THIS IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT. PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR. COMMENTS ARE WELCOME.

1 Incorporating Stabilization as a Key Aspect in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Transforming the Role of the UN in the Central African Republic Guilherme M. Dias 1 THIS IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT. PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR. COMMENTS ARE WELCOME. Abstract: The role of international organizations in post-conflict reconstruction processes is the recurrent object of study in International Relations. In the last decade, the United Nations has incorporated a stabilization issue into the mandates of peacekeeping operations. There is no consensus, however, on how an organization should act as a stabilizing agent, insofar as different members of the Security Council have different approaches to it. In order to understand the stabilization debate from the practice of operations in force since 2014, this article aims to analyze the changes that have occurred in the UN peace operations in the Central African Republic with the transition from BINUCA to MINUSCA. Keywords: Stabilization. Peacekeeping Operations. Central African Republic. United Nations. 1. Introduction Peace operations are one of the most important instruments of the United Nations (UN) in its highest task: guaranteeing international peace and security. Throughout its existence, the UN has faced many challenges in fulfilling its responsibility and, even though it is an organization made up of states, to have its members support it. The transformations that the international system has undergone since the end of the Cold War are important in understanding how institutionalized multilateral action on security issues becomes increasingly complex. These challenges stem from changing patterns of conflict and increasingly sensitive demands on the role of international organizations in threatening civilian life in various parts of the world. The increasing incorporation of responsibilities in the field of peace operations has undergone a series of normative constructions and culminated in the establishment of 1 Professor at the Brazilian Command and General Staff College (Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército ECEME). E-mail: diasgm@gmail.com

2 stabilization missions since 2004. These operations bring with them a symbiosis between security and development, defined as multidimensional and extend each the role of civilian components. It is a myriad of changes. One of the exemplary cases in relation to this transformation is the Central African Republic (CAR). Since its independence in 1960, the country has been the object of peace operations in different contexts and has alternated the presence of external actors with periods of autocratic regimes that marginalized large population groups with massive violations of human rights. If the objectives of the UN presence in CAR were not always the same, its ability to deal with the country's crises has always been limited in all of them. Its latest version is the United Nations Mission for Stabilization of the CAR (MINUSCA). In this article, MINUSCA is the case study on the issue of stabilization in the context of United Nations peace operations. The central issue here is the lack of definition about what constitutes stabilization for the organization and how it impacts its performance in one of the longest African crises. To do so, the first section of the article will provide a brief history of peace operations and the changes they have undergone especially since the 1990s. The second section will focus on stabilization as the most recent modus operandi and the repercussions of the lack of a concept within the organization. The third section addresses the stabilization debate for the MINUSCA case study and the different interpretations of this new pattern of action in the midst of field practice, and then move on to the final considerations. 2. Peace Operations: A History During the Cold War bipolarity significantly restricted the participation of other actors in international security issues other than the superpowers. The few exceptions refer to the instrumentalisation of international organizations, such as the Korean War, or peace operations, created in the late 1950s to separate parties to conflict and monitor cease-fire agreements (KENKEL, 2013). In an environment marked by the intense dispute over areas of influence, the structuring of peace operations as a mechanism for action by the United Nations on security issues was based on three fundamental principles: consent, impartiality and use of force only in the case of self-defense. This paved the way for the international

3 community to take on the responsibility assumed with the creation of the UN and the signing of its letter in 1945. At the same time, a way of dealing with conflicts was established without the direct presence of the superpowers and without the clear definition of terms and concepts that would define and restrict the scope of peace operations. If this model was relatively successful during the Cold War, to the point that the Peace Operations Forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, the end of the bipolar conflict opened space for a new phase in relation to this instrument. In approving the resolutions leading up to the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations took part in a consensus that would mark the new order and create a series of difficult expectations to achieve (KENKEL, 2013). The way to deal with the new prospects for peace operations began to be paved in normative terms with the presentation of the "Agenda for Peace" by the then Secretary- General Boutros Boutros Ghali. For the first time, the UN debated in a more comprehensive way a document with guidelines for peace operations. For the Egyptian diplomat, it was about acting in three fundamental dimensions: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Another crucial aspect of understanding the formulation of the Agenda for Peace has been the broadening of the scope of the United Nations in conflict situations. The transition to the post-cold War order is marked by the organization's participation in overseeing electoral processes, providing humanitarian aid, promoting human rights, and so on (UNITED NATIONS, 1992). The increasing incorporation of new responsibilities coupled with the new dynamics of international conflicts leads to a series of failures that call into question the UN's reputation. KALDOR (2007a) addresses the issue of new wars comprising this phenomenon as one of the main transformations in security studies. The transformation of the foundations of conflict, with the incorporation of identity motivations in place of the ideological questions that guided the wars of the bipolar era, is a factor that, if not understood, can lead to ineffective responses. The inability to deal with such changes within the United Nations is one of the main factors behind the failure to act in crises such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s. The legacy of legitimacy of the 1980s was quickly lost and led to questioning the effectiveness of peace operations as an effective instrument in security issues (KALDOR, 2007b).

