COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE

COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE

Sofía Rodríguez Secretary General José Araiza Director General Marcela Treviño Crisis Director Rebeca Ponce Subsecretary of Committees Elena García Chief of Crisis Héctor Cruz Chief of Technology Andrea Garza Head of Pages Welcome Delegates! The secretariat and I are honored to have you participate in the 11th Edition of PASMUN! Secretariat, chairs, and staff have been working non-stop to make the best experience possible for you. During the simulation you will be discussing real life and current situations to which you will be finding possible solutions. We encourage you to put to the test your abilities in teamwork, leadership, critical thinking, and communication, between others. We hope you enjoy the simulation and take the most advantage of it. Before, during, and after the simulation, keep in mind that today's actions build our future. Sincerely, Isabela Castro Chief of Logistics Sofía Rodríguez Secretary General

Committee: Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) Director: Valeria Treviño Moderator: Edna Sofia Eizondo Topic B: Preventing Terrorism and Extremism in the horn of Africa. I. Committee Background: The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), which was adopted unanimously on 28 September 2001 in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States. The Committee, comprising all 15 Security Council members, was tasked with monitoring implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), which requested countries to implement a number of measures intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability to counter terrorist activities at home, in their regions and around the world, including taking steps to: criminalize the financing of terrorism, freeze without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism, deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups, suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists, share information with other governments on any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts, cooperate with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of those involved in such acts; and criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to justice. II. Statement of the problem:

The terrorist threat is a significant one in the Horn of Africa. While Al-Shabaab has been a long-standing problem there, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) extended its presence into Somalia in 2015. Africa extends beyond Somalia into the neighboring states where they seek to recruit, establish bases, and conduct attacks In recent years, the Council has focused considerable energy on preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism. In resolution 2178, adopted on 24 September 2014, the Council called for states to cooperate to prevent foreign terrorist fighters from crossing their borders, to disrupt and prevent financial support to terrorists, and to cooperate in sharing lessons learned to counter violent extremism. The Comprehensive Framework focuses on how legal and law enforcement measures, public-private partnerships, and the creation of counternarratives could be used to combat terrorist narratives. Preventing terrorism in the Horn of Africa and countering violent extremism is an effort that needs to be tackled at the international, national, regional and sub-regional levels. While terrorism and the propagation of extremist narratives are threats with broad crossborder implications, some members may emphasize the responsibilities of individual member states to do their best to combat them and to collaborate with other member states in implementing strategies to address them. Some members may further underscore that combatting terrorism requires a comprehensive approach that employs a broad range of security, political, legal, economic and other tools. II. Topic Information

A) History of the topic: For over a decade, the United States has considered the Horn of Africa a major source of global terrorism. In 1989 the National Islamic Front seized power in Sudan and set out to build an Islamist state home to radical Muslim groups from around the world. During the 1990s, Sudan openly provided a safe haven to terrorists including Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and acted as a gateway for these group to operate in the greater Horn of Africa region. In 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, during an attack that some analysts attribute to Islamic terrorists. Five years later terrorists struck in the region again, bombing American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring more than 4,000. In October 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was struck by terrorists in Yemen, just off the east coast of Africa in an attack that claimed the lives of 17 American sailors. And in November 2002, al Qaeda backed terrorists bombed a hotel and attempted to down an Israeli airliner with a shoulder-held surface-to-air missile near Mombasa, Kenya. Indeed, for years the Horn of Africa, filled with weak, corrupt, and warring states, was seen as fertile ground for Islamists. Yet American responses to the regional terrorist threat like the cruise missile attack on Sudan in the wake of the embassy bombings were limited and unsustain. Following the 9-11 attacks against the United States, the Horn again came under intense scrutiny by counter-terrorism specialists and it remains a strategic focal point in the American war against terrorism. In May, 2003, the U.S. Institute of Peace convened a half-day workshop for specialists on terrorism, the Horn of Africa, and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, in an effort to determine the nature of the threats and responses to terrorism emanating from the

region. Six regional experts addressed the group, each following a common analytical framework designed to provide a concise analysis of the threats and responses to terrorism in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan. B) Current issues: The Horn of Africa has been the most conflicted part of Africa during the last 50 years. Although there have been long-standing disputes in places like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, no other region on the continent has had as many conflicts over such a long span of time. The root causes are numerous and sometimes complex even within a single dispute. They include ethnic, language and cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries, religion, ideology, competition for scarce resources including pasturage and water, unequal sharing of resources controlled by the state, and the sheer desire for power. There are underlying conditions in East Africa and the Horn that contribute directly to conflict and the use of terrorist tactics. Poverty and social injustice are widespread. Borders are porous even by African standards. Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea have long and poorly patrolled coasts on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean. Weapons are readily available throughout the region, but especially in Somalia. All of the countries have a severe shortage of financial resources and trained personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements. Corruption is endemic in the region and a particularly serious problem in several countries. Transparency International surveyed 102 countries in 2002 for its annual Corruption Perceptions Index. Kenya tied Indonesia for position 96 on the list while Uganda shared 93 with

