UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Laying transoceanic cables on Africa s shores: a Neo-gramscian study Derbe, S.T. Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Derbe, S. T. (2010). Laying transoceanic cables on Africa s shores: a Neo-gramscian study General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (http://dare.uva.nl) Download date: 11 Mar 2019
Chapter One: Theoretical Framework The purpose of this chapter is to lay down the theoretical framework adopted for the study of the subject matter of this dissertation. The first section highlights the ontological and epistemological assumptions of Neo-Gramscian theory of international political economy. In the next section, the theories on the relationship between technology and social change are explicated. Finally, the specific strand of Neo-Gramscian theory used in this study shall be explained. Neo-Gramscian Theory of Political Economy Neo-Gramscian theory of political economy was first formulated by Cox as a critique of the existing theoretical traditions in the field of international relations (1981, 1983, 1996). Subsequent works based on this theory have further elaborated Cox s interlocution rather than the original works of Gramsci himself (Bieler & Morton, 2004). According to Worth (2008), therefore, Neo-Gramscian theory is more Coxian than Gramscian in that sense. Theories of (neo) realism and liberal pluralism, it is contended, have an essentialist and ahistorical view of the world. Neo-liberalism postulates that human beings are essentially power maximizers, while realism assumes that states are driven by national interest. An analysis premised on these abstract assumptions is likely to have a problemsolving concern. In other words, its findings can only be useful to maintain the system (Cox, 1981). Neo-Gramscian theorists distinguish their approach from some strands of (neo) Marxist approaches as well. The latter 19
are rejected for setting down an objective law of history in which progressive social change mechanically follows from economic development (Cox, 1981, p.89). Neo-Gramscian theory aspires to introduce a comprehensive ontological, epistemological and methodological critique of these theories. Ontologically, Neo- Gramscian theorists placed social forces or classes as the major protagonists in the international arena. According to Overbeek (2004), the national-international dichotomy that is essential to international relations should be rethought in terms of the dynamics of social relations. Social forces or classes, therefore, primarily shape the form of the state and interstate relations. The specific question, then, becomes how the relation of production that is the basis of social power in one state is extended into the world arena. The state, in this theoretical formulation, comprises the official apparatus such as the government, military and political parties as well as civil society such as church, education and media. Where civil society is penetrated and dominated by the ideology of a certain group or class, the state s goal and function (raison d état) will be conditioned by that ideology and interest. Equally, new social forces can articulate an alternative ideology in the realm of civil society in order to precipitate another raison d état. This insight is used to conceptualise a global civil society where counterhegemonic forces may be mobilised to challenge intergovernmental organisations (Cox, 1999). Neo-Gramscian theory attempts to avoid both structural determinism and voluntarism by placing equal emphasis on the changing nature of structure and the limits of possibility of change at a given historical point. In other words, in order 20
to explain both stability and change, the historicity of a given frame of action has to be demarcated. Thus, structure is understood as persistent social practice that constrains and puts pressure on agency, rather than mechanically determining its action. The relationship between structure and agency is dialectical (Gill, 1993, pp.23-25). Epistemologically, Neo-Gramscian theory rejects classical positivism, which is predicated on a subject-object duality. Theory is for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, or social class, of dominance or subordination... (Cox, 1981, p.87). Gill further asserted that theory has some strategic goal in favour of a certain interest or worldview. Therefore, when a theory claims neutrality or self-imposed restraint to describe the world accurately, its underlying ideology has to be unmasked. Mainstream economics theory is cited as an example. It claims to limit itself to the description and enumeration, with the help of mathematical tools, of the natural behaviour of consumers, demand, supply, price, etc. Such an approach, therefore, implicitly accepts and endorses the normative premise of the underlying relations of power. Yet, theory should go beyond mere expression of perspective. It is desirable for a theory to be reflexive. It has to clarify its own assumptions and origins. Still, the initial perspective is always contained in the theory. This formulation of subject-object identity leads Neo-Gramscian IR to include theory itself as part of the problematic to be studied. 21
Methodology: Historic blocs, hegemony and civil society The major feature of Neo-Gramscian theory is that it offers a historicist reading of materialism. It takes class struggle as a heuristic model for the understanding of structural change, mediated by ideology (Cox, 1996, pp.57-58). Class, in the historical materialist strand of neo- Gramscian theory, is a historical, rather than a static analytical category. It is used to explain exploitation that arises from the production process. Likewise, class consciousness arises from the particular historical context (Cox, 1981, pp.138, 143). The Gramscian methodological constructs that have been deployed for such a historicist interpretation of specific international relations issues are mainly hegemony, historic bloc, and civil society. Cox (1983) applied the concept of historic blocs to capture the dialectical relationship between economic structure and the political superstructure in different eras of world history. Where these cohere in a reciprocal relationship, then we have a hegemonic historic bloc. Hegemony is about the constitutive role of ideology and culture in maintaining social orders at state and world level (Cox, 1981; Murphy, 1998; Ritzer, 1983; Rupert, 1998). The foremost revision to the study of international relations suggested by Gramscian approaches is that coercive power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to establish dominance. In a hegemonic relationship, the dominant and subordinate social actors are engaged in an educational or opinion moulding process. The primary focus of the struggle for power is intellectual and moral leadership (Bieler & Morton, 2004). 22