4 Attempts to overcome the false step taken by peace operations through normative propositions only came out in 2000 with the Brahimi Report. It should be noted that the United Nations has been active in the Kosovo and Timor-Leste crises over the past year, implementing transitional administrations and taking full control of the state-building process (MUGGAH, 2009). The Brahimi Report excludes the peace enforcement strategy, but maintains peacekeeping as the strategy for promoting peace through political action, designating that mission to act in concert with the signatures of the agreements of peacemaking. Despite the differences pointed out in the tables, they show that the authorization of a peace mission is directly related to the failure of the conflict prevention initiatives (UNITED NATIONS, 2000). In addition, the sequence of UN intervention strategies ends up creating a standard model of intervention, thus excluding any kind of influence that internal and external actors to armed and violent conflicts may exert in the development of the activities of a peace mission. Even so, the complementarity between these two strategies is evident. The authorization of a peacekeeping operation, which aims to promote an end to hostilities and armed confrontation, opens the door to fulfilling a fundamental requirement for the next peacebuilding mission to be initiated (NEWMAN; RICHMOND, 2006). The increasing importance of a process that was tied to peace operations, peacebuilding, is attested by the need for reflection and implementation from specific conditions. Peacebuilding concentrates efforts on the process of rebuilding the postconflict state and brings as an innovative fact a more incisive concern with the causes that lead a given state to plunge into a conflictive process, the so-called roots of conflict (ESTEVES, 2010). The next step was to present a set of specific guidelines for peace operations, the Capstone Doctrine. The document responds to a phase of increasing threat from the components of United Nations missions. This perception is accompanied by the relativization of the sense of impartiality, one of the principles of peace operations. Increasingly, blue helmets are now engaged in confronting insurgent forces that use force to constrain the state forces of a particular member of the organization (UNITED NATIONS, 2008). In general, the Capstone Doctrine proposes to create a stable and secure environment, supporting the State in providing security, highlighting respect for Human Rights and the rule of law. In addition, the doctrine addresses the need for a functioning

5 peacekeeping structure to create conditions for the success of the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation. For the formulators, it is essential to support the governance structure through its strengthening so that the recidivism of the conflict is avoided. Finally, the document reinforces the need to provide a framework that allows the United Nations and other international actors involved in conflict resolution to carry out their activities in a coherent and coordinated way (MAC GINTY, 2010). The conditions to operate on peacekeeping issues are increasingly seen as crucial to the success of peace missions. This is clear in the formulation of the New Horizon in 2009. Although it is an internal document designed to further promote the debate on the future and needs of peace operations, its repercussion is significant in bringing the idea of the three partnerships as their basis: a) partnership in purpose, A shared vision of the purpose of UN peacekeeping is a prerequisite for capable and effective action on the ground. To strengthen the direction, planning and management of UN peacekeeping, we need a renewed partnership in purpose based on the unity and cohesion of all stakeholders; b) partnership in action, Successful UN peacekeeping depends on the ability to deliver timely and practical results on the ground. To enhance delivery and confidence in UN peacekeeping to implement the tasks it has been assigned, we need a renewed partnership in action.; e c) partnership for the future, UN peacekeeping requires dependable and sustainable capabilities in order to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. To build the capacity of UN peacekeeping to continue to serve as a global peace and security instrument, there is a need for a partnership for the future (UNITED NATIONS, 2009: iii-vi, tradução nossa). Finally, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) submitted its report in 2015. The document is much more a call for debate, especially as regards the process of extending UN peacekeeping tasks. Despite this, the report highlights an approach on the demands of the new conflicts aimed at finding political solutions, complemented by the military component and the development initiatives from the post-conflict reconstruction. Another aspect highlighted by HIPPO is the strengthening of partnerships with regional actors who have more interaction with the parties involved in the conflict or with greater access to political actors at a time when prevention can still be a viable alternative to avoid the scale of the conflict. To a large extent, changes in the scope of peace operations are marked by a series of normative and consultative efforts since the end of the Cold War. In the midst of so many revision and adaptation movements of this United Nations instrument, the crisis in the DRC is paralleled, in which the presence of the UN (in 1999) precedes the

