The Presence of the Persian Gulf Monarchies in the Horn of Africa Cecília Maieron Pereira1 Rodrigo dos Santos Cassel 2 Vitória Kramer de Oliveira 3 After September 11, 2001, the Horn of Africa became the scene of a new process of securitization, carried out by the establishment of extra-regional military bases in the coastal states. The Persian Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, expand their zone of influence to the African Horn, motivated by strategic and pragmatic interests. The securitization of the region is directly related to maritime safety in the Strait of Bab el-mandeb, where freedom of navigation is threatened by the action of non-state armed groups. Presentation The strategic location of the Horn of Africa (separated from the Arabian Peninsula only by the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, a relevant maritime route for international trade) has historically led to the interference of external agents in regional dynamics. During the Cold War, both superpowers remained present in the Horn, which enhanced intra-regional rivalries. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, were not the only extra-regional players to expand their zone of influence to that region. The Persian Gulf monarchies especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also joined the scenario in the twentieth century. Although the end of the Cold War represented a strategic drain on the region, securitization resumed after September 11, when several counter-terrorism initiatives became part of the external agenda for the Horn of Africa, especially the Global War On Terrorism, promoted by the US authorities. Such a movement was not restricted to the United States. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies, along with other extra-regional actors such as China in 2017 have also expanded their projection towards the African continent throughout the 21st century and more specifically, to the Horn of Africa. Military bases were established in the local states Djibouti and Eritrea being the most prominent and there was also strong economic-financial cooperation with such nations. The current bulletin will therefore seek to analyze the reasons that led to a new wave of securitization in the region, with particular attention to the dynamics surrounding the conflict in Yemen (2015) separated from the Horn of 1 Master candidate in Political Science at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Research Assistant at the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA). E-mail: cecilia_maieron@hotmail.com. 2 Undergraduate student in International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Research Assistant at the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA). E-mail: rodrigosantoscassel@gmail.com 3 Undergraduate student in International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Research Assistant at the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA). E-mail: vitoriakramer@gmail.com 91
Africa by the Gulf of Aden, which has made Horn States become logistical-strategic bases for Saudi coalition operations. Another sensitive point for the safety of the African Horn is the American presence in the region. The United States, worn out after the end of its rivalry with the Soviet bloc, has considerably diminished its preoccupations with Africa, which had hitherto been considered fundamental to the consolidation of the US sphere of influence in the Third World from a strategic point of view. The region only resumed its importance in the eyes of the United States from the beginning of the 21st century, especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when many anti-terrorist initiatives were launched by the government of George W. Bush (Cardoso 2016). Historical Contextualization: the securitization of the Horn of Africa In the post-cold War period, Northeastern Africa experienced a period of strategic reconfiguration, marked by the creation of new states (Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011) and the presence of extra-regional powers, notably the United States. These processes are milestones for the redefinition of the Horn s strategic importance, since they inaugurate new security dynamics and also challenge the power configuration of the region (Cardoso 2016). The American presence in the Horn was justified by the rhetoric of the War on Terror, which was active in combating Al Qaeda forces and other suspicious parastatal groups located in the Middle East4. It was in this context that the Horn countries again received greater attention from the United States, as the region was of great strategic value and provided a significant foothold to US troops. Examples of the strength of the US presence were the construction of a military base in Djibouti (Camp Lemonnier) and the consequent establishment of a counterterrorism network in the same place, known as the Combined Joint Horn Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Thus, the necessary tools were created to secure North American strategic interests on the continent and maintain key regimes in power (leading oil exporters, Kenya and Ethiopia) through the sale of arms and training of their armed forces (Cardoso 2016, 159). First, it is worth noting that the vacuum of power left by Russian and American disinterest in the immediate post-cold War era was an important factor in determining regional security dynamics. In this context, the creation of the Eritrean state marked the beginning of the rivalries between the new country and its neighbor, Ethiopia, due to the disagreements about limiting borders. Tensions culminated in a war between the two countries, in 1998, when Eritrean forces occupied the town of Badme (Ethiopia), which was now disputed by both countries. In 2000, Eritrea was defeated and the Algiers Peace Agreement was established; and in 2002 EEBC (Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission) ruled that the disputed region would be held by Eritrea. But the impasse and tensions continue in the region, as Ethiopia does not recognize the Commission s decision and Eritrea refuses to open a negotiation dialogue (Cardoso 2016). From this moment, the securitization of the Horn became more evident. This is because not only did the US presence influence the political dynamics in 92