The origin, content and future trend of such a historical bloc is what Neo-Gramscian studies attempt to explain. The major contributions within this theoretical framework have expounded the processes by which social forces created within particular states forge alliances with kindred classes in other states. Van der Pijl (1998) traced the emergence of liberal internationalism, state monopoly capitalism, corporate capitalism and neo-liberalism over three centuries to such a process. His thesis was that these forms of capitalism became the foundation of state in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Later, the fractions of capital that played the role of a steward in these states were also able to establish the hegemony of the national political economic configuration at a world level. Likewise, Gill (1990) depicted the hegemonic leadership of the Trilateral Commission in constructing a neo-liberal world order. The Trilateral Commission was an elite organisation comprising owners and managers of TNCs, national and international financial authorities, politicians and civil servants in most developed and developing countries. With regard to the North-South issues of international relations, the concept of passive revolution, rather than hegemony, has been more useful. This refers to a situation where the ruling class are unable to integrate the masses under a comprehensive order based on consent and coercion. As a result, the state in the periphery merely absorbs only some aspects of the model that is hegemonic at a global level. Passive revolution takes the form of either Caesarism, or trasformismo. The former refers to a balance between forces promoting and opposing the social change maintained by sheer personal power of the leader. Trasformismo refers to domestication or cooption of potentially radical ideas and subaltern groups or leaders (Cox, 1981; Morton, 2007). 23
Strands of Gramscian thought Neo-Gramscian theory has also its own schisms with far reaching implications for the foundational claims stated above. Germain and Kenny (1998) drew attention to the ambiguities of the Coxian formulation of hegemony in which structure and superstructure are combined. This observation led to a revision of Cox s proposition that idealism and economism can both be maintained in the same framework without privileging one over the other. There are three different views about this particular proposition (Macartney, 2008). The first one rejected the possibility of congruence between hegemonic ideas and material forces as a disguised endorsement of liberal pluralism or idealist accounts of historical change. According to this position, ideas must be treated as mere epiphenomena that actors can instrumentally manipulate, while the determining factor is the economic structure. The second position interprets Cox s historic structure composed of ideas, material capabilities and institutions as eclectic but grounded on historical idealism or subjectivity. It is maintained here that subjectivity is necessary to give complete form and substance to material structures (Germain, 2007, p.129). This post-marxist historical materialism treats class as just one myth that may or may not be the foundation of the material structure. The point of departure in this approach is the particular form of consciousness at a given time. 24
In direct opposition to the above, the third position interprets Cox s formulation as a Marxist historical materialism in which hegemony is presented as class dominance. Nevertheless, unlike the first position, which regards ideas as epiphenomena, this one treats them as constitutive of the material structure (Morton, 2006; Bieler & Morton, 2008). Hall elaborated this position as follows: It is possible to hold both the proposition that material interest helps to structure ideas and the proposition that position in the social structure has the tendency to influence the direction of social thought, without also arguing that material factors unequivocally determine ideology or that class position represents a guarantee that a class will have the appropriate forms of consciousness (Cited in Rupert, 1998, p.430). In other words, in a historical materialist approach, class positions are necessary but not sufficient for the analysis of any ideological formation. Ideologies can be transformed through discursive practices or political construction. As aptly summarised by Rupert, social relations of production may be understood as having some determining effects in the first instance, rather than the last (1998, p.431). This dissertation similarly takes into account that economic structure sets important limits, but the political and economic superstructure has a degree of autonomy. The implications of this proposition for the study of global information society shall be highlighted in the third section of this chapter. As the specific issue under discussion in this dissertation relates to ICTs, it is in order first to clarify the relationship between technology and society. The following section deals with the definition of technology and the contending views as to its explanatory value for social change. 25
