Economics Marshall High School Mr. Cline Unit One BC

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Economics Marshall High School Mr. Cline Unit One BC

Political science The application of game theory to political science is focused in the overlapping areas of fair division, or who is entitled to what, For example, welfare benefits political economy, The study and use of how economic theory and methods influences political ideology. Political economy is the interplay between economics, law and politics, and how institutions develop in different social and economic systems, such as capitalism, socialism and communism. Political economy analyzes how public policy is created and implemented.

Public choice seeks to understand and predict the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats in the polity by utilizing analytical techniques developed from economics, based on the postulate of rational choice. Political science political economy, Because various individuals and groups have different interests in how a country or economy is to develop, political economy as a discipline is a complex field, covering a broad array of potentially competing interests. Political economy also involves the use of game theory, since groups competing for finite resources and power must determine which courses of action will give the most beneficial results, and what the probability of those results being reached are. public choice, or public choice theory has been described as "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science.

Political science public choice, or public choice theory has been described as "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science. In public choice, individuals, interest groups, bureaucrats, and politicians are assumed to seek their own self interest as in the market place. Decisions made depend on the costs and benefits of an action taken whereby each group attempts to maximize their own net benefits. Benefits can take the form of monetary or non-monetary rewards and can includes ideologies, goals, and cultural values. The seeking of self interest by bureaucrats and politicians, and collective action by the various interest groups in turn result in the adoption of a particular stance in the specification of institutions and property rights.

Political science war bargaining, or when to attack, threaten attack and negotiate peace social choice theory is an analysis of combining individual preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and voting theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual members of society. It also considers approaches to compensations and fairness, liberty and rights, variable populations, strategy-proofing of social-choice mechanisms, natural resources, and welfare, justice, and poverty

Political science In each of these areas, researchers have developed game-theoretic models in which the players are often voters, states, special interest groups, and politicians. For example, a game-theoretic explanation for democratic peace is that public and open debate in democracies send clear and reliable information regarding their intentions to other states. In contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of nondemocratic leaders, what effect concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. Thus there will be mistrust and unwillingness to make concessions if at least one of the parties in a dispute is a nondemocracy.

Biology The payoffs for games in biology, unlike those in economics, are often interpreted as corresponding to fitness. In addition, the focus has been less on equilibria that correspond to a notion of rationality and more on ones that would be maintained by evolutionary forces. The best known equilibrium in biology is known as the evolutionarily stable strategy (or ESS), and was first introduced in 1973. Although its initial motivation did not involve any of the mental requirements of the Nash equilibrium, every ESS is a Nash equilibrium. In biology, game theory has been used to understand many different phenomena. It was first used to explain the evolution (and stability) of the approximate 1:1 sex ratios, and it suggested that the 1:1 sex ratios are a result of evolutionary forces acting on individuals who could be seen as trying to maximize their number of grandchildren.

Biology Suppose male births are less common than female. A newborn male then has better mating prospects than a newborn female, and therefore can expect to have more offspring. Therefore parents genetically disposed to produce males tend to have more than average numbers of grandchildren born to them. Therefore the genes for male-producing tendencies spread, and male births become more common. As the 1:1 sex ratio is approached, the advantage associated with producing males dies away. The same reasoning holds if females are substituted for males throughout. Therefore 1:1 is the equilibrium ratio.

The author uses a plethora of insect-related metaphors to show that an economy tends to function like a living organism and is thus able to learn and to adapt. Biology Additionally, biologists have used evolutionary game theory and the ESS to explain the emergence of animal communication. The analysis of signaling games and other communication games has provided insight into the evolution of communication among animals. For example, the mobbing behavior of many species, in which a large number of prey animals attack a larger predator, seems to be an example of spontaneous emergent organization, which is an organization that spontaneously emerges from and exists in a complex dynamic environment or market place, rather than being a construct or copy of something that already exists. Ants have also been shown to exhibit feed-forward behavior akin to fashion, as argued in the book Butterfly Economics: A New General Theory of Social and Economic Behavior by economist Paul Ormerod.

Biology The theory presented by the book departs from conventional economic wisdom which understands individuals as isolated decision makers who act based on a rational evaluation of sufficient information about cost and benefits of respective choices. Butterfly economics adds interaction to the equation and argues that individuals interact when pursuing their interests, thereby gaining new information, which in turn influences their decision-making. Biologists have used the game of chicken to analyze fighting behavior and territoriality. Maynard Smith, in the preface to Evolution and the Theory of Games, writes, "paradoxically, it has turned out that game theory is more readily applied to biology than to the field of economic behavior for which it was originally designed". Evolutionary game theory has been used to explain many seemingly incongruous phenomena in nature.

