Image: NATO. Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437. In association with:

Image: NATO Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437 In association with:

Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437 Russia s annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, together with its insistence on the right to take action on behalf of Russianspeaking populations outside its own borders, dramatically changed the political and security environment in Europe. NATO and its member states have already responded significant ways to this aggressive Russian strategic posture through the decisions taken at the 2014 Summit in Wales and their continuing implementation. At its July 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO needs to decide how to transition from the immediate reactions and responses agreed in Wales to shaping and sustaining a longer-term comprehensive strategy towards Russia, encompassing deterrence, defence and political engagement. This Wilton Park meeting assessed: Russian objectives, strategy and capabilities to help gain a more complete and deeper understanding of the challenges NATO is confronting in Europe; The longer term political, programmatic and operational adaptations NATO may need to make in order to meet these challenges; and How to achieve greater political agreement and unity of effort and purpose within the Alliance on meeting the new challenges from Russia. Key points There is broad agreement within the Alliance that regime survival and a quest for great power status is driving Russian foreign and security policy. The Western relationship with Russia has fundamentally changed and is not likely to improve in any foreseeable future. There appears to be no scope for a grand bargain with Moscow without compromising fundamental Western values by allowing Russia to dominate its neighbours against their wishes. A key message to convey to Russia is that countries in Eastern Europe gained their freedom of choice several decades ago and all Allies insist on maintaining this situation. Nonetheless, important differences remain within the Alliance on the nature of the threat from Russia and how to respond to it, both politically and militarily. NATO needs to formulate a new strategy for Russia with a strong, effective deterrence component at its core. There is a tension between a mind set of war is unthinkable but we need to think about war in order to exercise effective deterrence. Scenarios postulating a Russian hybrid attack against a NATO member are extreme but not fantastical, and need to be addressed in order to convince Moscow that such a course of Page 1 of 8

action would be futile. While wanting to avoid actions that are unnecessarily provocative, any NATO strengthening of its deterrence posture will inevitably be negatively received in Moscow. The Alliance should proceed on the basis of its own assessment of what measures are needed to establish credible deterrence. In this context, it needs to examine what the right balance between rapid reinforcement and forward deployment should be. Pre-positioning heavy assets as well as training and exercises focusing particularly on Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities will be critical in order to mitigate Alliance vulnerabilities. Cross-domain operations (air, land, maritime, intelligence and cyber) with adequate force structures, capabilities, and training will respond to emerging threats not only from Russia but also from other actors. Ideally NATO Member States would pursue major new capability investment to meet the security challenges from Russia and the South. However, with defence budgets continuing to be highly constrained, it is critical to organise and make better use of existing assets. For example, countries have assets that are not currently earmarked for NATO. NATO and its member states need to become more adept in dealing with frenemies, opposing and countering them in some areas but working together on others where common interests exist. Such areas of engagement with Russia could include counter-terrorism, Syria, nuclear non-proliferation, and confidencebuilding measures (CBMs). There are many fora for engaging with Russia in addition to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), including bilateral ones. Before NATO tries to reactivate the NRC Russia should show that it is ready to engage constructively on issues that would be useful to take up within that body. The Warsaw Summit outcomes must clearly demonstrate an understanding that the security environment has greatly changed not just to NATO s east but to its south as well. Unity of the Alliance can only be achieved through a 360 0 approach that addresses threats to Allied security from wherever they arise. NATO must work closely with the EU in order to tackle hybrid threats to Europe. The two organisations should not try to have a formal joint strategy towards Russia but their review processes and strategy formulation on Russia and on hybrid conflict should be run closely together. The Alliance has built its capability over the last years focusing mainly on crisis management. Now it is turning towards collective defence again. The three core tasks of the 2010 Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security, are all critical to respond to Russian assertiveness and aggression as well as to the challenges to NATO s south. Threats to Alliance security 1. Russia s more ambitious, aggressive strategic posture was emerging well before the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. This posture is likely to endure for the long term, and even if some form of resolution on Ukraine took place the Western relationship with Russia has fundamentally changed and is not likely to improve in the foreseeable future. 2. Russia s aggressive posture is due to a combination of factors, but above all the goal of bolstering support for the Putin regime through the stoking of nationalist sentiment. Russia is attempting to regain great power status through controlling a sphere of influence in its neighbourhood as well as through a calculated decision of competition with Europe and the United States. Russia s strategic objective in Syria is thus to Page 2 of 8