Technology and Social Change Technology can have different meanings depending on the level of analysis. At the lowest level, it can refer to physical artifacts, such as the personal computer, the telephone, etc. But, at a higher level, technology refers to the context and knowledge that accompany use and development of such artifacts (Flew, 2002, pp.36-37; Sussman, 1997, p.19).in this study, we understand technology to refer broadly to the knowledge that underlies the artifacts and the way they can be used in society (Harvey cited in Castells, 2000b, pp.28-29; Herrera, 2003, p.575). The role of technology in social change has been analysed in the literature in terms of technological versus social determinism. For the former, technology is driven by the logic of scientific progress, or by its own autonomous logic. It is, a prime mover or independent variable that is uncaused by social factors but with a determinate impact upon society (Mackenzie, 1984). Technological determinism has been quite dominant in one or another form especially in connection with the new information and communication technologies. It is marked by the predominant role it assigns to ICTs in increasing personal freedom, empowering consumers, strengthening democracy, bridging global inequalities, etc. A subtler version is that technologies are neutral and it is up to human beings to shape their design and use (Chandler, 1995). The critics of technological determinism argue that it is a perspective based on a conception of technology as an exogenous factor to the social system. Besides, technological determinism allegedly downplays negative stories such as job 26
loss and income disparity, invasion of privacy, etc that also accompany its use (Sussman, 1997; Flew, 2003; Herrera, 2003). For instance, the various initiatives to bridge the digital gap such as African Information Society Initiative (AISI) of 1996 posit that information and knowledge ensure better provision of such human needs as health and education. Yet, the intellectual and managerial skills needed for their use and development are, unfortunately, in the hands of a few transnational corporations (Hamelink, 1997, 1999). The opposite pole in this debate is social determinism. It insists that technology is entirely determined by social and political factors and its effects are created by human interest and creativity. Social determinists emphasise that the development of particular technologies is determined by the social necessities of particular commercial or powerful groups. Some even argue that where the technology contains a potential to be used to challenge the dominant pattern of social relations, a law of suppression of radical potential operates to stop or reverse its development (Winston cited in Flew, 2003, p.57). The Political Economy tradition has generally underscored the social construction of technology. It spells out the political role played by owners and managers of large-scale corporations, the state and other players in the use and deployment of technology. Technology is regarded as a form of capital used in production processes to coordinate and control labour, or to cheapen labour power by employing unskilled and docile workers. In short, it is an instrument of profit maximisation and of class power in capitalism. Likewise, the recent emergence of digital technology is causally linked to changes in methods, instruments, and scales 27
of production in capitalism (Sussman, 1997, pp.8-9; McChesney, 1998, p.7; Simpson, 2004). It is, indeed, the case that the general course and effects of information and communication technologies take place based on the profit logic of capitalism. Nonetheless, even amidst the overarching interest and control by powerful political and economic interests, technology has also been applied for non-profits ends. Though not to be exaggerated out of proportion, the particular flexibility of the digital technologies must be mentioned in this respect. A case in point is the use of Internet for mass protests, for rural communication, for alternative media services, community health programmes, etc. However, redefining the potential use of communication technologies for non-commercial purposes requires social struggle, since the dominant forces in the world work toward its utilisation for pursuit of profit (Dawson & Foster, 1998; Golding, 1998). follows: Castells summarised the technology-society complex as Technology does not determine society. Nor does society script the course of technological change since many factors, including individual inventiveness and entrepreneurialism, intervene in the process of scientific discovery, technological innovation, and social applications, so that the final outcome depends on a complex pattern of interaction(2000b,p.5). In this study, therefore, we will regard the effects of technology as posing constraints and offering opportunities to actors. Technology can help social actors to achieve their pre-existing goals (that the prior material environment had made impossible) where it is shaped and produced in a manner conducive to their purpose and interest. It can also impose constraints on them where it is produced and shaped in a manner opposed to their purpose. 28
Thus, when technical features of a particular technology are discussed in the subsequent chapters, it is to demonstrate: "who uses it, who controls it, what it is used for, how it fits into the power structure, how widely it is distributed (Finnegan cited in Chandler, 1995, Theoretical Stances, para.6; Hamelink, 1997, 1999; O Sochuru, 2003; Padovani, 2005). The Neo-Gramscian framework adopted in this study focuses on the dialectical relationship between technoeconomic structure and the conscious action of human agency in directing change and development. Mapping a Neo-Gramscian Route for the Study of the Global Information Society The question of the relative primacy of ideas or social being seems to be central to the different paradigms in the field of international communication. Two different routes were indicated by previous Neo-Gramscian approaches to international communication research. The first route followed a culturalist (postmodern) interpretation of Gramsci for the study of international communication. The second route outlined a materialist and modernist appropriation of the Neo- Gramscian IR methodology. A shift to postmodern cultural studies Park (1998) identified the concept of the basesuperstructure relationship as the source of the two distinct approaches to mass media studies, namely: political economy and cultural studies. The political economy approach takes media as concrete forms of industrial infrastructure. It 29
