*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + WP(C) No.3009/1998 % Date of decision: 12 th April, 2010 R.N. BHAT... Petitioner Through: Mr. T.N. Razdan & Ms. Smriti Razdan, Advocates. Versus LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS.... Respondents Through: Mr. Kamal Mehta with Mr. Sudeep Singh & Mr. Deependra Kumar Sharma, Advocates. CORAM :- HON BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW 1. Whether reporters of Local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2. To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes 3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes in the Digest? RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J. 1. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated 3 rd May, 1997 of the Disciplinary Authority of the respondent Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) imposing the penalty of bringing down the basic salary of the petitioner by three steps and to the order dated 10 th June, 1998 of the Appellate Authority of the respondent LIC, while upholding the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, modifying the penalty imposed on the petitioner to bringing down by two steps, instead of three steps, the basic salary of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner was charged on 31 st July 1995 with having falsely claimed LTC bill dated 12 th August, 1993 for Rs.5,600/- in respect of himself, his wife, son and father for having visited Pune and back to Delhi from 31 st July, 1993 to 8 th August, 1993. It was the case of the Disciplinary Authority of the respondent LIC that the petitioner in support of the said bill had submitted a receipt dated 30 th July, WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 1 of 14
1993 for Rs.5,600/- issued by M/s. Shri Bharat Darshan Jain Yatra Sangh (Tour Operator) and wherein it was indicated that the journey aforesaid was performed by the petitioner by bus No. DL-IP-1857; that it had been found that such bus had not gone on conducted tour during the period 31 st July, 1993 to 8 th August, 1993. It was thus the case of the respondent LIC that the petitioner had fraudulently obtained bogus LTC claim and which action was alleged to be in breach of Regulations 21 & 24 of the LIC Staff Regulations, 1960. Regulation 21 requires every employee of LIC to at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and to conform to and abide by the Regulations. Regulation 24 requires every employee of LIC to serve the Corporation honestly and faithfully and use his utmost endeavours to promote the interest of LIC and to show courtesy and attention in all transactions. 3. The basis of the charge aforesaid was a letter dated 10 th January, 1994 of the Asstt. Secretary, State Transport Authority, Transport Deptt., Delhi Administration (STA) in response to the letter dated 6 th January, 1994 of the LIC. The STA in its reply dated 10 th January, 1994 inter alia informed with respect to bus No.DL-IP-1857 that from 17 th July, 1993 to 4 th August, 1993 no temporary permits/special permits had been issued. It was also mentioned in the said reply that in case bus No.DL-IP-1857 has All India Tourist Permit then the same can be verified after quoting the AITP number. In the said reply, while mentioning the bus No.DL-IP-1857, the numerical 7 has been added in hand at both the places. The Disciplinary Authority of the LIC along with the charge sheet gave a provisional list of documents/witnesses and in which the receipt dated 30 th July, 1993 issued by the Tour Operator was also mentioned. 4. The said receipt describes the said M/s. Shri Bharat Darshan Jain Yatra Sangh as L.I.C. Approved L.T.C. Tours Operators. 5. It may be mentioned that prior to the aforesaid charge sheet also, the petitioner was vide letter dated 14 th June, 1995 asked to furnish an explanation. The petitioner had furnished explanation vide his letter dated 20 th June, 1995. The petitioner while stating that he was not expected to remember the bus number after nearly two years stated that the travel agency involved i.e. M/s. Shri Bharat WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 2 of 14
Darshan Jain Yatra Sangh was approved by LIC and if the said travel agency has on its receipt mentioned a bus number which had not undertaken the journey, the petitioner could not be blamed for the same. The petitioner had thus requested for information to be called from the Tour Operator and reiterated that he had undertaken the journey for which the LTC bill had been submitted. However, it appears that notwithstanding the said reply of the petitioner, no inquiry was made by LIC from the Tour Operator; no mention thereof was made in the charge sheet. 6. The petitioner submitted a reply dated 6 th September, 1995 to the charge sheet reiterating his earlier reply including that the Tour Operator may be summoned to disclose the truth. 