Panel Discussion June 20, 2016 Vortragende: Terrence Hopmann (Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) Kate Marie Byrnes (Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the OSCE and Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Mission to the OSCE) Moderation: Heinz Gärtner (Director oiip, University of Vienna) Veranstaltungsort: Amerika Haus, Friedrich-Schmidt-Platz 2, 1090 Wien TeilnehmerInnen: 90 Zusammenfassung: Katharina Hämmerle 1
Zusammenfassung Mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und der Teilung Europas erschien die Möglichkeit ein System von Kooperativer Sicherheit auf dem europäischen Kontinent zu entwickeln als durchführbar. Kooperative Sicherheit versucht den Wettkampf zwischen sich gegenüberstehenden Blöcken mit einem kooperativen Set an Beziehungen aller Staaten zu ersetzen. Statt sich auf eine klassische Verteilung von Macht oder auf Bündnisse zu verlassen, nimmt das Konzept von kooperativer Sicherheit an, dass Sicherheit unteilbar ist. Das eröffnete der KSZE/OSZE die Möglichkeit kooperativen Frieden und Sicherheit innerhalb eines großen Teils von Europa zu gewährleisten. Dennoch scheiterte dieses Konzept an der Materialisierung, also an der konkreten Durchführung. In der Podiumsdiskussion fokussieren sich Kate Byrnes (Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the OSCE and Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Mission to the OSCE), Terrence Hopmann (Professor der Internationalen Beziehungen an der Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) und Moderator Heinz Gärtner (Direktor oiip, Universität Wien) auf die Frage, ob und wie die OSZE die Idee der kooperativen Sicherheit in Europa wieder zum Leben erwecken könnte. Abstract With the end of the Cold War division in Europe the possibility of creating a genuine system of "cooperative security" on the European continent appeared to be feasible. Cooperative security seeks to replace competition among opposing blocs with a genuinely cooperative set of relations all states. Rather than relying on a classical balance of power or fixed alliances, cooperative security assumes that security is indivisible. It opened for the CSCE/OSCE the possibility to maintain cooperative peace and security within the large European region. The concept of cooperative security order failed to materialize, however. In the panel discussion Kate Byrnes (Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the OSCE and Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Mission to the OSCE), Terrence Hopmann (Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) and moderator Heinz Gärtner (Director oiip, University of Vienna) focuses on the question whether and how the OSCE could revive the idea of cooperative security in Europe. 2
Introduction Before starting the panel discussion, Heinz Gärtner explains that the discussants will focus on a general picture of the OSCE and on its main concept, the cooperative security in Europe. The OSCE is a hybrid organization that covers almost all security issues we know, except defense issues. That is why it is also called a comprehensive security organization. Gärtner goes on by mentioning the three dimensions of the OSCE, which are: 1) the politico-military dimension, 2) the economic and environmental dimension and 3) the human dimension. Additional to the traditional security issues, new challenges are emerging right now, like cyber security migration, trafficking of persons, radicalization and terrorism. A special issue, with which the OSCE has to deal now, are the events in the Ukraine. Are there stronger dividing lines today or can the concept of cooperative security of the OSCE be revived? Kate Byrnes starts with a look at the narrative of the concept of cooperative security. She does think that this concept has already been materialized because there has already been a lot of cooperative work on many programs between the OSCE and the U.S. Mission to the OSCE, through field missions, through the independent institutions and also through the permanent council. The narrative also talks about the events in the Ukraine since 2014. Byrnes wants to be clear about what happened there: the Russian Federation violated the integrity and sovereignty of one of the members of the OSCE, an independent and democratic state. In that respect Russia threatened basic international principals, which say that 1) borders and territorial integrity cannot be changed by force, 2) a country and its citizens have the right to determine its own future and 3) all members of the international community are bound by certain rules and when these rules are violated, the international community should set some costs for that behavior. These are fundamental rules on which the international order is based. The narrative also talks about the OSCE failing. Byrnes states that you cannot blame the OSCE for the failure, it is up to the 57 states, which are the members of this organization. However, Byrnes feels optimistic because of the practical work that has already been done and says that the U.S. is still believing in this concept of the OSCE. 3
Terrence Hopmann says, that he is not disagreeing in any point with what Kate Byrnes said about the significant work that the OSCE is doing, but these things are not sufficiently recognized in the U.S., not even in the U.S. State Department and certainly not in the academic and public communities. The message has to get out because no one in the public knows about the important work that the OSCE is doing. Hopmann goes on by saying, that he thinks that the OSCE is still facing a big challenge at a broader level: When he thinks back at the days in Geneva in 1974 and Helsinki in 1975, it seems like the optimism and the sense to create a new international order has disappeared. Hopmann wants to deal with the question what has happened since then. He also refers to the events in the Ukraine in 2014 and calls it the most serious violations of the normative prescriptions the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. In this context, Hopmann describes a theory of International Relations: the Political Realism, a classic and traditional theory, which argues that the laws of international politics can almost be described as the laws of physics. So competition, conflict, the inability of states to cooperate about security is inevitable. If you look at the Charter of Paris, the Copenhagen Document and the Helsinki Final Act, those include different ideas on how to construct international