6 presentation of the Brahimi Report (2000) and the incorporation of an idea openness of stabilization as an objective, operational instrument, reference or other interpretation, given the lack of definition in relation to the concept. In the next section, this article will address the issue of stabilization as a response and dilemma within the context of United Nations peace operations. 3. Stabilization within the United Nations The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1542 in April 2004 established the creation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the first peacekeeping operation under the UN to explicitly bring stabilization as one of its objectives. Main atributions. Since then, three other stabilization missions have been set up by the organization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2010), Mali (2013) and Central African Republic (2014). There is, however, no clear definition of what the United Nations views as stabilization as the scope of its peace operations. The lack of a concept guiding such a process has been recognized as a problem in the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations set up by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and in its 111th paragraph highlights the need for a clear definition of that the organization understands and proposes when it is ready to carry out a process of stabilization of a State (UNITED NATIONS, 2015). If there is no concept, observing the mandates of stabilization missions in operation in Africa leads to the identification of a pattern. Such operations are set to act in the midst of ongoing conflicts, with mandates emphasizing the role of blue helmets in protecting government - supporting local authorities, and the population. At the same time, they bring the prerogative of greater robustness in the military dimension, including the possibility of offensive action in the case of the Intervention Brigade Force in the DRC (TITECA, FAHEY, 2016). According to DE CONING (2015) this pattern reflects a movement of separation between traditional operations and a new generation of peace operations. The traditional model is focused on conflict resolution while stabilization missions work towards its management. Not only that, but also a reformulation of the original principles of peace operations. Stabilization actions do away with impartiality to focus on supporting the coping of threats to the target states of operations.

7 When one notices the influences of such transformations, it is pertinent to note that the idea of stabilization arises within the framework of the foreign and defense policy makers of developed countries with a significant degree of engagement in the work of the United Nations. As an example, this article highlights the definitions of stabilization in the United States, the United Kingdom and France. While the American model is geared towards a more militaristic stance, highlighting the role of the armed forces in the leadership of actions, while recognizing that much of the demands for stabilization are directed toward a process of providing emergency aid and subsequent reconstruction of state bases, as well as their requalification for the provision of security and essential services. To a large extent, this approach reveals a trend that reflects international action in relation to the search for stability with the military assuming responsibilities that are now the responsibility of the civilian component, at least within the United Nations (SIEGLE, 2011). Regarding the British model, it recognizes conflicts and their resolution as a starting point, but identifies that the next steps do not necessarily go through the ostensive presence of the military component or incorporation of other assignments by this group. The approach of the British Stabilization Unit also fits in with the idea that politics is an indispensable instrument in peacebuilding and building capacity of state actors. In addition, in going back to the development process, it emphasizes that there is a nexus between security and development that is inescapable and needs to be reiterated and worked so that every process is effectively perennial and sustainable after the withdrawal of international actors. It should be noted that in all the stabilization initiatives implemented so far, the external forces and the civilian contingent have not yet been withdrawn, which raises questions about the effectiveness of the actions implemented so far (STABILIZATION UNIT, 2012). In relation to the French model, he approaches that the confrontation of violence is the central movement to deal with the dysfunctionalities that the State is experiencing. From overcoming violent confrontations, there is room for the institutional reconstruction process to progress and gradually stabilize the target state (MINISTÉRE DE LA DEFENSE, 2010). These stabilization approaches that influence the decision-making process in the United Nations Security Council portray the fact that there is no clear consensus among the different perceptions on the subject, and this makes the interpretations on the issue of stabilization distinct and create instability in the field (DE CONING, 2015).

8 The question is whether the current modus operandi, without the definition of concepts from decision makers, is a deliberate choice or only reflects the disagreement and unwillingness to build consensus in the midst of a growing division within the Security Council. There is no unison of analysts on the need for a stabilization concept, especially since this involves the debate about the relevance of peace operations and international action on security issues (ESTEVES, 2010; ROSLAND, SOLHJELL, 2016). Observing the behavior of the United Nations in dealing with security crises, one can perceive that at various times the indefinition of terms was an instrument of protection against the interests of more powerful states and their special voting status. Since the creation of peace operations, such conduct has been repeated and has some success (SIEGLE, 2011). The uncertainties, in many moments, were responsible for the expansion of expectations and later frustration, scratching in many cases the image of the organization. This phenomenon is repeated in relation to stabilization missions and leads to different responses in the four countries with operations with this approach. In the case of the DRC, the historical context leads to a series of peculiarities that condition the decision-making and behavior of international actors. In the next section, we will present a timeline of the crisis in CAR and the role of violence as a political instrument, from before the existence of a state to the present. Likewise, the international presence in security crises will be addressed, and the issue of stabilization and definition of the scope of action will be addressed, despite the lack of a general guideline within the United Nations. 4. The crisis in CAR and international action The spiral of violence in CAR goes back to the origin of the colonial process and runs through a whole sequence of political activities that culminated in the formation of a fragile state incapable of guaranteeing the population the minimum conditions of survival and the continuous international presence through United Nations since the end of the Cold War (KAM-KAH, 2013). Despite the waves of instability experienced by the population of the Central African Republic in the midst of political breakthroughs since the late 1970s with the