protect Assad or ensure that any successor regime will support the maintaining of Russia s presence and influence in the region. 3. Moscow is also using Ukraine and Syria as testing grounds for a new model army. Russia has significantly improved its military capability since the 2008 conflict with Georgia as well as its ability to use a wider array of instruments in pursuing its security objectives. 4. While there is broad agreement within the Alliance regarding the reasons for the shift in Russian policy, there are major differences over the extent of the threat posed by Russia. Some Alliance Member States view Russia as an imminent threat, while for others who are geographically more distant there is less concern. This leads to divergences among the Member States in terms of political and military response strategies. 5. Direct aggression against a Member State is a clear Article V redline for the Alliance that Putin seems extremely unlikely to cross. Nonetheless, various Member States express concerns that Russia could miscalculate Alliance redlines. Russian use of nonmilitary, hybrid instruments such as cyber-attacks, propaganda, and fostering political instability through financial and other support to extremist parties in NATO countries, could all potentially muddy the waters as a precursor to military aggression. 6. A postulated scenario for 2020 could be based around a Russian economy suffering from energy shocks, while a crisis in the East China Sea and continuing conflict in the Middle East leaves the US completely overstretched. Communications networks in a Baltic State collapse, little green men appear and take over airports, and Russian media outlets and communications networks say that Russian forces are needed to restore order. Moscow deploys conventional forces across the border and presents the West with a fait accompli. This type of scenario is extreme but not fantastical, and both NATO and EU need to address it in order to convince Moscow that such actions would be futile. 7. Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa has also exposed NATO Member States to major security threats from that direction. The flow of refugees through Turkey and North Africa from Syria, Afghanistan and other conflict states is a clear indication of European vulnerability to security problems on its southern flank. The Warsaw Summit cannot be just about Russia; a 360 o approach represents a key test of Alliance solidarity and NATO also needs to develop responses regarding the crisis to its South. One possible caveat to this 360 o approach, however, consists of the argument that the security challenges to the South do not lend themselves as strongly to a NATO response as those to the East from Russia. Deterrence responses 8. A credible and coherent deterrence strategy requires that Alliance member states understand and analyse Russia s long-term ambitions and risk calculus. This threat analysis should also include assessment of member state vulnerabilities and then consideration of measures to counter those vulnerabilities. 9. While military power must remain at the core of deterrence towards Russia, the threat of hybrid conflict means that a comprehensive approach encompassing both military and non-military instruments such as cyber and strategic communication capabilities is critical for an effective deterrence strategy. In deterring and countering hybrid threats the development of NATO-EU collaboration is critical (see section below). 10. The Baltic Sea region is the only part of Alliance territory in which NATO does not enjoy military superiority. Russia s Kaliningrad enclave and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities create vulnerabilities that require assessment of the requirements for effective deterrence. Pre-positioning of heavy assets along with training and exercises focusing particularly on A2/AD should constitute an important part of the deterrence response. NATO should explore with the US and Pacific allies whether there are useful Page 3 of 8

