CISS Analysis on. Obama s Foreign Policy: An Analysis. CISS Team

Similar documents
My other good colleague here tonight is Colonel Glen Dickenson who is the Garrison Commander of our installation here in Stuttgart.

Democracy, Sovereignty and Security in Europe

US DRONE ATTACKS INSIDE PAKISTAN TERRITORY: UN CHARTER

Making the Case on National Security as Elections Approach

STRATEGIC LOGIC OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

From King Stork to King Log: America s Negative Message Overseas

American Foreign Policy After the 2008 Elections

Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy 02/12/2005

IPIS & Aleksanteri Institute Roundtable 11 April 2016 IPIS Tehran, Iran

Closed for Repairs? Rebuilding the Transatlantic Bridge. by Richard Cohen

Tuesday, 4 May 2010 in New York

It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you all to the first session of Model United Nations Conference of Besiktas Anatolian High School.

Europe s Role in Strengthening Transatlantic Security and Defense

Preparing for NATO s 2014 Summit Under the Spell of the Ukraine Crisis

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS SINCE 1945

Notes of the conference given by His Excellency Ghalib Iqbal, Ambassador of Pakistan in France February 17, 2014

FAILING EUROPE? THE PRESENT REALITY.

Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review

Triangular formations in Asia Genesis, strategies, value added and limitations

AP Comparative Government

Transatlantic Security Challenges The View from Washington. SOME THOUGHTS ON US and EUROPEAN SECURITY

The Former Soviet Union Two Decades On

Back to Basics? NATO s Summit in Warsaw. Report

Queen s Global Markets

Western Responses to the Ukraine Crisis: Policy Options

Countering Color Revolutions

2017 National Opinion Ballot

Center for Strategic & Regional Studies

Reflections on U.S. Military Policy

HIS311- March 24, The end of the Cold War is our common victory. - Mikhail Gorbachev, January 1992

NATO and the United States

Nato s continuing non-proliferation role

CHINA POLICY FOR THE NEXT U.S. ADMINISTRATION 183

RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE WEST: A NEW 9/11 FOR THE UNITED STATES

Research Report. Leiden Model United Nations 2015 ~ fresh ideas, new solutions ~

Implications of the Indo-US Growing Nuclear Nexus on the Regional Geopolitics

Challenging Multilateralism and the Liberal Order

Crisis Watch: An Assessment of Al Qaeda and Recommendations for the United Kingdom s Overseas Counter Terrorism Strategy

Position Papers MiniMUN UNSC

The EU and the special ten : deepening or widening Strategic Partnerships?

NATO Background Guide

The 'Hybrid War in Ukraine': Sampling of a 'Frontline State's Future? Discussant. Derek Fraser

U.S. Global Engagement and the Military

July/August In this issue: The Caucasian War The India USA Nuclear Agreement ULDY Lebanon Anti Imperialist March & more...

General Assembly, First Committee: Disarmament and International Security

3. Define hegemony and provide two examples of this type of internationalism.

After the Cold War. Europe and North America Section 4. Main Idea

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen Remarks Prepared for Delivery to Chinese National Defense University Beij ing, China July 13,2000

International Relations GS SCORE. Indian Foreign Relations development under PM Modi

CHAPTER 2: Historical Context and the Future of U.S. Global Power

Igor Ivanov on Iraq and the Struggle for a New World Order Dr Mark A Smith Key Points of Russian Foreign Policy Unlike the Kosovo campaign and 11 Sept

AFGHANISTAN. The Trump Plan R4+S. By Bill Conrad, LTC USA (Ret) October 6, NSF Presentation

WHY THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE IS A REAL WAR, AND HOW IT RELATES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW.

AMERICA S GLOBAL IMAGE REMAINS MORE POSITIVE THAN CHINA S BUT MANY SEE CHINA BECOMING WORLD S LEADING POWER

Strategic Intelligence Analysis Spring Russia: Reasserting Power in Regions of the Former Soviet Union

Prospects for U.S. Russian relationship during D. Trump s presidency (pre)viewed through the prism of the two countries vital national interests.