9 coup that deposed Emperor Bokassa, there is no record of official communiqués or documents drawing the attention of the central organs of the United Nations until 1997. As was the case in other African crises, the European Union was the first expression of concern about the escalation of violence in the country on 15 January 1997. The document addresses the crisis in the FACA (CAR s Armed Forces) sectors that had taken place in the previous year and suggests a concern for the continuity of the democratic process initiated with the election of President Angé-Felix Patassé at the end of 1993. This is also the first official information circulating within the United Nations on the involvement of regional actors (International Mediation Committee, composed of Gabon, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mali) in the mediation of the crisis. In less than two weeks, the Bangui Accords were signed, which envisaged the cessation of hostilities between the government and the opposition along with the mutinous sectors of the FACA, a government reform to include members of the opposition, creating a National Union Government, a national dialogue aimed at implementing a reconciliation process, as well as strengthening democracy in the country. Another result of the agreements was the creation of the 800-troops Inter-African Monitoring Mission to Implement the Bangui Accords (MISAB), funded by the French government and which began operations in February. In July 1997 the Gabonese government went to the Security Council to report the deterioration in security conditions in the CAR, with a significant increase in the risks to the population and threat to regional stability. In its request, the central element was the authorization to act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with the consent to use all available means for the fulfillment of its mandate, which was approved by the Security Council on Resolution 1125. In January 1998, the Secretary-General reports to the Security Council on the few advances in security in the CAR and its concern about the electoral process scheduled for September, but which would only be carried out the following year. According to Kofi Annan, MISAB's viability conditions were restricted given the low funding capacity of the contributing countries and the reduction of direct French involvement. This movement reflected the pressure of the French foreign ministry to send a UN peacekeeping mission to the CAR and the political and economic costs to be diluted among the member states. In the midst of this movement, MISAB members report that with the withdrawal of the French troops who were in CAR, logistical issues would become more complex and that from April 15th it would be difficult to keep the mission in operation. The

10 response of the Secretary-General was to prepare the ground in the Council for a UN mission to replace MISAB and to promote the stabilization of the RCA in security terms while ensuring that the electoral process would be carried out. Annan's estimates spoke of 1,400 troops and 440 civilians (election observers, police, planning and logistics staff, etc.) at a cost of just over $ 70 million over nine months. From then on, the countries involved began a campaign for the creation of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), with correspondence from CAR and Gabon, as well as the Secretary General. Patassé submits to the Council documents referring to a National Reconciliation Pact signed by representatives of various institutions of the Central African state and which would demand security support and success in the elections in order to have any chance of success. Kofi Annan reports on timid progress in implementing the Bangui Accords, especially as regards the conditions for holding the elections. At the same time, appoints his Special Representative for CAR, Nigerian diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji, who would lead the UN mission after Council approval. 4.1 MINURCA and the 1999 election In March 1998, the Security Council adopted resolution 1159 and created MINURCA, defining its military contingent in 1350 troops and defining its initial duration in three months, but making it clear that according to a report to be presented by Annan until June the possibility of extension of the mission is real. MINURCA's initial mandate was to maintain security and stability in the country, support national security forces in protecting Bangui infrastructures, support the conduct of the electoral process and coordinate international police training efforts (UNITED NATIONS, 1998). Although one of the main security problems in the CAR is related to the ethnization of the armed forces that occurred during the Kolingba government and the lack of payments to civil servants, almost all the operation is concentrated in the capital of the country, disregarding the difficulties in regions further away, such as Birao and Bossangoa. Nonetheless, the mission reports point to a less hostile climate in the relationship between government, opposition and armed forces from the outset of Pact activities, at least in Bangui.