the region, but also because the very configuration of power and security among the African countries began to be modified. Although the Task Force had been heavily criticized by most of the continent s states, there were countries seeking to benefit from the US presence in the region, as was the case in Sudan. Khartoum has become an important ally of Washington in the fight against terrorism, since it used its state apparatus to offer privileged information to the White House (Cardoso 2016). Also, with the strengthening of relations with the United States and the implementation of transnational programs to combat terrorism, all Horn countries have benefited to some extent from the inaugural security strategies. What happened was the appropriation of this security agenda, to a greater or lesser extent, by the political frameworks of the States, making internal issues come to be seen through an approach that involved the resignification of national and regional dynamics (Fisher and Anderson 2015). As a clear example of this scenario, there is the case of Ethiopia, which began to criminalize several of government opposition groups as of its classification as terrorist entities (Cardoso 2016) (Figure 1 of the Appendix). to these states, the Persian Gulf monarchies have also begun to expand their strategic zone to encompass the Horn of Africa, a process which has its own motivations and implications, which will be described below. The Persian Gulf Monarchies and the Expansion of the Zone of Influence to Africa Concurrently with the securitization of the African Horn, another significant process occurred: the emergence of Gulf monarchies as influential actors in regions beyond the Arabian Peninsula. In particular, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) form a set of states with common characteristics, namely: abundant hydrocarbon reserves, high per capita income, religious homogeneity and, in the political sphere, governments led by emirs or monarchs. The group s political and economic relevance is already experienced on a number of fronts, such as increasing its share of funding for global humanitarian actions (1% of the global total in 2000 to 7% in 2014), as well as in establishing Dubai as a global investment focus. Added to this is the need for Gulf monarchies to adapt to the new power dynamics in the international system such as the emergence of China by making existing dependence on the United States of America being reconsidered by States (Shiferaw 2016). Thus, it can be affirmed that the American presence in the Horn implied in the insertion of new variables for the understanding of regional power dynamics. The intensification of the spillover effect shows that the securitization movement brought by the War on Terror is responsible for a large part of the new tensions in the region (Abdi 2017). But it is deceived who only observes the intensification of the American presence in the region. Several other nations, such as China, in 2017, and Japan, previously, also came to form the set of nations present in the Horn of Africa. In addition In view of the situation presented above, it is therefore concluded that the Gulf countries have sought to take a more active role in interregional affairs. Such a position necessarily involves the establishment of new political-economic partnerships in order to ensure the defense of national interests in strategic areas. Among the 93
regions covered by this expansion in the agenda of the Persian Gulf monarchies in particular, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates the African continent stands out as one of the main fronts. Although the presence was already relevant in North Africa much of it due to the identity-sharing between the Middle East and the subregion the move towards sub-saharan Africa (SSA) is relatively recent (Shiferaw 2016). of Africa strategic to the Persian Gulf Monarchies; and (ii) what has been done in order to materialize, in practice, such interest in the region? The Strategic Importance of the Horn of Africa The answer to both questions is directly related to the dynamics surrounding maritime safety in the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Located between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, this strait is one of the most navigated sea routes in the world, as it connects the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. On the one hand, it is bordered by Yemen, a country that has been facing a civil war since 2015, and, on the other hand, is bordered by Djibouti and Eritrea, whose conflictive relationship has been going on for decades. Because of its strategic importance, Bab-el-Mandeb is a passage that, along with the Suez Canal, allows transit between the Asian and European continents without the need to go around the Cape of Good Hope. Moreover, in practice, the strait accounts for about 14% of global trade and is therefore essential for the energy