes' to EU entry if a referendum were held then compared with 74 per cent a year earlier: Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 June 1999. 17. One recent example of Brussels pressures leading to domestic economic and political difficulties was the insistence that new visa rules be applied from 1998 on the eastern frontier. These caused a storm of local protest as communities in the north and east of Poland began to count the cost of lost 'suitcase' trade, a trade that is worth in total over $5billion per annum to the country. It is also often suggested (and equally speedily denied by Brussels) that PHARE funds cuts in May 1998 were a way of signalling EC displeasure that the finance ministry had lost its battle with the Europe Committee for control of such aid flows.

POLAND AND THE EU 143 18. Klaus Bachman, 'Ziemia za spokój' (Land for peace), Wprost, supplement to no. 47, 22 November 1998, p.19. Poland's chief negotiator, Jan Kulakowski, appears to have accepted that this will be the eventual formula: see Gazeta Wyborcza, 12-13Dec. 1998. 19. Kirsty Hughes, 'A Most Exclusive Club', Financial Times, 26 Aug. 1998. 20. 'Radość przedsiębiorców, zmartwienie polityków'(the happiness of entrepreneurs, the worries of politicians), Rzeczpospolita, 22 Oct. 1997. 21. 'Bez "ale", ale i bez daty' (Without "buts", but also without dates) was the headline in the Gazeta Wyborcza reports of the visit: see Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 Nov. 1998. 22. See Alan Mayhew, 'Rozszerzenie w blasku Kosowa' (Expansion in the shadow of Kosovo), Unia-Polska, No.13 (May 1999). 23. The proportion of the population that would vote 'yes' in an accession referendum declined from 72 per cent in April 1997 to 64 per cent in February 1998 and 58 per cent in June of that year: see Krzysztof Gołata and Andrzej Szoszkiewicz, 'Unia ze strachem' (Union with fear), Wprost, 22 Nov. 1998, p.23.