11 The core of MINURCA's activities was in the elections because virtually all the topics addressed by the Secretary-General in his report dealt with the electoral process, except for the budget issue and the security issue, both connected by the need to expand the military contingent to ensure a less tense climate in the interior of the country. One of the possibilities is that part of this contingent is part of the FACA and serves as a starting point for the restructuring of the army with greater balance in terms of ethnicity and effectively Republican stance. With regard to the budget, financing problems were notorious even to bear the costs of the elections, which cut the initial estimate by 25% because of the low international donor membership. With the legislative elections taking place in November 1998, measures to restructure the Presidential Guard lost strength along with other points that had been agreed with the opposition and MINURCA. The focus of everyone in the country turned to the lawsuit and the balance in terms of security was positive, without significant occurrences or even accusations among political leaders. The economic issue, however, had regressed with local institutions failing to meet the parameters set by the IMF and the World Bank for lending. Kofi Annan reports on his Special Representative's involvement as an element of pressure for the government to move ahead with reforms to open up the exploration of diamond mines. Despite some incidents involving Chadians and Central Africans in June 1999, the situation in RCA walked in relative calm until the presidential election of September of the same year. The biggest source of external risk came from the conflict in the DRC and the refugee movement. Internally, the suspension of the movements of demobilization of the Presidential Guard indicated problems for the future. 4.2 The growing crisis With the holding of the presidential election in September, MINURCA began its demobilization process. In February 2000, its activities were closed despite requests from Central African leaders for the mission to continue until at least December. In order to support the government in the process of consolidating peace and reconciliation, the United Nations Office for Peacebuilding (BONUCA) was established, which would take on the responsibilities left by MINURCA, in particular to support the strengthening of democracy and mechanisms for dialogue. The timing was timely since not all the opponents accepted the victory of Patassé and the president had governed without

12 considering the parliament, dominated by the opposition. The main limit for BONUCA was that it could not count on a military contingent, which charged its price in terms of instability and escalation of crime and violence. In the midst of the crisis due to the continued inability to pay for the troops and the servants, Patassé was the target of a coup attempt by General Bozizé, who was backed by Libyan forces who assisted the president. The balance, however, was a bloodbath and a significant contingent of displaced by the clashes in Bangui. For BONUCA there was nothing to do, just to observe, try to mediate and report to the Security Council. Even without much resources, BONUCA's boss negotiated an agreement with Patassé and Bozizé, but the president raped him and attacked the pro-bozizé troops by creating a split in the FACA amid the General's escape to Chad and a wave of desertions. With the crisis transcending the borders of the RCA, Patassé asks for troops to CEN-SAD and CEMAC, but this does not prevent that in March of 2003 Bozizé can get Bangui and give Patassé. In the midst of all the turmoil BONUCA could do nothing. With General Bozizé in power, the movement of the UN Office in Bangui focused on ensuring that the 2005 elections were held, which eventually took place, despite the ban on Patassé being able to take part in the election. Even victorious in the elections, Bozizé was targeted by rebel groups and began a national dialogue amid escalating tensions in the north of the country with the displacement of Sudanese refugees fleeing the crisis in Darfur. From then on, the Security Council approved the creation of MINURCAT on September 25, 2007, but the mission was aimed specifically at Chad, operating only at the northern end of the RCA in the Vakaga region. Their performance is a failure, with the mission being operated with less than 20% of the contingent planned and having difficulties to defend their positions in the north of the RCA. Its closure in 2010 comes amid growing instability in the region and the harbinger of yet another source of conflict in the already troubled Central African political dynamics. If MINURCAT is of minimal relevance to political dynamics, Bozizé's political movements point in the direction of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), with its application for membership in June 2008. For RCA it was a way of legitimating internationally the dialogue and focus donors' attention on the political breakthroughs made in the midst of the continuing payment crisis. The Commission has developed a strategic framework and identified three key elements for peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform (SSR), including Disarmament, Demobilization and

13 Reintegration (DDR); Governance and rule of law; and the resumption of development poles. In general terms, the first item had been under pressure from MINURCA until 2000 without great success especially in relation to the Presidential Guard. The DDR had moved forward with MISAB and remained at significant levels with the UN mission, but with the end of the peace operation and the clashes and coups there was an influx of weapons into the country. The second priority was the broader one, involving issues of promotion of Human Rights, Promotion of Democracy, Reform of the State Structure with a focus on the decentralization of decision-making processes and the fight against corruption. It was an agenda that followed a model of UN action in post-conflict countries. The expectation of a link with the PBC and its peacebuilding strategy from the results of the national dialogue will be short-lived as Bozizé leaves the entire debate agenda to focus on the 2011 electoral process. As a result, the initiatives planned by the Commission of Peacebuilding are stagnating or even receding, as in the case of DDR and SSR. The Secretary-General's response was to transform BONUCA into an Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office (BINUCA), placing all UN agencies working in a coordinated manner and expanding their mandate to work more directly with the PBC. Despite expectations, he still lacked the resources and political will to work with Bozizé to persuade him to advance the peacebuilding agenda. In looking at all the issues addressed as central to a culture of peace and stability in the CAR, the PBC was always emphatic in giving the Central African government responsibility for practical action and building a bond, society was imbued with belonging to a project that was not really his. With no breakthrough in interaction with the Peacebuilding Commission, the next step is the election. Bozizé's victory in 2011 is marked by several allegations of fraud, but nothing that prevents the president from continuing in power. Parallel to political instability, an explosion of violence from the north begins to hit every country on its way to Bangui. Despite the presence of troops of African partners, the Seleka rebels, working together with Chadian and Sudanese supporters, undertook an aggressive, violent campaign marked by looting. In 2013, Bozizé is overthrown and Djotodia, a leading Seleka leader, takes power amid chaos in the country. Without consensus on the terms of action, the Security Council seeks support from the European Union without success. The French volunteer for a mission in December