7. The petitioner in the departmental inquiry sought defence assistance of one Shri A.K. Dassi, Officer of LIC posted at Karnal. The same was declined for the reason of it being not convenient to allow an officer posted at Karnal as Assistant in the disciplinary proceedings at Delhi. The petitioner was advised to suggest the name of some other employee of Delhi. No such name was suggested by the petitioner and the petitioner participated in the inquiry proceedings himself. The Presenting Officer in the said inquiry proceedings only appeared as a witness and deposed of having obtained the letter dated 10 th January, 1994 (supra) from the STA; he declined any knowledge of the numerical 7 while giving the bus number in the said letter being handwritten and deposed that the letter was already prepared before delivery to him. The inquiry proceedings were held till March, 1996 and were thereafter revived in December, 1996. It appears that in between another letter dated 31 st October, 1996 was written by the respondent LIC to the STA, again seeking information with respect to the aforesaid bus number. The STA on 4 th November, 1996 made an endorsement on the letter dated 31 st October, 1996 itself that the bus number DL-IP-1857 had been given a Stage Carriage Permit in the name of Col. L. M. Sharma w.e.f. 29 th June, 1993 to 14 th October, 1993 and till then the bus was under Stage Carriage Permit up to 30 th November, 1996. WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 3 of 14
8. On revival of the inquiry proceedings, reliance was placed on the endorsement dated 4 th November, 1996 of STA (supra). The petitioner objected to the said letter. 9. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report on 14 th December, 1996 in which it was stated that the petitioner while submitting the LTC bill had certified at the foot thereof that he had incurred the fares as shown in the said bill. The Inquiry Officer on the basis of the two letters aforesaid of the STA held that since the bus by which the petitioner and his family were supposed to have travelled was operating on Red Line route during the period in question, the petitioner and his family could not have travelled from Delhi to Pune and back on the said bus and the same was a sufficient proof that the petitioner had claimed the LTC bill falsely. It was also held that the petitioner had been unable to prove as to how he and his family could travel to Pune and back on a bus which was operating on Delhi routes during the period in question. The Inquiry Officer thus concluded that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved beyond doubt. 10. The Disciplinary Authority concurred with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and provisionally came to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of charges levelled against him but however taking a lenient and sympathetic view proposed penalty of bringing down the basic salary of the petitioner by three steps in the then time scale of the petitioner in terms of Regulation 39(1)(d) of the Staff Regulations (supra) and the order for recovery of the sum of Rs.5,600/- in terms of Regulation 39(1)(c) and the petitioner was asked to show cause thereagainst. The petitioner submitted a reply dated 25 th March, 1997. However the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 3 rd May, 1997 held that the petitioner had not been able to prove that the persons for whom LTC had been claimed did travel to the place mentioned in the bill and imposed the penalty as proposed on the petitioner. 11. As aforesaid the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal. The Appellate Authority though finding a lapse on the part of the Inquiry Officer in asking the petitioner to submit the written brief first, held that such deviation from the prescribed procedure had not resulted into denial of natural justice. On the plea of the petitioner that the Tour Operator had not been examined as a witness, the WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 4 of 14
Appellate Authority held that the said letters issued by the STA clearly indicated that the bus through which the petitioner had claimed to have performed the impugned journey did not go to the places mentioned in the LTC claim on the dates mentioned therein. It was further held that there was no irregularity in reopening of the inquiry on receipt of the second letter from the STA in as much as the same was necessitated owing to the stand taken by the petitioner. However in view of the fact that it was a case of first misconduct on the part of the petitioner, the penalty was modified as aforesaid. 12. Aggrieved therefrom the present writ petition has been preferred. 13. The counsel for the petitioner has contended a. That the inquiry was initiated into an incident after two years of its occurrence and by which time the petitioner could not be expected to remember the bus number. It is argued that the inquiry/disciplinary proceedings were aimed at scuttling the promotion, then on the anvil, of the petitioner to the post of Asstt. Administrative Officer. It is argued that even though the inquiry from the STA was made and reply received on 10 th January, 1994 but the charge sheet thereafter was issued after long delay on 31 st July, 1995. It is further contended that there is unexplained delay during the inquiry proceedings also; after March, 1996 the inquiry was wrongly revived in December, 1996 instead of the Inquiry Officer submitting the inquiry report; b. That the Presenting Officer failed to prove the overwriting in the reply dated 10 th January, 1994 of the STA by summoning/calling the witness from the STA; c. That there was denial of natural justice in as much as no opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross examine the witness from the travel agency M/s. Shri Bharat Darshan Jain Yatra Sangh; d. That no fresh evidence could be collected and relied on during the course of inquiry; WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 5 of 14