Biology One such phenomenon is known as biological altruism. This is a situation in which an organism appears to act in a way that benefits other organisms and is detrimental to itself. This is distinct from traditional notions of altruism because such actions are not conscious, but appear to be evolutionary adaptations to increase overall fitness. Examples can be found in species ranging from vampire bats that regurgitate blood they have obtained from a night's hunting and give it to group members who have failed to feed, to worker bees that care for the queen bee for their entire lives and never mate, to Vervet monkeys that warn group members of a predator's approach, even when it endangers that individual's chance of survival.

Biology All of these actions increase the overall fitness of a group, but occur at a cost to the individual. Evolutionary game theory explains this altruism with the idea of kin selection. Altruists discriminate between the individuals they help and favor relatives. Hamilton's rule explains the evolutionary reasoning behind this selection with the equation c<b*r where the cost (c) to the altruist must be less than the benefit (b) to the recipient multiplied by the coefficient of relatedness (r). The more closely related two organisms are causes the incidences of altruism to increase because they share many of the same alleles.

Biology This means that the altruistic individual, by ensuring that the alleles of its close relative are passed on, (through survival of its offspring) can forgo the option of having offspring itself because the same number of alleles are passed on. Helping a sibling for example (in diploid animals), has a coefficient of ½, because (on average) an individual shares ½ of the alleles in its sibling's offspring. Ensuring that enough of a sibling s offspring survive to adulthood precludes the necessity of the altruistic individual producing offspring.[20] The coefficient values depend heavily on the scope of the playing field; for example if the choice of whom to favor includes all genetic living things, not just all relatives, we assume the discrepancy between all humans only accounts for approximately 1% of the diversity in the playing field, a coefficient that was ½ in the smaller field becomes 0.995.

Biology Computer science and logic Similarly if it is considered that information other than that of a genetic nature (e.g. epigenetics, religion, science, etc.) persisted through time the playing field becomes larger still, and the discrepancies smaller. Game theory has come to play an increasingly important role in logic and in computer science. Several logical theories have a basis in game semantics, or the approach to formal semantics (The branch of linguistics and logic concerned with the meaning of a word, phrase, sentence, or text) that grounds the concepts of truth or validity on game-theoretic concepts, such as the existence of a winning strategy for a player, somewhat resembling Socratic dialogues In addition, computer scientists have used games to model interactive computations.

Computer science and logic Also, game theory provides a theoretical basis to the field of multi-agent systems. Separately, game theory has played a role in online algorithms. In particular, the k-server problem. In this problem, an online algorithm must control the movement of a set of k servers, represented as points in a metric space, and handle requests that are also in the form of points in the space. As each request arrives, the algorithm must determine which server to move to the requested point. The goal of the algorithm is to keep the total distance all servers move small, relative to the total distance the servers could have moved by an optimal adversary who knows in advance the entire sequence of requests.

Computer science and logic Also, game theory provides a theoretical basis to the field of multi-agent systems. Separately, game theory has played a role in online algorithms. In particular, the k-server problem. This has in the past been referred to as games with moving costs and request-answer games, which are basically algorithms that return answers based on multiple inputs which the number and type of cumulatively affect the answer. In other words, you have multiple choices to make that can determine the outcome when taken together. If I choose this weapon type, these allies, this location against this opponent, will I win? C i :R i x A 1 A i R + U{+ },

Computer science and logic Yao's principle is a game-theoretic technique for proving lower bounds on the computational complexity of randomized algorithms, and especially of online algorithms. Yao's principle may be interpreted in game theoretic terms, via a two-player zero sum game in which one player, Alice, selects a deterministic algorithm, the other player, Bob, selects an input, and the payoff is the cost of the selected algorithm on the selected input. Any randomized algorithm R may be interpreted as a randomized choice among deterministic algorithms, and thus as a strategy for Alice. The emergence of the internet has motivated the development of algorithms for finding equilibria in games, markets, computational auctions, peer-to-peer systems, and security and information markets.

Algorithmic game theory and within it algorithmic mechanism design combine computational algorithm design and analysis of complex systems with economic theory. So what do all these algorithms do? They define the best Google searches They are leading towards predictive capabilities utilizing algorithms that examine social media to predict, with a great deal of accuracy thus far, stock sentiment, political attitudes and shopping behaviors They determine what ads you will see on web sites They allow for interactive games like Call of Duty so that similar moves will not always present the same results, making it more life like. Recommendations for movies to watch by companies like Netflix, or what to buy from Amazon Story algorithms can predict what scripts or novels will be accepted as blockbusters or flops