Lloyd N. Cutler Lecture on Rule of Law November 20, 2016 The Supreme Court. Law and the Use of Force: Challenges for the Next President

How the rest of the world perceives

TOPICS (India's Foreign Policy)

I think the title of this panel is somewhat misleading: it seems to imply that NATO has a clear nuclear preventive strike strategy;

Elections and Obama's Foreign Policy

The Legal Basis for Targeted Airstrikes Against Islamic State s British Citizens

Foreign and Defense Policy


Don't settle refugees in our states, Republican governors tell Obama

Sanctions in the Geopolitical Landscape

Great Powers. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, United States president Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British prime minister Winston

Chapter 6 Foreign Aid

THE WHY AND HOW OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH POTENTIAL FOES

Scott D. Sagan Stanford University Herzliya Conference, Herzliya, Israel,

Image: NATO. Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437. In association with:

Exploring Strategic Leadership of the ROK-U.S. Alliance in a Challenging Environment

Cyber War and Competition in the China-U.S. Relationship 1 James A. Lewis May 2010

Domestic policy WWI. Foreign Policy. Balance of Power

International Influence

PERSONAL INTRODUCTION

3. FACT SHEET: BRINGING THE U.S. WAR IN AFGHANISTAN TO A RESPONSIBLE END

Can Obama Restore the US Image in the Middle East?

confronting terrorism in the pursuit of power

United States Foreign Policy

MEDVEDEV S. Yury E. Fedorov BRIEFING PAPER 47, 27 November 2009

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION. SACT s remarks to National University of Public Service

Obama and the World: One Year Later

Colloquy Project May 13, 2016 UKRAINE CONFLICT. Made by William Ding & Daisy Zhu. Colloquy Project 1

American Leadership in a Global Century Commencement Address at Fort Leavenworth By Carlos Pascual 1. June 12, 2009

AJISS-Commentary. The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies IIPS RIPS THE FUKUDA DOCTRINE REVISITED.

Report. Iran's Foreign Policy Following the Nuclear Argreement and the Advent of Trump: Priorities and Future Directions.

The Cold War Notes

2009 Assessment Report 2009 International Studies GA 3: Written examination

POLITICKÉ VEDY / POLITICAL SCIENCES

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The Cold War Begins. After WWII

Madam Chairperson, Distinguished participants,

RUSSIAN INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA WAR: SOME METHODS AND FORMS TO COUNTERACT AUTHOR: DR.VOLODYMYR OGRYSKO

White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan INTRODUCTION

Russia. Dealing with an awkward partner PERSPECTIVE WASHINGTON, DC. NIELS ANNEN July 2015

U.S. foreign policy towards Russia after the Republican midterm victory in Congress

Disarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioner s View

U.S.-Russia Relations. a resource for high school and community college educators. Trust and Decision Making in the Twenty-First Century

VUS.13a. Postwar outcomes. Wars have political, economic, and social consequences.

Transcription:

CISS Analysis on Obama s Foreign Policy: An Analysis CISS Team Introduction President Obama on 28 th May 2014, in a major policy speech at West Point, the premier military academy of the US army, outlined the broad contours of US foreign policy for the coming decades. The speech included a focus on the upcoming withdrawal of US military from Afghanistan and the future role of the US in global politics. President Obama chose this occasion to defend the US foreign policy which had come under heavy criticism in recent years, both at home and abroad. The speech had two broad themes: the nature of future US engagement with the rest of the world, and placing limits on US overreach in its engagement with other countries. America has viewed itself as the global hegemon who has the sole right and responsibility to shape events around the world since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Obama has described it as US exceptionalism. In recent years, heavy military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, have considerably eroded US public opinion support for foreign wars and have strained the US militarily and financially. For this reason, when Obama had announced the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, his decisions had popular domestic support, although there was muted criticism in some quarters. It was against this back drop that Obama delivered his speech at the West Point. His words attempted to strike a balance between future US military engagements; the US role in the international system and the need to revive US economy for growth in coming years. The decision to disengage America militarily, in recent years, from various fronts has given credence to a growing perception across many regions that the US is not the power it once was. In order to reassure the US domestic audience Obama emphasized that the military might of the US was still unmatched by any other power. He recounted accomplishments of his administration; in countering terrorism and bringing an end to Iraq and Afghan wars. His speech reinforced the operating narrative that US military engagements had made the world a safer place, in spite of the tremendous military and economic losses suffered by the US. 49