e. That the petitioner had during the course of inquiry proceedings, on 15 th March, 1996 produced another letter from STA and which was neither taken on record nor considered; f. That at the contemporaneous time similar allegations were made against other employees also but no inquiry was held against them and only the petitioner has been singled out. Reliance is placed on para 10 of the Chapter on Disciplinary Proceedings in the Hand Book on P & I R Matters published by the respondent LIC in the year 1997 laying down that a time span of three months is prescribed for investigating into misconduct of employees if the investigation is carried out by own officials and six months in respect of cases investigated by the CBI. Reliance is also placed on Amal Ch. Chakraborty Vs. State of Tripura 1999 LAB. I.C. 1043 (Gauhati) where it is held that non production of star witnesses of prosecution is a glaring procedural lapse resulting in violation of the reasonable opportunity enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution. It was held that the charged officer was thereby deprived of cross examining the star witnesses who had not been called for examination during the inquiry. 14. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent LIC has contended a. That the misconduct with which the petitioner was charged invited even the major penalty of dismissal from service but only the minor penalty of reduction of basic pay by three levels, reduced by Appellate Authority to two levels has been imposed on the petitioner and thus no malafidies can be attributed; b. That the need to again inquire from STA occurred during the course of the inquiry owing to the petitioner having raised doubts about overwriting in the first reply received from the STA and no fault can be found with the inquiry proceedings; c. That it was up to the petitioner to examine the Tour Operator as his witness and it is the petitioner who failed to produce any evidence of having undertaken the travel for which LTC was claimed. Attention is invited to the inquiry proceedings held on 15 th March, 1996 WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 6 of 14
wherein the petitioner had stated that the Tour Operator was his witness. It is further contended that it is not the case of the petitioner that he was not permitted to summon the said witness; d. A photocopy of the permit conditions for stage carriage has been handed over to contend that the bus with a stage carriage permit could not have gone from Delhi to Pune and back; e. It is contended that the letter dated 12 th January, 1996 which the petitioner had sought to produce during the course of proceedings on 15 th March, 1996 was not taken on record and should be available with the petitioner only and the non production of the same by the petitioner indicates that the same is of no assistance to the petitioner. f. Reliance is placed on i. Lalit Popli Vs. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583 in support of the contention that in disciplinary proceedings the technical rules of evidence and doctrine of proof beyond doubt has no application and mere preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct; ii. State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557 where also the practice of viewing the departmental inquiry as a criminal prosecution was deprecated and it was further held that the High Court ought not to interfere with the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding; iii. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education Vs. K.S. Gandhi JT 1991 (2) S.C.296 again laying down that strict rules of Evidence Act and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal; iv. High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil (2000) 1 SCC 416 laying down that interference with the WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 7 of 14
decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion; v. Lalit Popli (supra) on the proposition that the review by the court is of the decision making process and where the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are based on some evidence, the court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. It is contended that the present is not a case of no evidence at all and there was evidence before the Disciplinary Authority of the bus having not undertaken the journey alleged; vi. Sh. Poorna Singh Kain Vs. Union of India MANU/DE/1292/2008 which was also a case of false claim of LTC expenses and a single judge of this Court reiterated the scope of judicial review as aforesaid. The counsel for the respondent has contended that the judgment of the Gauhati High Court relied upon by the petitioner is not in consonance with the principles enshrined by the Supreme Court in the judgments cited by him. It is contended that the onus to prove that the petitioner had undertaken the journey was on the petitioner. 15. I am unable to accept the contention of the petitioner of the inquiry proceedings being bad for the reason of delay. The LTC claimed was for the Block Year 1992-94. The inquiry initiated in the year 1994 itself cannot be said to be belated so as to vitiate the departmental proceedings. Similarly the argument of the WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 8 of 14
counsel for the petitioner of the time lag between the receipt of the reply dated 10 th January, 1994 from the STA and the charge sheet dated 31 st July, 1995 cannot be accepted. It cannot be lost sight of that prior thereto an opportunity was given on 14 th June, 1995 to the petitioner to explain. The respondent LIC is required to take appropriate sanctions for initiation of departmental proceedings and in fact the portion from the handbook cited by the petitioner himself records that the time schedules are observed more in breach in practice. Moreover no case of any prejudice to the petitioner by the said time lag is made out. I also do not find any such error as to vitiate the inquiry proceedings in the fresh letter being issued to the STA during the pendency of the inquiry proceedings. The STA had in response to the earlier letter of LIC informed that the bus had a Stage Carriage Permit. However, the petitioner in reply to the charge sheet contested the said reply on the ground of overwriting. Nothing wrong can be found in the conduct of the Disciplinary Authority in making fresh investigations during the course of the inquiry proceedings. Again no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner therefrom in as much as the petitioner also had full opportunity to contest the fresh material used against him. Similarly no merits are found in the contention of the petitioner of his being not allowed the Defence Assistant of his choice. A charged employee cannot demand a Defence Assistant whose presence would not only delay the inquiry proceedings but would also be at the cost of duties to be performed by the said Assistant as an officer/employee of LIC. Allowing the Defence Assistant from Karnal chosen by the petitioner would have necessarily made business of LIC at Karnal suffer. The petitioner was given opportunity to choose a Defence Assistant from Delhi but failed to do so and opted to proceed in the inquiry himself. No prejudice is found to have been caused to the petitioner therefrom. 16. As far as the contention of the petitioner with respect to the letter produced by him in the proceedings of 15 th March, 1996 is concerned, it is clear from the record of the proceedings on that date that the said letter rightly or wrongly was not taken on record by the Inquiry Officer. However to be able to appreciate the impact of the said letter, the petitioner ought to have placed the same before this Court. The petitioner has failed to do so. During the course of hearing also it was WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 9 of 14
asked from the counsel for the petitioner if he could handover a copy of the said letter even now. It was informed that even the petitioner has no copy of said letter available with him. The only inference from such conduct can be that the said letter in no way advances the case of the petitioner. Similarly qua the contention of the respondent LIC having not proceeded against others against whom similar charge had been levelled, the respondent LIC in its reply has stated that the other cases were considered on their own merits. There is no other material before this Court to conclude therefrom that the respondent LIC was vindictive towards the petitioner. In fact there is no averment even to that effect. The said plea also thus loses its shine. 17. Though the counsel for the petitioner has not argued but a reading of the pleadings shows that it is not disputed that the petitioner in the year 1989 had been commended for his timely action, when posted at Budgam Srinagar Branch of LIC, in saving that office from being damaged by fire. In 1993 again the petitioner was commended for his efforts improving considerably the ratings of the New Delhi Branch to which he was posted. Yet again on 10 th June, 1994 the petitioner was commended for his splendid performance and for streamlining the shattered OS Deptt. and improving its Audit rating from poor to good and for handling additional responsibilities by maintaining late hours in office. Yet again in 1997 the petitioner was commended for quick detection of mistake and saving Rs.20,000/- of LIC. All this shows that the petitioner has been consistently performing well for LIC to the extent of inviting appreciation in writing from his superiors. 18. Though well conscious of the limits of judicial review of departmental action but what strikes one immediately in the present case is that the entire inquiry proceedings were directed not as to whether the petitioner and his family members had undertaken the journey for which the bill was claimed, as they ought to have been directed but to whether the bus of which number was given in the receipt issued by the Tour Operator had undertaken the said journey or not. The question whether the bus had undertaken the journey or not is extraneous to the petitioner acting honestly and faithfully in all transactions including as to claim of WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 10 of 14