Moldova. Tanzania vied with several nations for position 71 and Ethiopia shared position 59 with several nations. There were not sufficient data to rank the other countries in the region. Countries facing serious corruption combined with low pay for security personnel leave officials wide open to the temptation of accepting money from terrorists in return for support. Important to the understanding of terrorism in the region is the inter-connectedness of most of the indigenous conflicts. They often result in refugee flows in various directions. Based on the author's experience with all countries of the region, they frequently lead to support for a dissident group in one country by a neighboring country. That support, in turn, causes the affected country to back another dissident organization against the offending government. C) United Nations Actions: The challenge for the US in countering terrorism in East Africa and the Horn is considerable. Groups engaged in or supportive of terrorist tactics are numerous, complex, and not easy to monitor. In the case of Islamic communities, it is important to track any terrorist links in cooperation with host government intelligence organizations. Looking to the future, it is even more important that the US show an interest in the Muslim communities and identifies ways that American assistance can support them. In the case of Ethiopia, the embassy opened the door several years ago to the Supreme Islamic Council by offering help in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Other innovative ways, perhaps in the areas of health and education, must be found to improve relations between these communities and the US. Improved American public diplomacy alone is not adequate. The US has

identified East Africa and the Horn as the priority region in Africa for counterterrorism cooperation because of its past history of terrorist acts. It has created a fund of nearly $100 million to increase the capacity of the countries in the region to combat terrorism. The key countries in this effort are Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Training is already well advanced in Ethiopia and Kenya while Djibouti hosts the CJTF-HOA. Smaller training programs will take place in Tanzania, Uganda, and Eritrea. Somalia does not have a government in control of the country and is not, therefore, in a position to develop a counter-terrorism program. The US seems to be in a quandary as to how it should treat Somaliland, which has established control over most of the country but is still unrecognized. This should not prevent the US from cooperating on issues such as counter-terrorism. Sudan remains on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. Nevertheless, CJTF-HOA personnel visited Sudan in May 2003 when they highlighted the improvement in relations between Sudan and the US. It is time to reassess whether Sudanese cooperation on counter-terrorism merits removing the country from the list and ending American sanctions. Indigenous insurgent groups that use terrorist tactics pose a greater challenge because by definition they are trying to harm governments that the US supports. Working with host governments, there may be cases where the US can serve as an intermediary to help resolve differences with certain insurgent groups. The US tried this several years ago without success in the case of Ethiopia and the OLF. The time may be ripe to try again. There are other groups, for example AIAI and the LRA, which do not lend themselves to this approach. Perhaps the most that can be done in such cases is to expand the effort to collect intelligence on them and implement training and appropriate counter-terrorism programs. In the

final analysis, helping to eliminate the conditions that give rise to the alienation of groups that use terrorism, better intelligence on those that persist anyway, and carefully designed counter-terrorism programs are the most effective ways to deal with the threat in East Africa and the Horn. IV) Conclusion: Some solution of this topic can be. The correct understanding of Islam because you cure this disease only through Islam not fighting Islam. It has been proven that terrorists exploit the lack of understanding of Islam. Groups who are ignorant of the high purpose and objectives of this religion and lack the power of persuasion and dialogue have distorted this tolerant religion; Spreading the culture of tolerance, coexistence and acceptance of others because religion cannot be forced upon people, and thus, we must fight extremism in all its forms; Removal of injustice, poverty, corruption and upholding the values of justice and equality amongst societies, because most of the communities who are marginalized in their own countries will have no option but turn to violence and terror; Listening to the demands of the people and giving them their civil rights, such as identity cards and passport, besides lifting the injustice from Somalis residents who live in Nairobi who are frequent targets of the police, whether they have legal documentation or not. Such behaviours generate hatred, anger and a feeling of lack of belonging to the country; Creating a serious dialogue with the groups in society who are most exposed to these ideas, such as the youth and children. This is because killing them does not bear any results, for the maximum penalty you can incur on a human being is by killing them. This is actually what these terrorists are looking for

they have turned into an explosive object that wants to exterminate others. So what s the point of imprisoning them or killing them? We should employ persuasion and dialogue for they are the right way to get them back to their conscious and to humanity; Finally, the phenomenon of terrorism is complex and the reasons vary from country to country, and from one environment to another. It would be an injustice to analyze it from one point of view for there s difference between al- Qaeda and ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the same way there s a difference between Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Ansar al-sharia in Egypt, al-shabaab in East Africa, Taliban in Afghanistan, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Lord s Resistance Army in Uganda. Every one of them kills for political purposes, and the world has to save the affected communities. Leaders should remove injustices, poverty, hatred, and ignorance so that equality can prevail in the distribution of wealth and resources. Occupation of countries also has to end, especially the Islamic holy site in Palestine so that peace can prevail and love can spread in the world and that s when we can all enjoy the culture of harmony and dialogue.

V) Essential Questions 1. What can your delegation do to stop terrorism? 2. What countries nearby your country are the most affected? 3. Is this problem affecting your delegation? 4. How can your delegation provide help to the people? 5. How is your country effectively trying to fight terrorism and enforce human rights by all means possible? 6. Is your delegation working with any NGOS? 7. What is your delegation s government doing? 8. How can your delegation help nearby countries? VI) Bibliography Whatisinblue.com recovered on November 22,2017 Martinplaut.worldpress.com recovered on November 22, 2017 http://www.whatsinblue.org/2017/06/arria-formula-meeting-preventing-terrorismand-violent-extremism-in-the-horn-of-africa.php https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2017/06/22/un-security-council-to-hold-meetingon-terrorism-in-the-horn-of-africa/ Newafricanmagazine.com recovered on November 22, 2017 http://newafricanmagazine.com/africa-can-beat-terrorism/5/

Usip.org recovered on November 22, 2017 https://www.usip.org/publications/2004/01/terrorism-horn-africa Journals.lib.unb.ca recovered on November 22, 2017 https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/218/376 UN.org recovered on November 22,2017 http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/terrorism/fact_sheet_1.pdf UN.org recovered on November 22,2017 http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/aboutus.html Sahanjoural.com recovered on November 22,2017 http://sahanjournal.com/root-causes-terrorism-solutions/#.whdsalsdxuq Aspeninstitute.it recovered on November 23, 2017 https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/ethiopia-and-horn-africa-antiterrorism-and-migration Iss.europa.eu recovered on November 23,2017 https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/euissfiles/brief_14_cve.pdf