lessons from Asia for Alliance A2/AD strategies. Intelligence assets, including human intelligence, is critical for early warning. Considerable improvement is needed in this area. 11. An enhanced NATO deterrence posture should include a shift from brigade size exercises to the division and corps level, matching Russian snap exercises. Table top exercises can play an important role in educating political leadership. Cross-domain operations (air, land, maritime, intelligence and cyber) with adequate force structures, capabilities, and training will respond to emerging threats not only from Russia but also from other actors. Russia s military involvement in Syria has also emerged as another potential A2/AD bubble. Key regional partner countries should be included in these activities to the greatest possible extent, maintaining and further developing interoperability with NATO forces. 12. Overall, the Alliance needs to pay more attention to maritime strategy, including in the High North, where there has been increased Russian military activity, albeit still less than during the Cold War. There are concerns that geopolitical tensions with Russia could spill over into the High North, which is of critical strategic importance to Russia due to the presence of the Northern Fleet with its nuclear deterrence function. NATO should re-examine its 2011 Maritime Strategy and assess with Member States potential new investments in maritime capability. 13. NATO must also carefully consider the proper balance between rapid reinforcement and forward deployment. Reinforcing NAT O s land presence in the Baltics will be seen as provocative by Moscow, but the counter argument is that showing weakness could also be provocative. While it is important to avoid unnecessary escalation, anything that NATO does to reinforce its deterrence posture will inevitably be viewed in a negative light by Moscow. So that consideration in itself should not be a reason for NATO to avoid taking measures that it judges to be important for the security of its Member States. Predictability will be extremely important for avoiding misunderstanding; NATO must be transparent in what it intends to do and follow through in implementing announced measures. 14. In assessing the balance between forward deployment and rapid reinforcement, it is important to consider that rapid reinforcement through deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJFT) would also appear as an escalatory step during a crisis. While the VJTF and other rapid reinforcement measures constitute major components of a NATO deterrence posture towards Russia, there are major political and operational issues surrounding its effective use. 15. New investment is critical as there is no redundancy in key capability areas, but continuing constraints on defence spending will limit options. NATO needs to become smarter in making effective use of all military capabilities at its disposal. Strengthened command and control systems and maintaining high levels of interoperability among allies and with key partner nations constitute fundamental objectives. NATO s high readiness force structures should be able to work well in all Member States. Countries also have assets that are not earmarked for NATO, but the organisation needs to be able to call on everything. 16. The cyber domain is an increasingly important area for deterrence and defence. NATO should continue to develop its cyber response capabilities. There is an action plan for cyber defence, but cyber doctrine and response should be included into the equation with a particular attention to aspects such as cyber de-escalation. 17. Along with conventional capabilities, NATO remains a nuclear alliance with nuclear forces a key pillar of its deterrence framework. Page 4 of 8

Countering hybrid threats NATO-EU collaboration 18. Russia is pursuing hybrid conflict with multi-layered conventional and irregular warfare strategies, cyber-attack, information warfare and propaganda, and use of financial flows to promote corruption and political instability. These asymmetrical challenges need a coherent response from both EU and NATO. 19. Russian threats against NATO partner states do not come under the Article V guarantee, making non-military instruments that are within the EU s purview a vital element in deterring Russia from further major acts of aggression against these states. In this regard EU sanctions against Russia have played a critical role following Russia s military intervention in Ukraine. A wider deterrence strategy must clearly highlight and support Western core values and ideas of Euro-Atlantic partnership. NATO-EU collaboration is critical to this strategy. 20. It does not seem feasible or even desirable to establish a joint NATO-EU review of strategy towards Russia. National differences of view make achieving common positions within each organisation difficult enough; the fact that each of them has six members who are not in the other adds a very significant level of political complexity. The EU s power is as an actor focusing on resilience measures, while NATO s strength as a military organisation is in the realm of deterrence. 21. A joint threat assessment may benefit both organisations in responding to future challenges and in helping to deepen cooperation in areas such as information sharing, strategic communications, cyber security, energy security, corruption and organised crime. Political obstacles still impede much formal cooperation between NATO and EU, but there is considerable scope for improvements to informal cooperation in these areas. 22. NATO Centres of Excellence (CoE) can be extremely influential as a key link between NATO and EU in promoting practical cooperation. The CoEs are Member State assets certified by NATO, with a focus on these different issue areas. An EU point of contact in NATO CoEs could be valuable for developing greater levels of coordination and cooperation and shared understanding for both organisations. 23. While a NATO-EU joint security strategy does not seem viable, countries should think more about how to implement at the national level measures that are discussed and decided within the institutions. This observation is particularly important to an area like strategic communications, for which messaging that is as consistent as possible across both organisations and their members can play a powerful role in countering Russian hybrid tactics. Strategic communications 24. Strategic communications is both about content and style. NATO should make its content more attractive. The messages should engage with the public. Attractiveness should be provided via rapid information diffusion, engaging with humour and satire, and supporting grassroots broadcasting outlets. The time for Radio Free Europe has passed and there is no need to fall back into analogies as such. 25. Russia is pursuing an information warfare and propaganda campaign that affects NATO s strategic communications posture. NATO s strategic communications aim should be to declassify more satellite images and other information and let civil society carry and push the message to the audience. 26. The messaging about Russia in the EU Strategic Concept of 2016 should be in line with the messaging of the Warsaw Summit. Clarity is important and collective positioning in times of complexity can be provided within three elements: a. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication should be brought closer together. The messages sent to the domestic population should resonate with Page 5 of 8