LTC. It is well nigh possible that the number of the bus given in the receipt of Rs.5,600/- issued by the Tour Operator is erroneous. From the documents it is borne out that the said receipt of the Tour Operator is signed only by the Manager of the said Tour Operator and not by the petitioner. The petitioner had submitted a claim for reimbursement of LTC in a standardized form and which neither has any column requiring the number of the bus in which the journey was undertaken to be stated nor is the number of the bus stated therein. Thus the certification of the petitioner at the bottom of the said form was also no certification of the number of the bus in which the journey was undertaken. All that the petitioner certified in the said form was that he and his family members had undertaken the journey by bus and for a fare of Rs.5,600/-. Of course, in support of having incurred the said fare, the receipt aforesaid of the Tour Operator was lodged but the petitioner was only concerned with the same to the extent of it containing a receipt of payment of Rs.5,600/- and not with the other particulars filled therein. The responsibility for filling the said particulars correctly was of the Tour Operator. 19. Another very important factor in the present case is, as aforesaid that the Tour Operator had been approved by the respondent LIC. The said fact has not been controverted by LIC. What immediately comes to one s mind is that if LIC has approved a Tour Operator and a doubt had arisen as to whether an employee claiming to have undertaken a journey through the said Tour Operator had in fact undertaken the journey or not, in the natural course of events, the first inquiry to the said effect would have been made from the Tour Operator. I am unable to fathom the need/necessity for the Disciplinary Authority of the LIC to approach the STA instead of approaching its approved agent. The said approved Tour Operator would have immediately informed whether the petitioner had undertaken the journey or not. The reluctance of the respondent LIC to make such inquiry from its approved Tour Operator stares one in the face in the present case. LIC avoided to make such inquiries from its approved Tour Operator even when the petitioner during the course of inquiry proceedings raised doubts as to the correctness of the number of the bus mentioned in the receipt issued by the Tour Operator. Significantly, it is not the case of the LIC that the Tour Operator was in collusion with the petitioner. It is also not the case that LIC has disapproved the WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 11 of 14
said Tour Operator at any time thereafter. All this leaves one with eerie feeling that the entire proceedings were to scuttle the promotion of the petitioner. 20. I find that this court in K.N. Shukla Vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 35(1988) DLT 33 quashed the departmental proceedings in similar circumstances. There the charge was of false claim of an allowance payable only to those who had undergone vasectomy. This Court held that if a suspicion had arisen as to whether the employee had undergone vasectomy or not the employee could have been got examined from any expert. The punishment imposed on the basis on the basis of there being no record of the employee being admitted to hospital for vasectomy was quashed inter alia for the reason of the Inquiry Officer having not got employee so examined and the findings of Inquiry Officer were held to be vitiated. 21. I also find that in Amiya Kumar Bala Vs. State (1999) 1 CHN 33 conviction under Section 420 IPC for false claim of LTC was set aside holding that proof of non existence of the taxi, number whereof was given on the receipt stated to be given by the driver and in which taxi journey was claimed to be undertaken was no evidence of journey having been not undertaken. 22. The Supreme Court in Chitra Venkata Rao (supra) also has held that where the Disciplinary Authority has disabled itself from reaching a fair decision by some consideration extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing itself to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Authority on the very face it is wholly arbitrary and capricious, the court is entitled to interfere. I find that the Disciplinary Authority in the present case, by directing its inquiry to the bus instead of to the travel by the petitioner and his family members disabled itself from reach a fair decision and has entered into the sphere of extraneous material. Similarly in K.S. Gandhi (supra) also it was held that it is open to the Disciplinary Authority to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant and cogent material. In the present case considering the fact that the Tour Operator through which the petitioner claimed to have undertaken the travel was the approved agency of the respondent LIC, the necessary, relevant and cogent material to determine whether the petitioner had undertaken the journey or not and made the WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 12 of 14
