IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CARL RAY SEESE, III, Petitioner, CASE NO.: vs. DCA CASE NO.: 4D05-3695 STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. / PETITIONER S JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF CAREY HAUGHWOUT Public Defender 15th Judicial Circuit PAUL E. PETILLO Assistant Public Defender Attorney for Petitioner 421 Third Street, 6th Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (561) 355-7600 Florida Bar No. 508438 appeals@pd15.state.fl.us
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS...ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT...1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS...2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...5 ARGUMENT...6 The District Court s decision expressly and directly conflicts with two lines of cases from this court. First, the decision conflicts with decisions that hold that the popular or commonly understood definition of malice is ill will, hatred, spite, evil intent. Second, the decision conflicts with decisions that hold that courts are generally not authorized to depart from the plain meaning of a statute s language...6 CONCLUSION...9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...10 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...10 ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE Cf. Huntley v. State, 66 So.2d 504 (Fla.1953)...6 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990)...8 Huntley v. State, 66 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1953)...6 Kincaid v. World Insurance Co., 157 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1963)...6 Ramsey v. State, 114 Fla. 766, 154 So. 855 (1934)...6 Seese v. State, 955 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)...7, 8 State v. Gaylord, 356 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1978)...6, 7 State v. Perez, 531 So.2d 961 (Fla.1988)...7, 8 State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205 (Fla.2003)...7, 8 FLORIDA STATUTES Section 784.048(4)...7 FLORIDA CONSTITUTION Art. V, Section 3(b)(3)...6 iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Petitioner was the defendant in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, In and For Palm Beach County, and the appellant in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Respondent was the prosecution and appellee in the lower courts. In this brief the parties will be referred to as they appear before the Court. All references to the record will be by the symbol R, followed by the appropriate page number. All references to the transcript will be by the symbol T, followed by the appropriate page number. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS Petitioner was convicted of aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2004). Seese v. State, 955 So.2d 1145, 1146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). This statute provides that any person who, after the imposition of an injunction or court-imposed prohibition of contact, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks any person commits the offense of aggravated stalking... At trial, defense counsel argued that the state failed to prove that petitioner acted maliciously. 955 So.2d at 1147. The state argued in closing that it had proved petitioner acted maliciously because there was no justification, good cause, or good intent for what petitioner had done. 955 So.2d at 1147. The trial court read to the jury the standard jury instruction on stalking, but this instruction does not include a definition of maliciously. 955 So.2d at 1147. After deliberations began, the jury asked for a dictionary. 955 So.2d at 1147. That request was denied, and the trial court instructed the jury, at defense counsel s request, to use the common ordinary understanding of any words not defined. 955 So.2d at 1148. The jury then asked for a legal definition of maliciously and whether it could have the court reporter s notes explaining what maliciously means per the state attorney. 955 So.2d at 1148. To this request, the trial court instructed the jury without objection as follows: 2
Any word which is not specifically defined in the jury instructions you must consider to have its normal common place every day understanding of that particular word. Maliciously was not specifically defined in the jury instructions so are you to rely on your common understanding of the definition of that word, okay. And to the extent that you thought the state attorney in her closing argument referred to a legal definition that the court would be giving that was not a correct understanding. I wish we could, can be more helpful. 955 So.2d at 1148. On appeal, petitioner argued that it was fundamental error for the trial court to fail to define the term maliciously, the state exploited the omission by arguing a definition prejudicial to his position. 955 So.2d 1148. The Fourth District recognized that there are two meanings of maliciously or malice: actual malice and legal malice. 955 So.2d 1149, citing Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla.2002). Actual malice means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent. Id. Legal malice means wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse. Id. The Court also recognized that if a statutory term is not defined then the term must be understood as a word of common usage having its plain and ordinary sense. 955 So.2d 1149. The Fourth District stated that no error of any kind occurred here because the trial court instructed the jury that it must give the term maliciously its normal, commonplace, everyday meaning, which we regard as the functional equivalent of 3
plain and ordinary meaning. 955 So.2d 1145. And the Court held that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term maliciously is legal malice: Taking the text of section 784.048(4) as a whole, and considering its context and the discernible purposes of the legislature, we conclude that the plain meaning of the statutory term maliciously is legal malice: i.e. wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification. We reach this conclusion because the essence of this entire subsection is to criminalize the stalker who violates a court order prohibiting the contact with the subject. Section 784.048(4) punishes the person who continues to contact the subject in spite of a court order barring such contact-in other words, wrongfully, intentionally and without legal justification. 955 So.2d at 1149. Petitioner filed a timely motion rehearing or certification. The Fourth District denied this motion June 7, 2007. Petitioner filed his notice of discretionary jurisdiction on July 6, 2007. 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The District Court s decision expressly and directly conflicts with two lines of cases from this court. First, decisions from this Court hold that the popular or commonly understood definition of malice is ill will, hatred, spite, evil intent. Thus, the District Court s decision that the plain or commonplace meaning of the term maliciously is wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification is in express and direct conflict with this Court s decisions. Second, decisions from this Court hold that courts are generally not authorized to depart from the plain meaning of a statute s language. Thus, the District Court s decision departing from the plain meaning of the term maliciously based on the discernible purposes of the legislature is in express and direct conflict with this Court s decisions. 5