14 2013. Their action turns to combat Seleka, ignoring the mobilization of Christian militias, the Anti-Balaka. The result is a confrontation that astonishes the French because of the difficulties they face and leads to a restructuring of the African forces that were in the RCA supporting the French under the auspices of the CEMAC and are incorporated by the African Union and enlarged, creating the MISCA after authorization of the Security Council. With a larger contingent in the field, French and AU negotiators persuade President Djotodia to resign. In the face of the critical scenario, the Security Council imposes an arms embargo following Resolution 2127, approved on December 5, throughout the territory of the CAR, likewise imposed a ban on the departure of a group of people involved in the crisis and has frozen the assets of people and companies linked to the scale of violence in the CAR. Even with the fall of Djotodia, the wave of violence intensifies with bloody fighting between Seleka, dissidents, Anti-Balaka militias and international forces. It is only in April that the Security Council reaches consensus for the creation of the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of the CAR (MINUSCA), through Resolution 2149, which will incorporate the MISCA troops and assume the responsibilities of BINUCA. The French forces continue in the country working together with MINUSCA. 5. MINUSCA and the stabilization in the CAR In an environment of total instability, the beginning of MINUSCA's actions is marked by the adoption of a very broad mandate, which provides for assignments such as the protection of civilians, support for national reconciliation and transitional justice, creation of a safe environment for the provision of humanitarian aid, SSR, DDR and DDRR, promotion and protection of Human Rights, and coping with exploitation and trafficking of natural resources. In addition, the Council called for the capture of perpetrators of human rights violations and the creation of a Special Criminal Court to try those responsible for the carnage that has plagued the country since Bozizé came to power until the fall of Djotodia. One of the major challenges of CAR was the political transition. The choice by Catherine Samba-Panza to lead the resumption of the Central African state was with optimism in international political hopes, manifested even by Secretary-General Moon. The terms for MINUSCA's activities also go through the Bangui Forum, held in May

15 2015 and which had two documents as a result of the discussions: the National Republican Pact and the DDR / R Agreement. The electoral process that ended with the victory of Faustin Touadera was relatively calm but was not able to end the spiral of violence that plagues the country since 2013 and goes back to the ethnic-religious disputes provoked by the political use of the divisions of the center- African Amid the political developments, stabilization priorities were defined in 2015 and remained the benchmark after the transition. What is discussed below is the definition of the scope of stabilization and the issue of protection of civilians amid continuing violence and the role of MINUSCA in both dimensions. 5.1 Priorities in CAR s Stabilization Plan The main formal policy instrument prepared by the government on stabilization was launched in October 2015. It is a document in partnership with the United Nations, mapping the immediate priorities for stabilization, peacebuilding and reconciliation in the country. As was the case at the beginning of the stabilization actions in the DRC, there is no clear and objective definition of what institutions mean by stabilization. The Priority Plan defines three areas in order of priority: Security, DDR and SSR; Justice and Reconciliation; and Decentralized State Authority and Economic Development. Regarding the first priority, it is pertinent to state that the MINUSCA interface with the government focuses on the issue of security, especially the protection of civilians, and support for DDR and SSR projects. Regarding security sector reform, the actions adopted so far refer to initiatives initiated in the Bozizé period when eight priority areas were defined: National Defense; Internal security; Judicial Administration; Territorial Administration; Finance and Customs; Democratic Control; Intelligence and DDR. The move to the transitional government and later the new democratic regime initially limited the participation of international partners in the meetings of the thematic working groups on DDR and SSR at the outset, largely due to the adequacy and redefinition of the members of the groups and committees. MINUSCA's role has been to advise and coordinate military cooperation with international partners. In the more operational dimension, work with UNDP resulted in the implementation of people management systems and the reform of physical structures in the security sector. In coming to the public presenting its demands on SSR, the Central African government stressed that reform is essential as it is part of restoring the rule of law and