security of several states, including the Persian Gulf monarchies (Rosen 2015) (Figure 2 of the Appendix). In addition to economic cooperation and investment in SSA, the Gulf States more and more increase their participation in the Peace and Security mechanisms of the African continent, sometimes through institutional interaction between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the African Union (AU), and other times through bilateral securitysector partnerships between African nations and the monarchies. As an example for this scenario, the pacification carried out by Qatar in border disputes between Djibouti and Eritrea, in which the country promotes mediation and offers financial subsidies for both parties to reach a common agreement is evident (União Africana 2013). In practical and strategic terms, beyond the interest of expanding their zones of influence and their political-economic partners, the objective of the monarchies is moved by quite obvious rationalities. Among them is the neutralization and the fight against Iran, which allegedly aims to establish alliances with African nations in order to jeopardize the energy supply and freedom of navigation as in the Suez Canal of their neighbors of the Persian Gulf. In addition, it is undeniable that there is a particular interest in a specific sub-region: the Horn of Africa. The section below will therefore seek to answer the following questions: (i) why is the Horn Its strategic relevance is evident. Persian Gulf monarchies note the need to ensure free shipping in the Strait to ensure the transport of their exports to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, for example, more than 90% of their income from the macroeconomic aggregate comes from oil exports. As for extra-regional powers, the Strait s relevance is also present, both in economic and military terms. Economically, it is the main sea route that carries crude oil from the Middle East to Western 94
European markets, and is also an important passage of Chinese products that are directed towards the West. The military presence of extraregional powers in the region, on the other hand, is also driven by clear interests: the United States, for example, with other countries, such as France, aim at the militarization of coastal nations in order to maintain the Strait s maritime patrol and the consequent freedom of navigation. It is noteworthy that, for the United States, the area is fundamental to the performance of its Fifth Naval Fleet, which patrols the West Indian Ocean sector (Al-Yadoomi 1991). ground for the rise of political extremism and terrorism, among other sectarian issues, which led to the outbreak of a civil war in 2015. At the time, Houthi rebel forces deposed Sunni President Abd Mansur Hadi and quickly seized control of various areas of the country. It is also worth noting that there are allegations that Houthi forces serve as proxies of Iran. According to Cordesman (2016), the rebels, allegedly instrumentalized by Iran, could use naval and air force in Yemen and its islands in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, potentially capable of destabilizing navigation across the Straits. For Iran, which has significant access to the Persian Gulf and has naval forces in the Red Sea since 2011, In addition to such strategic relevance, the access to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait further extends militarization of the Strait and its surroundings its power over maritime routes crucial for global the Horn of Africa is also motivated by the combat trade and energy security (CIMSEC 2017). of threats. There are two factors that promote the greater destabilization of Bab-el-Mandeb, namely: In October 2016, for example, a ship carrying (i) the activity of Somali pirates5 in the Horn of civilians and medicines belonging to the United Africa and the Gulf of Aden; and (ii) the current Civil Arab Emirates was attacked by the Houthi forces War in Yemen. If the former is directly related to in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait (BBC 2016). Despite the sacking and attacking of specific ships without the deaths of civilians, the attacks on vessels a complete interruption of maritime flows, the continued on this maritime crossing. Some time second concerns mainly the threat of a possible later, USS Mason, an American ship, had to be used blockade of the Strait, compromising the freedom to prevent the missile attack on North American of navigation and consequently the global supply fleets (LaGrone 2017). manufactured goods, commodities and energy. Both factors, therefore, put pressure on the area Feeling directly threatened by the Iranian presence to be further securitized and militarized, including in the Red Sea and by the rebels activity, other Arab through the establishment of military bases in the nations, led by Saudi Arabia, formed a coalition States that make up the Horn. mostly composed of petromonarchies in order to support the Hadi government and militarily combat Although the pirate threat is relevant today, the the rebels. As a strategic objective, one can observe destabilizing factor that most affects the region the protection of free access to the three most is by far the Yemeni conflict. In general terms, important Red Sea pipelines, as well as the free the situation in Yemen is the result of political navigation of ships towards the Suez Canal and the and religious divisions that have generated fertile Mediterranean Sea. In addition, a maritime force 95