messaging to the outside population. b. At the top decision making level messages should be general and consistent, and factually supported with declared policies. These messages should be applied across all branches. c. NATO should convey messages in order to help clarify its own thinking, reiterating the same answers to questions such as what is NATO seeking to achieve and through what means? Engaging with non-member states 27. Partners play a key role in responding to emerging threats. NATO should make a reassessment of the role of Partnerships for Peace (PfP) and what a new strategic partnership framework should look like. 28. There are four areas to be discussed in the Warsaw Summit regarding partners. The first is to include partners in resilience initiatives. Second is to form a type of Baltic Sea Commission as a step to enhance partners. Third is to revive the Mediterranean Dialogue. Fourth is to create a NATO-EU Memorandum of Understanding on hybrid issues that would encompass partner states. Dialogue and cooperation with Russia 29. While keeping its strongest focus on deterrence the Alliance must also strive to maintain a relationship with Russia, engaging and cooperating with Moscow on issues where it is beneficial to do so. This relationship, needless to say, is very different from partnership. The relationship with Russia has become fundamentally conflictual in nature, but compartmentalised cooperation can and should take place in areas of mutual interest. 30. NATO suspended the NRC following Russia s military intervention in Ukraine. Debate has arisen within NATO and its Member States regarding the conditions under which the Council could be reactivated. 31. The NRC has been a useful forum in the past for fostering cooperation in areas such as Afghanistan, the Sochi Olympics and counter-terrorism, and ballistic missile defence. However, there is no indication that Moscow is ready for the time being to engage seriously within the NRC regarding the issues related to Euro-Atlantic security that are the cause of the current tensions between the West and Russia. 32. Nor does it appear willing to take up within the NRC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) regarding military activities. The build-up of military activity on both sides creates a compelling requirement for dialogue and information exchange regarding these activities, but with the suspension of the NATO-Russia Council there is less communication and transparency. 33. Many ideas have been put on the table regarding notification of military exercises and management of potentially dangerous military encounters, but Russia has been less than forthcoming in responding to these. It is nonetheless important for NATO to continue to put forward such proposals because of their importance and to occupy the high moral ground. 34. Much can also be done on a bilateral basis. There are agreements in place in place between Russia and a significant number of NATO Allies on the prevention of incidents at sea as well as several broader bilateral agreements on preventing dangerous military activities. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) remains a key institution for the implementation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) regarding military activities, but here again Russian interest and cooperation has been limited. 35. In addition to bilateral channels, there are many multilateral fora in which discussion take place between NATO Member States and Moscow, including the UN Security Page 6 of 8