ARGUMENT The District Court s decision expressly and directly conflicts with two lines of cases from this court. First, the decision conflicts with decisions that hold that the popular or commonly understood definition of malice is ill will, hatred, spite, evil intent. Second, the decision conflicts with decisions that hold that courts are generally not authorized to depart from the plain meaning of a statute s language. This Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a decision of a district court of appeal that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of this Court or another district court of appeal. Art. V, 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The constitutional standard is whether the decision of the District Court on its face collides with a prior decision of this Court, or another District Court, on the same point of law so as to create an inconsistency or conflict among precedents. Kincaid v. World Insurance Co., 157 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 1963). In Huntley v. State, 66 So.2d 504, 507 (Fla. 1953), and Ramsey v. State, 114 Fla. 766, 154 So. 855, 856 (1934), this Court held that the popular or commonly understood definition of malice is ill will hatred, spite, evil intent. Likewise, in State v. Gaylord, 356 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1978), this Court held that the term maliciously in the child abuse statute is not unconstitutionally vague because the term: provides a definite standard of conduct understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence. Malice means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent. Cf. Huntley v. State, 66 So.2d 504 (Fla.1953). 6
Gaylord, 356 So.2d at 313. See also Seese v. State, 955 So.2d 1145, 1149 n.4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (dictionary definition of maliciously is given to malice; addicted to sentiments or acts of ill will; wicked or evil disposition or desire to harm or see others suffer; act without just cause or reason; extreme ill will or spite. (c.o.)). In this case, however, the District Court held that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term maliciously is wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification : Taking the text of section 784.048(4) as a whole, and considering its context and the discernible purposes of the legislature, we conclude that the plain meaning of the statutory term maliciously is legal malice: i.e. wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification. Seese, 955 So.2d at 1149. The Court s decision that the plain and ordinary meaning of maliciously is wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification is in express and direct conflict with Huntley, Ramsey, and Gaylord. Moreover, the Court s decision to consider the context and discernible purposes of the legislature in order to hold that the plain meaning of the statutory term maliciously is legal malice (which is not the plain meaning of the term, as explained above) is in express and direct conflict with this Court s decision in State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205 (Fla.2003), and State v. Perez, 531 So.2d 961, 962 (Fla.1988). In Ruiz, this Court stated: Even where a court is convinced that the Legislature really meant and intended something not expressed in the phraseology 7
of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity. Ruiz, 863 So.2d at 1209. Here, the Court used the discernible purposes of the Legislature to depart from the plain meaning of the term maliciously. 1 And in Perez, this Court stated that [a] court is required to follow the plain meaning of the language in a statute unless such an interpretation would lead to an absurd or illogical result. Perez, 531 So.2d at 962. But the District Court did not conclude that the plain or commonly understood definition of maliciously would lead to an absurd or illogical result. The Court concluded that justice would be better served if maliciously is defined as legal malice for that is surely the sense in which the legislature used the term in this statute. Seese, 955 So.2d at 1150. Because the District Court s decision is in express and direct conflict with the two lines of decisions cited above, this Court should accept jurisdiction. 1 Even if the District Court is correct about the discernible purposes of the legislature, those purposes would not be controlling. As the Supreme Court stated: Because construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader than that clearly warranted by the text. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990). 8
CONCLUSION Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to accept review of the instant case and order briefs on the merits. Respectfully Submitted, CAREY HAUGHWOUT Public Defender 15th Judicial Circuit PAUL E. PETILLO Assistant Public Defender Criminal Justice Building 421 Third Street, 6th Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (561) 355-7600 Florida Bar No. 508438 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of this brief was furnished by courier, to Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Assistant Attorney General, 1515 N. Flagler Drive, 9 th Floor, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-3432, on the day of July, 2007. Paul E. Petillo Assistant Public Defender CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Brief of Petitioner was typed in Times New Roman 14, per Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a)(2); 9.100(1), and that the applicable standard of review was stated in the issue on appeal, per Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(b)(5). Paul E. Petillo Assistant Public Defender 10