payment of Rs.5,600/- to the said Tour Operator or not was the Tour Operator and inspite of the very initial response of the petitioner requesting the LIC to enquire from the said Tour Operator, the refusal/reluctance of the Inquiry Officer to inquire from the said Tour Operator is unnatural, sufficient to vitiate the inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is thus found to have acted arbitrarily. Yet again in Sh. Poorna Singh Kain this Court observed that the object of judicial review is to ensure that a person receives a fair and objective treatment. As aforesaid in the present case the fair thing to be done in the inquiry was for the Disciplinary Authority of LIC to inquire from its approved Tour Operator and not rely on STA. As aforesaid, the petitioner cannot be penalized for the mistake if any in the said Tour Operator in mentioning the bus number. The petitioner after two years cannot certainly be expected to remember the bus number. 23. Though the counsel for the respondent LIC did not cite but I find that the Division Bench of this Court in Dharam Pal Vs. D.T.C. MANU/DE/0344/2008 was also concerned with the departmental proceedings with the charge of false claim of LTC. It was the contention of the charged employee in that case also that it was the Presenting Officer who was required to produce the witness from the transporter. The single judge of this Court held and the Division Bench affirmed that the burden of proof was on the employee for the reason that the employee had raised the said plea. However neither was the travel agent/tour operator in that case the approved agent of the employer nor was the address of the said travel agent available. The said important fact distinguishes the present case. In the present case it was for the respondent LIC to prove that the petitioner had not undertaken the journey for which he had raised the bill. All that the Inquiry Officer could establish is that the bus, number whereof was given in the receipt issued by the tour operator had not undertaken the journey. The said finding cannot lead to a finding that the petitioner had not undertaken the journey. 24. The Supreme Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India AIR 2006 SC 3475 has held that though the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited but nevertheless the disciplinary proceedings are quasi criminal in nature and although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 13 of 14
criminal trial i.e. beyond reasonable doubts but the Disciplinary Authority cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts and cannot shift the burden and cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses. In the present case the Inquiry Officer is found to have without any reason refused to examine the only relevant witness, being the approved Tour Operator of LIC. 25. Burden of proof is also a facet of the law of evidence. Once it is found that the departmental proceedings are not governed by the said rules of evidence, the argument of LIC of the burden being on the petitioner to examine the Tour Operator also cannot be accepted. Moreover, in the departmental proceedings no advocate and legal acumen is involved. Thus no weightage can be attributed to the comment of the petitioner on 15 th March, 1996 that the Tour Operator was his witness. An Inquiry Officer is to perform an inquisitorial and not an adversarial function. Where the Inquiry Officer is found to have, without any reason, not inquired from the most obvious sources, there is no option but to hold the inquiry to be vitiated. 26. I cannot restrain myself from mentioning that the Supreme Court recently in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. MANU/SC/0100/2009, though in the context of Income Tax Act, has held that the employer is under no statutory obligation to collect evidence to show that the employee has actually utilized the amount paid towards LTC. 27. The petition therefore succeeds. The order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as of the Appellate Authority of the respondent LIC is set aside and quashed. The respondent LIC is directed to within six weeks hereof release to the petitioner all benefits of which the petitioner has been deprived owing to the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority the order whereof has been quashed. The petitioner is also awarded costs of Rs.10,000/- of these proceedings. The writ petition is disposed of. 12 th April, 2010/pp RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) WP(C) No.3009/1998 Page 14 of 14