16 public security. One of the central elements for strategic reform is the development of a national evaluation process developed in accordance with international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. The infrastructures phase will include the reconstruction of police stations and gendarmerie in priority areas such as Bangui, Bimbo and Berbérati, as well as the recovery of FACA training centers and centers. These efforts will support the eventual redistribution of the security and defense forces to protect the territorial integrity of the CAR and its nationals. As the local government has defined, the idea for the future of national security forces in the CAR is that they will remain a prominent political element and will be at the center of stabilization and reconciliation. Long-term SSR initiatives are expected to emerge from an inclusive national political dialogue supported by the international community. Also in accordance with the Priorities Plan, the formulation and implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR), and Repatriation (DDRR) programs, as well as the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) actions are central elements in the stabilization strategy of the Central African Republic. The "Agreement on the principles of DDR / R and integration", signed at the Bangui Forum, is one of the bases of the peace process and has been ignored for years by different presidents. In addition, the implementation of Community Violence Reduction programs is a critical component to the success of DDR, as tens of thousands of anti-balaka-linked fighters and other armed groups are not eligible for the national DDR program, and continue to pose a real security threat to the civilian population. The issue of community violence is a phenomenon that has intensified with the religious division surfaced in 2013 and the growing dispute over arable land and potential for mineral exploration. The parties to the agreement pledged to disarm their troops and advance the DDR. In addition, one of the items in the agreement stipulated that regrouping and disarmament could occur before DDR. Disarmament of combatants is a priority and a prerequisite for the establishment of any pre-ddr and DDR programs. In addition, the repatriation of foreign combatants became compulsory with the signing of the agreement. One of the main problems to implement a DDRR program is the lack of representativeness of the signatories of the agreement. Their influence on commanders and combatants in the field is small and this reflects the fragmented structure of these organizations, which turn out to be neither political nor military. Another constraint is donor skepticism. They have yet to agree to cover the DDR budget, estimated at 28

17 million euros. The same applies to the budget of the EU violence reduction program, estimated at 20 million, but only currently funded by the UN ( 6 million). Unable to implement the DDR, MINUSCA has created a pre-ddr that it has sought to finance, which consists of occupying the armed groups in public works projects in exchange for the storage of their weapons. Despite the realization of awareness campaigns, the effectiveness of the pre-ddr program was practically none. Another priority in the stabilization actions of the CAR is linked to facing impunity through strengthening justice and promoting reconciliation. This process was conducted in parallel between the Security Council and the Central African Government, first with the demand in Resolution 2217 to create the Special Criminal Court, only to investigate and prosecute cases concerning the wave of violence in the country since 2003 "The RCA government has shown engagement in the issue by quickly starting the implementation of the court and now initiates a campaign to raise donations to enable its operation. At the same time, reconciliation initiatives are on the agenda of the transitional government and civil society. One of the alternatives at the table is the realization of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to assess the extent of society's wounds and raise public awareness that conflicts of this magnitude will no longer occur. Complementing the reconciliation process with a more forward-looking approach, the idea of a national human rights commission was also proposed to prevent the occurrence of abuses and violations incorporating respect for human rights as a value shared by the population. The third outstanding topic is economic development and the recovery of state authority and its decentralization. Ensuring quality public services to around 4.5 million people spread across a vast country with precarious infrastructure demands a steady volume of resources and accountability. The economic crisis resulting from a conflict of this magnitude has resulted in low government revenue, reinforcing the role of international community investments as crucial to leverage the process. Such investments are necessary to recover the state machine and solve the chronic problem of workers' pay. The Government also considers it fundamental to gradually adjust the cost of its operation to the internal resources available to avoid new indebtedness and loss of solvency and credit with foreign partners. In support of this objective, the Government envisages concrete measures to improve the management of public finances. In addition to reforms, systematization and capacity building, the focus of the productive process will be on the extractive sector as

18 an important source of income and still devalued today. After a period of trade embargoes imposed by the war, the RCA may return to the international diamond trade, which will generate core revenues for the state, but which must be managed from responsible systems implemented to track production, costs and fees which will be collected by the State. Another priority given to the stabilization vision envisaged by the government from the Bangui Forum is the reduction of poverty and inequality, factors that can effectively prevent a return to violence and create the necessary basis for inclusive economic growth and social development. This imperative should lead the Government to introduce a comprehensive strategy for economic reconstruction and development. At the local level, there is a need to design, plan, implement and sustain investments that take into account the differentiated and specific needs and priorities of women, youth and poor men, with particular emphasis on breaking down barriers to women's economic opportunities and empowerment. Examples of such local investments include supporting citizen participation in determining local economic opportunities, rebuilding local economic infrastructure (eg markets, irrigation schemes, rural electrification), support for small and medium-sized enterprises: vocational training, microcredit. In addition to financial resources, it is essential to qualify a legal framework that provides security for the private sector or the state. The marginalization of segments of the population and the absence of the state is one of the roots of the conflict and explains the constant climate of conflagration in the CAR, particularly in the interior of the country. During the drafting of the Republican National Compact, there was consensus on the importance of rebuilding the social pact, establishing a vertical relationship between the state and its citizens, affirming state authority and legitimizing it through the provision of public services. At the same time, among the communities, the idea is to foster a more equitable pattern, including by stimulating local economic conditions. As such, a number of priorities have been identified to restore and expand state authority. Another central factor in empowerment is the consolidation of democracy. The RCA was able to conduct an electoral process after experiencing a period of chaos and this was possible thanks to the involvement of the population and the support of the international community. With the new constitution adopted and a new elected executive and legislature, the transition time may lead to a new phase for the Central African people.