relations. Different states have also drawn different interpretations, also misinterpretaitions and have prioritized one principle over the others. Hopmann pleads, that we have to think of the mutual aspects of these principals. Together they are more than adequate to deal with the problems that we have right now. The norms, the ideas, the instruments exist, but the states are not using them or are not using them right. So Hopmann asks, how it is possible to convince 57 states in doing so. What are the uniting issues in the OSCE? Hopmann argues that in all countries of Europe, also in the U.S. and in Russia Islamophobia is on the rise as a really dangerous phenomenon, that in some cases Muslims have replaced Jews as primary target and that we need to be careful about this fact. On the other hand, there are issues of terrorism, not attributed to a specific religion, but seen as a tactic to attack civilians and therefor violating at least one of the critical premises of any notion of the just use of violence. We can build some consensus around dealing with the issue of terrorism and the movement of terrorists. Hopmann says, that this is just one many uniting issues, of which most of them have to deal with very concrete areas. The bigger question is if the OSCE can get back to an overarching idea. Hopmann 4
brings another issues up that would be interesting for the countries to work on: transparency around military force. Byrnes starts by explaining, that she can only speak for her country, the U.S, but she thinks that the things they are concerned about are things that other countries are also concerned about or should be. Borders is one of them. Russia for example has a lot more borders with other countries than the U.S., so this topic is also a very important one for them. Not only the integrity of borders, but also the traffic of drugs, weapons and people. Additionally there are new challenges like cyber security. Byrnes says that countries could share information and best practice in these areas. She does not know if they are really unifying because every country approaches these problems from a different perspective, but working together should still be in the interest of all states. Would neutrality be a solution to prevent the Ukraine from the dividing lines right now, like it was for Austria? Hopmann thinks, that it was an attractive idea in the early 1990s and points out the idea of the first post-soviet president in Belarus to create a belt of neutral countries out of the former Soviet states in central Europe. It would be much harder to do now because the conflict itself cuts off possibilities. Most of the Ukrainians are divided. If Ukrainians decided it was rational for them to pursue a policy of internationally recognized neutrality and a policy of some degree of federalization within the state, that could solve the problem. But it would be hard to implement. Questions and Answers After the discussants were asked questions by the moderator Heinz Gärtner, the audience had the possibility to ask questions themselves. Some of the most interesting ones were: Do you detect a greater willingness to use the OSCE from the perspective of the U.S.? 5
Byrnes argues, that we can see for example a German chairmanship today, which is deeply invested from the highest level and the Austrian government willing to take on the challenge of a chairmanship. That is something that they do not take for granted in the U.S. and in fact inspires them to continue their work and investing in this organization. In the case of Ukraine and Russia, could there have been a solution with the help of the OSCE mechanisms? Byrnes says, that there are mechanisms and tools of the OSCE, which can be used, but it is up to the 57 states to do so. It is in all of our common interest to think historically, but also to think creatively and innovatively, and to build on what the OSCE has done. When this does not happen, something like the events in the Ukraine do happen. Hopmann, thinks that in the case of Crimea in 2014 there was no time for diplomacy because these events happened so quickly. It is important to convince Russia to come back to diplomacy instead of using military force. He adds, that there were great chairmanships and not so great ones in the OSCE. The Ukraine chairmanship at its time did not bring up the topic of Crimea. So the failure of diplomacy was a failure of the Ukrainian chairmanship because it did not put Crimea on the agenda. Hopmann concludes, that the OSCE is a great model, but needs more resources for using its potential. How would you respond to the argument that the U.S., which led intervention in Kosovo without international consensus or OSCE consensus, set an international precedent that allowed Russia to justify its intervention in Crimea? Byrnes says, that when talking about Kosovo and Crimea, we talk about different situations with different historical backgrounds and in a different period of time, also with different level of international engagement. So those were different processes taking place. She pleads to be careful on dropping precedence over such a distinct set of different facts. Hopmann, argues that these two cases have some similarities, but also one striking difference: the way it was handled. The issues were similar in the sense that we have regions that were autonomous within Serbia and Ukraine, which wanted to break away. In the case of Kosovo there have been eight years of negotiation after its declared independency. In the case of Crimea in 2014, there has been none. 6
What is the role of civil society as part of the OSCE structures? Byrnes points out, that it is a truly unique aspect of the OSCE that governments work directly with this organization. States have the possibility to sit at the table. This is something that distinguishes the OSCE from the NATO, where they only sometimes reach out to civil society for advice. Every year in Warsaw there is a meeting of the OSCE, in which civil society is registered as delegates and have speaking time. So then you have representatives of governments listening to these voices, which is very important. In the U.S. they have developed a practice in the recent years, where they have also open hours: every civil society can come in and speak to the OSCE. So the civil society is being part of the discussions as the OSCE tries to improve their models. To conclude Byrnes says, that the civil society is developing a more and more important role in the structure of the OSCE. Photo credit: US Embassy 7