describes cultural domination in terms of the monopoly of production by global media giants. According to Park, the political economy approach was pervasive in the three dominant development paradigms, namely: modernisation, dependency, and postdependency. The common emphasis of all these has been the economic disparity between the rich and the poor countries in the world. The literature on cultural imperialism is about economic domination of western media industries as the main, if not the sole, determinant of cultural dependency. This argument, therefore, assumes that audiences are passive recipients of cultural products and, consequently, totally at the mercy of global media producers. The cultural studies approach, on the other hand, questions whether cultural objects or media texts are effective in imposing the ideology of the ruling class. This shifts the focus of research to the process of construction of meaning by the audience. Then, it appears that multinational mass media companies do not have control over the construction of the text by audiences. Media products can be construed in a manner not intended by the producers of the content. Park recommends postmodern concepts such as simulation, signification, and decentring the subject to elaborate the cultural studies approach to international communication 1. 1 Signification or the social practice of meaning making is supposed to replace transmission, which was the major concern of political economic approaches, according to Park. Hence, media outputs are regarded as texts whose meaning is produced both by the writers and the readers. Simulation is also a view opposed to representation which, supposedly, was the hallmark of traditional communication approaches. Representation refers to equivalence between the sign and the real while such lack of equivalence is normally regarded as false representation. Simulation, however, implies 30
Gramsci s contribution to such a research approach is understood to be his elaboration of ideas or the superstructure as an independent variable, not derived from but shaping the economic infrastructure. In particular, his concept of hegemony can be deployed to expound multivocality or susceptibility to multiple meanings of all kinds of cultural communication. Hence, by shifting the research focus to how media content is construed by audiences, Park argues, an emancipatory politics for creation of alternative realities, meanings, and identities can be advanced. Park s reading of the literature exaggerates the dichotomy between an economistic and idealistic reading of international communication. A definition of political economy of communication necessarily addresses the relationship between the two as a more complex interface: First, it addresses the nature of the relationship of media and communication systems to the broader structure of society. In other words, it examines how media (and communication) systems and content reinforce, challenge, or influence existing class and social relations. Second, the political economy of communication looks specifically at how ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. advertising), and government policies influence media behaviour and content (McChesney, 1998, p.3). Thus, political economy and cultural studies of international communication would regard production and reception of texts as their respective points of departure, that the sign and the real are one and the same. Signs produce the real. In short, reality is not given and then represented afterwards; it is created (simulated) by signs in the first place. Decentering the subject refers to the rejection of a metanarrative based on class, gender etc. Instead, research should focus on exposing local differences that are concealed or suppressed by universal categories. Decentering aims to deny these categories their privileged central status in institutional discourse. 31
not destination. A historical materialist approach can incorporate both material and ideational aspects. More importantly, the underlying assumption of this culturalist reading of Gramsci is that culture or ideology is an independent variable. Laclau and Mouffe s (1985) poststructuralist political strategy, based on the concept of radical democracy attempted effectively to politicise social and cultural forces to replace the depoliticised labour movement. In present-day society, where dominant groups have diverse interconnections with subordinate groups, the forms of domination should differ from the forms of domination based on economic relations... From the perspective of hegemony, the multinational media industry is only one of the cultural forces vying for cultural hegemony in developing countries (Park, 1998, pp.89-91). This argument introduces a shift away from a historical materialist direction that takes economic relationship as its entry point for analysis. Its insistence on a decentred subject clearly calls for a research question and methodology more germane to a post-modernist strand of Gramscian theory. Hegemony, ideology and commercialisation of the Internet Simpson (2004), on the other hand, applied the concept of hegemony differently to explain the recent transformation of Internet as a tool for commercial exploitation. He argued that the recent development of the Internet as a lightly regulated marketplace is more a result of consensus and hegemony spearheaded by leading industrial states, infrastructure owners, service providers and users. The Internet, Simpson pointed out, was a technology largely used only by few experts and specialists before its transformation into a medium to provide and exchange multiple products. Once the potential of the technology to create 32
networks across the world was realised, capitalist forces in collaboration with governments introduced structural changes to shape the operation of the Internet for business. The commercialisation of the Internet, however, gained a hegemonic character through political agency of these actors at international institutions like the WTO, WIPO, and ICANN. While adopting the general outlines of Simpson s approach, this study attempts to further elaborate the political economic context. The relationship and differences between systemic and non-systemic conflicts in relation to Internet governance issues is also given additional emphasis. In analysing the (non)hegemonic nature of the prevailing historical structure, I critically engage with Bieler and Morton s nuanced elaboration of hegemony as class dominance, with ideas not as epiphenomenon but as integral to the material structure. This specific approach is especially suited to explicate the relationship between material production and the discourse of information society. It is equally germane to assess the real significance of international organisations in amalgamating material capabilities and ideas that constitute the hegemonic structure. 33