19 Finally, with the new political regime there is a need to ensure that local and central authorities are committed to the collective interest of the population. Combined with a progressive implementation of decentralization, the purpose of the elections was to create an environment in which communities participate to determine local development priorities, and the state can be held accountable for delivering services to advance those priorities. As such, the decentralization of public administration, in an inclusive and balanced manner, will help restore minimal public services that meet the needs of the population. In addition to basic social services, restoration of state authority will include the deployment of security forces and police and gendarmerie trained and controlled in other regions beyond Bangui, with a mandate to protect the population and restore and rebuild law and order. In presenting the priorities that make up the basis for the reconstruction of the CAR, it is possible to verify that although they are embryonic elements, there are a number of limitations that go through the most effective action of MINUSCA in terms of safety and interface in relation to disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, which has occurred almost imperceptibly due to the lack of definition about the structuring of DDR and SSR programs. 5.2 MINUSCA and the civilian protection As shown by Council resolutions and the Secretary-General's reports, the protection of civilians in response to serious threats of physical violence was the highest priority for MINUSCA. To this end, actions are coordinated with UNICEF, UNHCR and the Office Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) to identify and resolve outstanding issues. MINUSCA forces and the police continued to intensify protection efforts in priority areas and responded to several serious threats to civilians. In Bangui, police and MINUSCA forces, as part of the Joint Task Force, carried out targeted operations to protect civilians, containing the movement of armed elements. Even with the most ostentatious presence of the security apparatus, crime levels are a problem and scratch the image of MINUSCA as responsible for protecting the population. The context in which MINUSCA is implemented is perhaps the most significant obstacle to the Mission. Three elements are important in this regard: first, the extremely limited capacity of the CAR to maintain law and order and to protect civilians, particularly outside the capital; second, the motivation of non-state armed groups to perpetrate

20 targeted violence against civilians; and third, the number and geographical spread of protection threats compared to the size of MINUSCA and limited capacity to respond. According to the reports of the Panel of Experts, despite the agreement on the cessation of hostilities signed on July 23, 2014, armed groups, in particular the anti-balaka and ex-combatants of Séléka, continue to operate relatively freely in much of the country and commit atrocities against civilian populations. The main allegations of human rights violations brought to the attention of independent observers include violations of the right to life, acts of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary arrests, rape, assault and racketeering and violations of the right to education, right to health, and right The feeding. Taking advantage of the limited state presence, armed groups exercise de facto authority and pillaging the country's natural resources. The conflict exacerbated intercommunal violence. The anti-balaka and ex-séléka continue to intimidate, threaten and attack individuals and local communities because of their supposed collaboration or affiliation with the rival armed group. These abuses have intensified with the displacements of Fulani pastors and in the context of conflicts over access to land and water resources. The recurrent persecution of the Fulani by the belligerent groups led MINUSCA and its humanitarian partners to seek from the transitional government the relaxation of the restriction of displacement in the Central African territory. With the release, dozens of Fulani were voluntarily allocated on the border with Cameroon. The most serious incidents were attributed to anti-balakas fighters. As in many cases in such conflicts, clashes at Bria began with the murder of a man suspected of being a former combatant Séléka, he was killed by an angry crowd who accused him of throwing a bomb in a crowded commercial area. The incident has degenerated into a series of attacks and counter-attacks, in which 11 civilians were killed and hundreds injured, including members of the Christian and Muslim communities. The clashes also led to the displacement of more than 7,000 civilians in the largest area of Bangui, with robberies and the burning of dozens of homes and shops. Humanitarian workers and their equipment were also targeted by attacks and looting, as well as ambushes against members of MINUSCA. In the territory under their control, the former Séléka fighters occupied administrative buildings and exercise de facto authority. Internal power struggles and lack of cohesion and discipline have led to new clashes between factions, which have seriously affected the civilian population. According to Em Bria, for example, the security situation