states could use their territory to establish military bases. In contrast, a number of benefits were granted to the African nation, such as a 30-year agreement on loans between Eritrea and the United Arab Emirates, as well as supply of fuel for Asmara, modernization of the international airport and new infrastructure projects in the country. In October 2017, the UAE already used the Eritrean port of Assab as a naval base for their armed forces, as well as a site for troop training and for logistic supply of military equipment used by the Saudi coalition in the Yemen Civil War. In addition, the UAE is still seeking to establish another military base at the port of Berbera, Somaliland, which would be used for naval and air operations. Finally, in December 2016, Djibouti Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf announced a Saudi military base in the country, which he said should open soon (Alghoul 2016). At the same time, a unique situation also emerges: Horn States, such as Eritrea and Sudan for example, contribute with troops to the Saudi coalition in Yemen. Shiferaw (2016) states that, in addition to lending its ports and airports, Eritrea contributes with 400 troops to Yemeni operations, while Sudan lends approximately 350-700 soldiers to fight the Houthi rebels. comprising 32 countries was recently established to ensure naval transport in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait (Badam 2017). This force has the function of watching and guaranteeing the passage of ships, as well as trying to avoid attacks on them. Other extra-regional actors, equally dismayed at Bab-el-Mandeb s navigation safety, end up militarizing the African Horn coastal nations, especially Djibouti, where new military bases are set up mainly by Saudi Arabia beyond the already established American, French and Japanese bases. China has recently completed the installation of its first military base outside its territory in Djibouti (AlJazeera 2017). Thus, the Chinese guarantee once again their presence in an important trade route of the world. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa Besides the traditional extra-regional actors, the Horn of Africa has been attracting the interest of the Persian Gulf monarchies, as mentioned above. Nowadays, it is said that there is a Pivot to the Horn by the petromonarchies, resembling the American policy of Pivot to Asia. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are mainly seeking to expand their influence in the region, especially in Djibouti, Eritrea and the unrecognized territory of Somaliland. As already mentioned, the main threats that lead to this expansion to the Horn are: instability in Yemen, threats to freedom of navigation and piracy (Ardemagni 2017). Final Remarks These new external engagements with the Horn of Africa end up entailing new dynamics, which affect interregional relations. The most relevant case is that of Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, which are directly impacted by the relationship of extraregional actors. For a long time, and by In 2015, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki and Ethiopian initiative, the Eritrean state remained Saudi King Salman met to establish cooperative isolated in the international system, sometimes ties, culminating in Eritrea accepting that Gulf even being credited with the title of North Korea 96
of Africa. However, within the context evidenced throughout the article, it is seen that the country is establishing ties of cooperation with new actors. In terms of diplomatic gains, it is possible to analyze that Eritrea has been receiving political support from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Yemeni government. In addition, the improved relations between the country and post-mubarak and post-morsi Egypt is a source of concern for Ethiopian authorities, who see Eritrean isolation threatened (Shiferaw 2016). In general terms, it is possible to indicate that the extra-regional presence in the Horn of Africa has the potential to catalyze and alter the nature of existing local rivalries while favoring one state over another in order to take advantage of its territory, natural resources and human capital mainly for activities involving military operations. Exchange relations are pragmatic and, to a certain extent, they remain similar in different cases: external actors usually provide financial assistance, commitments to modernize the local armed forces, and promises to improve national infrastructure in order to receive in exchange either soldiers for operations in conflict situations, or territory for the establishment of military bases. This movement, although already practiced by western powers, is now also carried out by the Persian Gulf monarchies, which, eager for power projection, enter the dynamics of the Horn of Africa. 97
Appendix Image 1: Extra-regional Military Bases in the Horn of Africa Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2017). Image 2: the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb Source: Google Earth. Notes 4 With the publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS), also known as the Bush Doctrine, in September 2002, the US macro-securitization was formally launched in various parts of the world through the so-called Global War on Terror (GWoT). In this document, the United States recognized non-state actors as important enemies and weak states as dangerous (Cardoso 2016, 157). 5 Being non-state actors, pirates represent a diffuse and uncontrolled threat to the shipping lanes of all sovereign nations. Specifically in the Gulf of Aden area, as a crossroads for trade on all continents, the incidents ranges from the hijacking of a US 98
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