Council, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and OSCE. Russia has of course positioned itself as a key player in the Syrian conflict, and any hopes of bringing about a resolution of that conflict will necessarily involve dialogue with Moscow. Nuclear nonproliferation has been a long-standing area of cooperation between the West and Moscow, and Russia was a key partner in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran regarding the latter s nuclear program. 36. Revival of the NRC, however, should depend on Russia s willingness to conduct serious discussions there regarding Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic Security along with transparency, risk reduction, and confidence- building regarding military activities. If Russia opens up the possibility of dialogue through the NRC on these issues then NATO should respond positively. 37. In addition to dialogue and cooperation with Moscow at the official level on issues where that makes sense, it is worth assessing how to engage with a wider circle around the Kremlin. There are major limitations though to any such effort. It is very difficult to understand much less influence the thinking of people in the wider Kremlin circle. Discussions with think tank and academic experts, journalists, and the business community can all be very valuable for obtaining a better understanding of Russian thinking, but here again possibilities for influencing the Kremlin would appear to be limited. A way forward to the 2016 Warsaw Summit 38. Russia has broken down the rules established around the Euro-Atlantic region and the idea of security and safety for all. The concept of partnership with Russia has been profoundly undermined. Russian foreign and security policy is likely to remain aggressively nationalistic for a long time. Consequentially NATO and its Member States should adapt their long-term strategic and political thinking, continue to implement the decisions taken at the Wales Summit and identify priority areas for capability improvements, including with regard to training, exercises, forward deployment, and pre-positioning of equipment. 39. Strategic adaptation, focusing on immediate and long-term measures, and making a comprehensive assessment of Russian intention and capabilities is key for a successful response. Part of the response is to conduct a strategic review of the new security environment, and to assess Russia s foreign policy posture. It is especially important to understand and analyse Russia s involvement in Syria, annexation of Crimea, and influence in the neighbourhood. This should include an analysis of Russian conventional and unconventional forces. 40. Member States largely agree on the need to strengthen NATO s deterrence posture towards Russia. The Warsaw Summit should communicate the intent of the Alliance with faster, sharper and more mobile collective defence measures against any threat in any direction, including hybrid threats. 41. Cross-domain operations (air, human, land, maritime and cyber) with adequate force structures, capabilities, and training will respond to emerging threats not only from Russia but also from other actors. Conducting out-of-area operations should be smarter and faster. For rapid actions, NATO Member States should be able to present their national capabilities at all times. In the Baltic Sea, the forces of the neighbouring countries are of key importance. In a broader scale, an update on NATO s Maritime Security Strategy would be valuable. 42. There are no quick fixes for building a stable NATO-Russia relationship. Russia s decision-makers consider that it can afford and even gain from a conflictual relationship with the West. Strategic patience with expected limitations in areas of cooperation and keeping the door open for future engagement, and to highlight areas of mutual gains, are starting points for building towards a more stable relationship. 43. At Warsaw, the most important challenge will be to agree on the right message to send Page 7 of 8

to Russia. A new, comprehensive NATO strategy towards Russia should combine a strong core element of deterrence with a willingness to engage on the key issues in conflict between the two sides, military transparency and risk reduction, and international issues of mutual interest. 44. NATO s strategy towards Russia is also a debate within the European Union. Therefore, discussions within the Alliance should include EU officials; this would lead to a single, coherent posture. 45. NATO-EU Cooperation within certain issues areas rather than a formal, structural cooperation is a way forward to not replicating capabilities, and to showing shared and common messaging against future threats. Law enforcement issues, for instance, are considerations for both NATO and the EU. 46. The Warsaw Summit should encompass all issue areas and should not become solely a forum for eastern flank security, because the southern flank is extremely important as well. It is difficult to neatly prioritise threats in terms of geography any longer because of the level of interdependence and interconnectedness of the world. The flow of immigrants to Europe is a clear example of how mobility of people can pose a human security problem in Europe. The Warsaw Summit should not be an event that is only about Russia. Beyza Unal Wilton Park April 2016 Wilton Park reports are brief summaries of the main points and conclusions of a conference. The reports reflect rapporteurs personal interpretations of the proceedings as such they do not constitute any institutional policy of Wilton Park nor do they necessarily represent the views of the rapporteur. Should you wish to read other Wilton Park reports, or participate in upcoming Wilton Park conferences, please consult our website www.wiltonpark.org.uk To receive our e-newsletter and latest updates on conferences subscribe to https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/newsletter/ Page 8 of 8