Obama acknowledged the fact that the world has changed in fundamental ways in the last few decades. He emphasized that for sustaining its dominant position the US must adjust to the changing global environment. The forces of globalization such as the rise of media, expanding communications, and increasingly connected economies mean today the world is more linked together than at any other time in history. These factors are changing the dynamics underlining international politics. It is in such a world that the US has not only to lead but to lead by example. It cannot succeed by merely adapting itself to meet the new challenges. What Obama advocated is interventionism in a new form with new strategies of power projection, instead of isolationism. In other words he advocated a new form of imperialism which would sustain the US power primacy in the world. As President Obama put it: The world is changing with accelerating speed. This presents opportunity, but also new dangers. We know all too well, after 9/11, just how technology and globalization has put power once reserved for states in the hands of the individuals, raising the capacity of terrorists to do harm. Russia s aggression toward former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China s economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors. From Brazil to India, rising middle classes compete with our own, and governments seek a greater say in global forums. And even as developing nations embrace democracy and market economies, 24 hours news and pervasive social media makes it impossible to ignore sectarian conflicts, failing states and popular uprisings that might have received only passing notice a generation ago. According to President Obama the US, as the sole super-power, has the responsibility to lead the world while facing multidimensional threats. In doing so Obama broke away from the policy followed by the previous US administrations. He advocated preference for multilateralism over the use of brute military force but emphasized that the US would use military power in exceptional circumstances. Mr. Obama clearly defined redlines for use of military force by the US. First, let me repeat a principle I put forward at the outset of my presidency - the United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it - when our people are threatened; when our livelihood is at stake; or when the security of 50

our allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about whether our action is proportional, effective and just. International opinion matters. But America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life. This can be called the Obama doctrine i.e., the US will fight for its core interests and to protect its allies. Here US policy differentiates between allies and core interests. It may mean the US will use military force to protect its western European allies, but will not fight for Ukraine or Georgia. Obama, in his speech has drawn a clear line. For regional powers who are challenging US hegemony in various parts of the world the message is clear: they now know where they cannot safely push against the US interests, and areas where their actions may go unchecked. Second element of this strategy is building alliances with regional countries., This includes boosting military capabilities of the US allies; using other tools of power including economic incentives and threat of sanctions, and in extreme cases multilateral military actions to contain threats. This element of the strategy seems a throwback to the Cold War era when the US policies were designed to contain the Soviet Union. Back then the US built alliances in various regions, for example SEATO and CENTO. The regional powers were the pillars of the strategy. They were given economic, military and political support by the US in order to play a role in containment of communism in their respective regions. President Obama continues to believe that the threat of terrorism is likely to keep America preoccupied in the near future. In order to defeat terrorism, Obama outlined strategies which seem a continuation of Bush era policies. These include ongoing policies such as partnering with countries in which terrorist have hideouts, and the use of military force and covert actions to attack terrorist networks. In the speech Obama announced the expansion of such programs, and announced a $5 billion Counter-Terrorism Fund to undertake the capacity building of countries countering terrorism. The announcement during the speech that the US is substantially increasing its assistance to Syrian rebels meant that, earlier policies of restraint have been revised, and now the US will treat Syria as an imminent threat. However, on covert action and drone strikes, Obama claimed all strikes should pass a simple test: "We must not create more enemies than we take off the battlefield 51

Judging by available evidence, this policy is already a failure. In recent years civilian deaths in drone strikes have increased anti-american sentiments both in Pakistan and Yemen, where majority of drone strikes have taken place. President Obama also focused on the need to revisit the existing international financial system: After World War II, America had the wisdom to shape institutions to keep the peace and support human progress from NATO and the United Nations, to the World Bank and IMF. Though imperfect, these institutions have been a force multiplier reducing the need for unilateral American action, and increased restraint among other nations. But just as the world has changed, this architecture must change as well. Evolving these institutions to meet the demands of today must be a critical part of American leadership. When a US president calls for transforming the international financial architecture and other multilateral institutions, a deeper analysis is required. It was the US which, after Second World War, was the main architect of International multilateral security and financial institutions such as NATO, UN, IMF and World Bank. These institutions mainly served to consolidate the US power and build financial and strategic structures that promoted its influence across the globe. At certain moments in history the US has sometimes elected to bypass these institutions when they refused to support military action by the US. A case in point is invasion of Iraq. Advocating change in these institutions at this point in time means that the US no longer feels it has the ability to shape events around the world unilaterally. It seeks to deepen its engagement and role within these institutions in order to be able to better align institutional policies with the US national interests. Nonetheless, President Obama s initiative to counter Russian aggression on Crimea and Ukraine through institutional mechanisms was unsuccessful. Russia was not deterred by OSCE or NATO. It managed to achieve its original goal of annexing the Crimean Peninsula despite the US opposition and taking full advantage of divisions within European countries on the issue. The US inability to act decisively provided Russia the opportunity to behave aggressively and get away with it. Contributed by CISS Team 52